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ABSTRACT
 
Security and usability are both essentiaJ in user authentication processes. One 
of the biggest challenges facing heterogeneous organizations is providing access 
control systems, to logical as we]] as physical resources, that are both secure and 
usable. To achieve this, it is initially necessary to implement three indispensable 
components such as Identification (Who does this user claims 10 be?), Authentication 
(ls this user infact who s/he claims to he?), and Authorization (Is this user authorized 
to have the resource or service that s/he is requesling?). Inquiry particularly on user 
authentication is vital. Without authentication, a computer system often has no 
foundation for establishing if access should be granted or not. 
So far, there has been very little research on usabJe security of user 
authentication methods although a considerable body of research work has been made 
for computer security mechanisms in general other than authentication methods. 
Therefore a usable security protocol is needed for user authentication. 
My thesis is that there is an intrinsic conflict between creating systems that are 
secure and systems that are usable. But usability and security can be made synergistic 
by providing requirements and design tools with specific usable security principles 
earlier in the requirements and design phase. ln certain situations it is -possible to 
concurrently increase usability and security by revisiting design decisions that were 
made in the pasto ln other situations it is possible to align security and usability by 
changing the regulatory environment in which the computers operate. To these ends, 
this thesis's main goal is not to address usability and security after the product 
(authentication method) has been manufactured, but to make security a natural 
outcome of the requirements and design phase of the authentication method 
development life cycle. 
Keywords: user authentication, usability, computer security, access control. 
RÉSUMÉ 
L'utilisabilité et la sécurité sont des éléments crucIaux dans le processus 
d'authentification des utilisateurs. L'un des défis majeurs auquel font face les 
organisations aujourd'hui est d'offrir des systèmes d'accès aux ressources logiques 
(par exemple, une application informatique) et physiques (par exemple, un bâtiment) 
qui soient à la fois sécurisées et utilisables. Afin d'atteindre ces objectifs, il faut 
d'abord mettre en œuvre les trois composantes indispensables que sont 
l'identification (c.-à-d., définir [' identité d'un uti! isateur), l'authenti fication (c.-à-d., 
vérifier l'identité d'un uti 1isateur) et l'autorisation (c.-à-d., accorder des droits d'accès 
à un utilisateur). Plus particulièrement, la recherche en authentification de l'utilisateur 
est essentielle. Sans authentification, par exemple, des systèmes informatiques ne 
sont pas capables de vérifier si un utilisateur demandant l'accès à une ressource 
possède les droits de le faire. Bien que plusieurs travaux de recherche aient porté sur 
divers mécanismes de sécurité, très peu de recherches jusqu'à présent ont porté sur 
l'utilisabilité et la sécurité des méthodes d'authentification des utilisateurs,. Pour 
cette raison, il nous paraît nécessaire de développer un protocole d'utilisabilité et de 
sécurité pour concevoir les méthodes d'authentification des utilisateurs. La thèse 
centrale de ce travail de recherche soutient qu'il y a un conflit intrinsèque entre la 
création de systèmes qui soient sécurisés et celle de systèmes qui soient facile 
d'utilisation. Cependant, ]'utilisabilité et la sécurité peuvent être construites de 
manière synergique en uti lisant des outi ls d'analyse et de conception qu i incluent des 
principes d'utilisabilité et de sécurité dès l'étape d'Analyse et de Conception de la 
méthode d'authentification. Dans certaines situations il est possible d'améliorer 
simultanément l'utilisabilité et la sécurité en revisitant les décisions de conception 
prises dans le passé. Dans d'autres cas, il est plus avantageux d'aligner l'utilisabilité 
et la sécurité en changeant l'environnement régulateur dans lequel les ordinateurs 
opèrent. Pour cette raison, cette thèse a comme objectif principal non pas d'adresser 
l'utilisabilité et la sécurité postérieurement à la fabrication du produit final, mais de 
faire de la sécurité un résultat naturel de l'étape d'Analyse et de Conception du cycle 
de vie de la méthode d'authentification. 
Mots-clé: authentification de ['utilisateur, utilisabilité, sécurité informatique, 
contrôle d'accès. 
CHAPTER 1
 
INTRODUCTION
 
1.1 Creating Systems that are 80th Secure and Usable 
This chapter describes the research objectives and approach, the justification 
for the research, the economics of strong user authentication, and the main hypothesis 
of this research. 
AIl systems demand sorne form of user account. A user is a single entity whose 
behavior is solely identified within a computer-based system (i.e. Personal Digital 
Assistant (PDA), workstation, server login, Web sites, etc.). Individual users 
classically correspond to individual people, but they might also represent particular 
system services or resources. Most accounts are protected by an easy keyboard 
password that even a novice hacker can crack in less than 10 minutes. Once inside, 
hackers use the attacked account for a diversity of nefarious activities, such as 
launching distributed denial of service (DOS) attacks, distorting Web sites, stealing 
billing and credit card information or making counterfeit purchases. 
A new report from Penn (2008) Forrester Research shows that security 
spending is on the rise in sorne enterprises. The Cambridge, Massachusetts-based 
research firm interviewed practically 1,000 firms for its State of Enterprise IT 
Security: 2008-2009 report and found that the security segment of lnformation 
Technology (IT) budgets is expected to increase 12.6 percent in 2009, up from 7.2 
percent in 2007 and Il.7 percent in 2008. As a matter of fact even during difficult 
economic conditions, IT security remains an essential portion of business operations 
as enterprises try to preserve their current environment as well as plans for the 
implementation of novel initiatives. Security is getting a bigger portion of the IT pie, 
with the focus less on reactive vulnerability defenses and more on looking at what is 
required to protect businesses. The focus now is more on protecting the data itself 
which means information security. 
2 
Distribution of budget for new security initiatives, information security, has 
increased from 17.7 percent in 2008 to 18.5 percent in 2009. There has been a major 
shift from what was the broadly recognized state of security just a few years ago. 
Protecting the organization's information assets is the top concern facing security 
programs: data security (90 percent) is most frequently mentioned as a vital concern 
for IT security organizations, followed by application security (86 percent), and 
business continuity/disaster recovery (84 percent). Data security as weil tops the list 
of business objectives for security, with 89 percent mentioning protection of 
corporate data and 87 percent mentioning protection of persona! data as essential 
business objectives. Most of this 2008 spending on information security 
countermeasures has purchased confidentiality and integrity solutions: products like 
firewal1s to protect the information perimeter of an enterprise (or encryption), Virtual 
Private Networks (VPNs)!, and anti-virus and intrusion detection to safeguard the 
actual information. Spending on user authentication products to safely identify users 
has folJowed in the security market. Inefficient user authentication marginalizes 
perimeter security and access controls, showing vulnerabilities in the confidentiality 
and integrity areas. The growing trend toward identity theft, or employing stolen 
names, birthdays and identification numbers to perpetrate fraud, would meet firm 
resistance if strong authentication practices were universally employed. Privacy 
violations take place as weil due to compromised user authentication. Authentication 
is behind confidentiality and integrity because exactly identifying huge numbers of 
users has proven a costly and overwhelming task. 
The central research question of this thesis is the folJowing: 
How is it possible to ensure usability of user authentication without 
compromising security and vice-versa? 
Security and usability are both essential 111 the authentication process. 1t is 
broadly held that security and usability are two opposing goals in system design 
1 A YPN is a network that uses a public telecommunication infrastructure, such as the Internet. to 
provide remote offices or individual users wilh secure access 10 their organizalion's network. 
3 
(Cranor and Garfinkel, 2005; J0sang et 01.,2007; Nielsen, 2000) but there are several 
cases in which security and usability can be synergistically enhanced by reviewing 
the usable security approach. In addition, the human portion of computer security is 
effortlessly exploited and continually overlooked. Companies spend millions of 
dollars on firewalls, encryption and secure access devices, but most of the time they 
forget to address issues related to the weakest link in the security chain: the human 
being. 
In considering the extent that users are important in the authentication process, 
a company's goal is to select an Authentication Method (AM) that is suitable to the 
risk involved and as easy to use as possible. Applying too Iowa level of security 
might compromise the integrity of the company's process. But applying too high a 
level for a low-risk process means the process will be too hard and will confront low 
adoption rates. As stated by Penn (2()O~), the key criteria when assessing such 
solutions are ease of use, portabil ity, cost, security, manageabili ty, and cross-channel 
utility. 
My thesis is that there is an intrinsic conflict between creating systems that are 
secure and systems that are usable. But usability and security can be made synergistic 
by providing requirements and design tools with specifie usability and security 
principles earlier in the requirements and design phase. In certain situations it is 
possible to concurrently increase usability and security by revisiting design decisions 
that were made in the past. ln other situations it is possible to align security and 
usability by changing the regulatory environment in which the computers operate. To 
these ends, this thesis's goal is not to address usability and security after the product 
(authentication method) has been manufactured, but to make security a natural 
outcome of the requirements and design phase of the authentication method 
development life cycle. 
4 
1.2 Justification for the Research 
Security and usability are both essential in user authentication processes. One 
of the biggest challenges facing heterogeneous organizations is providing access 
control systems, to logical as weil as physical resources, that are both secure and 
usable. To achieve this, it is initially necessary to implement three indispensable 
components such as Identification (Who does this user daims to be?), Authentication 
(1s this user infact who s/he daims to be?), and Authorization (1s this user authorized 
to have the resource or service that s/he is requesting?). Inquiry particularly on user 
authentication is vital. Without authentication, a computer system often has no 
foundation for establishing if access should be granted or not. 
Furthermore, the majority of contemporary computer users for example need to 
authenticate to a company network several times during their work day. Another 
particular concern in authentication according to Cranor and Garfinkel (2005) is that 
authentication systems do not fai! gracefully. It means that if an average consumer 
computer user forgets her usemame but gets right the password the system does not 
enable her partial access to an online magazine, for instance, or for an average 
corporate computer user access to the system's less important files, or an emergency 
or temporary access. However there are a few companies that are in the initial stages 
of implementing sorne of these ''fai! grace[ully" functionalities2 in the corporate area. 
There is no established and recognized mechanism to accommodate user error, which 
means that most likely the productivity will be strongly compromised and the user's 
dissatisfaction with the system will be high. Figure 1.\ models the relationship 
between usability and security. 
General princip les for User Interface Design (UID) have already been weil 
recognized in the Human Computer Interaction (HCI) field. These general principles 
2 Users who have lost their hardware authenticator, for instance, can still log in to their accounts with 
an emergency access code through the on-demand authentication method, without having to contact 
the system administrator. RSA SecurlD® On-demand (SMS) Authenticator. RSA - The Security 
Division of EMC <http://www.rsa.com/node.aspx?id=348)> 
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are called "heuristics" because they are more in the nature of rules of thumb than 
specifie usability guidelines (Molich and Nielsen, 1990) (e.g. "User Control and 
Freedom" is one ofthese principles). 
Context of Use Intimate Causes Effects Relationship 
,.---------------, 
Problem -4- 1---------1 ~ Problem 
Usability Scenario Security Scenario 
, --
Ideal Solution based on Ideal Solution based on
 
HCI Principle and Measures Security Principle and Measur;?
 
Figure 1.1: Usability and Security Trade-off: A Common Solution Based on a 
Compromise (Braz and Seffah, 2007). 
So far, there has been very little research on the security usability of user 
authentication methods, although a considerable body of research work in usable 
security (a terminology adopted in this thesis when referring to security and usability) 
has been made for computer security mechanisms in general other than authentication 
methods. Therefore a usable security protocol is needed for user authentication. 
This thesis defines the concept of Usable Security as the study of how security 
infonnation and usability factors should be handled in either front-end or back-end 
user authentication processes, taking into consideration resources and costs. But why 
take front-end/back-end processes into consideration? Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
Developers should have knowledge of user interface design, and tools for 
implementing designs correctly. This knowledge will result in better front-end design, 
minimize the number of bugs in the software, and result in lower development costs 
per feature. GUI Developers should be assigned responsibility for accurate 
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implementation of front-end design, as well as back-end functionality. GUI 
Developers should understand interface issues sufficiently weil to know when to raise 
design issues during implementation, rather than disregarding them or implementing 
them inaccurately. 
lt is crucial to note that the tenn -interface- in this thesis is not only related ta 
GUI, but also to a shared limit through which the information flows (Maffezzini, 
2006). It consists of a hardware or software component that makes the junction 
between the interface and the user with the purpose of transiting information between 
them (e.g. an aTP token is an interface between the autbentication server and the 
user) (Figure 1.2). 
Hardware Token User VVeb Interface 
Figure 1.2: abjects with which users might interact: An authentication tokenJ , a 
wireless device, and a Web interface. 
According to Sasse (2004), one of the most recognized researchers in usable 
security-, "Don't focus on Uis to security tools - the big problems are in security 
requirements, job design and user involvement." That is exactly what this thesis is ail 
about: requirements and design. Additionally, according to Whitten and Tygar 
(1999), most of the research in HCISec focuses on providing better UIs, but it is 
obvious that usability problems with secure systems are more than only Uis and need 
application of HCI factors and design methodology. Whitten and Tygar (1999) claim 
that using conventional methods for usabi lity evaluation that concentra te on the 
3 http://www.rsa.comlnode.aspx?id=3049 
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impact of usability on security effectiveness will assist developers to discover 
usability probJems that threaten-I security. Both analytical and empiricaJ evaluations 
were performed in testing the usability goals of Pretty Good Privacy (PG P) Desktop 
E-mail software (i.e. public keyencryption software for desktops and laptops) 
(Whitten and Tygar, 1998). A number of usability problems causing security failures 
were discovered in the study, providing the foundation in the Whitten and Tygar 
(1999) study that specifie usability goals are needed for usability evaluation of 
security mechanisms. It is important to note that the PGP software has been cited 
throughout this dissertation as an example of public key authentication. This is due ta 
the fact that PGP is one of the most common solutions for email encryption, supports 
-major email security standards, and interoperates with most accepted email security 
software solutions. 
The value of usable security was pointed out as early as 1883 by the Belgian 
cryptographer and linguist Auguste Kerckhoffs in two articles on cryptography. 
Kerckhoffs is most famous for establishing the principle that security should not be 
based on obscurity. Moreover, four out of six of Kerckhoffs' cipher principles of 
design (Kerckhoffs, 1883) are related to usable security (3 to 6) in bold) as follows: 
1.	 The system must be practically, ifnot mathematically, indecipherable; 
2.	 It must not be required to be secret, and it must be able to fall into the hands 
of the enemy without inconvenience; 
3.	 lts key must be communicable and retainable without the help of written 
notes, and changeable or modifiable at the will of the correspondents; 
4.	 It must be applicable to telegraphic correspondence; 
5.	 It must be portable, and its usage and function must not require the concourse 
of several people; 
6.	 Finally, it is necessary, given the circumstances that command its application 
that the system should be easy to use, requiring neither mental strain nor the 
knowledge of a long series of rules to observe. 
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The initial data gathered on usabJe security related to user authentication 
methods are basically research regarding an evaluation of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 
(Whitten and Tygar, 1998), a public key encryption program primarily intended for 
authentication and email privacy, anti-phishing authentication mechanisms (Dhamija 
et a/., 2006; Dhamija and Tygar, 2005), security toolbars (Wu et a/., 2006), user 
authentication mechanisms (pictorial passwords) (Angeli el a/., 2003), security user 
studies (Chiasson and Biddle, 2007), secure User Interface (UI) for network 
applications (i.e. authentication of the communication) (J0sang and Patton, 2003), 
design principles and patterns for computer systems that are secure and usable 
(Cranor and Garfinkel, 2005), and sorne general white papers about user 
authentication. Although, Human Computer Interaction-Security (HCI-Sec) 
researchers have been applying HCI techniques in security software on a very small 
scale, there are no methods or techniques to effectively design secure and usable user 
authentication systems yet. This is area which this thesis is going to explore: 
integrating usable security in the requirements and design phase. 
Moreover, authentication services are critical to authorization and auditing 
services. If users' identities are not appropriately authenticated, an organization has 
no guarantee that access to resources and services is correctJy monitored. Regardless 
of how weil controlled a company's authorization services are, everything stems from 
the exact identity of the users. AIso, correspondingly, without accurateIy 
authenticated identities, audit trails, though complete and weil monitored, will be 
untrustworthy and give no accountability (e.g., a forged user ID could be Iinked ta 
auditing actions). 
On October 12, 2005, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
(FFlEC) issued the updated guidance, "Authentication in an Internet Banking 
Environment." FFlEC requires that financial institutions provide consumers of online 
financial services with the same security protection enjoyed by customers buying 
groceries or gas with a debit card: strong authcntication. The -FFIEC (2005) guidance 
states the folJowing: "Single-factor authentication, as the only control mechanism, ta 
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be inadequate for high-risk transactions involving access to customer information or 
the movement of funds to other parties. The authentication techniques employed by 
the financial institution should be appropriate to the risks associated with those 
products and services. Account fraud and identity theft are frequently the result of 
single-factor (e.g., ID/password) authentication exploitation." 
1.2.1 The Challenging Issues - Why Authentication? 
Without a proper user authentication system (the "door-entry" of any system), 
organizations are susceptible to potential attackers who can compromise the whole 
organization 's computer and network system, and consequently undermine its 
infrastructure and assets as weil. For example, the -CSl/FBI-- Computer Crime and 
Security Survey (2008) defined 13 types of attacks or computer mishandling resulting 
in direct financialloss to the survey's participants (Table 1.1). The survey asks about 
a number of different sorts of computer attacks and incidents. The areas marked with 
red squares in Table 1.1 highlight the type of incidents related to authentication. A 
significant percentage (44%) is responsible for attacks coming from inside an 
organization. In Figure 1.3, a subset of the mentioned attacks is graphed, with data 
stretching back to 1999 by percentages of key types of incidents. In Particular, this 
chart illustrates the four categories of highest incidence: viruses, insider abuse, laptop 
theft, and unauthorized access to systems. 
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Figure 1.3: Percentages of key types of incident (CSlIFBI, 2008). 
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Table 1.1: Percentages of key types of incident (CSl/FBI, 2008). 
Virus incidence fell below insider abuse Jast year, but regained its position of the 
rnost cornrnon occurrence this year. That said, both categories dropped cornpared to 
last year, and actually ail four of the rnost widespread types of incidents fel!. There 
seerns to be an obvious trend of lower and lower percentages of incidence being 
reported in these categories over the past several years. Table 1.1 also shows that only 
four categories showed to sorne extent iDcreased percentages. 
ln the real-world, organizations struggle to enforce security policies-even the 
rnost basic ones (e.g. password). When a user has unsupervised physical access to a 
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mobile device, for example, he can usually do whatever he wants with it, even 
authenticate himself through the software token installed in the mobile device since 
he knows his friend's username and password. As a result, most of these policies 
violate the Big Stick principle: Whoever has physica! access to the device is a!!owed 
to take if over (Stajano, 2003) (as in the previous example). These policies are 
extremely hard ta enforce and thus scarcely of practical usage. The Big Stick 
Principle is a very high level security policy model which identifies a set of cases in 
which authentication is superfluous. 
ln the Web area, it is worth noting that 5 out of the top 10 Web application 
security vulnerabilities are directly or indirectly related to authentication according to 
OWASP (2009). 
J.2.2 Strong Authentication 
Strong authentication relates to systems that entai! ngorous user identity 
verification, which is accomplished through multiple factors for authentication. lt 
allows us to irreversibly determine the user's identity or the integrity of precise data. 
Strong authentication also presumes that access to a network is extremely hard to 
break, thus creating a secure network. The goal of strong authentication is to 
strengthen the security by replacing the classic authentication method of password for 
a software-ooly autheotication solution with dynamic password generators, or 
software-hardware authenticators like smart cards, tokens, biometrics, etc. Traditional 
authentication assumes we know something: the user and the password. In contrast, 
strong authentication presupposes we know the username and the password, but also 
employs something that will generate the password, Iike password generators. A 
password generator offers the user the choice to a1Jow the system to assign passwords 
to usemames and logins. Password generators use an amalgamation of case sensitive 
letters, numbers, and symbols mathematically generated to offer the user with the 
strongest, hardest to hack passwords. 
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A single factor authentication is not secure. Actual information security 
reqUires an amalgamation of mechanisms (i.e. multi-factor user authentication) ta 
verify who the user is, what the user knows, what the user has, or where the user is. 
Verifying who the user is typically requires a Personal Identification Number (PIN) 
to attest what the user knows. The PIN combined with a biometric method, such as a 
fingerprint or iris scan, attests what the user has., or a smart card or digital certificate 
also assures what the user has and a Global Positioning SateJ1ite (GPS) receiver (e.g., 
a Blackbeny with a GPS application instaJJed) corroborates- where the user is. 
Combining multiple user authentication methods generates almost infallible 
user authentication on the Web, just as multiple levels of identification provide 
security for the physical access control. For example, a user who enters the top secret 
area of a military building might be asked to present two pieces of identification 
which is information known only to the user, match a fingerprint, and finally type in 
the combination for an electronic door lock. Once inside, the user still has to log onto 
the computer. Multi-factor user authentication su ch as this has been employed for a 
long time in physical world security systems. 
There are currently several authentication technologies to select from, and they 
each verify the identity of a user and grant access to resources. NevertheJess, they 
essentially diverge in the level of security they offer as shown in Figure 1.4. While 
passwords are usually considered weak forms of authentication, token and especially 
Biometries have been established as much stronger forms of authentication. 
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Figure 1.4: Levels of security (l/OSoftware, 2005). 
Users frequently and understandably resist strong authentication because it adds 
additional steps to their login and Internet sessions. Once they are authenticated, 
users' identities are securely established. As expected, corporate users are more 
receptive to strong user authentication, especially since it is intrinsic to their jobs. 
Generally speaking consumers have shown more resistance to additional or intrusive 
steps that eliminate anonymity. Many security experts foresee equivalent trends 
toward stricter user authentication for Internet consumers as e-commerce continues to 
increase and an increase in novel kinds of services that require strong authentication 
in the market. 
Authentication policies are required to manage how the authentication methods 
interoperate. These policies orchestrate user authentication methods, such as the 
methods to employ for specific resources, the order in which to employ them, and the 
back-up activities to be carried out should the selected methods fail. DeveJopjng user 
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authentication policies typically reqUlres the expertise of highly skilled security 
system designers to put -the system into operation on- a long-term basis. Automated 
user authentication management systems are only in their infancy to ease the human­
intensive effort usually associated with deploying and operating strong 
authentication. However, that same automation on one end- pushes the burden to the 
other end of the chain, which is the end-user. 
The greatest challenge of strong authentication is to make fraud more difficult 
for an attacker while respecting the constraints associated with an application: the 
technical, economical, and organizational environment (Braz and Aïmeur, 2005). 
1.2.3 Authentication Methods - Vulnerabilities Still Remain 
Despite the efforts that have been made by organizations to provide suitable 
authentication methods, vulnerabi lities still remain. Mechanisms and models that are 
complù;ated to the user will be misused. When an authentication method is too 
demanding the user might not keep up with the increasing workload (e.g. a user might 
refuse to sign up to a Web site because she cannot cope with the strong authentication 
method). Thus, organizations often tend to bJame the users for the human failure of 
not handling complex and demanding technical systems. However, Norman (1988) 
argues that what we often view as human error is the result of design flaws that may 
be surmounted. According to the Computing Technology lndustry Association 
(CompTIA, 2002), human errors turn out to be one of the major causes of security 
breaches in organizations; they account for 84% of security breaches in 900 private 
and public American organizations. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
There is a cornmon sense among security professionals that it is crucial to find 
ways of designing secure systems that individuals can use, including user 
authentication systems. However, there is still less agreement on how to achieve this 
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goal (Adams and Sasse, 1999; Whitten and Tygar, 1999; Garfinkel, 2005; Sasse and 
Flechais, 2005; Yee, 2005). 
The main goal of the research presented in this dissertation is to investigate the 
relationship between usability and security and address the problem ofusable security 
in user authentication methods in the field of computer security. This dissertation has 
the fol10wing objectives: 
•	 Find the right trade-off between Security and Usability: The design of usable 
yet secure systems raises crucial questions when it cornes to properly 
balancing security and usability. Finding the right tradeoff between these twa 
important attributes is not an easy endeavor. Usability problems in these 
systems can lead to security vulnerabilities which can consequently impact a 
company's bottom line. One of the difficulties in developing human interfaces 
to security systems is anticipating the response of users to the huge space of 
possible system states and design options (Harris, 2007). lt would be useful ta 
have a computational representation of the user that would allow the designer 
to simulate user responses to a diversity of situations and design options. 
Although the HC1Sec field is far from having a complete model of the user, a 
first step has been taken in this research with the deveJopment of a Usable 
Security Protocol (USP) for user authentication by taking into consideration 
the cognitive as weil as computer science aspects. 
•	 Provide practical and specifie guidelines on the design of authentication 
methods to support usable security: The HerSee research community has 
gradually been developing a good body of work in usabJe security, but this 
consists primarily of general guidelines (See Chapter 2, Review of the State of 
the Art, for more details.) These do not provide a method for pointing out and 
solving specifie design problems (e.g., for one-factor authentication like a 
password, have strict password policies been established?). Contrary to 
general design guidelines, which are mostly descriptive- and simply specify 
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"nice to have" generaI design features, this thesis adopts a constructive 
approach by specifying how a problem can be solved. The bottom line is that 
companies don't base their security decisions on "general solutions". 
•	 Develop a robust design tool for the development of an authentication 
method: Even if a project is small and the requirements are simple, there is 
still a design process that occurs between understanding the requirements and 
starting to construct. Design becomes progressively important as the project 
becomes larger and more complex, which is usually the case for the 
development of security products and mechanisms. The Requirements and 
Design phase is an important prelude to extracting and gathering the 
requirements and especially because it defines the problem that the 
stakeholder is trying to solve, no matter what mode! of software development 
process is adopted (e.g., waterfall, iterative, etc.). It is broadly held that 
gathering and agreeing on requirements and design is crucial in the whole 
development process and also important to the overa1l success of any project 
(Perks, 2003). Therefore a robust design tool is recommended to influence an 
authentication method's reliable design and bring security and usability 
together earlier in its life cycle. 
•	 Establish a sol id ground basis for developing a Usable Security Symmetry 
Web-based application (USSWebApp): The research work in this thesis 
represents exactly what should be done when following best practices for 
software development, which is starting with a robust and weil defined 
Requirements and Design phase prior to going through the Implementation, 
Deployment, Testing, and Evaluation phases. 
•	 Publish research papers in conferences and joumals: 
o	 Published - Braz, c., Poirier, P., & Seffah, A.: 2010. Designing 
Usable, Yet Secure User Authentication Service: The Cognitive 
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Dimension. e-Review of Tourism Research (eRTR), Web-based 
international research network for tourism professionals. 
o	 Published - Braz, c., Seffah, A. (1) & Poirier, P. (2): 2009. User 
Authentication: Adding Usable Security Symmetry into Design and 
Requirements. First International Workshop on Software Security 
Process (SSP09) .in conjunction with the IEEE International 
Conference on Information Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust 
(PASSAT 09), August 29-31, Vancouver (Canada); (1) Department of 
Computer Science, Concordia University; (2) Department of 
Philosophy, University ofQuebec at Montreal. 
o	 Published - Braz, c., Seffah, A. (1) & M'Raihi, D. (2): 2007. 
Designing a Trade-Off between Security and Usability: A Metrics ­
Based Approach. INTERACT 2007 Socially-Responsible Interaction 
The Eleventh IFIP TC 13 International Conference on Human 
Computer Interaction, 10-14 September 2007, Rio de Janeiro, RJ 
(Brazil); (1) Department of Computer Science, Concordia University; 
(2) Principal Scientist, Innovation Group, VeriSign, Inc. 
a	 Published - Braz, C. & Robert, lM.: 2006. Security Usability: The 
Case of User Authentication Methods. fn 18th French-Speaking 
Conference on Human Computer Interaction (HCI2006), École 
Polytechnique de Montréal, 18-21 April, Montreal, Quebec (Canada). 
a	 Published - Braz, C. & Aïmeur, E. (1): 2005. ASEMC: Authentication 
for a Secure Mobile Commerce. RFID Journal, RFID White Papers, 
Security White Papers (June 2005); (1) University of Montreal. 
a	 Published - Braz, c.: 2004. AUTHENLINK: A User-Centered 
Authentication System for a Secure Mobile Commerce. In ERGO-IA 
2004, November 17-29,2004, Biarritz (France). 
a	 Published - Braz, C. AUTHENLINK: 2004 A User-Centered 
Authentication System for a Secure Mobile Commerce. In 
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Proceedings of the 1st French-Speaking Conference on Mobility and 
Ubiquity Computing UBIMOB 2004, June 1-3, 2004, Nice, Sophia­
Antipolis (France). 
o	 Published - Braz, C. & Aimeur, E. AUTHENLlNK: 2004. 
Authentication System for a Secure Mobile. ln 3rd International 
Workshop on Wireless Information Systems (WIS-2004), April 13-14, 
2004, Porto (Portugal). 
1.4 Assumptions and Hypotheses 
This thesis project assumes the following hypotheses: 
•	 Usab1e security is critical to the effective adoption and deployment of user 
authentication methods. As a matter of fact there is no set of recognized 
usable security standards particularly targeted to user authentication methods 
but rather only to security mechanisms in general. As expected, there are 
numerous examples that fully characterize this hypothesis such as the so­
called password complexity, locking Persona1 Identification Number (PIN) 
systems, cumbersome data input of challenge-response calculators, Jack of 
usability in security software, "negative redundancy" (this term has been 
coined by this research) of biometrics systems wh en users are authenticating 
to a system (e.g., comblnc a L1SCIllLlmC PIN \\ ith tingcrpllnt), and so on. 
Moreover, to reduce management and support costs, organizations are placing 
more and more of the burden of authentication on the user (i.e. key 
stakeholders like employees, partners, end-users, etc.), forcing them to 
perform - at the enterprise's discretion - lifecyc1e-management tasks (i.e. self­
service user authentication) such as token activation, password replacement, 
and certificate renewal. 
•	 The development of a user authentication method, irrespective of being a 
software or hardware authenticator, should include usable security measures 
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at an early stage as part of the Requirements and Design phases in a trusted 
security framework of an organization. 
•	 A user authentication method might be adapted to a computer system's 
infrastructure already in place in an organization. In sorne cases the 
specification of an authentication method may be infrastructure-dependent on 
a computer system within an organization since authentication should be 
integrated into an existing security infrastructure (i.e. post-implementation). 
•	 The choice of an authentication method depends also on industry norms and 
well as on legal and business needs such as the environmental characteristics 
of the electronic communication (e.g. online shopping). These needs basica11y 
prescribe the computer requirements of an organization, putting in place 
con troIs on processes and technical infrastructure. 
•	 Security designers address the diverse authentication needs of severaI 
different users, inc1uding system administra tors, employees, business partners, 
customers, and end-users. For example, System Administrators might require 
a strong Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) solution. Employees who want ta 
mix physical access security with strong network authentication might require 
a smart card, aggregating use of a One-Time Password (OTP), PKI, and 
building-access credentials. External users such as remote Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) users, business partners, and customers may prefer clientless 
OTP tokens (VeriSign, 2010). Users who conduct high-value transactions and 
need non-repudiation capabilities may require a hybrid authentication 
platform that can combine OTP and PKI VeriSign functionality such as the 
RSA SecurlD® 800 hybrid authenticator4 (i.e. a11 in-one-devices). Lastly, 
4 RSA hybrid authenlicalors: The RSA SecurlD® 800 aulhenticalor is a hybrid device lhal sec ures lhe 
end-LIser environment by combining features of the RSA SeclIrlD hardware. 311thenticator wilh a smart 
chip - ail in a single USB form faclor. RSA-The Security Division of EMC. May 23, 2010 
<http://www.rsa.com/node.aspx?id=1215> 
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organizations setting large-scale consumer applications may prefer consumer 
scratch cards over more expensive electronic devices for authentication. 
• Security tools (including authenticators) have been developed, but their 
successful use in real applications is fairly limited because of their 
complexity, "hard-of-use", and the necessity of previous advanced technical 
knowledge on the part of end-users. The "hard-of-use" restrains not just 
novice users but also the average corporate and consumer computer user. This 
originates from the fact that several steps and parameters have to be set on 
those security applications so that security services, which range from security 
policy development (i.e. authentication included) to intrusion detection 
support, can be properly executed. However such configuration complexity 
leads to unwelcome circumstances in which some users are ready to give up 
security to meet their project deadlines or to attain higher system 
performance. For example "maintaining the secrecy of authentication keys is a 
particular problem because humans are famously the weak link in information 
security. People trust each other and will sometimes disclose classified 
information upon request" (Renaud, 2003). Even when people are security 
conscious enough not to disclose their authentication key, they will often 
write down codes they should be memorizing. They will do this in self­
defense if the codes change too often or if they have too many. "These 
weaknesses are caused by the human factor in security, and no authentication 
mechanism can succeed in meeting its dual roles of permission and prevention 
until the human factors are taken into account" (Mitnick and Simon, 2002). 
There is an increasing understanding of the user's role in the security of any 
system, as just one of many links of a chain which can be considered to 
surround and secure the system. One way to make the user link stronger is to 
consider essential factors such as the user's needs, abilities, inclinations and 
skills in forrnulating security mechanisms and policies (Renaud, 2003). 
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Therefore security architects and designers who are in charge of selecting, 
implementing, and managing IT security services for an organization ­
cautiously assess their options before selecting resources that will be 
delegated to meet their specifie IT security program requirements. 
Development of methods and techniques to diminish complexity in usage of 
security services is therefore required. 
1.5 Human Computer Interaction Security (HCISec) 
Human Computer Interaction Security (HCSec) is the field of research that 
studies how humans interact with computers, especially information security. It aims, 
in plain terms, to improve the usability of security features in end user applications. 
Traditionally, security features demonstrate poor usability for the following reasons: 
•	 Security features are usualIy added in casual afterthought; 
•	 Security features are quickly patched in to deal with newly revealed security 
bugs; 
•	 Security features deal with very complex use cases; 
•	 Interface designers usually lack understanding of security concepts; and 
•	 Interface designers are not often usability experts but application developers. 
1.5.1 Conferences in Usable Security 
Since 2004, conferences in Usable Security have been held and have steadily 
been gaining attention within the HCISec research community and Computer 
Security industry as follows: 
•	 Computer Human Interaction (CHI) 2003 - Workshop on HCI & Security 
Systems: <http://www.andrewpatrick.ca/CHI2003/HCISEC/> 
•	 DIMACS Workshop on UsabJe Privacy and Security Software:
 
<http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Tools/>
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•	 SOUPS Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security:
 
<http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2009/>
 
•	 Usable Security (USEC):
 
<http://usablesecuri ty .org/>
 
1.6 Types of Users 
This research includes five different types of users related to Computer and 
Web Security areas. Each type of user has different attributes and responsibilities. A 
user can be defined as described below: 
•	 Super Administrator (Super Admin): An Information Technology (lT) 
professional who acts as the chief administrator, for instance for the 
authentication manager software. This person is presumed to be highly 
skilled, commensurate with the type of lT professionaJ who would be 
assigned to administer a mission critical application. The Super Admin has ail 
permissions to configure and administrate the system and other 
administrators, and is typically the person who would be responsible for 
planning, deploying, and configuring the software. The Super Admin can also 
act as an Approver or Distributor. The Super Admin may grant administrative 
permission to approve credential manager requests from and distribute tokens 
to End-Users. 
•	 Domain Administrator: Generally speaking, each domain has its own 
Administrator, or a Domain Administrator can look after a number of 
domains. The role of the Domain Administrator is to configure and maintain 
the authentication manager software for the portion of the enterprise for which 
they are responsible. They can manage, for example, objects such as users, 
users groups, tokens, and password policy. The Domain Administrator can 
also act as an Approver or Distributor. 
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•	 Help Desk Administrator: Like the Super Admin, the Help Desk Admin is an 
IT professional who acts as an administrator for the mentioned software. This 
person is assumed to be of reasonable skill, commensurate with the type of 
professional who would be assigned to administer parts of a mission critical 
application. A Help-Desk Admin is a person who provides first-tier or second­
tier help desk technical troubleshooting support for end users. 
•	 Developer: The Developer is a person who designs and writes software. 
•	 Customer: The customer is the buyer of the authenticator (i.e., authentication 
method solution). The Customer should not be confused with the End-User. 
•	 End-User: A person who will ultimately use a software or hardware 
authenticator to enable her/him to perform a job function (e.g. an individual 
employs a hardware token to authenticate to a corporate network). The End­
User has knowledge ofbasic Web browsing with typical technical expertise or 
sorne previous training in the use of computer interfaces, and can be 
considered -an average corporate or/consumer computer user. 
1.7 Thesis Roadmap 
This thesis contains six (6) Chapters and four (4) Appendices. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Justification for the research, Research objectives, Assumptions and 
hypotheses, Human Computer Interaction Security (HCISec), Author's Publications 
in Usable Security, Types of users, and Thesis roadmap. 
Chapter 2: Review of the State of the Art 
The context of Authentication in Computer Security, Elements of User 
Authentication, User Authentication Methods, To Whom Authentication Is Targeted? 
Comparative Analysis of User Authentication Methods, Usability and Usable 
Security Principles and Guidelines. 
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Chapter 3: The Usable Security Protocol 
The Usable Security Protocol Methodology, Step 1: Define the mission and 
conceptual design objective, Step 2: Identify the most representative user 
authentication methods categories, Step 3: Develop the NGOMSL Model (NaturaJ 
Goals, Methods, Selection Language), Step 4: Develop the Authentication Risk 
Assessment Matrix, Step 5: Generate the usabJe security principles, Step 6: 
Formulate the Usable Security Symmetry (USS) inspection method, and Step 7: 
Demonstrate the USS, and The Usable Security ProtocoJ Methodology Reuse. 
Chapter 4: The Cognitive Science Axis 
Cognitive Ergonomics, Main Cognitive Areas of Focus Relating to User 
Authentication, and the Cognitive Model of User Authentication (CMUA). 
Chapter 5: The Computer Science Axis 
Security as a Usability Characteristic, User Authentication Use Cases, Usability 
Factors and Usability Criteria, The USS Inspection Method, Demonstrating USS 
using A Multifunction Tel1er Machine (MTM), Usability Severity Ratings, Security 
Severity Ratings, and One-Time-Password (OTP) demonstration. 
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Work 
Summary of the Research Work, Scientific Contributions, Practical 
Observations on the Impact of USS in Corporate and Academic Environments, 
Limitations, and Future Work and Recommendations, and The Future of User 
Authentication. 
Summary of the topics discussed in Chapter 1: Introduction. 
In this Chapter, the Justification for the research has been presented as weil as 
the challenging issues in authentication (Strong authentication and vulnerabilities in 
user authentication methods), Research objectives, Assumptions and hypotheses, the 
Human Computer Interaction Security (HCrSec), and Types ofusers. 
CHAPTER II
 
REVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE ART
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of the state of the art in User Authentication, 
Usability inspection methods, Usable Security principles and guidelines, and the 
GOMS mode!. 
Security systems are conceived to allow authorized users m, and to keep 
unauthorized users out of an organization 's network resources. In addition, the 
security system needs to make sure that users only perform actions they are 
authorized to perforrn. To this end, user authentication is the entry point to different 
computing networks or facilities in which a set of services are rendered to users or a 
set of tasks can be performed. For example, once successfully authenticated, the user 
can gain access to a company's Intranet, databases, applications, facilities, etc. 
Usability of the authentication mechanisms has seldom been investigated, and 
since security mechanisms are conceived, implemented, put into practice and violated 
by people, human factors should be taken into account in their design (Adam and 
Sasse, 1999). For example, Social Engineering attacks precisely target the human 
link, and represent a very effective attack vector. A reformed and world-famous 
controversial computer hacker Kevin Mitnick found that he never had to crack 
passwords by technical means because he could constantly get them from people. 
The GOMS model, first proposed by Card et al (1983), is the general term for a 
family of human information processing techniques that attempt to model and predict 
user behavior. 
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2.2 User Authentication 
Usability becomes a strategie issue in the implementation of user authentication 
methods in organizations. Usability can be defined as "the extent to which a product 
can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, 
efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of use" (IS0924 1-11:98). Usable 
Security is concemed with the study of how security information and ease-of-use 
should be handled in the user interface. 
Authentication is an enabling task that needs to be completed to get to the 
resources required to do real work (Sasse el al, 2001). The function of user 
authentication should not be to educate users to better manage their security 
(authentication) issues, nor should it be so difficult to use that it requires either 
mental strain or the knowledge of a long series of rules to observe (Kerckhoffs, 
1883). Instead, it should follow the least (if not zero) user interaction principle, 
meaning that authentication procedures are unobtrusive involving almost no user 
input (or none at ail) and are intuitive, helping users to authenticate themseJves. Good 
examples of the latter are the "zero" interaction authentication (Corner and Noble, 
2002), and the RSA Security Toolbar Token with an auto fill code feature that 
drastically reduces user interaction (Figure 2.1). 
RSA SecurlD Toolbar Token 
Figure 2.1: AutoFill Codes improving usability in user authentication. 
Identification, Authentication, and Authorization are distinct and necessary 
components-that allow users to securely access a computer system. Authentication is 
the process of establishing whether someone is who s/he declares her/himself to be. 
In private and public computer networks (encompassing the Internet), authentication 
is popularly done through the use of logon passwords. The logon is the process used 
5 Auto fill code. RSA,The Security Division of EMC <hllp://www.rsa.comlnode.aspx?id=3031> 
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to gam access to an operating system or application, generally from a remote 
computer. Usually a lagon requires that the user have a user ID (username) and a 
password. Authentication is one of the criticaJ elements of a set of services that 
constitute a security sub-system in a communications infrastructure and encompasses 
the following security services: 
•	 Authentication: The verification of a claimed identity. 
•	 Conjidentia/ity: The property that information is not made avaiJabJe or 
disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes. 
•	 lntegrity: The property that data has not been modified or destroyed m an 
unauthorized manner. 
•	 Non-repudiation: The process of ensuring that the author of a document 
cannot later claim not to be the author. 
•	 Access Control: Encompasses any mechanism of granting access to data or 
performing an action. An authentication method is used to check a user login; 
then the access control mechanism grants and revokes privileges based on 
predefined rules. 
•	 Availability: Demands that a computer system 's assets be available to 
authorized parties when needed (Braz and Aïmeur, 2005). 
The three essentiaJ security properties of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability rely on differentiation between authorized and unauthorized users. In 
order to differentiate between them, authentication must be present. The 
authentication process is based on a risk criterion. High-Jevel risk systems, 
applications, and information necessitate distinct forms of authentication that more 
precisely affirm the user's identity than would a low-Ievel risk application, where the 
confirmation of the identity is Dot as significant from a risk standpoint (e.g. 
anonymous authentication in a library). This is typically referred to as "stronger 
authentication". 
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2.2.1 The context of Authentication in Computer Security 
The authentication services are located beneath the Security Operations ring in 
an ideal organization's computer security framework (Figure 2.2). The trusted 
security framework is no longer a limited technological matter: lt supports strategie 
initiatives and provides a platform for taking a business to new levels of 
competitiveness. The enterprise security framework must provide confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability throughout the enterprise, bringing it into conformity with 
corporate objectives. 
Figure 2.2: User authentication in an ideal organization's 
security framework (Accenture, 2004). 
The framework is centered on the Business Assets to be protected, which are 
identified and prioritized through the Security Strategy and Management. The 
Security Management is in charge of coordinating and supervising the different 
Security Services (Security Operations, Security Compliance, Security Policy and 
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Standards, and finally Security Awareness). Security servIces are the servIces 
supplied by a system for implementing the security policy of an organization. A 
standard set of such services includes identification and authentication, access control 
and authorization, accountability and auditing, data confidentiality, data integrity and 
recovery, data exchange, object reuse, non-repudiation, and finally reliability. 
And why focus on authentication? Authentication is more important than ever 
due to the collapse of network security perimeters, the expansion in the number of 
devices wanting to access company networks, and the rising number of remote users 
and wireless devices (including laptops) since users want to access increasingly 
diverse applications. The information users (i.e. average corporate/consumer 
computer users) need to access has broadened to comprise ail aspects of both personal 
and business purposes, including e-mail, a greater range of applications, and various 
types of data. In particular, there has been an impressive increase in corporate users' 
need to access their organizations' network resources, characterized by a growing 
number and variety of users (e.g., local and mobile users, teJecommuters, etc.), 
applications, access methods, and extensions of enterprise networks to include third 
parties (i.e., customers, suppliers, partners, employees, consumers, etc.), hence 
exposing organizations to significant risks unless they take protective measures. 
According to JanneyMontgomery (2005), the total authentication market­
(comprising tokens, smartcards, and biometrics), will achieve $6.77 billion in revenue 
by 2008. The same report estimates the authentication market will grow at a 15% 
CAGR (Compound AnnuaJ Growth Rate) through 2009, biometrics at 40% CAGR 
through 2008, and the smartcard market at $7.4% CAGR through 2008. Also, more 
than half of the enterprises surveyed in Forrester's Enterprise and 5MB Security 
Survey, North America and Europe, Q3 2007 (Forrester, 2007) have either 
implemented strong authentication at desktop logon or are planning to start or finish 
such a project in 2008. Although strong multifactor authentication surely improves 
security, there is no guaranty that end users will accept il as a convenient and usable 
second{actor. "Reflecting the real-world difficulties security managers have had in 
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keeping users happy with the choice of strong authentication, the vendor landscape is 
complex and fragmented. Vendors will continue to expand their product lines until 
enterprise adoption of identity management, including strong authentication, becomes 
more widespread in the coming years" (Forrester, 2007). 
Finally, an organization's authentication service should be suitabJe to the risks, 
and should consider the impact on users, as weIl as the cost of integration with its 
existing technology architecture, and total cost of ownership. 
According to Allan (2007) from Gartner (Figure 2.3), RSA, the Security Division of 
EMC (EMC, 2010) has dominated the remote-access OTP token space for years, and 
now provides a wide range of authentication methods concentrated on the enterprise 
and consumer spaces, including an In-The-Cloud Authentication Service (ITCAS) 
complemented by fraud detection capability. Vasco has had the most success in the 
consumer authentication space in Europe and Australia, and now provides a generic 
infrastructure - a versatile authentication server (VAS) - that supports multiple 
authentication methods. There are progressively more authentication vendors, but the 
bulk is focused on a narrow range of authentication methods, and frequently only one 
(Allan, 2007). "Lightweight OTP methods" employ a form factor other than PC 
software, a purpose-built handheld device or a smart token. 
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Figure 2.3: The Authentication Marketplace - Gartner Research (Allan, 2007). 
Entrust also provides a VAS along with a wide range of authentication 
methods, including low-cost OTP tokens and fraud detection for online consumer 
security. VeriSign6, a key proponent of the Initiative for Open Authentication 
(OATH)7, entered the authentication market with an ITCAS as an Original 
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) (i.e. a computer firm whose products are produced 
by customizing basic parts supplied by others). OEMs for tokens from other vendors, 
like Entrust and RSA, complement raw authentication with fraud detection. Smart 
card vendors that focus on the user authentication market include Gemalto, which 
offers a variety of authentication tokens (including OTP tokens) that embed smart 
chips. Most of the newer vend ors focus on a single method or set of related methods, 
but sorne, such as Deepnet Security, provide open, flexible infrastructures along with 
a wide range of methods. 
6 VeriSign, Ine. Mountain View, California (USA).
 
7 Initiative for Open Authentieation (OATH). Februaty 12,2008
 
<http://www.openau1hentieati on. org/>
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2.2.2 Elements of User Authentication 
ln an authentication process there are sorne elements that are present as shown 
in Figure 2.4 as follows: 
•	 A user (or principal) to be authenticated. The principal is the entity 
requesting authorization. lt is generally sorne combination of user, device, 
and/or service. 
•	 A credentia! which is possessed by the user who submits it as proof of 
identity. The main types of credentials are shared key (password), One-Time­
Password (OTP), digital certificate, and biometric credential. 
•	 A distinguishing characteristic that sets apart that particular user. 
•	 A proprietor who is responsible for the system in use. 
•	 An authentication mechanism to verify the existence of the distinguishing 
characteristic. 
•	 A server which is the authentication key storage. 
•	 A privi!ege when the authentication is successful by employing an access 
control mechanism which rejects the privilege if authentication is 
unsuccessful. 
•	 And finally, conlextua! information of the authentication request that 
encompasses the network and physical location of the request (e.g., Geo 
location, IP address, workstation), the kind of access provided (e.g., check 
balance), the time of day, and other elements such as network load, security 
threat level, and so on. 
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Authentication 
MechanismLogin 
Process 
login: jdoe
 
pass\'Iord: asdf
 
Access Control 
Mechanism 
... 
...	 
Computer 
... System	 Proprietor:
... Resources	 or an Admimslralor 
working on the 
proprietor's behalf 
Figure 2.4: The elements of the authentication process (Smith, 2002). 
2.2.3 Architectural Design Patterns in Authentication 
There are sorne architectural design patterns that have frequently been 
encountered in the deployment of authentication systems (Smith, 2002). These 
patterns analyze problems in terms of space and people, not data and processing. 
Below is a description of the architectural design patterns employed in authentication: 
•	 Local Authentication: This is related to single desktop systems and laptops. 
The whole system (comprising its authentication and access control 
mechanism) lives within a single physical security perimeter. 
•	 Direct Authentication: Figure 2.5 shows the direct authentication when a 
client and service share a trust relationship. Direct authentication requires the 
presentation of credentials, which are usually a user name and password. The 
service employs these credentials to authenticate the request. 
34 
;_----+>(1 
Service Request ~ 
\'J\th Credenlials 
Client	 Servlœ 
Figure 2.5: Direct Authentication when a client and service share 
a trust reJationship (Microsoft, 2005). 
•	 Broker Authentication: Using a broker to carry out authentication when client 
and service do not share a trust relationship, as shown in Figure 2.6. The 
broker authenticates the client and then issues a security token that the service 
can employ to authenticate the client. The security token is constantly 
verified, but usually the service does not need to interact with the broker ta 
carry out the verification. The reason for this is that the token itself can 
include proof of a relationship with the broker, which can be employed by the 
service to verify the token. 
Authentication 
/ Broker ~" 
Authenlocalton Requesl Validale Credenlials 
,
,
, 
_______-+)n 
Service Request ~ 
wilh Socurily Token 
Client	 Service 
Figure 2.6: Broker Authentication (Microsoft, 2005). 
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•	 Offline Authentication: Public-key certification software follows an offline 
authentication pattern, which recognizes authorized users, is stored in multiple 
locations throughout the system, and is accessible offline. For example, if a 
legitimate user wants to authenticate to her bank's server, her workstation first 
acquires the bank's public key certificate and authenticates it with a pre­
established public key. Second, it uses the public key within the bank's 
certificate as part of sorne other protocol, such as Secure Socket Layer (SSL), 
to authenticate the bank as the reaJ owner of the private key, which is 
mathematically related to the certificate's public key (Public key 
authentication is described later on in this chapter). 
2.2.4 Authentication Factors 
ln sorne applications, there is no need for users to be authenticated by the 
system, as in the case of browsing the internet in a public library. So, if the data is 
public, there is no need to limit access to users. If no authentication is taking place, 
the user is said to be "anonymous". This is the initial status, after a connection has 
been opened to the server. However, when the resources are protected, for example in 
an online banking website, the user must be authenticated in order to have access to 
the services. The fundamental purpose of security is to control who has access ta 
valuable property, whether physical or logical. 
An authentication factor is a piece of information used to authenticate or verify 
a person's identity. There are four factors of user authentication that might be 
employed in combination to increase the level of security in the claimed identity of a 
user according to Table 2.1: Something you HAVE (e.g., a smart card), something 
you KNOW (e.g., a password or PIN), and something you ARE (e.g., iris 
recognition). In addition, a fourth authentication factor has been also proposed by 
Braz and Aïmeur (2002), which is something you CONVEY (e.g., a mobile user who 
authenticates to a system by conveying a chip user's ID by radio frequency signal 
from an under-skin chip tag to a wireless device). 
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Classification Factor Examples 
Type 1: Authentication by Something · A password or passphrase~ 
Knowledge Vou · A Personal Identification Number 
KNOW (PIN) 
· Information about the user or 
family members 
Type 2: Authentication by Something A physical key 
Ownership Vou · A magnetic-stripe card 
HAVE · A token that generates a One-
Time Password (OTP) 
Type 3: Authentication by Something A Biometrie trait: 
Characteristic vou ARE 
· 
Fingerprint 
(or a Iris pattern 
physical Hand geometry 
attribute) Voice 
Type 4~: Authentication by Something A microprocessor-chip computer 
Emanation Vou (ChipTag) implanted under human 
(Braz and Al'meur, 2002) CON VEY skin. This ChipTag is able to 
authenticate users' access to 
systems and- connect them 
wirelessly- through -Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFLD) 
(Braz and Aïmeur, 2002) 
Or a combination of the above 
Table 2.1: Guide to Understanding Identification and Authentication 
in Trusted Systems (NCSC, 1983). 
Using any authentication factor alone provides single-factor authentication. 
Any two authentication factors may be combined to provide two-factor 
authentication; NCSC-TG-O 17 calls these combinations Type 12 ("one-two"), Type 
13 ("one-three"), and Type 23 ("two-three") as shown in Table 2.1. Associating ail 
three factors presents three-factor authentication, Type 123 ("one-two-three"). So, 
associating two or more factors introduces greater security. The most well-known 
8 Passphrase: is generally longer than a password and includes letters, numbers, words, and random 
characters, ln enClypled communications, one should always use a passphrase rather Ihan a password. 
For example: 1 must g'a dawn ta the sea again, ta t7he /ane/y s8a and the siy. 
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example IS the magnetic-stripe card (smart card) and PIN (Two-Factor 
Authentication) used with an Automated Teller Machine (ATM): To access the 
network, a legitimate user must have both "factors", just as he must have an ATM 
card and a PIN to withdraw money from a bank account. Another example is the RSA 
SecurID® 700 10 hardware authenticator (Figure 2.7), which enforces strong "two­
factor" user authentication by requiring the user to present two forms of credentials to 
prove his identity: something you KNOW (a password or PIN), and something you 
HAVE (authenticator). An example of a multi-factor authentication method is the 
combination of password, smart card, and iris recognition, resulting in far greater 
security (e.g., it can be employed for higher risk transactions). 
Figure 2.7: RSA SecurID® 700 hardware authcnticator with Onc-Iime Password (OIP). 
Consider the following contex tuai authentication scenario: Before a system 
grants a legitimate user access to a company's protected network resources, the 
system must detennine who she is, if she belongs to the system, if she has the right to 
access the system, and if she is the person she says she is. Actually, the system has 
required three distinct elements - identification, authentication, and authorizatiol1 ­
that together comprise the so-called access control. However, how does the system 
confirm that she is who she says she is? For example, entering her password does not 
prove it is her. Hence, the system needs the identification and authentication to 
authorize access for her. The AI may be gathered from one of the -authentication 
factors- shawn in Table 2.1. 
10 RSA, The Security Division of EMC. May 25, 20 J0 <http://www.rsa.com/producls/securid/ 
datasheets/l 0306_SID700_DS_0709.pdf>. 
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As already mentioned, authenticated identities are the foundation for several 
other information security services. Typically an organization needs to do the 
following: 
•	 Control individual users' access to its information systems (Authentication); 
•	 Control individual users access to the resources and services supplied by those 
systems (Authorization); 
•	 Generate an audit trail of users' access or attempted access to those systems, 
resources, and services. 
2.2.5 User Authentication Methods 
This section describes the most representative user authentication methods 
currently available for IT systems, such as Passwords and PINs, Authentication 
Tokens (also known as authenticators), Kerberos, Biometries, and Single Sign-On 
(SSO). It also introduces an advanced user authentication method called Under-Skin 
RFID Chip. 
2.2.5.1 Passwords and PINs 
To avoid other users from using your account through your username, you are 
required to have a password. A username is a unique identifier which can be system­
defined or user-defined ll . Usernames are usually built of text so that people might 
easily remember and type in their user names during the logon process. A password is 
a secret word or string of characters that is employed for authentication, to prove 
identity or gain access to a resource. A password al10ws you (and only you) to access 
protected network resources in a computer system. A simple password such as 
11	 fThere are several types 0 passwords such as weak, strong, system-defined ,or user-defined 
passwords, passphrases, and PINs. One of the goals of this thesis was to identify the main user 
authentication task scenarios: They have been -buill onlytaking into consideration ils main use cases, 
which in the case of Password/PIN scenarios, is "a user successfülly logs into a 
system." Sa this use case did not consider ail possible and alternative password scenarios such as 
changing a password, reselling a password, or providing passphrases hints, and other alternative 
scenarios due ta the fact that they are out of the scope ofthis thesis. 
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hello, which is in fact easy to remember, has weak password strength, while a 
complex password such as hCytW7m9!, which is hard to remember, has strong 
password strength. Password slrenglh is a measure of the effectiveness of a password 
in resisting guessing and brute-force attacks. The strength of a password is a function 
of length, complexity, and unpredictability. A password essentially proves to the 
computer system that you are who you say you are. The use of a password is by far 
the most common knowledge-based (Type 1) authentication method (Figure 2.8) in 
user authentication. A computer system may employ otber Knowledge-Based 
Autbentication (KBA) metbods, such as secret questions and answers to check the 
identity of a user by asking for a password. 
A long password, especially one with inserted spaces, is called a passphrase. A 
passphrase is a special type of token-based password where the tokens are words 
instead of symbols from a character set (e.g. "Where is my checked shirt?"). In 
principle, the longer the password the stronger it is. (ln facl, it is less guessed and less 
exposed to certain kinds of attacks). 
User RSA Authentication
 
Manager
1 
• "May 1Enter? "Is This User A?" 
( 
"Enter" \'John Doo types 
h.s u rnarn jdoe P wordlil on 
and 0 'ord asdf the h d dnve Password Checking 
Procedure 
Figure 2.8: The password authentication process (adapted from Smith (2002) 
and RSA® Authentication Manager 7.1 12). 
12 Enterprise-class security engine for RSA SecllrID® aUlhentication. RSA-The Security Division of 
EMC May 23, 2010 <htlp://www.rsa.com/prodlicts/securid/datasheets/9239_SlDAM_DS_020S­
lowres.pdf> 
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Passwords are the first 1ine of defense against attacks to a computer system. 
The rules for password choice can be definitely a burdensome problem for a user and 
a security problem for a system. For example, trivial choices that are easy to guess are 
broken within seconds using password cracking techniques - the longer the password 
the more difficult it is to crack. To prevent hackers from gaining access to a 
company's computer or files, experts recommend -using a complex password (strong 
password) that is capable of, in a first instance, increasing the Short-Term Memory 
(STM) load of users causing frequent errors. As already mentioned, the capacity of 
STM is usually limited to 7± 2 items (e.g. letters, digits, words, etc.) (Miller, 1956). 
Traditional password systems include many design features for the purpose of 
making trial-and-error attacks as difficult as possible. Actually, they violate most of 
the recognized usability standards for computer systems. From the eight "Golden 
Rules" for interface design recommended by Schneiderman and Plaisant (2005), 
password interactions break six mies as shown in Table 2.2. Table 2.3 presents the 
"six password broken rules"- and their corresponding usability issues through a 
couple of examples and security benefits. Users also should follow a set of ruJes (i.e. 
password security policy) especially related to password creation: "Yom password 
must contain: 8 to 32 characters, at least 6 alphabetic characters (a mix of upper and 
lower cases), at least J non-alphanumeric character, not allowed: @<>&%. You may 
not re-use one of your last 3 passwords. Do not write anything down" (EMC, 2009). 
If users don't pay proper attention to this password policy, their accounts become 
vulnerable to intrusion by spoofers. 
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Golden Rules of User Interface Design	 Adequate for 
Passwords? 
1. Strive for consistency	 Yes 
2. Frequent users can use shortcuts	 No 
3. Provide informalivefeedback	 No 
4. Dialogs should yield closure	 Ycs 
5. Prevent en'ors and provide simple error handlinf!.	 No 
6. Easy reversai ofany action	 No 
7. Put the user in charge	 No 
8. Reduce short-term memory load (F)	 No 
Table 2.2: Do the 8 golden rules of user interface design apply to security systems? 
(Schneiderman and Plaisant, 2005). 
Item Usability Security 
Frequent users Users can't take shortcuts: the system Prevcnts dictionary UI and 
cannot use won't match the first few lettcrs typed cavcsdropping 14 attacks. 
shortcuts and -fill in the rest. 
Don't provide Users hardly see the password they Prevents guessing attacks 
informative type: they can't find out repeated and Social Engineering 15 
feedback letters/accidental misspellings. 
Don't prevent Most systems only mention success Prevents guessing, 
errors and don't or failure: they don't show how close eavesdropping, and social 
provide simple the password guess was, or Even engineering attacks. 
error handling discern between a mistyped uscrname 
and password. 
Difficult Most systems keep track of incorrect Prevents guessing, 
reversai of any guesses and take irreparable action eavesdropping, and social 
action (locking the user's account) if several engineering attacks. 
bad guesses happen. 
Don't put the The system makes users be Prevents guessing, 
user in charge "responders" of actions rather th an the eavesdropping, and social 
initiators. engineering attacks. 
Don 't reduce Users must follow a set of security Prevents guessing, 
short-term policies rclated to password creation eavesdropping, and social 
memory load recommended by EMC, (2009). STM engineering attacks. 
is usually Iimited to 7+ 2 items. 
Table 2.3: The "six password broken rules" and their corresponding usability and 
security mismatches (Schneiderman and Plaisant, 2005). 
13 A form of attack in which an attacker uses a large set of Jikely combinatians to guess a secret.
 
14 EJectranic eavesdropping is the intentional surveillance of data: voice, fax, e-mail, mobile
 
telephones, etc. often for nefarious purposes;
 
15 To infiltrate a physicaJ building or information systems using non-technical means (e.g. searching
 
user desks for passworcts on notes).
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Users have too many passwords with different values, expiration periods, and 
composition rules. Usually these new complexity requirements drive users to forget 
their passwords and cali the help desk, write down their passwords, and finally chose 
common, insecure passwords. A Web-based pool was developed by Strauss and 
Corbin (1990) to gather quantitative and qualitative data on user behaviour and 
perceptions concerning password systems. The key findings are respectively: A large 
number of passwords diminish their memorability and raises insecure work practices, 
causing serious usability problems; users' understanding of what it is secure 
password content is deficient; and at last, the users are not well-informed about 
security issues. 
In an extremely networked world as the Internet for example, wherein users 
may access numeraus applications, password protection is regarded as expensive, 
awkward, and insecure. The requirement of authentication to access different 
applications, services, or facilities might generate frustration among users on a daily 
basis, because users might need to frequently access the same secured applications in 
a shol1 period of time. 
The prablem with passwords is that if they are not encrypted, or if the 
encryption is easy to break, passwords and passcodes (i.e. a PIN plus a tokencode) are 
vulnerable to eavesdropping and replay. And if it is encrypted, there are other types 
of attacks that may be used. A brute force or dictionary attack consists of an attack 
that just tries possibility after possibility until the right one is found. Utilities to help 
an attacker with this kind of attempt are easily found on the Internet. Short 
passwords, made of one simple word, are the easiest to figure out with this kind of 
attack. Therefore, many Super Administrators require pass phrases, complex 
combinations of words. ContraIs will also often require the use of a password policy 
as mentioned above, which makes it more random in nature and harder to guess. ln 
sorne environments, users must remember many complex passwords and pass phrases 
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and end up writing them down near the computer. This becomes the vulnerability 
(EMC, 2009). 
A Personal Identification Number (PIN) is in turn a unique personal character 
string used as a password, usually with a four-digit number, which must be entered by 
the user before a remote tenninal (e.g. desktop, mobile device, ATM, etc.) or Point­
of-Sale tenninal (e.g. kiosk) can be used to transfer information or complete a 
transaction. PINs are often employed with a magnetic-stripe card or smart cards at an 
ATM to authenticate, for example, a bank customer. PINs are also employed with 
authentication tokens such as the RSA SecurlD® Token for BlackBerry (Figure 2.9) and 
SafeWord Remote Access (Figure 2.10). A classic strategy to defend against Personal 
Identification Number (PIN) guessing attacks in authentication tokens is to lock a 
user's account usually upon three consecutive invalid PIN attempts. However, this 
"classic" strategy could seriously undermine the usability of the system or what is 
called a locking PIN system. Since the PiN is locked, it can only be unblocked by the 
Help Desk Administrator. Until then, the user will be not able to logon to the system. 
SafeWord tokens l6, for instance, will only generate the correct password after the 
correct PIN has been entered, and has attack lockouts if the wrong PIN is entered too 
many times. in the worst case scenario, the token becomes totally blocked, and 
service is not available. 
2.2.5.2 Authentication Tokens 
An Authentication Token (AT or sometimes also referred to as an 
authenticator), broadly defined, is a unique hardware or software object given to 
specifie users to prove their identities. ATs provide a means of authenticating and 
identifying an end-user. To verify the identity of the token's owner, the host system 
perfonns its authentication protocol using data encoded on the token. Some ATs 
16 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ud. June 23, 2009 
<http://www.securecomputing.com/index.cfm?skey=643> 
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contain advanced components like a microprocessor and semi-conductor memoryl7, 
and they support sophisticated authentication protocols which provide a high level of 
security. Generally, ATs allow the use of SSO systems that enable users to utilize an 
AT to sign on only once to a wide range of applications or Websites for which they 
demand access. 
ATs come in a variety of physical forms. The size, shape, and materials from 
which a token is manufactured are referred to conjointly as the token'sformfactor. A 
token's forrn factor involves trade-offs that must be evaJuated for deployment in 
different applications so security professionals can choose the form factor that is best 
suited to a particular application. An AT may have different form factors depending 
on the authentication method used and the vend or, i.e., a handheld device with or 
without a keypad, a key fob (small hardware device with built-in authentication 
engines), and a smartphone executing a certain type of software from a vend or. 
There are two types of token forrn factors: Non-contact Tokens and Contact­
Tokens. 
2.2.5.2.1 Non-Contact Tokens 
Non-contact Tokens demand no electrical or physical contact with a token 
reader device such as proximity cards (e.g., an employee brings it close to the card­
reader in order to gain physicaJ access into the office). One-Time-Password (OTP) 
generators and handheld Challenge-Response calculators are microprocessor-based 
authentication tokens which do not require a physical connection to host systems. 
These devices communicate directly with human users through an onboard display 
and sorne form of keypad. Users reJay authentication data, such as passwords or 
encrypted challenges, between tokens and hosl systems manually. 
17 RAM and ROM are semi-conductor memories. One of the characteristics of the semi-conductor 
memory is the ability to write information al an exlremely high speed and read il out. 
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2.2.5.2.1.1 One-Time Passwords (OTP) 
A security system that requires a new password every time users authenticate to a 
system, One-Time-Password (OTP) generators- make it more difficult to gain 
unauthorized access to restricted resources, such as by a hacker replaying an 
intercepted password. An OTP system usually employs microprocessor-based ATs, 
which do not demand a physical connection to host systems. These devices 
communicate directly with users through an embedded display and sorne form of 
keypad. Users transmit authentication data, such as passwords or encrypted 
challenges, between tokens and hast systems manually. Examples of OTP generators 
are the following: RSA SecurlD® Token for BlackBerry (Figure 2.9), SafeWord 
RemoteAccess (Figure 2.10), RSA SecurlD® Software Token 1.1 for iPhone Deviees 
(Figure 2.11), and DigiPass from Vasco (Figure 2.12). 
0068 1396 
Figure 2.10: SafeWord Figure 2.12: DigiPass 
Figure 2.9: RemoteAccess 18. Go 320. 
RSA 
SecurID® 
Token for Figure 2.11: RSA 
BlackBerry. SecurID® for 
iPhones l9 . 
18 Aladdin Knowledge Systems Lld. June 23, 2009
 
<http://www.securecomputing.com/index.cfm?skey=643>
 
19 RSA SecurlO® Token for BlackBerry. RSA, The Securily Division of EMC. May 23, 2010
 
<http://www.rsa.com/node.aspx?id=1165>
 
20 Vasco Data Security Inc. October 15,2007
 
<http://www.vasco.com/products/digipass/d igi pass_go_range/d igi pass_go3 .aspx>.
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OTP generators produce a sequence of passwords that are synchronized with 
host systems. Each password is only valid for one authentication, and so cannot be 
recorded and replayed to obtain access. Synchronization is frequently based on a 
secret initial source value, which is swapped at specifie time intervals, or each time 
an authentication event takes place. Then, without knowledge of the secret value and 
the number of times it has been swapped, an attacker may not foresee the next 
password in the sequence even if one or more previous passwords are known. When 
an OTP is combined with a Persona! Identification Number (PIN), two-factor 
authentication is achieved because the client needs to have something (the token) and 
know something (the PIN). But how exactly does authentication via OTP work? 
Figure 2.13 shows the OTP authentication process. 
User ID: asmi~h 
PIN: kzwo8 
token code: 449054 
RSA 
A t en ication 
Manager 
RAS, VP . 
( 44 054 )SSl-VPN, WLA , 
web and m rerit e algorit m 
Seed lime Same seed Same ime 
Figure 2.13: Authentication via OTp 21 : Pre-condition: Authentication server 
randomly generates OTPs (six-digit numeric token numbers) on the user's token 
display (e.g. 435961) every 60 seconds. User has an assigned authentication token. 
21 Authentication Manager - Enterprise-class security engine for RSA SecurID® authentication. RSA, 
The security divison ofEMC <http://www.rsa.com/products/securid/datasheets/ 
9239_SIDAM_DS_0208-lov.rres.pdf> 
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1.	 User opens and connects to the Virtual Private Network (VPN) application 
from his computer; 
2.	 User enters his username (idoe) and a 4-digit numeric PIN (72 34) ln the 
username and passcode fields on the login application screen-; 
3.	 User types and appends the six-digit numeric token number (currently 
displayed on her token) to the entered PIN on the login screen. This number 
(7234435961) becomes the passcode, which is in fact the combination of 
PIN and token number. 
4.	 User clicks "OK". 
5.	 If the authentication is successful, the authentication server validates the 
passcode and grants user access to the network's protected resources. 
2.2.5.2.1.2 Challenge Response (C/R) Authentication 
There are currently three main types of Challenge Response (CIR) generators: 
Handheld CIR, CAPTCHA: Telling Humans and Computers Apart Automatically, 
and SiteKey. The following describes the operation of these methods in general 
terms, but many variations are possible. 
A Handheld CR (HCIR) is a security mechanism for verifying the identity of a 
user or system without the need to transmit the actual password across the wire or 
wireless network. The server sends a challenge (string of alpha or numeric characters) 
to a client; this client then combines the string with its response (password), and from 
this a new password is generated. The new password is sent to the server; if the server 
can generate the same password from the challenge it sent the client and the client's 
password, then the client must be authentic. Sorne vendors provide software tokens 
(Figure 2.11) as an alternative to their hardware tokens. The main advantage of the 
software token is ease of use, since the user does not have a separate token; however, 
this reduces security. To solve this problem, sorne vendors provide smart cards or 
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Universal Seriai BUS22 (USB) keys (Figures 2-16 and 2-18). Other vendors make 
simpler the authentication process by providing a connection without interface 
between the hardware token and the user's computer. Typically, this is a Radio­
Frequency23 (RF) or wireless (Bluetooth or (IEEE802.11, 1999) interface. 
RF/wireless tokens provide an advantage over traditional tokens because a user can 
be continuously authenticated; hence going away from the computer automatically 
locks the computer or logs the user off. 
These HClRs require even more data input in companson with other 
authentication methods. Regardless of whether it is an average consumer or corporate 
computer user, the interaction with the device is al ways difficult since the fol1owing 
data have to be entered: a conventional user ID and password, a PIN, and the 
challenge. The difficulty of input is nowhere more obvious, since, for example, 
HClRs do not "echo" the password back on the screen as it is typed, but instead 
asterisks. Even ifwe make use of an OTP, the input error will be not evident 
until the server rejects the try. For that reason, the usability of the system suffers 
greatly. For example, in order to authenticate users to the network resources using a 
24CIR Windows LAN Manager (LANMAN), a 14-byte password product feature 
concatenates with O's if the password is less than 14 bytes, converts to upper case and 
splits into 7-byte halves for encryption. This security mechanism of encryption 
indirectly provides a good practice of usability since users can make a shift key error 
(e.g. typing a lowercase password) and the system will still recognize their password. 
On the other hand, this feature reduces the password entropy25. 
The CAPTCHA: Telling Humans and Computers Apart Automatically (Ahn et 
al, 2003) is a type of authentication employed to tell humans apart from machines by 
22 A seriai bus with a data transfer rate of 12 Mbps for cOlUlecting peripherals to a microcomputer. 
23 Radio Frequency (RF) is an automatic identification method, relying on storing and remotely 
retrieving data using devices called RFID tags or transponders. 
24 
Windows NT LAN Manager version 3 client with first logon prevents subsequent logon activity. 
Retrieved on June l, 2009. <http://support.microsofLcom/default.aspx?scid=kb;ENUS;241338> 
25 We can estimate the number of guesses, on average, the attacker must make to disclose a base secret 
(e.g. usemame and password); this metric is named Average Aftack Space. 
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avoiding automated responses. It falls into the category of C/R authentication. A 
CAPTCRA is a program that protects websites against Internet bots (i.e. a computer 
program which perfonns automated tasks) by generating and grading tests that 
humans can pass but existing computer programs cannot. For example, humans can 
read distorted text as shown in Figure 2.14, but existing computer programs can't. It is 
usually a word or set of numbers and letters -presented to the user that are in fact obscured 
or modified in sorne manner to prevent computers from responding to a prompt. 
Hatm the dtaraders in the pidure 
To continue. type the characters vou see in the picture. V!ni 
Charaders: 1	 _ 
[ Continue 
Figure 2.14: CAPTCRA: Telling Rumans and Computers Apart Automatically 
(Ahn et ol., 2003). 
Another C/R authentication method is SiteKey (BankofAmerica, 2009), a 
server authentication via images. It is a web-based security system that offers one 
type of mutual authentication between end-users and websites. Its main purpose is to 
deter phishing. SiteKey (Figure 2.15) has been employed by Bank of America, a large 
American financial institution, since 2006. SiteKey is owned by RSASecurity 
(2010). 
SiteKey uses the following C/R techniques: 
1.	 User identifies (not authenticates) herself to the site by entering her username 
(but not her password). If the username is a valid one the site proceeds (screen 
1). 
2.	 Site authenticates itself to the user by displaying an image and accompanying 
phrase that she has ear1ier configured. If the user does not recognize them as 
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her own, she is to assume the site is a phishing site and immediately abandon 
it. If she does recognize them, she may consider the site authentic and proceed 
(screen 2). 
3.	 User authenticates herselfto the site by entering her password. If the password 
is not valid for that usemame, the whole process begins again. If it is valid, 
the user is considered authenticated and logged in (screen 2). 
HankofAmerica ~ 
onfirm that your SiteK y is corr 
If yeu recegnlze your S,teKe)' 'mage, you'!l knew fa 
SlteKev Image IS also how you'!l know that Ifs ;-afe t 
1': = rt::qulred 
Bankof Amer-ca ~ 
Your SiteK y: 
PERSONAL • 
,i 5 Weicome to my photO! 
Online Banking iii 
Enrofl CRmo :llm more 
Use Savel! Online !D: 
IBall....• 
If you don't recognlze your perse alized SrteKey, 
A C r U!E ôlnOlher Onhne le don't enter YOUf Passcode. 
. Passcode: 
1 
fa.· 20 Ch8r&cte~ caSé sen_~r.~ 
1	 2 
Figure 2.15: SiteKe/6 helps prevent unauthorized access to users' accounts. It 
employs a combination ofusemame (Ieft), then phrase, image and passcode (right). 
26 SiteKey. Bank of America. November 19,2007 
<http://www.bankofamerica.com/onlinebanking/index.cfm?template=site_key&state=CA> 
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2.2.5.2.2 Contact Tokens 
To transfer data, most tokens must make physical contact with a reader device. 
Examples of such devices are magnetic stripe tokens used in Automated Teller 
Machines (ATM)27 (Figure 2.17) and hardware authentication USB tokens, which are 
small hardware devices that can be plugged into a USB port on a computer and can 
also be used with a password or PIN. Examples of USB tokens are the RSA 
SecurID® 800 Hardware Authenticator (Figure 2.16) and the VeriSign Secure 
Storage Token 28 (Figure 2.18). But what if you lose your token, or lock them in your 
car, or what if it is stolen? This is a common problem for tokens. 
Figure 2.16: RSA Figure 2.17: Magnetic Figure 2.l8: VeriSign 
SecurID® 800 with üTP. stripe token. Secure StorageToken. 
2.2.5.3 Digest Access Authentication 
Digest Access Authentication 29 (DAA) is one of established methods a web page 
can employ to negotiate credentials with a web user. It employs the Hyper Text 
Transfer Protocol (HTTP)30. This method builds upon (and obsoletes) the basic 
authentication scheme, enabling a user's identity to be established without having to 
send a password in plain text over the network. A DAA scheme provides no 
encryption of message content. The goal is simply to create an access authentication 
27Retrieved on June 25, 2008 
<http://www.lstsource.comipersonal_banking/products/resourceylus.htm> 
28 <http://www.verisign.comistaticIDEV016111.pdf> 
29 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2617.txt 
The basic authentication scheme was originally detined by RfC 1945 (Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
- HTTP/J .0). 
30 
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method that prevents the most serious flaws of basic authentication. One advantage of 
the basic authentication scheme is that it is supported by roughly ail popular web 
browsers. 
The classical transaction is comprised of the following steps: The user asks for 
a page that requires authentication but does not provide his credentials (i.e. user name 
and password). Typica1Jy this is because the user simply enters the address or fol1ows 
a link to the page. The server responds with the "401" response code, providing the 
authentication realm and a randomly-generated, single-use value called nonce 31 . At 
this moment, the system will show the authentication realm (normally a description 
of the computer or system being accessed) to the user and prompt for her credentials 
through the login window (Figure 2.19). Once the credentials have been provided, the 
system re-sends the same request but adds an authentication header that contains the 
response code. In this example, the server accepts the authentication and the page is 
retumed. If the credentials are invalid, the server may retum the "401" response code 
and the system would prompt the user again. 
31 Nonce is a random or non-repeating parameter value thal is included in data exchanged by a 
protocol, usually for the purpose of guaranteeing liveness and thus detecting and protecting againsl 
replay attacks. A nonce can be a time stamp intended to limil or prevent the unauthorized replay or 
reproduction of a file. 
53 
? ...__a___ 
.-- ---­
. -- '. ''''-,. '.:.,:'=-~----=-~-=--
....~.- .....- _~_..- ..._­...... 
___
'-"'--_ ..._-_.. ­~_ ...~~..-
..._1_·· ..·_..... _ 
_ h ..... .... ..... _._. ,._.__ •
~  
,.. __._. - ~  .._._._­
---_.._-.. _...._..- __.......... ­~. 
_ .... _ •••_ .. _l .. _ ...-..... ..._ 
-	 ... .. __ ..~_ .........__ .- .. _.
 
- -.- --. -- _.-- ..-" 
.. =---_ 6l'.tt~,ywJ~dfur~s-oit1Atu·attmp.:J/tJ0bJ4t:!QI!JO 
\.Js.t:NAme: 
a ,. ­
Figure 2.19: Digest Access Authentication's window login in Firefox. 
2.2.5.4 Out-Of-Band Authentication (OOBA) 
Out-Of-Band Authentication (OOBA) is the utilization of two separate 
networks working concurrently to authenticate a user. Therefore it prevents an 
intruder from having a chance to hack the password, It is as a strong defense against man­
in-the-middle attacks and sophisticated online hackers. OOBA works weil because 
even if an intruder gains aU security credentials to a user's account, a transaction 
cannot be completed without access to the second authentication network. Consider 
the mobile phone scenario to verify the identity of the user involved in a Web 
transaction. Sorne of the advantages of using a mobile phone-based OOBA are the 
following: 
•	 No supplementary hardware, software, or training is necessary for the end 
user. However it is still difficult for the average consumer computer user to 
cope with. 
•	 Users already carry phones and keep close track of them. 
•	 Mobile phone communication can take place in true reaJ time. 
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• Mobile phone authentication can require interaction with a human being. 
• The Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) is a secure network. 
• A strong, humanly understandable audit trait of the transaction is captured. 
OOBA using a mobile phone enables legitimate account owners to be made 
aware of attempts to breach their accounts. If an account is protected by mobile 
phone-based OOBA, the user will receive a cali to authenticate a large dollar 
transaction before it can be completed. If the rightful account owner is not involved in 
the web transaction, he cannot complete the mobile phone-based authentication, and 
the counterfeit transaction will be cancelled before losses are incurred. 
SafePass Mobile al a 
Glanee 
• Sign in to Onltne: Banking 
~	 Reque:st a SafePass 
code: te be: sent to your 
mobile devlce: 
OpE:n the 
n"'le:ssage to Yeu, 
obtain your S.II::Pi~ 
CodeSafePass code 653217 
"'	 . ... 
....	 Ent~r l'our SafePass 
code and compl~te 
your transactIon 
Figure 2.20: SafePass Mobile. 
To improve online security, Bank of America introduced SafePass32 (Figure 
2.20). To register for the SafePass OOBA service, customers add their mobile phone 
32 SafePass: Link retrieved on May 22, 2009 
<http://www.bankofamerica.com/privacylindex .cfm?template=leam_about_sa fepass> 
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numbers to the accounts overview section on Bank of America's Web site. When a 
customer initiates certain online transactions, the user will be prompted to enter a six­
digit code, which is sent via text message to the user's mobile phone. The code is 
required for transactions such as money transfers for amounts greater than the current 
limits, adding new bill payees, or adding new accounts for online transfers. The code 
expires within 10 minutes ofbeing issued or immediate1y after it is used. 
2.2.5.5 Risk-Based Authentication (RBA) 
Similar to layered authentication, RBA reqUlres vanous levels of proofs, 
depending on the risk level of the transaction. This tenn is used interchangeably for 
systems where risk assessment is used in two different ways: 1) In sorne systems, risk 
assessment is employed to determine the toughness of the processes and procedures 
to sign up and use a particular set of resources. The same credentials will be 
employed in every session, but users who need different kinds of resources possibly 
will use different credentials. A user name and password will be sufficient for sorne 
users, whereas others with more access to sensitive information may need, for 
example, a two-factor hardware token. 2) RBA is employed when systems require 
different authentication levels for the same user, based on the specifie transaction, not 
identity. For example, many web services will use a cookie, placed on the browser 
from an earlier session, as proof of identity for browsing catalogue pages, but will ask 
for a user name and password to make a purchase. 
An example of RBA is the RSA® Adaptive Authentication, which is an RBA 
and fraud detection platform that measures over one hundred risk indicators to 
identify high-risk and suspicious activities. Adaptive Authentication is powered by 
RSA® Risk Engine (Figure 2.21) that conducts a risk assessment of ail users behind 
the scenes. A unique risk score is assigned to each activity, and users are challenged 
when an activity is identified as high-risk and/or an organizational policy is violated. 
Adaptive Authentication monitors and authenticates activities based on risk, profiles, 
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and policies by correlating device identification profiles, behavioral patterning 
profiles, user profiles, RSA® eFraudNetwork™ feeds, and fraud intelligence. 
RSA'" Risk Engine 
,e::::::::, R5A NelworkL--J efraudNetwork 
Channel 
Information 
IP 
Information 
Behavioral Profile R5A Case Management 
feedback 
Deviee Profile Fraud Intelligence 
Figure 2.21: The RSA® Engine33 measures a number of factors in 
generating a risk score. 
The RSA Risk Engine is a proven, self-learning technology that evaluates each 
online activity in real-time, tracking over one hundred indicators in order to detect 
fraudulent activity. A unique risk score, between 0 and 1000, is generated for each 
activity. The higher the risk score, the greater the likelihood -that an activity is 
fraudulent. Adaptive Authentication protects users while accessing Websites & 
portais, SSL VPN applications, and WAM applications, for example. 
2.2.5.6 Public Key Authentication 
In conventional cryptography, the sender and receiver of a message know and 
use the same secret key; the sender uses the secret key to encrypt the message, and 
the receiver uses the same secret key to decrypt the message. This method is known 
as secret key or symmetric cryptography. The main challenge is getting the sender 
and receiver ta agree on the secret key without anyone else finding out. If they are in 
separate physical locations, they must trust a courier, a phone system, or sorne other 
33 Adaptive Authentication for the Enterprise (RSA® Engine) datasheet. May 21, 2010 
<http://www.rsa.comlproducts/consumer/datasheetsl1 0087_AA VPN_DS_0409,pdf> 
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transmission medium to prevent the disclosure of the secret key. Anyone who 
overhears or intercepts the key in transit can later read, modify, and forge ail 
messages encrypted or authenticated using that key. The generation, transmission and 
storage of keys are called key management; ail cryptosystems must deal with key 
management issues. Because ail keys in a secret-key cryptosystem must remain 
secret, secret-key cryptography often has difficuIty providing secure key 
management, especially in open systems with a large number ofusers. 
In order to solve the key management problem, Diffie and Hellman (1976) 
introduced the concept of public-key cryptography. Public-key cryptosystems have 
two primary uses, encryption and digital signatures. ln their system, each person gets 
a pair of keys, one called the public key and the other called the private key. The 
public key is published, while the private key is kept secret. The need for the sender 
and receiver to share secret information is eliminated; ail communications involve 
only public keys, and no private key is ever transmitted or shared. In this system, it is 
no longer necessary to trust the security of sorne means of communications. The only 
requirement is that public keys be associated with their users in a trusted 
(authenticated) manner (for instance, in a trusted directory). Anyone can send a 
confidential message by just using public information, but the message can only be 
decrypted with a private key, which is in the sole possession of the intended recipient. 
Furthermore, public-key cryptography can be used not only for privacy (encryption), 
but also for authentication (digital signatures) and various other techniques. 
In a public-key cryptosystem, the private key is always linked mathematically 
to the public key. Therefore, it is always possible to attack a public-key system by 
deriving the private key from the public key. Typically, the defense against this is to 
make the problem of deriving the private key from the public key as difficult as 
possible. For instance, sorne public-key cryptosystems are designed so that deriving 
the private key from the public key requires the attacker to factor a large number; in 
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this case it is computationally infeasible to perform the derivation. This is the idea 
behind the RSA public-key cryptosystem34 . 
Another important component often used in Public Key Authentication is a 
smart cardo Smart cards are plastic cards that include integrated circuit cards. They 
are tamperproof and can be employed to store users' certificates and private keys. 
Smart cards can execute complex public key cryptography operations, for instance 
digital signing and key exchange. 
lt is possible to deploy smart cards (and smart card readers) to offer stronger 
user authentication and non-repudiation for a variety of security solutions, incJuding 
logging on over a network using fingerprint (i.e. the smart card includes 
cryptographie keys and biometric fingerprint data), secure email, and other methods. 
But what are the benefits of making use of smart cards? 
The benefits are the following: 
•	 Private keys are stored on the smart card (tamper-resistant) instead of, for 
instance, on a users' hard disk (not secure). Therefore smart cards provide 
stronger security for user authentication and non-repudiation. 
•	 As cryptographie operations are disassociated from the operating system 
(OS), smart cards are not subject to attacks on the OS (e.g., memory dump 
attacks which may expose private keys or other cryptographie secrets). 
•	 Logon credentials foJ]ow users, so the system administrator for exampJe can 
issue a single smart card to each network user to provide a set of logon 
credentials for logging on to local and remote networks, which can reduce the 
cost of managing separate user accounts for Jogging on to a network and 
Jogging on remotely (Microsoft, 2010). 
Additionally, because the administrative support that is needed to administer 
user passwords is an important cost for large organizations, smart cards can be 
34 3.1.1 What is the RSA cryptosystem? RSA Laboratoires. RSA-The Security Division of EMC. May 
23, 201 0<hllp://www.rsa.comlrsaJabs/node.asp?id=2214> 
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deployed to reduce the cost of forgotten or expired passwords. Smart cards use PINs 
instead of passwords. The PIN protects the smart card in case of misuse due to the 
fact that the PIN is known only to the smart card's owner. A smart card scenario is a 
user who inserts the card in a smart card reader that is attached to a computer and, 
when prompted, enters the PIN. The smart card can be employed only by a user who 
possesses the smart card and has knowledge of the PIN. 
2.2.5.6.1 Encryption 
When Alice wishes to send a secret message to Bob, she looks up Bob's public 
key in a directory, uses it to encrypt the message and sends it off. Bob then uses his 
private key to decrypt the message and read it. No one listening in can decrypt the 
message. Anyone can send an encrypted message to Bob, but only Bob can read it 
(because only Bob knows his private key). 
2.2.5.6.2 Digital Signatures 
To sign a message, Alice does a computation involving both her private key 
and the message itself. The output is called a digital signature and is attached to the 
message. To verify the signature, Bob does a computation involving the message, the 
purported signature, and Alice's public key. If the result is correct according to a 
simple, prescribed mathematical relation, the signature is verified to be genuine; 
otherwise, the signature is fraudulent, or the message may have been altered. 
2.2.5.6.3 No Usability Features of Public Key Authentication 
The "Usability of Security: A Case Study" (Whitten and Tygar, 1998) was 
developed in order to evaluate the usability of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 5.0. PGP is 
standard software, which uses Public Key Infrastructure to encrypt, decrypt, and 
digitally sign data for the encryption of Electronic Mail developed by Phil 
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Zimmermann. The study's authors have chosen PGP because it has a very good user 
interface by established standards, and they wanted to know whether that was 
sufficient to allow non-programmers who know little about security to in fact use it 
effectively. The most meaningful results, obtained from a cognitive walkthrough and 
user test methods, unequivocally show that users had considerable difficulty with the 
following: avoiding dangerous errors, encrypting -messages, understanding the public 
key model, figuring out the correct key to encrypt with and how to encrypt with any 
key, decrypting a message, publishing the public key, and finally verifying a 
signature on an emai! message. Weil, these are in fact the basic tasks needed to l'un ­
the program correctly! Therefore, PGP has not been considered usable as a way to 
provide effective security for most email users, according to the authors, because of 
the fact that there is a "mismatch between the design phiJosophy behind its user 
interface and the usability needs ofa security utility". 
2.2.5.7 Single Sign-On (SSO) 
"External compliance requirements and internai security initiatives are driving 
the need for more complex passwords with more frequent expirations. Without a 
solution that helps end users, corporate password policies only frustrate end users. 
Users will write down passwords or use the same password for multiple applications ­
weakening security and hindering regulatory compliance efforts. Additionally, 
supporting multiple passwords also hits the IT bottom line as employees use costly 
help desk resources for password resets" (RSASecurity, 201 Oa). 
Single Sign-On describes the ability to use one set of credentials, an ID and a 
password or passcode, for example, to authenticate and access information across a 
system, an application, or even organizational boundaries. It may be called Web SSO 
when everything is accessed through a browser. With SSO, users authenticate only 
one time for a particular working session, in spite of where the information that they 
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want to access is located. This process provides improved security over a simple 
synchronization of passwords. 
SSO is quite useful these days when users need to access an ever increasing 
numbers of applications. SSO has major security and user benefits, as weil as the 
capacity to reduce the helpdesk costs ofpassword management significantly. 
There is a security risk with static password-based SSO because a breach of password 
security means ail systems accessible by a particular user can be compromised. 
Typically, SSO uses are in conjunction with sorne form of two-factor authentication. 
Although security vendors like RSA Security openly tout the benefits of RSA 
Federated ldentity Manager (i.e. SSO)35 as convenient and easy to use, users still 
need to create a secure (strong) password, which is- a cumbersome task, and 
remember it, increasing memory workload. This is the very same usability problem 
encountered with traditional password systems. 
A variant of the SSO is OpenlD (20 10) (not owned by any one company such 
as AOL), a decentralized sub-set of SSO for the Web that is different in that end­
users own an identity URL instead of a password. "You may choose to associate 
information with yom OpenID that can be shared with the websites you visit, such as 
a name or email address. With OpenlD, you control how much of that infon11ation is 
shared with the websites you visit. With OpenlD, your password is only given to your 
identity provider, and that provider then confirms your identity to the websites you 
visit. Other than your provider, no website ever sees your password, so you don't 
need to worry about an unscrupulous or insecure website compromising your 
identity" (OpenlD, 20 10). Also, you are able to make use of a single, existing account 
(e.g. AOL) to sign in to numerous websites without needing to create another 
username and password. OpenID is an easy method of joining new sites. Yet there are 
also sorne challenges associated with using Open ID, such as the struggle of creating a 
35 RSA Federated Idenlity Manager. RSA, The Security Division of EMC. May 23, 2010 
<http://www.rsa.com/node.aspx?id=1191> 
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username and password; however, this burden is minimized since you create your 
credentials only once. Still, users rnight not understand- or may be confused by 
open ID since it is not the standard usemame/password process weil known even to 
Novices users. Vou should not use OpenlD for high-privacy sites such as online 
banking, e-commerce sites, or healthcare sites since you trust only one provider for 
your -credentials (only one), so it is fine to use it for trivial things (e.g., library). 
Finally, an openlD provider may track your habits since they receive ail of the 
authentication requests. 
2.2.5.8 Kerberos 
Kerberos36 is an authentication method created by MIT (2006) as a solution to 
network security problems. Kerberos is a network authentication protocol that 
supplies strong authentication and shares temporary base secrets for client/server 
applications by using secret key cryptography. It uses strong cryptography so a client 
may prove its identity to a server (and vice versa) across an unsecure network session. 
Ihus, ail authentication processes happen between clients and servers. In Kerberos 
ontology, a "Kerberos client" is an entity that obtains a service "Ticket" for a 
Kerberos service. A client is cornmon ly a user. The designation "Kerberos Server" 
usually appeals to the Key Distribution Center (KDC). The KDC carries out the 
Authentication Service (AS) and the Ticket Granting Service (TGS). The KDC has a 
copy of each password related to every client or server. Hence, it is crucial to keep 
the KDC as secure as possible. 
36 The name Kerberos comes from Greek mythology; it is the lhree-headed dog that guarded the 
entrance to Hades. 
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Figure 2.22: A network authentication method: Kerberos (Smith, 2202). 
How does it work? An indirect Authentication design pattern, which appears in 
the deployment of an authentication system like Kerberos, works according to the 
following (Figure 2.22): John logs on to the KDC, which supplies him with two 
encrypted credentials that are designated "Tickets" (one encrypted for his Master Key 
and the other encrypted with the Mail Server's Master Key). Then, John decrypts his 
Ticket to gather the shared secret key (e.g. something that the user and the system 
hold in common: a password) and forwards the other to the Email Server, which uses 
that Ticket to authenticate John. ln fact, a Ticket is an encrypted copy of a temporary 
base secret, and it is encrypted with the Master Key known only by the KDC and the 
Ticket's supposed receiver. 
2.2.5.9 Biometries 
Biometries is a forrn of authentication that employs the user's physical or 
behavioral characteristics to verify her claimed identity. Physical characteristics like 
fingerprints, retinas and irises, hand geometry, facial structure, voice/speech, and 
under skin-based authentication and behavioral characteristics Iike signature- and 
keystroke recognition are sorne of the existing biometric authentication methods. 
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They may be employed alone or integrated with other technologies such as smart 
cards, encryption keys, or digital signatures. 
Biometric-based authentication applications encompass workstation, network, 
and domain access, single sign-on, application logon, data protection, remote access 
to resources, transaction security, and Web security. A Biometric system operates in 
two modes: enrolment and verification. In the enrolment process, the user's 
biological characteristics - are acquired and stored (Lemplale) for later use. This 
lemplale is then placed in a back-end database for tater retrieval. ln the verification 
process, the user's characteristics are measured and compared against the stored 
lemplale. Biometric authentication is potentially the strongest single authentication 
method. Nevertheless, it is not infallibte, and certain vulnerabilities have far-reaching 
consequences. Fingerprint, voice, and face recognition are the most appropriate 
biometrics for restricting access to Web pages, as the sensors for these AMs are 
small, cheap, and available at large as standard options on PCs from many computer 
vendors. 
Figure 2.23: Biometric authentication process (Woodward et al., 2003). 
How does Biometrics work? 
1.	 The Data Collection process- captures the individual's biometric data using a 
physical biometric reader (e.g., a fingerprint scanner or an iris camera) and 
sends the unprocessed biometric data (shown by the splash) to Signal 
Processing. 
65 
2.	 Signal Processing refïnes the unprocessed biometric data and sends the 
biometric sample (shown by the parallelogram) to Matching Process. 
3.	 The Matching Process compares the biometric sample with the individual's 
template and sends a Score to the Decision process. 
4.	 The Decision process (shown separately from the application in this example) 
determines whether the Score is above or below some pre-established 
thresholds, and sends it the final Yes or No to the Application. 
The redundancy factor of Biometries systems is an important aspect of usable 
security. The best practices in authentication state that multi-factor authentication is 
generally stronger than any single-factor authentication method. Biometries is 
generally recognized as a "good candidate" to be used with another authentication 
technique: a two-factor authentication. ln a two-factor technique (e.g. coupling 
biometrics with smart card technology) the redundancy of the authentication 
augments the security level, but at the same time diminishes the user experience. In 
such cases, the authentication process must have built-in redundancy, so that a second 
method must be provided in order to confirm the user's identity. Secondly, 
physioJogical traits such as fingerprint or hand recognition generally require a single 
data scanning of the acquisition device (e.g. fingerprint scanners, iris recognition 
cameras, etc.) and are stable physical characteristics. On the other hand, behavioural 
characteristics like voice or signature recognition are more susceptible to alterations 
(e.g. illness, aging, emotion, etc.) and usually require- multiple- samples from the 
user in order to generate an accurate template. Therefore, behavioural characteristics 
require extensive user collaboration and also fast data acquisition devices. The former 
demands ease of use of the system, while the latter at present doesn't offer data speed 
or user convenience, since both enrolment and verification generally bother users. In 
theory, any good security policy means using multiple forms of security to create a 
positive redundancy and make it more difficult for an attacker, but as already stated, 
this undermines usability. 
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This tbesis argues that it is feasible to balance (trade-uff) the security usability 
constraints of the biometric systems by the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and the 
False Rejection Rate (FRR) - two measurements often quoted as identifying the 
capabilities of biometric systems. These rates refer to the number of false negative or 
false positive matches returned during a biometric evaluation and verification. A FAR 
of a non-legitimate user may cause damage to the system it is supposed to protect. 
Frequent FRR of a legitimate user, on the other hand, would have an undesired 
consequence for the user and drop user acceptance for the system. The risk of having 
an FRR is clear, for instance, in the case of a user having a terrible cold. The !rade-off 
between the FRR and the FAR rate depends on the extent that the system is able ta 
tolerate (i.e., if the decision threshold is increased, FRR increases, and FAR 
decreases, and vice versa) at the moment of a signature or hand verification, for 
example. 
Biometric authentication is susceptible to capture and replay attacks (i.e. 
between the scanning device and client software) or between the client and the 
database server. If an attacker can capture the image or trial template of a user's 
biometric, then the attacker can replay that data to masquerade as that user. Once an 
individual's biometric is compromised, that user can no longer employ that 
characteristic on that system, or on any other analogous system, for 1ife. ln contrast ta 
a password or token, a biometric is not able to be reissued, so in order to participate 
in the biometric system again, the user must re-enroll. 
2.2.5.9.1 Fingerprint Recognition 
Fingerprint Recognition (FR) is the most common fonu of biometrics. One of 
the most widely known and commonly used biometric identification schemes is 
fingerprint. FR compares users' fingerprints to a previously stored template and 
detennines validity and authenticity based on this comparison. For example, users 
place their finger on a device that reads the thumbprint (figure 2.24) on a laptop. Ta 
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authenticate them, the system compares the CUITent fingerprint pattern with a 
previously collected thumbprint, and access is granted only when the patterns are 
identicaJ. 
Figure 2.24: Eikon To Go fingerprint reader37 . 
Figure 2.24 illustrates a wireless network and electronic access control-based task 
using a portable UniversaJ SeriaI Bus (USB) device coupled with software that 
allows remote employees to simply swipe their finger, for example to log -into the 
organization's system or access password-protected Web sites. 
37 <http://www.upek.com/solulions/mac> 
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Figure 2.25: Fingerprint recognition scheme BioEnable38 . 
Fingerprint recognition technology is divided into two distinct processes: 
verification and identification (Figure 2.25). ln the verification process, the user states 
who she/he is and a fingerprint is taken and compared to the user's previously 
registered fingerprint. If the fingerprints match, the user is "verified" as who he/she 
says he/she is. Since the newly acquired fingerprint is compared to only one stored 
fingerprint, this is called a one-to-one matching process (1: 1). 
As in the enrollment process, when fingerprint verification is done, only the 
fingerprint template is used in the comparison, not the actual image of the fingerprint. 
ln the identification process, the user doesn't need to state who she/he is. A 
fingerprint is taken and compared to each fingerprint in the database of registered 
users. When a match occurs, the user is "identified rr as the existing user the system 
found. Since the newly acquired fingerprint is compared to many stored fingerprints, 
this is called a one-to-many matching process (1 :N). As in the verification process, 
38 <http://www.bioenabJetech.com/> 
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when fingerprint verification is done, only the fingerprint template \s used In the 
comparison, not the actual image of the fingerprint. 
2.2.5.9.2 Optical Recognition 
There are two common types of optical biometrics: retinal and iris. Retinal and 
iris scanning devices now enable individuals to be scanned even through eyeglasses 
and contact lenses. Commercial authentication systems are produced by Panasonic39 
and LG IrisAccess4o . 
2.2.5.9.3 Facial Recognition 
An image is examined for overall facial structure. In authentication 
applications, the system has a camera that searches a user's face and matches it 
against the face stored in the user record (Figure 2.26). Commercial face recognition 
systems are produced by LI Identity. 
Figure 2.26: Facelt Argus: facial recognition system from LI Identit/'. 
39 http://www-images.panasonic.com/bus iness/securi (y/prod uCls/biomelrics.asp
 
40 http://www.lgiris.com/
 
41 L-l ldentity Solutions <hllp://www.Jlid.com/pages/ 17>
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2.2.5.9.4 Voice/Speaker Recognition 
Voice/Speaker recognition is weil suited for telecommunications applications, 
and the latest mobile devices already have the necessary hardware to utilize these 
applications. Speaker Recognition systems prompt a user for sorne spoken words, and 
authenticates the user based on distinguishing speech patterns (voiceprints). Apple 
Computer (Figure 2.26)- and Sensory Technologies42 are vendors which produce 
speaker recognition systems for user authentication. 
One of the drawbacks ofVoice/Speaker recognition is the impersonation attack, 
where an unauthorized individual changes her biometric to appear to be an authorized 
individual. Aiso it is more susceptible to alterations (e.g. illness, aging, emotion, etc.). 
Flrst Recordlnll 
Rf!'cord the phrase: _ 
-Myvolce Is illY password." 
R"ç,ord 
Ploy 
Select Microphone: 1 Extemal Mic ~I 1 Cancel 1 ~ Done 
Figure 2.27: This is a voiceprint for the passphrase: "My voice is my password".
 
Spoken passphrase gathered by Apple's Mac OS 9.043 .
 
2.2.5.9.5 Signature Recognition 
Signature recognition operates in a three-dimensional environment. It measures 
height and width as weil as the amount of pressure applied in a pen stroke. Signature 
authentication software is produced by Cyber-SIGN. Dynamic signature verification 
(Figure 2.28) takes into account how the signature was realized. It is the alterations in 
speed, pressure, and timing that take place during the act of signing that are 
42 Sensory, lnc. <http://www.sensoryinc.com/> 
43 http://www.apple.com/macosx/what-is-macosx 
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significant, and not the shape or look of the signature. ln fact, only the original signer 
can reconstruct those alterations in timing and X, Y, and Z pressure. 
Figure 2.28: Dynamic signature verification from Cyber SIGN44 . 
2.2.5.9.6 Keystroke Recognition 
ln this type of technology, not only must the attackers know the correct 
password, but they must be also able to reproduce the user's rate of typing and 
intervals between letters. AdmitOne45 uses two methods to identify individuals: First, 
the user must know both the correct username and password, and second, the user's 
typing rhythm must match the biometric template that has been stored and secured by 
the system. Keystroke Dynamics: Unique Keyboard Signature of an Individual IS an 
example of a keystroke recognition program. 
44 Wilswell Consulting & Services, Inc. <hllp://www.cybersign.com/com/CSlacrobal.html> 
45 Keystroke Dynamics: Unique Keyboard Signature of an Individual. AdmitOne Security is the 
idenlity assurance division of Scout Analylics. 
<h[tp://www.admitonesecurity.com/keystroke_dynamics_advantages.asp/> 
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2.2.5.9.7 Under-Skin RFID Chip - AuthenLink 
This thesis's author envisions a Personal Area Network (PAN)46 wherein 
humans communicate (intercommunicate) continually with wireless devices without 
additional user authentication inputs like passwords, passphrases, PINs, Biometries, 
or other existing authentication methods. To this end, an authentication method 
dealing with human-implanted RFID chips has been developed by Braz and Aïmeur 
(2003): AuthenLink. It is a wireless and user-centered authentication system to 
authenticate humans to remote systems. It is specifically designed to protect against 
fraud, counterfeit, and theft, and particularly well-suited for high-risk security 
systems. The system achieves its goal through a microprocessor chip (ChipTag) 
computer implanted under human skin. This ChipTag is able to authenticate a user's 
access to systems; to connect them wirelessly through the RFID technology; and to 
enable mobile devices to perform mobile transactions, access files, and so forth. For 
more information, go to: http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/d362040/masterThesis.htm. 
2.2.5.9.8 Biometries Trade-Offs Related to Usable Seeurity 
From the usability perspective, the ideal systems only require a single biometric 
signature to enrol a user. For example, fingerprints and hand paJm recognition 
typically require a single reading, whereas behavioural systems like voice recognition 
or written signatures are more exposed to variation, and frequently require multiple 
readings to train the system to recognize each user. The secret is to balance the 
likelihoods of FRR and FAR- so the system barely Jocks out legitimate users and it 
doesn't fall for masquerades. 
46 A Personal Area Network (PAN) is a computer network used for communication among computer 
devices (including wireless devices) close to one's person. The reach of a PAN is lypically a few 
meters. PANs can be used for communication among the personal devices themselves (intrapersonal 
communication), or for connecling to a higher level network and the Internet (an uplink). 
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Figure 2.29: Balancing security and usability (Smith, 2002). 
According to Smith (2002), as shown in Figure 2.29, Biometries readings from 
a particular user should c10sely match that user's biometric pattern; at worst, the 
difference should never exceed the matching threshold shown by the dashed line. The 
risk of masquerades (i.e. FAR) is reduced by moving the curve to the left, which 
reduces the amount of grey area on the left. But this reduces usability, given that it 
increases the likelihood of FRRs (the grey area on the right). 
For a comparison of the most representative Biometrie technologies (Jain, 
2004), see Appendix A, Comparative Analysis of User Authentication Methods. 
2.2.6 '1'0 Whom is Authentication -Targeted? 
An important point is which type of users employs authentication systems, or 
more specifically, to whom is authentication targeted? An end-user is the final or 
ultimate user of a computer system. The term "end-user" usually implies an 
individual with a moderately low level of computer expertise. Typically there are four 
classes of users: Security User (a computer security expert user), Techy User (a 
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computer programmer or expert user), Corporate User (a user who works for an 
organization and has - relatively - good knowledge of computer systems), and a 
Novice User. 
As already mentioned in Chapter l, the end-user has knowledge of basic Web 
browsing with typical security and technical expertise or sorne previous training in 
the use of computer interfaces, and can be an average corporate computer user or an 
average consumer computer user. Typically this individual ultimately uses a software 
or hardware authenticator to enable them to perfonn their job function (e.g. an 
individual employs an authentication token to authenticate to a corporate network or 
access an online banking account). 
2.2.7 Comparative Analysis of User Authentication Methods 
As part of one of the tasks to understand what authentication methods are, how 
they work, and what kind of different features are found on them, a comparative 
analysis of the main user authentication methods has been developed according to 
Table 2.4. (The full version is available in Appendix A). 
The frame of reference for this comparative analysis has been acquired from 
specifie sources indicated in the footnotes and also from observation, experience, and 
secondary data. Il has been established according to the different attributes contained 
or possessed by the authentication methods such as characteristics/acquisition device, 
definition, advantages, disadvantages, security, costs, usability and place of use, 
acquisition time, industrial application, and finally accuracy. The primary grounds for 
comparison have to do with the most representative and diverse authentication 
methods currently on the market, and an example that describes a specifie advanced 
method created by this thesis's author which has not been yet commercialized. 
Following are explanations of the definitions, abbreviations, and notes/footer 
sections used in Table 2.4: 
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•	 To describe the authentication methods attributes, subjective rating scales 
have been used, such as: 
o	 "Security" and "Usability" range from 1=Minimum to 5=Maximum in 
order to measure the degree of severity issues related to each 
authentication method. 
o	 "Automation versus Human" range from 1=Human is better; 
5=Machine is better. 
•	 Total Transaction Time (seconds) corresponds to the time it takes for a single 
user to present the biometric (acquisition time), processing time, and, 
optionally, might include entry of a PIN or user identifier (Woodward et al., 
2003). 
•	 "Accuracy" has two measure rates of authentication by biometrics: 
o	 False Reject Rate (FRR) where a legitimate user is rejected by the 
acquisition device. 
o	 False Acceptance Rate (FAR) where a false user is accepted. 
•	 "Average Attack Space": corresponds to the number of guesses made by an 
attacker in order to disclose the base secret (e.g. passwords, PINs, etc.). 
•	 Abbreviations used are the following:
 
C/R=Challenge/Response
 
PK=Public Key
 
PRK=Private Key
 
SSO= Single-Sign-On
 
TGS=Ticket Granting Service.
 
Notes are displayed as numbers between square brackets (e.g. (1), (2), n), and can be 
found right after the comparative analysis table. They are not displayed in order of 
entry, given that different items may use the same note. References are also used due 
to the variety of data provided and the need to minimize the number of notes and/or 
footnotes on the pages. They can be found in the "References" section. 
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2.3 The GOMS Model 
The GOMS model, first proposed by Card et al. (1983), is the general term for 
a family of human infonnation processing techniques that attempts to model and 
predict user behavior. 
The acronym GOMS stands for Goals, Operators, Methods, and Selection 
Rules, as illustrated in Figure 2.30. 8riet1y, a GOMS model consists of descriptions 
of the Methods needed to accomplish specified Goals. The Methods are a series of 
steps consisting of Operators that the user performs. A Method may cali for sub­
Goals to be accomplished, so the Methods have a hierarchical structure. If there is 
more than one Method to accomplish a Goal, then Selection RuJes choose the 
appropriate Method, depending on the context. Describing the Goals, Operators, 
Methods, and Selection RuIes for a set of tasks in a formaI way constitutes doing a 
GOMS analysis, or constructing a GOMS mode!. 
GOALS 
Figure 2.30: The GOMS Model (Grasso, 2008). 
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2.3.1 Engineering Models for Usable Interface Design 
The major extant form of an engineering model for interface design is the 
GOMS model. The standard accepted technique for developing a usable system, 
empirical user testing, is based on iterative testing and design revision using actual 
users to test the system and help identify usability problems. It is widely agreed that 
this approach, derived from Human Factors, does indeed work when carefully applied 
(Card, 1983). The GOMS model is appropriate for modern software development 
practice since it is faster and cheaper than empirical user testing, especially when 
difficult-to-get domain experts are the target user group. Another important point is 
the concept of engineering models for usability, which has been evolving since the 
work by Card et al (1983). Similarly to the models used in other engineering 
disciplines, engineering models for usability produce quantitative predictions of how 
weil humans will be able to perform tasks with a proposed design. Such predictions 
can be used as a substitute for actuaJ empirical user data, making it possible to iterate 
through design revisions and evaluations much more rapidJy. Furthermore, unlike 
purely empirical assessments, an engineering model for an interface design can 
capture the essence of the design in an inspectable representation, making it easier to 
reuse successful design insights in the future. 
The overall scheme for using engineering models in the user interface design 
process is as follows: Following an initial task analysis and proposed first interface 
design, the interface designer would then use an engineering model as applicable to 
find the usability problems in the interface. However, because there are other aspects 
of usability that are poorly understood, some fonTI of user testing is still required to 
ensure a quality result. Only after dealing with design problems revealed by the 
engineering mode] would the designer then go on to user testing. If the user testing 
reveals a serious problem, the design might have to be fundamentally revised, but 
again the engineering models will help refine the redesign quickly. Thus the slow and 
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expensive process of user testing is reserved for those aspects of usability that can 
only be addressed at this time by empirical trials. If engineering models can be fulJy 
developed and put into use, then the designer's creativity and development resources 
can be more fully devoted to more challenging design problems, such as devising 
entirely new interface concepts or approaches to the design problem at hand. 
The major extant form of an engineering model for interface design is the 
GOMS mode!. The standard accepted technique for developing a usable system, 
empirical user testing, is based on iterative testing and design revision using actual 
users to test the system and help identify usability problems. It is widely agreed that 
this approach, inherited from Human Factors, does indeed work when carefully 
applied (Card, 1983). The GOMS model is appropriate for modern software 
development practice since is faster and cheaper than empirical user testing, 
especially when difficult-to-get domain experts are the target user group. Another 
important point is the concept of engineering mode!s for usability, which has been 
evolving since the work of Card et al. (1983). Similarly to the models used in other 
engineering disciplines, engineering models for usability produce quantitative 
predictions of how weil humans will be able to perform tasks with a proposed design. 
Such predictions can be used as a substitute for actual empirical user data, making it 
possible to iterate through design revisions and evaluations much more rapidly. 
Furtherrnore, unlike purely empirical assessments, an engineering model for an 
interface design can capture the essence of the design in an inspectable 
representation, making it easier to reuse successful design insights in the future. 
The overall scheme for using engineering models in the user interface design 
process is as follows: Following an initial task analysis and proposed first interface 
design, the interface designer would then use an engineering model as applicable to 
find the usability problems in the interface. However, because there are other aspects 
of usability that are poorly understood, sorne form of user testing is still required to 
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ensure a quality result. Gnly after dealing with design problems revealed by the 
engineering model would the designer then go on to user testing. If the user testing 
reveals a serious problem, the design might have to be fundamentally revised, but 
again the engineering models will help refine the redesign quickly. Thus the slow and 
expensive process of user testing is reserved for those aspects of usability that can 
only be addressed at this time by empirical trials. If engineering models can be fully 
developed and put into use, then the designer's creativity and development resources 
can be more fully devoted to more challenging design problems, such as devising 
entirely new interface concepts or approaches to fit the design problem at band. 
2.3.2 GOMS: A Method for Cognitive Task Analysis 
Advances in technology have augmented demands on the cognitive skills of 
workers, whereas the human system has remained moderately stable. Workers bave 
been employing and/or operating complex computer technology. User interfaces 
(UIs) help users interact with programs and in their tasks. Users employ programs for 
performing their tasks. A Ul should not reflect the structure of the underlying 
program, but the structure of the task domain and/or the task solution process. Users 
should not interact with the computer, but with their tasks. Cognitive Task Analysis 
(CTA) can boost human performance by guiding the development of tools and 
programs that support the cognitive processes required for a task (Chipman et al., 
2000). CTA is conducted for a wide variety of purposes such as system development, 
instruction and training, and human-computer interface design. For our particular 
study, CTA provides a description of the conceptual and procedural knowledge 
utilized by users as they perform, for example, authentication tasks such as accessing 
a protected network resource using a KBA method (e.g. security questions as an 
emergency access method). Based on extensive research among a variety of CUITent 
CTA strategies (Kirwan et al., 1992; Hollnagel, 2003; Kieras et al., 1995; Diaper 
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and Stanton, 2003; Hackos and Redish, 1998), and in the context of the problem 
under consideration, user authentication, NGOMSL (Natural Goals, Methods, 
Selection Language) (Kieras, 1996) was selected as the most appropriate CTA 
method. 
According to Proctor and Vu, (2005), GOMS 1S the most widely used method 
of cognitive task analysis. GOMS is both a performance model and a cognitive task 
analysis method. A GOMS model represents users' knowledge in a hierarchical stack 
structure consisting of goals, the state of affairs to be achieved; operators, elementary 
perceptual, motor, cognitive acts whose execution is necessary to change any aspect 
of a user's mental state or to affect the task environment; methods', sequences of 
operators that describe a procedure for accomplishing a goal; and selection ru/es, 
rules that determine which method is used when there are several methods for 
accomplishing the same goal. A GOMS task analysis is a process of creating a 
GOMS model by decomposing user task knowledge into GOMS components. The 
general strategy is similar to hierarchical task analysis: Begin by identifying the top­
level user goals, emphasizing breadth over depth. Then refine each goal into sub­
goals, methods, and operators. It differs from hierarchical task analysis in that a 
GOMS model has a specifie format. GOMS is specifically designed to represent 
procedural knowledge of well-Iearned cognitive tasks. Additionally, a GOMS mode! 
can be translated into executable programs for evaluating the consistency of the 
model and obtaining quantitative measures of the interface being designed. 
In the analysis and implementation stages, a GOMS model of existing or 
proposed tasks can be used to determine if the functional requirements are derived 
from the tasks performed by users: Every task goal should have a specifie method for 
achieving the goal. The GOMS analysis can identify benchmark tasks (i.e. set of 
benchmark cases that represent important user tasks) and establish performance 
criteria for usability tests at later stages. A GOMS model also can be used ta 
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determine the consistency of procedures: Similar goals should be accomplished with 
similar tasks. When more than one method is provided, the GOMS analysis can 
determine whether there are selection rules that determine the method to be used. 
When a GOMS model is constructed, quantitative assessments of the design can be 
made from assumptions about operator execution times. For example, a GOMS 
model can be used to evaluate alternative design concepts in terms of time to learn to 
use the system, time to perform some tasks, and possibly time for recovering from 
errors. 
GOMS analyses and models are most appropriate for user tasks having well­
defined goals (e.g. logging into the system) and requiring the application of learned 
cognitive ski lIs. GOMS also does not permit analysis of interface issues related to the 
layout of components, readability of text, and so on. Instead it is focused on the 
procedures that the user must learn and execute when performing tasks. 
It is worth noting that GOMS represents only the procedural aspects of 
usabiIity. GOMS models can predict the procedural characteristics of usability; these 
concern the amount, consistency, and effectiveness of the procedures that users must 
pursue. Since the usability ofnumerous systems depends profoundly on the simplicity 
and effectiveness of the procedures, the GOMS model has significant value in 
guiding interface design. The reason why GOMS models can predict these 
characteristics of usability is that the methods for achieving user goals has a tendency 
to be strongly constrained by the design of the interface, making it possible to build a 
GOMS model given just the interface design, prior to any prototyping or user testing 
(Kieras, 1996). 
Clearly, there are other important characteristics of usability that are not related 
to the procedures entailed by the interface design. These concelll both lowest-Ievel 
perceptual issues like the font's readability on Cathode-Ray Tubes (CRTs)47, and also 
47 CRI is the technology used in most teJevisions and computer display screens. 
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very high-level issues such as the user's conceptual knowledge of the system (e.g. 
whether the user has an appropriate mental model) (e.g. Kieras and Bovair, 1984), or 
the degree to which the system fits properly into an organization (i.e. the social or 
organizational impact of the system and the resulting influence on productivity) (John 
and Kieras, 1994). The lowest-Ievel issues handle fine in terms of standard human 
factors methodology, while understanding the bigher-level concerns is at present an 
issue of good judgment on the part of the practitioner and the higher-level task 
analysis techniques (Kieras et al., 1995). 
For detailed information on why to choose the GOMS model over other CTA 
techniques, see Appendix E.l, NGOMSL versus CPM-GOMS, KLM, and CMN­
GOMS: Which Model to Use? 
2.3.3 How to Develop a GOMS Model? 
ln ail GOMS analysis techniques, the analyst must start with a list of high-level 
user goals. Typically, this list of goals can be obtained from other task analyses, 
including observations of users of similar or existing systems. The GOMS steps are 
described as follows: 
•	 ldentify user's goals (The analyst can then express in a GOMS model how the 
user can accomplish these goals with the system being designed). A goal is 
something that the user tries to accomplish. The analyst attempts to identify 
and represent the goals that typical users will have. A set of goals usually will 
have a hierarchical arrangement in which accomplishing a goal may first 
require -accomplishing one or more sub-goals. A goal description is an action­
object pair in the form- <verb noun> (e.g. Acces s a file). The verb can be 
complicated if it is necessary to distinguish between methods (see below on 
selection rules). Any parameters or modifiers, such as where a "to-be-deleted" 
word is located, are represented in the task description. 
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•	 Define methods (Write Method for accomplishing Goal - may invoke sub­
goals). The example consists of a list of methods for each system. For 
example 
Select a word expressed in the NGOMSL notation is shown in Figure 2.31. 
Method for goal: select word
 
Step 1. Locate middle of word.
 
Step 2. Move cursor to middle of word.
 
Step 3. Double-click mouse button.
 
Step 4. Verify that correct text is selected
 
Step 5. Return with goal accomplished.
 
Figure 2.31: Method for selecting a word (Kieras, 1996). 
•	 Define Operators (Standard Primitive External Opera tors, Standard Primitive 
Mental Operators, and Analyst-Defined Mental Operators). They are mostly 
determined by the hardware and lowest-Ievel software of the system (e.g. 
Move finger to the USB fingerp:::int reader). Extemal operators are 
the observable actions through which the user exchanges information with the 
system or other objects in the environment (e.g. a perceptual operator such as 
Read your online ID from a screen). Mental operators are the internal 
actions performed by the user. In the notation system presented here, sorne 
mental operators are "built in". These operators correspond to the basic 
mechanisms of the cognitive processor, the cognitive architecture. 
A particular task analysis assumes a particular level of analysis which is 
reflected in the "grain size" of the operators. If an operator will not be 
decomposed into a finer level, then it is a primitive operator. But if an 
operator will be decomposed ioto a sequence of Iower-Ievel, or primitive, 
operators, then it is a high-Ievel operator. Exactly which operators are 
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primitives depends on the finest grain level of analysis desired by the analyst. 
Some typical primitive operators are actions like pressing a button- or moving 
the hand. AU built-in mental operators are primitive. High-Ievel operators 
would be gross actions, or stand-ins for more detailed analysis, such as LOG­
INTO-SY8TEM. The analyst recognizes that these could be decomposed, but 
may choose not to do so, depending on the purpose of the analysis (Kieras, 
1996). 
ln the case of the Standard Primitive External Operators, the designer 
defines the primitive motor and perceptual opera tors based on the basic 
actions required by the system being analyzed. These correspond 
straightforwardly to the physical and sorne of the mental operators used in the 
Keystroke-Level Model (KLM). KLM uses only keystroke level operators, no 
goals, methods or selection rules. The analysis simply lists the keystrokes, 
mouse movements, and mouse-button presses that a user must perform ta 
accomplish a task, and then uses a few simple heuristics to place a single type 
of trivial "mental operator" which approximates many kinds of internai 
cognitive actions (e.g. think of). 
Standard Primitive Mental Opera tors IS 111 turn divided into Flow of 
Control and Memory storage and retrieval. Flow 0.1' Control represents a sub­
method which is invoked by declaring its goal: Accomplish goal: 
<goal description>. Control passes to the method for the goal, and returns 
here when the goal has been accomplished. The operator Return with goal 
accompli shed marks the end of a method. A decision is represented by a 
Decide operator; a Decide operator contains either one IF-THEN conditional 
with an optional ELSE, or any number of IF-THEN conditionals. ln Memory 
storage and retrieval, the memory opera tors reflect the distinction between 
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Long Term Memory (LTM) and Working Memory (WM), They are usually 
used in computer operation tasks as follows: 
Recall that <WM-object-description> 
Retain that <WM-object-description> 
Forget that <WM-object-description> 
Retrieve-from-LTM that <LTM-object-description> 
Finally, Analyst-Defined Mental Operators represent- psychoJogical processes 
that are too complex to be practical to indicate as methods in the GOMS 
model, so -the designer can circumvent these processes by defining operators 
that act as place holders for the mental activities. They are mostly high-Ievel 
operators. For example, Think-of <description> represents a process of 
thinking of a value for sorne parameter designated by <description> and 
putting the information into working memory (Kieras, 1996). 
•	 "The purpose of a Selection rule is to route control to the appropriate method 
to accomplish a goal (Kieras, J996). If there is more than one method for a 
goal, then a selection rule is logically required as shown below: 
Selection rule set for goal: <general goal description>
 
If <condition> Then accomplish goal: <specific goal
 
description> .
 
If <condition> Then accomplish goal: <specific goal
 
description>.
 
Return with goal accomplished.
 
An example of the GOMS model is shown below: 
GOAL: CLOSE-WINDOW 
(select GOAL: USE-MENU-METHOD 
MOVE-MOUSE-TO-FILE-MENU 
PULL-DOWN-FILE-MENU 
CLICK-OVER-CLOSE-OPTION 
GOAL: USE-CTRL-W-METHOD 
. PRESS-CONTROL-W-KEYS) 
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For a particular user: 
Rule 1: Select USE-MENU-METHüO unless another rule applies 
Rule 2: If the application is GAME, 
select CTRL-W-METHüO 
2.3.4 Natural GOMS Language (NGOMSL) 
ln psychology, researchers fit the parameters of their models to data they've 
collected on the task they're studying. But in interface design, system developers 
need quantitative a priori predictions for systems that have not yet been built. Thus, 
HCl researchers have done extensive theoretical and empirical work to estimate 
parameters that are robust and reliabJe across tasks and can be used without .Ii/l'thel' 
empirica/ validation to make predictions (e.g. usability testing). NGOMSL is one of 
the GOMS models that does quantitative a priori predictions for systems that have 
not yet been built. 
NGOMSL is a structured natural language notation for representing GOMS 
models and a procedure for constructing them (Kieras, 1996). An NGOMSL model is 
in program form, and provides predictions of operator sequence, execution time, and 
time to learn the methods. An analyst constructs a- NGOMSL model by performing a 
top-down, breadth-first expansion of the user's top-level goals into methods, until the 
methods contain only primitive operators, typically keystroke-Ievel operators (e.g. 
Click on "Sign In" button with .1 eft mouse butl:on). Like CMN-GOMS, 
NGOMSL models explicitly represent the goal structure, and therefore can represent 
high-level goals. 
The NGOMSL technique refines the basic GOMS concept by representing 
methods in terms of a cognitive architecture called Cognitive Complexity Theory 
(CCT) (Kieras and Poison, 1985). This cognitive theory allows NGOMSL to 
incorporate internai operators such as manipulating working memory information or 
setting up sub-goals. Because of this, NGOMSL can also be used to estimate the time 
92 
required to learn how to achieve tasks. An example of a NGOMSL model taken from 
John and Kieras (1996) is shown in Figure 2.3l. 
The GOMS modeling technique has proven extremely successful in developing 
accurate cognitive task models (Williams and Voigt, 2004). Sorne of the types of 
applications in which cognitive task models have been applied in their research 
include assessll1g human-computer interaction complexity, determining the 
productivity of human-computer interfaces, and analyzing an interface design to 
determine whether methods can be automated. 
For detailed information on why to choose NGOMLS over other GOMS 
models such as CPM-GOMS, KLM, and CMN-GOMS, see Appendix E.1, NGOMSL 
versus CPM-GOMS, KLM, and CMN-GOMS: Which Model to Use? 
2.3.4.1 Cognitive Complexity Theory 
When you have learned to perform a task with a particular interface and have to 
switch to- doing the same task with a new interface, how much better off will you be 
than someone just leaming to do the task with the new interface? That is, how much 
is the knowledge gained from using the old interface "transferred" to using the new 
interface? Cognitive Complexity Theory (CCT) (Bovair et a/. , 1990; Kieras and 
PoIson, 1985) is a psychological theory oftransfer of training applied to HCL It seeks 
to decompose user goals for completing computer tasks with a greater degree of 
granularity than GOMS in order to obtain more accurate predictions of how long it 
will take users to learn to complete tasks online with fewer errors. In contrast to 
GOMS mode1s, CCT investigates learners rather than skilled users. CCT has been 
shown to provide good predictions of execution time, learning time, and transfer of 
procedure leaming. 
CCT assumes a simple seriaI stage architecture in which Working Memory 
(WM) triggers production rules that apply at a fixed rate. These rules alter the 
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contents of working memory or execute primitive external operators such as making a 
keystroke. GOMS methods are represented by sets of production rules in a prescribed 
format. Learning procedural knowledge consists of learning the individual production 
rules. Learning transfers from a different task if the rules have already been learned. 
The complexity of a task will be reflected in the number and content of the 
production rules. The time it takes to learn a task is a function of the number of new 
rules that the user must learn; if the user already has a production, and a new task 
requires a rule that is similar, then the rule for the new task need not be learned. It is 
important to note that sorne predictions about errors and speedup with practice can 
also be collected from the contents of the production rules. 
The association between the NGOMSL notation and the CCT architecture is in 
fact direct: There is basically a one-to-one relationship between statements in the 
NGOMSL language and the production rules for a GOMS model written in the CCT 
format. Therefore, the CCT prediction results can be used by NGOMSL models ta 
estimate not only execution time like Keystroke-Level Model (KLM) and CMN­
GOMS48,but also the time to learn the procedures. CMN-GOMS stands for Card, 
Moran and Newell GOMS. 
CCT and NGOMSL modeIs have been empirically validated at the KLM of 
analysis (operators like DETERMINE-POSITION and CLlCK-MOUSE-BUTTON); 
therefore, models at that Ievel can generate trustworthy quantitative estimates. 
Because NGOMSL models specify methods in program form, they can characterize 
the procedural complexity of tasks- both in terms of how much must be learned- and 
how much has to be executed. 
CCT employs production systems in the form IF (condition) THEN (action) in 
order to explain the cognitive demands related to task performance. The condition 
48 CMN-GOMS adds hierarchical structure to the KLM version of GÜMS. Tasks are organized as a 
series of goals and sub-goals and opera tors are organized inlo subroutines called methods. CMN­
GOMS can provide task execution times and afford- a better view of the task structure [han KLM. 
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component of production rules relates to either the contents of WM or environmental 
factors (e.g. screen display). The action component relates to manipulations of either 
the environment (e.g. key presses) or the contents of WM (e.g. deleting current 
goals). The clauses included within the "condition" component are combined using 
logical AND. If the pattern of goals, notes, and external information in WM matches 
the condition clauses, the rule is said to "fire" and the action operators are executed. 
Current goals and variables have to be stored in WM, and it is -on this basis that task 
demands are estimated. Once added to WM by a production, GOALS and NOTES must 
be preserved in WM until deleted by later productions. A number of production 
systems may be produced with the purpose of describing complete task performance. 
The sequence in which these productions are performed may depend upon selection 
rules that specify different methods of achieving the current task goals (Card et al., 
1983). 
To illustrate a CCT production rule, consider the following example: 
•	 Editing with VI (Visual editor)49: 
o	 Production rules are in LTM. 
o	 Model working memory as attribute-value mapping: 
(GOAL perform unit task) 
(TEXT task is insert space) 
(TEXT task is at 5 23)
 
(CURSOR 8 7)
 
•	 Rules are pattern-matched to WM. 
•	 e.g., LOOK-TEXT task is at %LINE %COLUMN is true, with LINE = 5 
COLUMN = 23. 
49 VI (visual) editor is available on ail major computer systems. VI is a display oriented, interactive 
text editor which allows a user to create, modify, and store files on the computer via a terminal. 
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2.3.4.2 NGOMSL Steps Development Process 
This section lists the steps involved in the development of the NGOMSL 
model. Each step contains information on which processors its operators require. 
Interstep mental operators (e.g. Recall_Passcode) require use of the cognitive 
processor, but intrastep mental operators (e.g. Return_with_90al_accomplished) 
do not. The steps are the following: 
•	 Generate Task Description; 
•	 Describe a List of High-Level User Goals; 
•	 Define Operators, Write Methods, and Selection Rules for Accomplishing 
Goals; 
•	 Estimate Pure-Leaming Time. 
2.3.5 Learning Time Predictions 
NGOMSL models have been demonstrated to be superior predictors of the time 
it takes to learn how to use a system, keeping in mind that what is predicted is the 
Pure Leaming Time for the procedural knowledge represented in the methods. As 
already mentioned, the user is assumed to alrcady know how to execute the operators; 
the GOMS methods do not represent the knowledge involved in executing the 
operators themselves, but rather only represent the knowledge of which opera tors ta 
apply and in what order to accomplish the goal. Innovative interface technology 
frequently results in new operators; moving the cursor with a mouse was a new 
operator, and selecting objects with an eye-movement tracker or manipulating 3D 
objects and flying about in virtual space with data-glove gestures will be new 
operators as these technologies move into the workplace. Undoubtedly, the time ta 
Ieam how to execute new opera tors is a decisive aspect of the value of new interface 
devices, but a GO MS model that assumes such operators cannot predict their learning 
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time. The tirne to learn new opera tors themselves would have to be measured, or 
simply not included in the analysis. 
The total elapsed time to learn to use a system depends not simply on how 
much procedural knowledge must be learned but on how much time it takes to 
complete the training curriculum itself. It means that nearly ail learning of computer 
use occurs in the context of the new user performing tasks of some sort, and this 
performance wou Id take a certain amount of time even if the user were fully trained. 
As a result, the total leaming time includes the time to execute the training tasks in 
addition to the extra time required to learn how to perform the tasks, the Pure 
Leaming Time (PLT). As Gong (1993) has demonstrated, training-task execution 
times can be predicted from a GOMS model of the training tasks. 
The fundamental empirical result is that the time needed to learn a particular 
procedure is roughly linear with the number of NGOMSL statements that must be 
learned. Thus, the PLT for the methods themselves can be estimated just by counting 
the statements and multiplying by an empirically determined coefficient. The transfer 
of training effects can be calculated by deducting the number of NGOMSL 
statements in methods that are identical, or highly simiJar, to ones already known to 
the leamer (Bovair et al., 1990). This description of interface consistency in terms of 
the quantitative transferability of procedural knowledge is possibly the most 
important contribution of the existing CeT research and the NGOM SL technique. 
A supplementary element of the PLT is the time required to memorize chunks 
of declarative information required by the methods, such as the menu names under 
which commands are found. Such items are assumed to be stored in LTM, and while 
not rigorously part of the GOMS methods, are required to be in LTM for the methods 
to execute correctly. Including this component in leaming time estimates is an 
approach to representing the learning load imposed by menu or command terms. 
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"The validity and utility of the learning time estimates depend on the general 
requirements of the learning condition. Obviously, if the learner is engaged in problem­
solving, or in an unstructured learning situation, the time required for learning is more 
variable and ill-defined than if the leamer is trained in a tightly controlled situation" (John 
and Kieras, 1996). Also, it seems logical that in spite of the learning situation, systems whose 
methods are longer and more complex wi Il require more time to learn them, beeause more 
procedural knowledge has to be acquired, either by explicit study or infcrential problem­
solving. Summarizing the above discussion of estimating learning using the values 
determined, Gong (1993) presents the following 
Total Learning Time Pure Method Learning Time + Long Term 
Memory Item Learning Time + Training 
Procedure Execution Time 
Pure Procedure Learning rime = NGOMSL Me/hod Learning rime + 
LTM Item Learning Time 
NGOMSL Method Learning Time = 17 sec 
No. ofNGOMSL Statemenls 10 be Learned 
LTM Item Learning rime = 6 sec * Number ofLTM Chunks to be Learned 
These formulas give a pure procedure learning time estimate for a whole set of 
mcthods in an usual learning situation, assuming no previous knowlcdgc of any methods, and 
assuming that learning the appropriate command words for the two menu terms will require 
learning three chunks each (John and Kieras, 1994). 
2.3.6 Execution time predictions 
As already mentioned, the execution time for a task is predicted by simulating the 
execution of the methods required to perform the task as shown below: 
Execution Time	 NGOMSL statement time + Primitive 
External Operator Time + Waiting Time 
98 
The execution time predictions are founded on the sequence of operators 
executed while carrying out the benchmark tasks. Execution time might be 
approximated by a constant, by a probability distribution, or by a function of sorne 
parameter. For example, the time to type a word might be approximated by a constant 
(e.g., the average time for an average typist to type an average word), or a statistical 
distribution, or by a function involving the number of letters in the word and the time 
to type a single character (which couId, in tum, be approximated by a constant or a 
distribution) (John and Kieras, 1994). The precision of estimates obtained from a 
GOMS mode] depends on the precision of this assumption and on the precision of the 
duration estimates. 
2.3.7 NGOMSL Methodology 
According to Kieras (2006), the NGOMSL methodology starts with the following: 
•	 Top-down breadth-first task dccomposition: 
o	 Start with the user's top-lcvel goals. 
o	 Write a step-by-step procedure for accomplishing each goal in tcrms of sub­
goals or keystroke-level operators.
 
oUse NGOMSL syntax for the procedure.
 
o	 Recursively write a method for each sub-goal until ail methods contain only 
keystroke-level operators. 
o	 Writc a selection rule to specify which method to use if more than one for a 
goal. 
•	 Count number of statements in methods to predict learning time. 
o	 Consistency can be directly rcflected by the presence of re-used sub­
methods, reducing learning time. 
o	 Similar methods also reduce lcarning time. 
•	 for a specifie task scenario, count number ofstatemenls and operators executed ta 
predict executian time. 
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2.3.8 NGOMSL Limitations 
The GOMS mode] has a number of limitations, the most significant of which is­
that the predictions are only valid for expert users who do not make any errors. This 
is in fact a significant deficiency, because even expert users will make mistakes. 
Given that one of the goals of HCI is to seek - maximum usability for ail users, 
including novices, this is a grave insufficiency in the mode!. However, at the same 
time, the only GOMS model that mitigates this deficiency is NGOMSL, which 
attempts to model the time required to learn a task. As already mentioned, the GOMS 
model has been used in this research work as a cognitive task analysis tool and not for 
evaluating a specifie user interface. Therefore, this dissertation is not interested in 
measuring the user performance related to user authentication methods, but rather in 
identifying and understanding the cognitive processes involved specifical1y in those 
types of interaction. 
Another limitation IS that in NGOMSL models aIl tasks as goal-directed, 
neglecting the problem-solving nature of some tasks. They do- not take into account 
individual differences among users. One of the main premises of this thesis is that 
tasks should be goal-directed (e.g. make an electronic funds transfer) and include the 
user authentication pOltions in them. The goal-directness "feature" is in fact very 
appropriate to the type of tasks described in this dissertation. Computer security 
applications, especially the user authentication applications, -usually have a clear-cut, 
narrow user interface and function. This entails limited application features to users, 
but at the same time, simplicity is gained. 
GOMS models cannot provide information on how valuable or pleasant the 
product under design will be. Finally, as already mentioned, GOMS does not address 
the social or organizationaJ impact of the product under development. 
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2.4 Usability and Usable Security 
Usability has been defined differently 111 several standards (ISO/IEC 9126, 
2004), (ISO 9241-11, 1998)- and (IEEE 1061, 1998). Each of these standards 
emphasizes somewhat different sets of usability factors, such as effectiveness, 
efficiency, learnability, or user satisfaction. Thus, a more comprehensive model of 
usability should include both process-related and product related usability 
characteristics such as effectiveness, efficiency, satisfaction, security, and 
leamability. Moreover, usability is a generally relative measure of whether a software 
product enables a particular set of users to achieve specified goals in a specified 
context of use (Abran et al., 2003). On the other hand, - according to Josang and 
Patton (2003), Usable Security deals with how security information should be 
handled in the ur. Both usabilüy and security can vary depending on the context of 
use that includes user profiles (i.e., who are the users), task characteristics, hardware 
(including network equipment), software, and physical or organizational 
environments (Seffah et al., 2006). As previously mentioned, Usable Security is 
imperative from the user's perspective, from the developer's perspective, and from the 
management's perspective (e.g., software with weak security support can be a major 
constraint to the usability of the system). 
2.4.1 Usability Inspection Methods 
Usability evaluation methods can be divided into three categories: Test, 
Inspection, and Inquiry. Each category can be applied to one or more phases of the 
design lifecycle as follows: 
•	 Testing method: It makes use of representative users to work on typical tasks 
using the system (or the prototype) (e.g., the conventional usability testing), 
and their performance is usually measured. 
101 
•	 Inspection method: ln this approach, usabi/ity experts - and sometimes 
software engineers, or domain experts - inspect usability related aspects of a 
user interface (e.g., Heuristic Evaluation) (Nielsen, 1994), Usable Security 
Symmetry (Braz et al., 2010). One interesting characteristic of this method 
when compared to the other two categories is that they can be used at any 
stage of design, from product definition to final design. Usability inspection 
methods -are particularly efficient in terms of a high benefit-cost ratio, and are 
able to find many usability problems that are overlooked by user testing 
(Karat et al., 1992; Desurvire el al., 1992; Desurvire, 1992). 
•	 Inquiry method: This method collects information regarding users' 
preferences, desires, and behavior (e.g., a focus group), and aims to formulate 
the requirements of a design. 
There is at present a multiplicity of methods used to evaluate usability. To 
choose a specific method you must consider human and facilities resources, costs, 
time constraints, and the suitability of the method for the product at hand. 
This section presents an overview of the three most representative usability 
inspection methods relevant to this thesis: Heuristic Evaluation, Cognitive 
Walkthrough, and the GOMS Model. These methods are recognized as the most 
actively employed and researched usability inspection methods by the HCI Research 
and lndustry communities according to Hollingsed and Novick (2007) and Kieras 
(2006). 
2.4.1.1 General usability principles ("heuristics") for User Interface Design 
One of the most widely recognized usability evaluation methods, "Heuristic 
Evaluation" is a usability inspection method employed to analyze the usability 
problems of a user interface or a system against a set of ten established - principles 
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called "heuristics" (Molich and Nielsen, 1990). These heuristics are more based on 
empirical data than on specifie usability guidelines. After evaluating numerous sets of 
heuristics, Nielsen (1994) developed a set ofheuristics as follows: 
•	 Visihi/ity of system status: The system should aJways keep users informed 
about what is going on, through appropriate feedback within a reasonable 
time. 
•	 Match betvveen system and the real world: The system should speak the users' 
language, with words, phrases, and concepts familiar to the user, rather than 
system-oriented tenus. Follow real-world conventions, making information 
appear in a natural and logical order. 
•	 User control andfreedom: Users often choose system functions by mistake 
and will need a clearly marked "emergency exit" to leave the unwanted state 
without having to go through an extended dialogue. Support undo and redo; 
•	 Consistency and standards: Users should not have to wonder whether 
different words, situations, or actions mean the same thing. Follow platform 
conventions. 
•	 En-or prevention: Even better than good error messages is a careful design 
which prevents a probJem from occurring in the first place. Either eJiminate 
error-prone conditions or check for them and present users with a 
confirmation option before they commit to the action. 
•	 Recognition rather than reca!!: Minimize the user's memory load by making 
objects, actions, and options visible. The user should not have to remember 
information from one part of the dialogue to another. Instructions for use of 
the system should be visible or easily retrievable whenever appropriate. 
•	 Flexibility and efficiency of use: Accelerators - unseen by the novice user ­
may often speed up the interaction for the expe11 user such that the system can 
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ca ter to both inexperienced and experienced users. Allow users to tailor 
frequent actions. 
•	 Aesthetic and minimalist design: Dialogues should not contain information 
which is irre1evant or rarely needed. Every extra unit of information in a 
dialogue competes with the relevant units of information and diminishes their 
relative visibility. 
•	 He/p users recognize, diagnose, and recover from en-ors: Error messages 
should be expressed in plain language (no codes), precisely indicate the 
problem, and constmctively suggest a solution. 
•	 He/p and documentation: Even though it is better if the system can be used 
without documentation, it may be necessary to provide help and 
documentation. Any such information should be easy to search for, focused 
on the user's task, - concrete in regards to the steps to be carried out, and not 
overly complex. 
An example of such a (usability) heuristic is as follows: 
Visibility of system status: The system shou/d a/ways keep users informed 
about what is going on, through appropriate feedback within a reasonab/e 
timeFame. 
Heuristic evaluation is not limited to the list of heuristics above. In fact, the list 
of heuristics can be as long as the evaJuators consider appropriate for the task at hand. 
For instance, you may create a specific list of heuristics for specific audiences, like 
senior citizens, children, or disabled users, based on a review of the literature (UPA, 
2010). 
Heuristic evaluation falls into the general category of usability inspection 
methods, and it is considered a "discount usability engineering" method (i.e. smaller 
and cheaper usability studies for projects with small budgets for usability). 
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Heuristic Evaluation is perforrned by one or more evaluators, preferably 
experts, who often possess the knowledge to design and carry out comprehensive 
performance tests with human subjects and the ability to analyze the resultant data. 
Their training is usually an advanced degree in human factors, behavioral science, 
industrial engineering, human-computer interaction, industrial design, computer 
science, or a related field. The greatest results are achieved by evaluators who are 
usability specialists with domain knowledge. Independent research has found 
heuristic evaluation to be extremely cost-efficient, confirming its value in 
circumstances where limited time or budgetary resources are available. "Overall, the 
heuristic evaluation technique as applied here produced the best resu Its. It found the 
most problems, including more of the most serious ones, than did any other 
technique, and at the lowest cost" (Jeffries et al., 1991). 
Another important factor to be taken into consideration is the ideal number of 
evaluators to perform the evaluation. According to Nielsen (1994), it is recommended 
to use of three to five evaluators, since different evaluators tend to find different 
problems. 
l05 
70-,---------------,---------, 
~ 60 
V1 
a 
U 
.8
 
~ 40
 
Q)
c:: 
Q) 30en 
"­a
 
a 20
 
:i::; 
l\J 
C( 10 
O+-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-------' 
o 5 10 15 
Number of Eva/uators 
Figure 2.32: The optimal number of usability evaluators: benefits versus costs 
(N ielsen, 1994a). 
The curve showing how many times greater the benefits are in comparison to 
the costs associated with heuristic evaluation (sample project) is presented in Figure 
2-32. The optimal number of evaluators in this example is four, with benefits that are 
62 times greater than the costs. It also shows the varying ratio of the paybacks to the 
costs for different numbers of evaluators in the sample project mentioned by Nielsen 
(1994a). In fact, the curve illustrates that the optimal number of evaluators is four, 
validating "the general observation that heuristic evaluation seems to work best with 
three to five evaluators. In the example, a heuristic evaluation with four evaluators 
would cost $6,400 and would find usability problems worth $395,000." 
With regards to Expert review versus usability testing, Molich and Dumas 
(2008) argue that Expert reviews with highly experienced practitioners may be more 
efficient than usability tests, in terms of number of issues found as a function of 
resources expended." 
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The next paragraphs describe the required procedures to perform a Heuristic 
Evaluation according to UPA (2010): 
•	 Decide which aspects of a product and what tasks you want to review. for 
most products, you cannot review the entire user interface, so you need to 
consider what type of coverage will provide the most value. 
•	 Decide which heuristics will be used. 
•	 Select a team of three to five evaluators (you can have more, but the time to 
aggregate and interpret the results will increase substantially) and give them 
some basic training on the principles and process. 
•	 Create a list of representative tasks for the appl ication or component you are 
evaluating. You might also describe the primary and secondary users of your 
product if the team is not familiar with the users. 
•	 Ask each evaJuator to perform the representative tasks individually and list 
where the product violates one or more heuristics. After the evaluators work 
through the tasks, they are asked to review any other user interface objects 
that were not directly invalved in the tasks and note violations of heuristics. 
You may also ask evaluators to rate how serious the violations would be from 
the users' perspective. 
•	 Compile the individual evaluations and ratings of seriousness. 
•	 Categorize and report the findings so they can be presented effectively to the 
product team. 
The advantages of heuristic evaluation are that it is inexpensive, intuitive (i.e. 
we apply a set of predefined rules/heuristics), very easy to plan, and -can be used 
early in the design process. Feedback can also be obtained early in the design process. 
Assigning the right heuristic can aid to recommend the best corrective measures ta 
the designer. The disadvantage is that there is a focus on problems rather than on 
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solutions. Also if the wrong heuristics are assigned to potential problems, it will 
mislead designers into applying the wrong solutions to the problems. 
2.4.1.2 Cognitive Walkthrough 
Cognitive walkthroughs are performed at any stage of design using a prototype, 
a conceptual design document, or the final product. This is a more specifie version of 
a design walkthrough, focusing on cognitive principles. Based on a user's goals, a 
group of evaluators steps through tasks, evaluating at each step how difficult it is for 
the user to identify and operate the interface element most relevant to their current 
sub-goal and how clearly the system provides feedback for that action. 
Cognitive walkthroughs take into consideration the user's thought processes 
that contribute to decision making, such as memory load and the ability to reason. For 
example, finding the Usability First website can be broken down to several levels of 
tasks. At a general level, it requires opening up a browser, remembering the Uniform 
Resource Locator (URL), and typing it in the text box at the top of your browser. Or, 
if you do not remember the URL, you must choose a search engine, think of a search 
term, view the results, scroll through the results, and then click on the link. Each of 
these actions can be further decomposed. This approach is intended specifically ta 
help understand the usability of a system for first-time or infrequent users, that is, for 
users in an exploratory leaming mode. 
But how does one- perform a Cognitive Walkthrough? The following 
procedures must be taken into consideration, according to Richardson (2000): 
•	 Define the inputs: 
o	 ldentify the users and tasks, create a description of the interface 
(screenshot or prototype), and define the action sequences for 
completing each task. 
- - ------
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•	 Gather the walkthrough team: 
o	 A facilitator for the discussion and a scribe for recording information. 
o	 Participants walk through the tasks relating to the user interface. 
o	 Participants probe the task on hand (e.g. does the label for the correct 
action match the user's goal? What is the user's goal?, etc.). 
•	 Walk through the action sequences for the task(s). 
•	 Record critical information (i.e. the happy (or failure) path(s), problems, 
etc.). 
•	 Review the interface to fix the problems (i.e. re-implement rapid prototype or 
new screenshots). 
•	 Repeat. .... (i.e. iterative design, which means prototyping, testing, analyzing, 
and refining the user interface, and repeat ifneeded). 
2.4.1.3 GOMS Model 
GOMS is a family of techniques proposed by -Card et al- (1983) for modeling 
and describing human task performance. However, GOMS models have also been ­
used as a usability inspection method as shown by Card et al. (1983), Lecerof and 
Paternà (1998), Schrepp (2010), John and Kieras (1996), and Kieras (2006). 
GOMS is an acronym that stands for Goals, Operators, Methods, and Selection 
Rules, the components of which are used as the building blacks for a GOMS mode!. 
Goals represent the goals that a user is trying to accomplish, usually specified in a 
hierarchical manner. Operators are the set of atomic-Ievel operations with which a 
user composes a solution to a goal. Metbods represent sequences of operators, 
grouped together to accomplish a single goal. Selection Rules are used to decide 
which method to use for -achieving a goal when several are applicable. 
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According to John and Kieras (1996), the GOMS model has been one of the 
few extensively recognized theoretical concepts in HCl, and has been used in real­
world design and evaluation situations. The paper by John and Kieras (1996) actually 
summarizes the previous work on GOMS by offering a unified analysis of GOMS 
models, showing how these models can be used in design, and describing several 
examples of the application of GOMS to the design and evaluation of the interfaces 
for a multiplicity of real-world systems such as the Computer-Aided Design (CAO) 
system for mechanical design, the Space operations database system, and the Mouse­
driven text editor, among others. 
One recent application of the GOMS model as a usability inspection method is 
the Guideline compliance, a necessary but insufficient condition to guarantee the 
usability of web units by disabled users, since efficiency-related issues can be as 
exclusive for disabled users as violations to basic guidelines. This paper shows that 
Goals, Operators, Methods and Selection rules (GOMS) analysis, which is an 
established method in user interface design, can be adapted to evaluate the efficiency 
of interface designs for disabled users. As examples, several GOMS models for the 
interaction behavior of disabled users with web units are described, showing how 
such models can be used to answer concrete accessibility-related questions. 
Advantages and limitations of GOMS analyses are also discussed. 
Another relatively recent application of using GOMS for evaluating user 
interface is "A GOMS Model for Keyboard Navigation in Web Pages and Web 
Application" developed by Schrepp and Fischer (2006). Generally speaking, 
technology should be accessible and usable by users effortlessly, including users with 
disabilities. According to the study authors, 81 % of the websites were incompliant 
with basic standards for accessibility as recommended by the World Wide Web 
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(W3C) Consortium50. Aiso the study infers that a task that can be carried out in one 
minute using a keyboard- might need 5 to 10 minutes using a mouse. Many disabled 
(and even expert) users favour handling desktop and Web applications by using the 
keyboard, as it is often faster than using a mouse. Therefore, offering efficient 
keyboard support is crucial to increasing the usability of those applications. To 
achieve this, it is necessary to make use of a method to evaluate mouse and keyboard 
navigation; the GOMS model is a very appropriate method for doing this, as it aJJows 
for the comparison of diverse methods to operate a Web application. According to the 
GOMS model, "the average time taken to carry out a task such as following a link 
will be 11.83 seconds using a mou se and 28.56 seconds using the keyboard. If the 
time taken to work on a Web page using a keyboard should not be twice or even more 
than twice the time taken using a mouse, then additional keyboard support should be 
implemented for this page. FUlthermore, the GOMS models can be used to verify 
whether the amount of keyboard support for a Web application is adequate to 
guarantee that there are no inadmissible drawbacks to keyboard users. 
2.4.1.4 Additional Usability Evaluation Methods 
It is worth noting that there are other recent usabi lity evaluation methods (Law 
et a!., 2008), not inspection methods, that have been used on a limited scale in 
industry settings, but they are worth mentioning in the context of this thesis. This 
section gives an overview of these methods as follows: 
•	 Condensed Contextua! lnquiry (CCI) (Kantner and Keirnan, 2003): 
Traditional CI requires long hours with each user, which usually can take a 
full day per visit. Although this long session time allows researchers to gather 
much important information, organizations refrain from spending the time to 
50 W3C <http://www.w3.org/> 
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gather and analyze so much data. Additionally, organizations are reluctant to 
interrupt employees for such an extended period of time. This method is 
basically a one-on-one observation of work practice in the user's real context. 
CCI in fact identifies -a more restrained suite of concerns to examine than the 
traditional version of a Context lnquiry, which often requires -a full day per 
visit. CCI tries to accommodate the restricted time that product development 
teams have to 1earn about users' work processes and motivations. The primary 
difJerence between traditional Cl and CCI is the restricted nature of the work 
under observation. CCI looks at the bigger picture of the users' motivations 
and contextual artifacts for accomplishing work. Therefore, this method is not 
suitable for designing a complex system such as authentication management 
appl ications. 
•	 Remote Usability Testing (RUT): This evaluation method remotely gathers ­
key data from larger populations (e.g., 40, 80, 120 and so on) in a single 
usability testing. Participants are observed by usability evaluators in real-time 
sessions to collect instantaneous behaviors and comments. RUT collects 
performance measures such as the number of errors, types of errors, time on 
task, and automatic data collection regarding user behavior such as logging 
(Client and Server sides), browser logs, etc. According to Law et al. (2008), 
these requirements have led evaluators to conduct usability testing with larger 
sample sizes as mentioned. The RUT method is typically used to compare two 
or more products, designs, or product features (e.g., from competitors). 
According to Paternà and Santoro (2008), the key dimensions for analyzing 
the different methods for assessing remote usability evaluation are: 
o The type of interaction between the user and the evaluator. 
oThe platform used for the interaction (desktop, mobile, vocal, etc.) 
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o	 The techniques used for collecting information about the users and 
their behavior (graphical logs, voice/or Webcam recordings, eye­
tracking, etc.). 
o	 The type of application considered in terms of the implementation 
environment (Web, java-based, .NET, etc.). 
o	 The type of the evaluation results (task performance, emotional state) 
provided. 
•	 Longitudinal Usabi/ity Evaluations: Longitudinal studies follow a user over 
an extended period of time (i.e., a month or two), with observations made at 
periodic intervals. After each experiment, for instance, participants are 
typically asked to answer two questionnaires: one questionnaire intended to 
assess the hardware, software, and technological issues encountered- and the 
other intended to assess the extent and quality of the cooperation between 
users. According to Sy (2009), the research methods most appropriate for 
longitudinal studies are: 
o	 Diary studies. 
o	 Usage logs and clickstreamlinstrumented data analysis. 
o	 Periodic field ethnography. 
o	 Periodic interviewing (both on site and remote). 
o	 Periodic usability testing (both on site and remote). 
o Retrospectives. 
There is no method that is the most appropriate- for longitudinal studies, but 
what is critical here is to triangulate data compilation from several methods. 
An example is a longitudinallaboratory-based usability evaluation of a health 
care information system (Kjeldskov et al., 20 lO). The goal of this study was 
to inquire into the nature of usability problems experienced by novice and 
expert users, and to see to what extent usability problems of a health care 
113 
information system would or would not disappear over time, as the nurses got 
more familiar with it. The authors conducted a longitudinal study with two 
main sub-studies: a usability evaluation was conducted with novice users 
when an electronic patient record system was being employed in a large 
hospitaJ. After the nurses had used the system in their daily work for 15 
months, the authors repeated the evaluation. The results demonstrate that time 
does not heal. Even though sorne problems were not -as severe, they still 
remained after 1 year of extensive use. 
2.4.2 Usable Security Princip les and Guidelilles 
The research work of Whitten and Tygar (J 998) and Whitten and Tygar (1999) 
on the usability of the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), a public key encryption 
application, is considered pioneering in the Usable Security field. 
To date, there is no theoretical framework to provide an inspection method that 
considers security and usability syncrgistically for user authenlicaliol1 methods. 
However, the HcrSec community has been steadily developing research work in 
usable security guidelines and standards for computer security software in general, 
such as Computer Security Design Principles (Saltzer and Schroeder, 2000), Design 
guidelines for security management systems (Chiasson el al., 2007), Guidelines and 
Strategies for Secure Interaction Design (Yee, 2005), Design Principles and Patterns 
for Aligning Security and Usability (Garfinkel, 2005), and finally, Properties of the 
Usability Problem for Security (Whitten and Tygar, 1998). The next paragraphs 
explain ail of these usable security guidelines and standards. 
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2.4.2.1 Computer Security Design Principles (Saltzer and Schroeder~ 1975) 
The work of Saltzer and Schroeder (1975), "The Protection of Information in 
Computer Systems", presents the basis required for designing and implementing 
secure software systems. Their principles describe useful practices that are suitable 
mainly to architecture-level software decisions regardJess of the platform or language 
of the software. Software developers, whether they are developing new software or 
assessing existing software, should always apply these design principles as a 
benchmark for making their software more secure. The eight design principles that 
apply particularly to protection mechanisms are the following: 
1.	 Keep the design as simple and small as possible. The most natural way to do 
any task should also be the most secure way. This well-known principle 
applies to any aspect of a system, but it deserves emphasis for protection 
mechanisms for this reason: Design and implementation errors that result in 
unwanted access paths will not be noticed during normal use (since normal 
use usually does not include attempts to exercise improper access paths). As a 
result, techniques such as line-by-line inspection of software and physical 
examination of hardware that implements protection mechanisms are 
necessary. For such techniques to be successful, a small and simple design is 
essential. 
2.	 Fail-safe defaults: Base access decisions on permission rather than exclusion. 
It means that the default situation is Jack of access, and the protection scheme 
identifies conditions under which access is permitted. The alternative, in 
which mechanisms attempt to identify conditions under which access should 
be refused, presents the wrong psychological base for secure system design. A 
conservative design must be based on arguments as to why objects should be 
accessible, rather than why they should not. In a large system, sorne objects 
will be inadequately considered, so a defauJt of lack of pennission is safer. A 
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design or implementation mistake in a mechanism that glves explicit 
permission tends to fail by refusing permission, a safe situation, since it will 
be quickly detected. On the other hand, a design or implementation mistake in 
a mechanism that explicitly excludes access tends to fail by allowing access, a 
failure which may go unnoticed in normal use. This principle applies both to 
the outward appearance of the protection mechanism and to its underlying 
implementation. Complete mediation: Every access to every object must be 
checked for authority. This principle, when systematically applied, is the 
primary underpinning of the protection system. lt forces a system-wide view 
of access control, which in addition to normal operation includes 
initialization, recovery, shutdown, and maintenance. It implies that a 
foolproof method of identifying the source of every request must be devised. 
It also requires that proposaIs to improve performance by remembering the 
result of an authority check be examined skeptically. If a change in authority 
occurs, such remembered results must be systematically updated. 
3.	 Open design: The design should not be secret. The mechanisms should not 
depend on the ignorance of potential attackers, but rather on the possession of 
specifie, more easily protected- keys or passwords. This decoupling of 
protection mechanisms from protection keys permits the mechanisms to be 
examined by many reviewers without concern that the review may itself 
compromise the safeguards. In addition, any skeptical user may be allowed to 
convince himself that the system he is about to use is adequate for his 
purpose. Finally, it is simply not realistic to attempt to maintain secrecy for 
any system that receives wide distribution. 
4.	 Separation of privilege: Where feasible, a protection mechanism that requires 
two keys to unlock it is more robust and flexible than one that allows access 
to the presenter of only a single key. The relevance of this observation to 
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computer systems was pointed out by R. Needham in 1973. The reason for 
this is that once the mechanism is locked, the two keys can be physically 
separated, and distinct programs, organizations, or individuals can be made 
responsible for them. From then on, no single accident, deception, or breach 
of trust is sufficient to compromise the protected information. This principle is 
often used in bank safe-deposit boxes. It is also at work in the defense system 
that fires a nuclear weapon only if two different people both give the correct 
commando In a computer system, separated keys apply to any situation in 
which two or more conditions must be met before access is permitted. For 
example, systems providing user-extendible protccted data types usually 
depend on the separation of privilege for their implementation. 
s.	 Least privilege: Every program and every user of the system should operate 
using the fewest privileges necessary to complete the job. Primarily, this 
princip le limits the damage that can result from an accident or error. It also 
rcduces the number of potential interactions among privileged programs to the 
minimum for conect operation, so that unintentional, unwanted, or improper 
uses of privileges are less likely to occur. Thus, if a question arises related to 
the misuse of a privilege, the number of programs that must be audited is 
minimized. Put another way, if a mechanism can provide "firewalls," the 
principle of least priviJege provides a rationale for where to install the 
firewalls. The military security rule of "need-to-know" is an example of this 
principle. 
6.	 Least common mechanism: Minimize the number of mechanisms common to 
more than one user and depended on by aIl users. Every shared mechanism 
(especially one involving shared variables) represents a potential information 
path between users, and must be designed with great care to be sure it does 
not unintentionally compromise security. Furthermore, any mechanism 
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servmg all users must be certified to the satisfaction of every user, a job 
presumably harder than satisfying only one or a few users. For example, given 
the choice of implementing a new function as a supervisory procedure shared 
by all users or as a library procedure that can be handJed as though it were the 
user's own, choose the latter option. Then, if one or a few users are not 
satisfied with the level of certification of the function, they can provide a 
substitute or not use it at ail. Either way, they can avoid being harmed by a 
mistake in il. 
7.	 Psychological acceptability: It is essential that the human interface be 
designed for ease of use, so that users routinely and automatically apply the 
protection mechanisms correctly. Also, to the extent that the user's mental 
image of his protection goals matches the mechanisms he must use, mistakes 
will be minimized. If he must translate his image of his protection needs into a 
radically different specification language, he will make errors. 
2.4.2.2	 Design Guidelines For Security Management Systems (Chiasson et al., 
2007) 
Although end-users are the major concern for the field of usable security, 
interfaces for security professionals are equaJly important, because the consequences 
of usability problems can potentially leave entire networks vulnerable to attack. For 
example, an Administrator might miss an attack entirely or misdiagnose il. For 
example, poor upgrades through security patches can lead to unstable systems that 
need to be rolled baclc Also, despite -the fact that the knowledge acquired to design 
for end-users can assist in designing interfaces for security experts, these two user­
categories are quite different in terms of the domain knowledge, their level of 
responsibility, the amount of information these users have to process, and the 
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consequences of their actions. To this end, Chiasson et al (2007) developed a 
preliminary set of design guidelines for security management interfaces as follows: 
1.	 Administrators should reliably and promptly be made aware of the security 
tasks they must perform; 
2.	 Administrators should be able to figure out how to successfully perform those 
tasks; 
3.	 Administrators should be able to tell when their task has been completed; 
4.	 Administrators should have sufficient feedback to accurately determine the 
current state of the system and the consequences of their actions; 
5.	 Administrators should be able to revert to a previous system state if a security 
decision has unintended consequences; 
6.	 Administrators should be able to form an accurate and meaningful mental 
model of the system they are protecting; 
7.	 Administrators should be able to easily examine the system from different 
levels of encapsulation in order to gain an overall perspective and be able to 
effectively diagnose specifie problems; 
8.	 The interface should facilitate the interpretation and diagnosis of potential 
security threats; 
9.	 Administrators should be able to easily seek advice and take advantage of 
community knowledge to make security decisions; 
10. The interface should encourage administrators to address critical Issues In a 
timely fashion. 
These design principles recognize that users will need to -make key decisions 
and be supported in this process. The majority of the interactions will take place 
because ofunpredicted events that the system cannot handle on its own, and as such it 
should strive to give clear, pertinent, and sufficient information so that users are able 
to precisely identify and address the problem. 
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Furthermore, it is to be expected that users will occasionally make mistakes 
when dealing with these novel situations so the system must allow users to easily 
revert to a previous state. Such mistakes differ from the "dangerous errors" addressed 
in usable security because these mistakes may not be possible to predict (whereas 
dangerous errors such as entering a password in a phishing site are always considered 
bad). For example, poor upgrades through security patches can lead to unstable 
systems that need to be rolled back. Occasional mistakes are unavoidable, and thus 
the systems must be flexible enough so that recovery is possible. 
When faced with a new security threat, it is likely that others are also being 
similarly attacked. The interface should support and facilitate interaction within the 
security community not only to more quickly analyze a new threat and determine 
appropriate counter-measures, but also to facilitate propagation of such security 
measures. Social navigation cou Id also be used to provide trusted feedback about 
what steps others have taken in similar situations, and could be further customized by 
defining a specifie group of trusted sources from which to gather information. 
Integrating the communication and social navigation into the system could be faster, 
have less noise, and be harder to spoof than current ad hoc methods. Security systems 
still generate a sufficiently large number of false alarms to potentially lure 
administrators into ignoring alarms or deeming them as non-urgent, or otherwise lead 
to situations where it is impossible to address ail alarms. This may result in 
unnecessarily vulnerable systems. The interface should attempt to recognize such 
situations and encourage the administrators to take corrective action. The interface 
should alert administrators if the majority of other security professionals have taken 
some preventative measure that has yet to be addressed in the current system, 
especially if related to a severe threat given the specifie system configuration. 
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2.4.2.3 Guidelines and Strategies for Secure Interaction Design (Yee, 2005) 
This section presents a preliminary set of guidelines for secure interaction 
design. The criterion used by Yee (2005) for admitting something as an essential 
principle is that it should be a valid and non-trivial concern. Each principle is valid by 
showing how a violation of the principle wou Id lead to security vulnerability. In the 
statement of these principles, the term "actor" is used to mean "user or program". The 
term "authority" only refers to the capability to take a particular action. 
1.	 Path of Least Resistance: The most natural way to do any task should also 
be the most secure way. 
2.	 Appropriate Boundaries: The interface should expose, and the system 
should enforce, distinctions between objects and between actions along 
boundaries that matter to the user. 
3.	 Explicit Authorization: A user's authorities must only be provided to other 
actors as a result of an explicit user action that is understood to imply 
granting. 
4.	 Visibility: The interface should allow the user to easily review any active 
actors and authority relationships that would affect security-relevant 
decisions. 
5.	 Revocability: The interface should allow the user to easily revoke 
authorities that the user has granted, wherever revocation is possible. 
6.	 Expected Ability: The interface must not give the user the impression that it 
is possible to do something that cannot actually be done. 
7.	 Trusted Path: The interface must provide an unspoofable and faithful 
communication channel between the user and any entity trusted to 
manipulate authorities on the user's behalf. 
8.	 Identifiability: The interface should enforce that distinct objects and distinct 
actions have unspoofably identifiable and distinguishable representations. 
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9.	 Expressiveness: The interface should provide enough expressive power (a) 
to describe a safe security policy without undue difficulty and (b) to allow 
users to express security policies in terms that fit their goals. 
10. Clarity: The effect of any security-relevant action must be clearly apparent 
to the user before the action is taken. 
2.4.2.4	 Design Principles and Patterns for Aligning Security and Usability 
(Garfinkel, 2005) 
Garfinkel's (2005) doctoral thesis's philosophy was to identify patterns that can 
make systems that are in fact secure, rather than the conventional goal of creating 
systems that are in theory securable. This section introduces the six general design 
principles and patterns for aligning security and usability: 
1.	 The Principle of Least Surprise. This principle is an interpretation of Saltzer 
and Schroeder's (1975) principle of "psychological acceptability." This 
principle holds that the computer should not surprise the user when the user 
expects the computer to behave in a manner that is secure. The Principle of 
Least Surprise is violated when there is a mismatch between the user's 
expectations and the computer's implementation. 
2.	 The Principle of Good Security Now. Computer security IS an engmeenng 
discipline. Even though it is impossible to have a computer system that is 
completely secure, there is always a tension between deploying good systems 
that are available today and waiting for better systems that can be deployed 
tomorrow. This principle holds that it is a mistake not to deploy good systems 
that are available now: if good systems are not deployed, end-users who are 
not trained in security will create their own- poor security solutions. 
3.	 Provide Standardized Security Policies. Today's security subsystems provide 
too many choices and configuration options that are relevant to secUlity. 
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These choices are frequently overwhelming to end-users. Worse, relatively 
minor changes in a security policy or configuration can have a drastic impact 
on overall security. Most users need security experts to make decisions for 
thcm, because - by definition - users are not experts. This is not to say that 
users need to be locked in tightly to a few inflexible policies from which they 
can never deviate. What is needed is a range of well-vetted, understandable, 
and teachable policies, and then the ability to make understood, controlled, 
contained and auditable deviations from these policies when needed. 
4.	 Consistent Meaningful Vocabulary. Usability is promoted when information 
is presented with a vocabulary that is consistent and meaningful. But there is a 
natural tendency among computer engineers to be Joose with their choice of 
language. A guiding principle for aligning security and usability is that 
security information, at least, must be standardized and used consistently. 
5.	 Consistent Controls and Placement. In addition to standardizing vocabulary, it 
is important that security-related controls in graphical user interfaces be 
likewise standardized, so that similar functionality is presented in a similar 
manner and in a consistent location in user interfaces. 
6.	 No External Burden. Security tools must not pose a burden on non-users who 
do not otherwise benefit from their use. Otherwise, non-users will push back 
on users through social channels and encourage the users to discontinue the 
use of the tools. 
According to Grudin (1989), these principles should be adapted rationally to the 
tasks that are at hand since there are many cases in which a simple application of 
consistent UI rules does not lead to interfaces that are easy-to-use. 
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2.4.2.5	 Criteria for Security Software to Be Usable (Whitten and Tygar, 
1998) 
The authors studied the usability of Pretty Good Privacy (a public key 
encryption application) which was considered to have a good GUI, but the results 
showed that PGP 5.0 was not suitably usable to provide effective secllrity for most 
users. 
Security has sorne inherent properties that make it a difficult problem domain 
for user interface design. Design strategies for creating usable security will need to 
take these properties explicitly into account, and generalized user interface design 
does not do so. Five properties are described below; it is possible that there are others 
that have not yet been identified. 
1.	 The unmotivated user property: Security is uSlially a secondary goal. People 
do not generally sit down at their computers wanting to manage their security; 
rather, they want to send email, browse web pages, or download software, and 
they want security in place to protect them while they do those things. It is 
easy for people to put off learning about security, or to optimistically assume 
that their security is working, while they focus on their primary goals. 
Designers of user interfaces for security should not assume that users will be 
motivated to read manuals or to go looking for security controls that are 
designed to be unobtrusive. Furthermore, if security is too difficult or 
annoying, users may give up on it altogether. 
2.	 The abstraction property: Computer security management often involves 
security policies, which are systems of abstract rules for deciding whether to 
grant accesses to resources. The creation and management of such ru les is an 
activity that programmers take for granted, but which may be alien and 
unintuitive to many members of the wider user population. User interface 
design for security will need to take this into account. 
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3.	 The lack of feedback property: The need to prevent dangerous en"ors makes it 
imperative to provide good feedback to the user, but providing good feedback 
for security management is a difficult problem. The state of a security 
configuration is usually complex, and attempts to summarize it are not 
adequate. Furthermore, the correct security configuration is the one which 
does what the user "really wants", and since only the user knows what that is, 
it is hard for security software to perform much useful error checking. 
4.	 The barn door property: The proverb about the futility of locking the barn 
door after the horse is gone is descriptive of an important property of 
computer security: Once a secret has been left accidentally unprotected, even 
for a short time, there is no way to be sure that it has not already been read by 
an attacker. Because of this, user interface design for security needs to place a 
very high priority on making sure users understand their security weIl enough 
to keep from making potentially high-cost mistakes. 
5.	 The weakest link property: It is weil known that the sccurity of a networked 
computer is only as strong as its weakest component. If a cracker can exploit a 
single error, the game is up. This means that users need to be guided to attend 
to ail aspects of their security, not left to proceed through random exploration 
as they might with a word processor or a spreadsheet. 
2.4.2.6	 Additional Criteria for Security Software to Be UsabIe (Chiasso" et 
al., 2006) 
In their usability study regarding two password managers, Chiasson et al. 
(2006) proposed two additional criteria which actually support items 2 and 3 from 
Whitten and Tygar (1998) above: 
1.	 Be able to tell when their task has been completed: lt concerns a usability 
probJem seen in both the (Whitten and Tygar, 1998) and (Chiasson et al., 
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2006) studies: users were unable to tell whether their task had been 
successfully completed, and sometimes incorrectly assumed success. This can 
cause security vulnerabilities (e.g., as information believed to be secure can be 
left unprotected). 
2.	 Have sufficient feedback to accurately determine the current state of the 
system: This criterion uses the well-known usability guideline of feedback, 
which is especially important for supporting accurate mental models in 
security interfaces. Transparency in this case can be dangerous because it 
leaves users free to make assumptions about the system that cou Id lead to 
security breaches. 
2.4.2.7	 General Security Usability Principles (ldentity Management) 
(Josang et al., 2007) 
Direct user involvement in a security service is often required, and a distinction 
can be made between two types of involvement. A security action is when users are 
required to produce information and security tokens, or to trigger sorne security 
relevant mechanism. For example, typing and submitting a password is a security 
action. A security conclusion in turn is when users observe and assess sorne security 
relevant evidence in order to derive the security state of systems. For example, 
observing a closed padlock on a browser- and concluding that the communication is 
protected by SSL is a security conclusion. 
Usability principles related to security actions and security conclusions are 
described below. 
•	 Security Action Usability Principles: 
oThe	 users must understand which security actions are required of 
them. 
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oThe users must have sufficient knowledge and the practical ability to 
take the correct security action. 
o	 The mental and physical load of a security action must be tolerable. 
o	 The mental and physical load of making repcated security actions for 
any practical number of transactions must be tolerable. 
•	 Security Conclusion Usability Princip les 
o	 The user must understand the security conclusion that is required for 
making an informed decision. This means that users must understand 
what is required of them to support a secure transaction. 
o	 The system must provide the user with sufficient information for 
deriving the security conclusion. This means that it must be logically 
possible to derive the security conclusion from the information 
provided. 
o	 The mental load of deriving the security conclusion must be tolerable. 
o	 The mental load of deriving security conclusions for any practical 
number of service access instances must be tolerable. 
This chapter described the most representative usability inspection methods 
currently used in the HCI landscape. These methods have served as foundation (and 
data source) for the development of the USS. Also, it is important to note that due to 
the absolute lack of specific standards and guidelines for user authentication, HCISec 
research, including both previous and current work related to usable security of 
computer security mechanisms, has been presented. It was crucial to research the 
usable security related to a broader spectrum of security mechanisms, fîrst- because 
of the referred lack of user authentication guidelines, and then secondly to understand 
what they are, how they work, and verify if any of these guidelines could be used or 
re-adapted for user authentication. 
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Summary of the topics discussed in Chapter 2: Review of the State of Art. 
Chapter 2 described the state of the art of User Authentication, the GOMS 
models, and the Usable Security Principles and Guidelines. Regarding user 
authentication, the following topics have been described: The context of user 
authentication in Computer Security, Elements of user authentication, Architectural 
design patterns in Authentication, Authentication factors, User Authentication 
Methods (Passwords and PINs, Authentication tokens, Digest access authentication, 
Out-Of-Band Authentication, Risk-based authentication, Public Key Authentication, 
Single Sign-On, Kerberos, Biometries), To whom authentication is targeted?, and 
Comparative Analysis of User Authentication Methods. Next, the GOMS models 
have dealt with the Engineering models for usable interface design, GOMS as a 
method for cognitive task analysis, GOMS analysis guiding the design, Natural 
GOMS Language (NGOMSL), Cognitive complexity theory, Learning and Execution 
time predictions, NGOMSL methodology, and NGOMSL limitations. Finally this 
chapter has also described the most representative usability inspection methods in 
HCI, and discussed HCISec research, both previous and current, in regards to the 
principles and guideJines related to usable security of computer security mechanisms 
from (Saltzer and Schroeder, 2000; Chiasson & al, 2007; Yee, 2005; Garfinkel, 
2005; Whitten and Tygar, 1998). 
CHAPTER III
 
THE USABLE SECURITY PROTOCOL
 
3.1 1ntroduction 
Numerous studies have shown that usability inspection methods are capable of 
finding many usability problems that are disregarded by user testing but also that user 
testing also involves sorne probJems that are disregarded by inspection, meaning that the 
best results can often be achieved by combining several methods (Desurvire, 1994; 
Desurvire et al., 1992; Karat et al., 1992). 
Both empirical usability testing and usability inspection methods appear to be in 
extensive use by designers who choose the most suitable method for their purposes and 
their context. While inspection methods require expert evaluators to be effective, their 
strengths are that they can be implemented in the early phases of the development cycle 
and offer an 0ppoltunity in which changes to an interface can be agreed upon. 
Empirical methods can also be used early in the development process- through low­
fidelity versions of interfaces. Also designers frequently combine multiple inspection 
methods - heuristic evaluation and the cognitive walkthrough - so that it is feasibJe to 
obtain better coverage of usability issues. Final/y, adding multiple perspectives such as the 
range of stakeholders or types of usabiJity problems seems to improve the efficiency of 
inspection methods. 
This thesis's author agrees with J0sang et al. (2007) that poor usable security clearly 
represents a significant vuJnerabiJity. It seems that poor security usabiJity still does not 
appear on standard vulnerability checklists used by security analysts and experts. This is an 
urgent issue that has to be addressed, and this thesis addresses this issue by proposing the 
Usable Security Symmetry inspection method. 
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3.2 The Usable Security Protocol Methodology 
This chapter details the Usable Security Protocol (USP) methodology step by step, 
including the goal and the logistics behind each step and the utiJ ity of using a cognitive and 
computer science approaches in deveJoping a usability inspection method for user 
authentication. This chapter starts with an overview of the USP methodology and 
discussion of how the USP methodology brings together the cognitive and computer 
science approaches, detailing the theoretical and demonstrational basis for the Validation 
and Verification (V&V) of the protocol. Each step of USP is then presented in sequence, 
and finally, at the end it shows how aIl the steps fit together to provide a design 
requirements inspection method tool for the design of user authentication methods. 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Before delving into the specifics of the USP methodology, this thesis's author 
considers it important to define what the notion ofmethod%gy is for the purposes of this 
thesis. The notion of "methodology" encompasses a description of processes as they relate 
to the particular discipline of software engineering. The reason for adopting such a notion 
is that based on the professionaJ experience of this thesis's author, the development of a 
software product is similar to the development of an authentication method product. 
Therefore this thesis's author borrows this definition, and the term method%gy is used 
throughout this thesis. 
The USP development methodology refers to the framework that is used to structure, 
plan, and control the process of developing a usable security user authentication inspection 
method. The framework of the USP methodology consists of multiple methods- to assist in 
the USP development process, having as the final output the USS inspection method. 
This thesis is based on appl ied research that encompasses both theoretical and 
demonstrational approaches developed from the analysis and gathering of primary, 
secondary, and tertiary data. Both approaches are then validated by the V&V phase within 
the protocol. The theoretical approach is comprised of usable security principles, which 
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when relevant, are confronted against their cognitive dimensions as presented by the 
cognitive model and also by the Usable Security Symmetry (USS) inspection method In 
Chapter 6. 
The demonstrational approach presents the theoretical approach through a 
demonstration comprised of a representative authentication method named RSA SecurlD® 
SlD700 hardware authenticator with One-Time Password (OTP), which is completely 
described in Chapter 6. The theoretical approach is in turn validated by the Cognitive 
Model in Step 4, showing the respective cognitive dimensions using GOMS (Natural 
Goals, Operators, Methods, Selection Language) or more specifically Natural GOMS 
Language (NGOMSL). 
Methodologically speaking, here is a summary of the main activities developed for 
the accomplishment of this thesis: 
•	 lnitially, a comparative analysis of the existing user authentication methods is 
developed in order to understand what authentication methods are, how they work, 
and what kind of features are contained in them. Then a classification analysis is 
undertaken from the literature review (e.g. authentication marketplace) to establish 
the main user authentication methods to be used for the purposes of this thesis. 
•	 Afterward-, the most representative user authentication methods categories 
according to Allan (2007) from Gartner are identified as folJows: PasswordlPINs 
(wired network-based task): username and password login operation in a desktop 
environment; One-Time-Passwords(wireless/token network-based task): real-time 
generated OTPs based on the challenge-response method; OUI-o.rBand 
AUlhentieation (wired and wireless network-based task): utilization of two separate 
networks working concurrently to authenticate a user (e.g., computer and mobile 
device interaction, such as a cell phone, blackberry, etc.); and finally Biometries 
(wired network and electronic access control-based task): JogicaJ and physical 
access control (e.g. fingerprint). ln parallel, types of users (e.g. Super Admin, End­
Users, etc.) and working contexts are identified. 
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• From the user authentication methods categories identified previously, the task 
scenarios are created to perform the NGOMSL analysis, which includes the 
following: Check Business E-mail, Update the SecurID token User 
Ir.terface Specification, Make an electronic funds transfer, and 
Access a file on a personal laptop. 
• Also in parallel, the identification of the main cognitive areas of focus relating to 
user authentication (i.e. perception, attention and memory, mental models) is 
established followed by the definition of the appropriate cognitive architecture (i.e. 
adaptation of EPIC and SOAR), which guides the construction of the final 
cognitive architecture: the Cognitive Model of User Authentication (CMUA). 
CMUA helps to determine how and what cognitive processes are involved 
specifically for user authentication tasks (e.g. attention and memory, etc.). It serves 
as the basis for the development of the USS inspection method. 
• Next, the NGOMSL mode] is developed by i) specifying Standard Primitive 
External (i.e. Type <string of characters>, exampIe: Type <username» and 
Mental Operators (i.e. Recall <STM-object-description>, example: Recall 
<passcode», and Analyst-Defined Mental Operators (i.e. Think-of <description>, 
example: Think-of <VPN Dialer» and ii) generating a Task Description, a list of 
High-Level User Goals, Operators and Write Methods for Accomplishing Goals, 
and Total Execution and Learning Times estimates for each of the user 
authentication use cases. 
• After that, an Authentication Risk Assessment matrix is undertaken to identify the 
most critical vulnerabilities and threats related ta online user authentication. This 
assessment determines which Security Review shauld be considered within each 
usability criterion in the USS. 
• Next, the specification of the usability factors and usability criteria is undertaken 
by classifying and prioritizing the cognitive processes generated by the NGOMSL 
mode!. 
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•	 Afterward, the development of the USS inspection method itself is carried out by: 
i) plotting the usability factors and usability criteria in the USS matrix, ii) defining 
the rating severity of identified security problems, its rating severity representation, 
and recommendations, and iii) defining the rating severity of identified usability 
problems, its rating severity representatlon, and recommendations. 
•	 The V&V phase of the USS is undertaken by using the Multifunction Teller 
Machine (MTM) example and the RSA SecurID® 700 hardware token. 
•	 Finally, a usability Testing has been performed to identify high-priority usability 
issues. The testing assesses the usability of designs for end-user authentication 
tasks involving remote access; Secure Socket Layer (SSL); and Virtual Private 
Network (VPN), which is commonly known as SSL-VPN user authentication, a 
two-factor OTP system that provides strong authentication 51 . 
3.2.2 The Usable Security Protocol Architecture and Methodology 
An orderly and sequential seven-step methodology, which makes clear the process of 
enquiry through which knowledge materializes, is undertaken to generate the USP 
architecture as depicted in Figure 3.1. The USP architecture is comprised of Primary, 
Secondary, and Tertiary Data in the development phase. Then the Cognitive Science Model 
{Cognitive Ergonomies} is developed followed by the Computer Science Model 
{Demonstration}, which both form the Theoretical and Demonstrational approaches. 
51 Adaptive Authentication for the Enterprise. RSA-The Security Division of EMC. May 19, 20 J0 
<hllp://www.rsa.com/node.aspx?id=3018> 
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Primarv. Secondarv. Tertiarv Data 
Figure 3.1: The USP architecture and methodology. 
Step 1: Define the mission and conceptual design objective.
 
Step 2: Identify the most representative user authentication methods categories.
 
Step 3: Develop the Natural GOMS Language (NGOMSL).
 
Step 4: Develop the Authentication Risk Assessment Matl·ix.
 
Step 5: Generate the usable security principles from the NGOMSL mode!.
 
Step 6: Forrnulate the Usable Security Symmetry (USS) inspection method.
 
Step 7: Demonstrate the Usable Security Symmetry (USS).
 
Finally, the V&V phase is undertaken in Step 7, where the US? is validated by the 
authentication method demo. The V& V will demonstrate the protocol, fulftlling its 
intended purpose. As already mentioned, the key point of this thesis is the creation, 
development. and integration of the USS into the Requirements & Design process of user 
authentication method design. 
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Using one of the most essential design patterns, the Input-Process-Output (IPO) 
model, the different functions and interactions between the USP (information system) and 
the outside world (users in the environment) are represented in Figure 3.2. Data is provided 
for the USP (Input) (e.g., gathering and capturing data for the comparative analysis of user 
authentication methods), which is afterward analyzed and reorganized (Process) (e.g., 
analyzing and classifying the most representative user authentication methods), and finally 
it is displayed (Output) (e.g. selecting the most representative user authentication methods 
to be used in the GOMS model). The Process stage in fact entails translating or converting 
data into useful Outputs. Thus processing can involve formuJating comparisons, making 
calculations (i.e. execution time in NGOMSL), or classifying data for future use. 
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The Human Actors and their roles in the USP: 
•	 Researeher: The individua1 (graduate student) who undertakes this thesis 
research and is the Subject Matter Expert (SME). 
•	 System Administrators: 
o Super Administrator: See Section 1.6 Types of Users. 
o Domain Administrator: See Section 1.6 Types of Users. 
o Help Desk Administrator: See Section 1.6 Types of Users. 
• End-User: See Section 1.6 Types of Users
 
The System Actors and their roles:
 
•	 Mufti/unetion Teller Machine (MTM): A fully integrated cross-bank MTM 
network providing functionalities which are not straightforwardly associated 
with the management of one's own bank aceount, such as loading monetary 
value into pre-paid cards. Also, the MTMs can provide advanced 
authentication capabilities such as Biometries (e.g., palm recognition). 
•	 EMC VPN Application: Client Version 4.8.02.0010 2006. Client type: 
Windows winNT. 
•	 Authentieafor: RSA SecurlD® 700 hardware token. 
3.2.2.1 Step 1: Delble the mission and conceptllal design objective. 
Sub-Step 1.1 Formalize a usable security delinition: 
As stated in the introduction of this thesis, Usable Security is the study of how 
security information and usability factors should be handled in the system, including both 
front and back-end processes, and taking into consideration the resources and costs 
involved. front-end processes are represented by the interface that has been already 
highlighted, and are in fact regarded as a shared limit through which the infoll11ation flows 
(Maffezzini, 2006). 
137 
Sub-Step 1.2 Specify usable security scenarios and use cases. What are usable 
security scenarios - aU about? 
Although the HCl and HClSec literature contains plenty of definitions of what task 
and usability scenarios are, this thesis refines them in the context of usable security, and 
also introduces a novel definition for a security scenario as follows: 
•	 Task Scenario: A task scenario refers to a description of the task at hand, including 
its context of use. According to Figure (1-1), the Context of Use (CoU) analysis 
refers to a broad technique to determjne the characteristics of the User, Tasks, and 
their Environments. The application of the CoU analysis is primarily -used to 
support the data gathering requirements to build the basic components at the early 
developmental stages of the application, and also to establish the end results, which 
consist of effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction. 
•	 Usability Scenario. A usability scenario details a liser problem when doing a task 
in a certain context. Therefore, a usability scenario is a problem related to a task 
scenario, but it should be well known, meaning defined in a usability model, 
standard, or evaluation method. 
•	 Security Scenario. A security scenario refers to a description of a task scenario that 
includes the use of a particuJar security mechanism. A security scenario can be 
tangible or intangible. A Tangible Security Scenario (TSS) includes physical 
infrastructure, such as controlling a user's access to buildings and facilities using 
Biometries, or sending a silent alarm in response to a threat at MTM. An Intangible 
Security Scenario (ISS) includes data or other digital information, for example, a 
user who enters sensitive information at registration in order to purchase a concert 
ticket at an MTM. A Security Scenario might (or might not) be a combination of 
TSS and ISS. 
Examples ofTask, Usability, and Security Scenarios are described in Chapter 5 in Table 5.2, 
which describes the user authentication use cases as follows: 1. authenticate to an MTM 
(Multipurpose Contactless Smart Card (MpCC). 2. transfer funds to an international bank account, 
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3. buy a ticket concert, 4.access your MTM offline with your ceU phone, 5. deposit your check by 
using checking image, and 6. send a silent alarm. 
Sub-Step 1.3 Identify users and working context:
 
See Chapter l, Section 1.6: Types ofUsers.
 
Sub-Step lA Perform a comparative analysisfor user authentication methods: 
As part of one of the tasks to understand what authentication methods arc, how they work, 
and what kind of different features are found in them, a comparative analysis of the main user 
authentication metbods has been developed in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.7, Table 2.4. 
3.2.2.2 Step 2: IdentifY the most representative user authentication methods categories 
Step 2 will serve as the task scenarios for the NGOMSL model: 
Sub-Step 2.1 PasswordiPINs (wired network-based tasks): 
Uscmame and password login operation in a desktop environment. 
Sub-Step 2.2 One-Time-Passwords {wirelessltoken network-based tasks}: 
Real-time generated OTPs based on the challenge-response melhod. 
Sub-Step 2.3 Out-of-Band Authentication (wired and wireless network-based tasks) 
(e.g. computer and mobile device such as a cell phone, smartphone etc.)-: 
Utilization of two separate networks working concurrently to authenticate a user (e.g. 
when a user initiates certain online transactions, the user will be prompted to enter a 4-digit 
code, which is sent via text message to the user's mobile device). 
Sub-Step 2.4 Utilization of Biometries {wired network and electronic access 
contro/-based task}: 
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Logical and physical access control (e.g. a fingerprint). 
3.2.2.3 Step	 3: Develop the NGOMSL Model (Natural Goals, Methods, Selection 
Language) 
NGOMSL Model (Natural Goals, Methods, Selection Language) is a method in 
which learning time and execution time are predicted based on a program-like 
representation of the procedures that the user must learn and execute to perform tasks with 
the system. Under NGOMSL, methods are represented in terms of an underlying cognitive 
theory known as Cognitive Complexity Theory (CCT). This cognitive theOl)' allows 
NGOMSL to incorporate internai operators (i.e. actions that the user executes) such as 
manipulating working memory information or setting up sub-goals. Because of this, 
NGOMSL can also be used to estimate the time required to learn how to achieve tasks. To 
this end, the NGOMSL task analysis identifies and measures the execution and learning 
times of key perceptual, cognitive, and motor processes undertaken by users. They are 
based on expert users and weil defined tasks. There is an emphasis on the analysis of those 
cognitive processes involved in the user authentication processes. 
The task scenarios descriptions and a list of goals, methods, and operators for each 
user authentication method category is described throughout this current step. Ali data 
resources for developing the NGOMSL model have been gathered and/or developed frorn 
usability tests and user interviews, authentication token demonstrations, published research 
papers for estimating Jearning and execution times (Gong and Elkerton, 1990; Gong, 1993; 
Gong and Kieras, 1994; Card et al., 1983), and observations of real users employing the 
RSA SecurID® 700 (Figure 2-7) for authentication tasks in their real environments at the 
RSA Security Corporation in Bedford, MA (US). 
A vital decision as to what (and what not to) describe was made when developing 
the NGOMSL anaJysis, which is that mental processes should be basically treated as "black 
boxes" due to their overwhelming complexity. As a matter of fact, this is recommended by 
Kieras (1996). Il means that trying to explain in detaiJ, for instance, what Read mental 
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process is would be extraordinarily difficult. Hence this thesis treats the user's reading, 
verification (as looking or seeing), forgetting, reading, and thinking mechanisms as "black 
boxes" (For further details, see Section 2.3.3, How to Develop a GOMS Model). 
This thesis implements a set of basic operators for constructing the NGOMSL model 
as described in the sub-sections below. 
3.2.2.3.1 Standard Primitive External Operators 
The analyst52 defines the primitive motor and perceptual operators based on the 
elementary actions required by the system being analyzed. The standard primitive extemal 
operators used in this NGOMSL analysis are the following: 
•	 Click mouse button 
•	 Move cursor ta <target coordinates> 
•	 Type <string of characters> 
•	 Locate <name> value from screen is equivalent to the process of scanning 
specifie spots on a screen that supply a value for sorne parameter specified by 
<name> to determine the location of this value and placing the infomlation into 
working memory. Basically, there should be a Locate operator executed prior to a 
Double-click or Click, ta reflect that before an object can be clicked, its location 
must be known (e.g. Locate the password field). 
•	 Wait for <description>: The waiting time is the time when the user is waiting 
idly for the system's response (e.g., the liser has entereJ her username and 
password, the system processes the user authentication, and logs the user into the 
system). 
52 The "Analyst" is the persan wha perfarms a GOMS analysis as referred la by (Kieras_96). 
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3.2.2.3.2 Standard Primitive Mental Operators 
As previously mentioned, mental operators are the internaI actions (steps within the 
Methods) performed by the user. These operators include actions like making a basic 
decision, recalling an item in STM, retrieving information from LTM, etc. The mental 
operators used in this NGOMSL analysis are described below: 
•	 Read <name> value from screen is equivalent to the process of interpreting 
characters on a screen that supply a value for sorne parameter specified by <name> 
and placing the information into working memory (e.g. Read the password 
displayed on the digital readout window on the SecurlD Token).verify <name> 
value from screen is equivalent to the process of representing how the user is 
expected to notice and make use of that feedback information. A Verify operator 
should nOlmally be included at the point where the user must commit to the entry of 
information (e.g. Verify ha h pass\.;ord has been corre ly typed in). 0 
For memory storage and retrieval, the memory operators reflect the distinction 
between LTM and STM as they are typical1y used in computer operation tasks. The 
standard primitive mental operators used in this analysis are the fol1owing: 
•	 Recall <LTM-object-de:scd .on> Recall means to fetch from LTM. Searches 
LTM for an item whose specified properties have the specified values, and stores its 
symbolic name in STM. 
•	 . ecall <wrV;-object-descripti on> Recall means to fetch from STM. Searches STM 
for an item whose specified properties have the specified values, and stores its 
symbolic name in STM. 
•	 Retrieve <wt-'l-object-desClo'p ion> Retrieve means to get back an item from 
memory, which can either be from LTM or STM, during the method execution. 
•	 Retain <W~~-object-description> Retain means to store in working memory. 
•	 Forget <WM-obj ect -description> Forget means that the information is no longer 
needed, and thus can be deliberately dropped from working memory. 
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•	 Listen <Auditory stimulus-abject-description> Listen (auditory stimulus) 
means that the user listens to either speech or sound inputs. After a standard time 
delay representing auditory working memory decay time (currently 1000 ms), this 
object is deleted and the auditory stimulus information is no longer available. 
•	 Return with goal accamplished is a basic flow of control. A sub-method IS 
invoked by asserting that its goal should be accomplished, and returns here when 
the goal has been accomplished. The operator: Return with goal accomplished IS 
analogous to an ordinary RET(JRN statement, and marks the end of a method. 
3.2.2.3.3 Analyst-Defined Mental Operators 
Analyst-Defined Mental Operators represent psychological processes that are too 
complex to be practical to designate as methods in the GOMS model. The designer can in 
fact circumvent these processes by defining operators that act as place holders for the 
mental activities as follows: 
•	 Think-of <description> represents a process of th in king of a value for some 
parameter designated by <description> and putting the information into working 
memory (Kieras, 1996) (e.g. Think-af "VPN Dialer" padlock icon which indicates 
that it is a fully secure connection). 
•	 Read <name> value fram screen is equivalent to the process of interpreting 
characters on a screen that supply a value for some parameter specified by <name> 
and placing the information into working memory (e.g. Read the password 
displayed on the digital readout window on the SecurID Token). 
As stressed by Kieras (1996), the methods have been represented at the standard 
primitive operator level, so the calculations for predicting learning and execution times will 
generate realistic, accurate, and useful results. 
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3.2.2.3.4 Total Execution Time and Total Learning Time 
NGOMSL predicts the Learning Time that users will take to leam the procedures 
represented in the GOMS model- and the Execution Time (ET) users will take to execute 
particular task instances by following the procedures. It is important here to understand the 
difference between these two usability measures. 
The Total Execution Time comprises the methods, steps, and operators needed to 
carry out a specifie task. The time needed to complete a task instance is determined by the 
number and content of NGOMSL statements that have to be executed in order to get that 
particular task done. The time needed by each statement is the sum of a small fixed time for 
the statement plus the time required by any external or mental operator executed in the 
statement. 
The execution time for a task is predicted by simulating the execution of the methods 
required to perform the task. Each NGOMSL statement (i.e. each step) is assumed to 
require a small fixed time to execute, and any operators in the statement, such as a 
keystroke, will then take additional time depending on the operator. 
Execution Time =	 NGOMSL statement time + Primitive 
External Operator Time + Waiting Time 
Execu tion Time = Time for the execution of the methods required to perform the task 
itselfby the user. 
NGOMSL statement time = Number of statements executed x 0.1 sec 
Primitive External Operator Time = Total of times for primitive external 
opera tors 
Waiting Time = Total time when user is inactive while waiting for the system's 
response. Note: For the purposes of this thesis, the waiting time is irrelevant due to the fact 
that - the system is considered to be fast enough, and it is not the main focus of our GOMS 
analysis related to user authentication. Therefore it will be not measured and indicated in 
the time measurement analysis. 
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The Total Learning Time 1S the total number and length ofail methods. The time to 
learn a set of methods 1S fundamentally specified by the total length of the methods, which 
1S provided by the number of NGOMSL statements in the whoJe GOMS modeJ for the 
interface. This is the quantity of procedural knowledge that the user has to acquire in order 
to know how ta use the system for al! tasks under consideration (Kieras, 2006). The time 
required to learn how to perform the methods themselves is defined as the Pure Learning 
Time. 
Total Learning Time =	 Pure Method Learning Time + LTM Item 
Learning Time + Training Procedure Execution 
Time 
Total Learning Time = the total time needed to complete a training process.
 
Pure Method Learning Time = Learning Time Parameter X Number of NGOMSL
 
Statements to be learned (the time required to learn how to perform the methods):
 
Leaming Time Parameter = 30 sec for rigorous procedure training or 17 sec for a typicaJ
 
learning situation.
 
Long Tenn Memory (LTM) Item Learning Time = the time required to memorize items
 
that will be retrieved from LTM during method execution. Gong (1993) has estimated that
 
in general this takes approximately 6 secs x Number of LTM Chunks* to be Learned.
 
* Retrieving a chunk from memory: A chunk is a cornmon unit such as a file name, 
command name, or abbreviation. For instance, if the user wants to list the contents of 
directory foo, they need to retrieve two chunks, dir and foo, each of which takes 
anM. 
According to Kieras (1996), there is no recognized and verified method for counting how 
many chunks are implicated in "to-be-memorized" information, so what is presented next 
is heuristic-based information. Count the number of chunks as follows: 
• one chunk for each common pattern in the retrieval cue.
 
• one chunk for each common pattern in the retrieved information.
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• one chunk for the association between the retrieval cue and the retrieved 
information. 
For instance, presume that the "to-be-stored" association for a command is l110ve cursar 
right bya ward is CTRL-RlGHT ARROW. Then: 
(move cursor right) (by a word) = 2 chunks for retrieval cue 
(ctrl) (right-arrow) = 2 chunks for retrieved information 
association between the two = 1 chunk 
Training Procedure Execution Time = If the procedures to be used in training are 
known, it may be usefu1 to estimate the total 1earning time by adding the time required to 
execute the training procedures. 
The following KLM (Keystroke-Level Model) GOMS Operators have been used for 
some of the operators' duration times (Kieras, 2001) according to the table below. 
Although those KLM Operators have been counted and included as part of the time 
calculations, they are not explicitly shown in Sub-Steps 1, 2, 3, and 4 in the next sections as 
specific values within the time measurements so as to simplify data presentation. 
When considering a user's typing skills, it is important to notc that thc typing time 
depends on the typing skill of the user, so for the purposes of this thesis it has been 
specified by the Average Skilled Typist (55 wpm*) = 0.20 secs (Card et al., 1983). 
*wpm=words per minute is a measure of input or output speed. 
Operator Abbreviation Duration (secs) 
Mental M (1) 1.20 
Keystroke <key> K 0.28 
MouseDown or Up B 0.10 
Click (mouseDown & Up) BB 0.20 
Homing (2) H 0.40 
DoubleClick BBBB 0.40 
Point w/ mouse P (3) 1.10 
Type characters T(n) (4) 0.20 
System Response R (5) t 
(1) Thinking time. (2) Homing is the process of determining the location of something, and going to il. 
(3) Point with mouse to a target on a dispJay. (4) T(n): Type a sequence of N characters on a keyboard. 
146 
(5) The system response time during which the user has to wait for Ihe system. The duraI ion (1) can 
drastically vary depending on the system being analyzed. 
An example of TET and TLT time calculations for "Access a file on a 
personal laptop", Method for goal: Log into the system, fo.11ows: 
Total Execution Time (TET): 
Method for goal: Log into the system NGOMSL 
Statemen 
t(secs) 
Operator 
(Type) 
Operator 
Time 
(secs) (1) 
Sub-Total 
Execution 
Time (secs) 
Step 1. Read fingerprint logon WeJcome 0.10 M 2.01 2.11 
screen containing finger image and 
"Password" field on the laptop computer. 
Step 2. Refer to the Universal Seriai Bus 0.10 H 2.01 2.11 
(USB)-based biometric fingerprint reader. 
Step 3. Locate the fingerprint sensor on 0.10 M 2.01 2.11 
the USB fingerprint reader. 
Step 4. Move finger to the USB 0.10 P 1.01 1.11 
fingerprint reader. 
Step 5. Position last knuckle joint over the 0.10 H 1.01 1.11 
center of the fingerprint sensor. 
Step 6. Swipe the finger without lifting it 0.10 P 1.21 1.31 
over the fingerprint sensor. 
Step 7. Verify that you have been granted 0.10 M 1.1 1 1.21 
access to the system. 
Total Execution Time (secs) 9.16 
(1) A 0.01 milliseconds have been added 10 the Operalor Time as a margin of errol'. 
Total Leaming Time (TLT): 
Total Learning Time = Pure Method Learning Time + Long Term Memory Item 
Learning Time + Training Procedure Execution Time 
Total Leacning Time = 119 secs + 30 secs + 0 secs = 149 secs 
(Pure Method Learning Time = Learning Time Parameter X Number ofNGOMSL 
Statements to be Jearned -> 17 secs x 7 steps = 119 secs) 
The foUowing task- scenarios with their corresponding authentication methods have 
been created to develop the NGOMSL mode!: 
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• Chee B siness E-mail incorporates the Usemame and Password login 
authentication method; 
•	 Update the SecurI token User Interface Sp cificat i 0 incorporates 
One-Time-Passwords (OTP); 
•	 ke n clce onic nds trans er incorporates Out-Of-Band Authentication 
(OOBA); 
•	 Aeeess a ile on a pe sa laI 1a or incorporates Biometries (fingerprint 
recognition). 
These tasks were conceived of only to serve as a basis for demonstrating the 
authentication portions which are embedded in them. Security is a secondary goal for many 
users, an indispensable step in the way of achieving their primary goals such as the task­
scenarios mentioned previously. Therefore, it would be odd to describe only the 
authentication activity given that users don't authenticate to a system, and in fact do 
nothing. There is always a goal involved when authenticating to a system. 
As already mentioned, a method is a series of steps that accomplishes a goal. A step 
in a method typically consists of an external operator, such a pressing a key, or a set of 
mental operators involved in setting up and accomplishing a sub-goal. Much of the work in 
analyzing a user interface consists of specifying the acmal steps that users carry out in 
order to accomplish goals, so describing the methods is the focus of the task analysis. 
According to NGOMSL, the structure for a method is as follows: 
Method or goal: <goal descriptio >
 
Ste? 1. 0 e aLo > .
 
Ste? 2. <oper tor> .
 
S~e? 3. <operaL r> .
 
Step n. Ret rn vlil goal aceornplished. 
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The NGOMSL analysis lays down the foundation for the design of the USS 
inspection method. Finally, this section presents the results of quantitative and qualitative 
aspects ofNGOMSL applied to user authentication. 
Sub-Step 3.1 Username and Password Login {wired network-based task}: 
This authentication task scenario is specified as Task_scenario: Tl. 
• Generate Task Description 
This task is related to the username and password [ogin operation in a wired network­
based desktop environment. Password authentication is the most common method of 
authentication, and also one of the least secure. Basically the computer asks the user to type 
in a username and a password. The computer searches the system's password hie for an 
entry matching the usemame in the database. If the password in that entry matches the 
password just typed, then the login succeeds. (For more details, see section 2.2.5.1 
Passwords and PINs). This task scenario makes use of the Microsoft Windows NT53 
operating system, which controls - user access to systems within and across domains 
(i.e. local and remote access). When a user logs on to an NT system, NT validates the user's 
account and authorizes access to the appropriate system or domain (i.e. Windows NT 
authentication). 
• Describe a List ofHigh-Level User Goals 
The topmost user's goal is: Check Busi s E-maj]. The set of a user's high level 
goals - includes the following: 
• Log in 0 the system 
• Open -Mic~oso t Of . j ce Oullock 
• Rea E-mail [Vessa e 
• Ret ri wilh g al accompli hed. 
This analysis is based on the premise that this thesis is about user authentication, so a 
particular level of analysis or granularity is required for the Jo into Lh8 sys -em high­
53 Microsoft Windows NT <http://www.microsofl.com/technet/archive/winntas/defaull.mspx?mfr=true> 
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level operator. It means that this operator is decomposed into finer levels (i.e. a series of 
lower-Ievel, or primitive, operators), whereas the Op n -Microsoft Offi ce Outlo k and 
Read e-mail message high-leveJ operators function as supportive methods within the 
task, and are therefore not decomposed. This is in fact a common decision-making point 
when undertaking GOMS: specifically, whether the operator should or should not be 
decomposed into finer levels, depending on the finest grain level of analysis desired by the 
analyst. It is worth noting that users do not authenticate to a system pel" se since 
authentication is not a goal but rather a means to accomplishing a goal within the context 
ofthis task: Check Busine sE-mail. 
• Define Operators and Write Methodsfor Accomplishing User Goals 
ethod for goal: Log into the system 
Step 1. Read Windows Logon Welcome screen on the desktop computer. 
Step 2. Locate Ctr1+Alt+Del key combination on the keyboard and simultaneously hold 
them down. 
Step 3. Verify that the Windows pop-up window is opened. 
Step 4. Locate the username field on the screen. 
Step 5. Move the cursor to the usemame field. 
Step 6. Recall the username "jdoe", retrieve it from LTM, and retain it. 
Step 7. Type the username in the username field. 
Step 8. Verify that the username has been correctly typed in. 
Step 9. Forget the username. 
Step 10. Locate the password field. 
Step II. Move the cursor to the password field. 
Step 12. RecaJJ that the password is "Boat6paper!", retrieve it from LTM, and retain it. 
Step 13. Type the password in the password field. 
Step 14. Verify that the password has been correctly typed in. 
Step 15. Forget the password. 
Step 16. Locate the "Submit" button. 
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Step 17. Double-click the "Submit" button.
 
Step 18. Verify that you have been granted access to the system.
 
Step 19. Return with the goal accompli shed.
 
Method for goal: Open -M icrosoft Office Outlook
 
Step 1. Locate the Microsoft Office Outlook icon in the task bar.
 
Step 2. Double-click on the Microsoft Office Outlook icon.
 
Step 3. Verify that Microsoft Office Outlook has opened up the inbox.
 
Step 4. Return with the goal accomplished.
 
Method for goal: Read E-mail Message.
 
Step 4. Double-click on any e-mail message row.
 
Step 5. Verify that the e-mail message has been opened.
 
Step 6. Retum with the goal accomplished.
 
• Estimate Total Execution Time: 
The time measurement related to the execution time for Task scenario: Tl Check 
Busi ess E- al is listed in seconds below. 
l 
Method for 20al: L02 iuto the system 
Step 1. Read Windows Logon WeJcome screen on the 
desktop computer. 
Step 2. Locate Ctrl, Ait, and Del keys on the keyboard. 
Step 3. Hold down Ctrl+Alt+Del keys simultaneously. 
Step 4. Verify that the Windows pop-up window is opened. 
Step 5. Locate the username field on the screen. 
Step 6. Moye the cursor to the username field. 
Step 7. Recall the username "jdoe", retrieye it from LTM, 
and retain it. 
Step 8. Type the username in the username field. 
Step 9. Verify that the username has been correctly typed in. 
Step 10. Forget the username. 
Step 11. Locate the password field. 
Step 12. Moye the cursor to the password field. 
Step 13. RecalJ that the password is "Boat6paper!", retrieye 
it from LTM, & retain it. 
Step 14. Type the password in the password field. 
Step 15. Verify that the password has been correctly typed 
tn. 
Step 16. Forget the password. 
Step 17. Locate the "Submit" button. 
Step 18. Double-click on the "Submit" button. 
Step 19. Verify that you haye been granted access to the 
system. 
Total Execution Time 
Method for goal: Open the Microsoft Office Olltlook
 
(MOO)
 
Step 1. Locate the MOO icon in the task bar.
 
Step 2. Double-click on the MOO jcon.
 
Step 3. Verify that MOO has opened up the inbox.
 
Total Execution Time
 
Method for 20al: Read E-mail Message
 
Step 1. Double-click on any e-mail message row.
 
Step 2. Verify that the e-mail message has been opened.
 
Total Execution Time
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Sub-Execution Time(s) 
1.21 
1.21 
0.77 
1.21 
1.21 
1.11 
1.21 
2.16 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
1.11 
1.21 
2.16 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
0.21 
1.21 
23.25 
SlIb-Execution Time(s) 
1.21 
0.41 
1.21 
2.83 
Execution °rime(s) 
0.41 
1.21 
1.62 
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The Total Execution Time for Task scenario: Tl - Check Business E-mail \s 
shown below: 
Task scenario: Tl Check Business E-mail 
Methods 
Method for goal: Log into the system 
Sub-Execution Time(s) 
23.25 
Method for goal: Open -Microsoft Office Outlook 2.83 
Method for goal: Read E-mail Message 1.62 
Total Execution Time 27.70 
• Estimate Total Learning Time: 
The Total Learning Time for Task_scenario: Tl - Check Business E-mail 
is shown below: 
Total Learning Time = Pure Method Learning Time + LTM Learning Time + 
Training Procedure Execution Time 
Total Learning Time = 408 secs + 24 secs + 0 secs = 432 secs 
Sub-Step 3.2 One- Time-Passwords (OTP) {wired netJVork-based taskj: 
This authentication task scenario is specified as Task_scenario: T2. 
• Generate Task Description 
This \S a hardware token and wireless network-based task with real-time 
generated OTPs based on the challenge-response authentication method. The typical 
scenario where OTP is used is with Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)54/Virtual Private 
Network (VPN)55 servers and web portaIs. 
In a simple scenario, John Doe, a user, connects to the VPN application and 
opens it in his computer. John enters his username (idoe) and a 4-digit numeric PIN 
(7234) in the usemame and passcode fields in the login application screen. Then John 
54 Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is a protocol developed by Netscape for transmitting private documents
 
via the Inlernet. SSL uses a cryptographie system [hal uses two keys to encrypl data - a public key
 
known to everyone and a private or secret key known only to the recipient of the message.
 
55 Virtual Private Network (VPN) is a private network that uses a public network (usuaJly the Internet)
 
10 connecl remote sites or users together.
 
153 
types and appends the six digit numenc token number (currently displayed on his 
hardware token, e.g. 435961) to the entered PIN on the login screen. This whole 
number (7234435961) becomes the passcode, which is in fact the combination of the 
PIN and the token code. John clicks "OK". If the authentication is successful, the 
authentication seryer yalidates the passcode and grants user access to the network. 
Pre-condition for this task scenario: The authentication seryer randomly generates ­
OTPs (six-digit numeric token numbers) on the user token's display (e.g. 435961). 
John has possession of a hardware authentication token which has been assigned to 
him by the company's IT administrator. For more details, see Section 2.2.5.2.1.1: 
One-Time-Passwords (OTP). 
• Describe a List ojHigh-Level User Goals 
The topmost - goal for users is- Update the SecurID token user 
interface specification using a client/seryer configuration management 
system56 . 
The set of -high leyel user goals eonsidered are: 
• Open the EMC Virtual Private Network (VPN) application. 
• Log into the system. 
• Get authorization from the system to the protected resource. 
• Enable the configuration management system. 
• Open the SecurID token user interface specification. 
• Retuzn with goal accomplished. 
• Deflne Operators and Write Methodsfor Accomplishing User Goals 
Method for goal: Open the E C VPN application (EMC, 2006) 
Step 1. Locate the EMC-VPN icon in the bottom taskbar on the screen in Windows. 
Step 2. Moye mouse oyer the EMC-VPN ieon and double-click the ieon of the VPN. 
Step 3. Verify that the EMC-VPN pop-up window is opened. 
56 hllp://www.perforce.com 
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Step 4. Return with the goal accomplished.
 
Method for goal: Log into the system
 
Step 1. Locate and verify that the "Americas East Coast" connection entry IS
 
highlighted in the EMC-VPN pop-up window.
 
Step 2. Move the mouse over to it.
 
Step 3. Double-click it with left mouse button.
 
Step 4. Verify that the status bar on the bottom left corner of the pop-up window is
 
displaying "Authenticating user... ".
 
Step 5. Verify that the "VPN Client User Authentication for Americas East Coast"
 1 
secondary login pop-up window is opened.
 
Step 6. Verify that the username field has been automatically filled in (e.g. joedoe).
 
Step 7. Verify that the cursor is automatically placed within the "Passcode" field.
 
Step 8. Recall the 4-digit Personal Identification Number (PLN), retrieve it from LTM,
 
and retain it.
 
Step 9. Type the 4-digit- PIN in the "Passcode" field.
 
Step 10. Verify that asterisks are displayed while entering the PIN within the
 
"Passcode" field.
 
Step II. Forget PIN.
 
Step 12. Refer to the SecurID 700 token to get the ever-changing (i.e. each 30
 
seconds) 6-digit numerical password.
 
Step 13. Read the 6-digit numerical password displayed on the digital readout window
 
on the SecurID token.
 
Step 14. Retain, memorize, and store the 6-digit numerical password in the STM.
 
Step 15. Retrieve the 6-digit numerical password from the STM.
 
Step 16. Verify that the cursor is in the correct place within the "Passcode" field.
 
Step 17. Append the 6-digit numerical password to the PIN that has been already
 
entered in the "Passcode" field.
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Step 18. Verify that asterisks are displayed while entering the 6-digit numerical
 
password in the "Passcode" field.
 
Step 19. Forget the 6-digit numerical password.
 
Step 20. Move the mouse over to the "OK" button.
 
Step 21. Double-click the "OK" button.
 
Method for goal: Get authorization t'rom the system to the protected resource.
 
Step 1. Wait for the authentication server to the check user's username and passcode
 
against the database.
 
Step 2. Verify that the system displays "Contacting the security gateway at
 
137.69.1 15.17... " message in the status bar at the bottom left corner, and the progress
 
bar at the bottom right is running.
 
Step 3. Verify that the system displays the "Negotiating security policies ... " message
 
(after successfully contacting the security gateway)- in the status bar bottom in the left
 
corner, and ensure that the progress bar at the bottom right is running.
 
Step 4. Verify that the system displays the "Connected to Americas East Coast"
 
message (after successfully negotiating the security policies) in the status bar bottom
 
in the left corner, and ensure that the progress bar at the bottom right is running.
 
** The system displays the Internet Protocol (IP) address of the authentication server.
 
Method for goal: Enable the configuration management system.
 
Step 1. Double-click on "Continue" button to enable the protected network resource.
 
Step 2. Verify that the system displays the "VPN Dialer 1 Banner" pop-up window.
 
Step 3. Read the "VPN Dialer 1 Banner" statement.
 
Step 4. Locate the "VPN Dialer 1 Banner" padlock icon, think-of as locked (i.e. user is
 
connected with the software VMS) in the status bar bottom right corner, and put this
 
information into the STM.
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Step 5. Think-of also that the "VPN Dialer 1 Banner" padlock icon -indicates that it is
 
a fully secure connection.
 
Step 6. Retum with goal accomplished.
 
Mcthod for goal: Open the SecurlO token u. cr interface specification. 
Step 1. Locate the SecurID token user interface specification in the directory of the
 
VMS.
 
Step 2. Double-click with left mouse button.
 
Step 3. Go to the "Request a Token" section in the specification.
 
Step 4. Add a new software tokcn type.
 
Step 5. Retum with goal accomplished.
 
• Estimate Total Execution Time 
The time measurement reJated to the execution time for Task scenario: T2 
Update the SecurID token user interface specification is listed in seconds 
below. 
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-
Method 
.. 
for goal: Open the EMC-VPN application 
Step 1. Locate the EMC-VPN icon in the bottom taskbar 
on the screen in Windows 
Step 2. Move mouse over the EMC-VPN icon and double-
click the icon of the EMC-VPN 
Step 3. Verify that the EMC-VPN pop-up window is 
opened 
Total Execution Time 
Method for goal: Log into the system 
Step 1. Locate and verify that the "Americas East Coast" 
connection entry is highlighted in the EMC-VPN pop-up 
window 
Step 2. Move mouse over to it 
Step 3. Double-click it with left mouse button 
Step 4. Verify that the status bar on the bottom left corner 
of the pop-up window is displaying "Authenticating 
user... " 
Step 5. Verify that the "VPN Client User Authentication 1 
for Americas East Coast" secondary login pop-up window 
is opened 
Step 6. Verify that username field has been automatically 
filled in (e.g. joedoe) 
Step 7. Verify that the cursor is automatically placed 
within the "Passcode" field 
Step 8. Recall the 4-digits Personal Identification Number 
(PIN), retrieve it from LTM and retain it 
Step 9. Type the 4-digits PIN within the "Passcode" field 
Step 10. Verify that asterisks are displayed while entering 
the PIN within the "Passcode" field. 
Step Il. Forget PIN 
Step 12. Refer to the SecurlD 700 token ta get the ever­
changing (i.e. each 30 seconds) 6-digit number password 
Step 13. Read the 6-digit number password displayed on 
the digital readout window on the SecurID token 
Step 14. Retain, memorize and store the 6-digit number 
password in the STM 
Step 15. Retrieve the 6-digit number password from STM 
Sub-Execution 
Timc(s) 
1.21 
1.11 
1.21 
3.53 
Sub-Execution 
Time(s) 
1.21 
1.11 
0041 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
1.51 
2.16 
1.21 
1.21 
2.1 
3.0 
1.51 
1.21
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Step 16. Verify that the cursor is at correct place in the 
"Passcode" field 
Step 17. Append the 6-digit number password to the PIN 
that has been already entered in the "Passcode" field 
Step 18. Verify that asterisks are displayed while entering 
the 6-digit number password in the "Passcode" field 
Step 19. Forget the 6-digit number password 
Step 20. Move mouse over to "OK" button 
Step 21. Double-click the "OK" button 
Total Execution Time 
Method for goal: Get authorization from the system to 
the protected resource. 
Step 1. Wait for the authentication server to check user's 
username and passcode against the database. 
Step 2. Verify that the system displays "Contacting the 
security gateway at 137.69.115.17... " message in the status 
bar bottom left corner, and the progress bar bottom right is 
running. 
Step 3. Verify that the system displays "Negotiating 
security policies... " message (after successfully contacted 
the security gateway), in the status bar bottom left corner, 
and the pro,gress bar bottom right is runnin,g. 
Step 4. Verify that the system displays "Connected to 
Americas East Coast" message (after successfully 
negotiated the security policies) in the status bar bottom 
left corner, and the progress bar bottom right is running. 
Total Execution Time 
1.21 
1.50 
1.21 
1.21 
1. Il 
0.41 
28.13 
Sub-Execution 
Timc(s) 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
4.84 
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-
ethod for goal: Enable the software Sub-Execution Time(s) 
configuration management system (CMS). 
Step 1. Double-click on "Continue" button to 0.41 
enable the protected network resource. 
Step 2. Verify that the system displays the "VPN 1.21 
Dialer 1 Banner" pop-up window. 
Step 3. Read the "VPN Dialer 1 Banner" statement. 1.1 1 
Step 4. Locate the "VPN Dialer 1 Banner" padlock 1.51 
icon, think-of as locked (i.e. user is connected with 
the CMS) in the status bar bottom right corner, and 
put this information into the STM. 
Step 5. Think-of also that "VPN Dialer 1 Banner" 0.29 
padlock icon as indicating that it is a fully secure 
connection. 
Total Execution Time 4.53 
Method for goal: Open the SeclIrlD token user lib-Execution Time( ) 
interface specification. 
Step 1. Locate the SecurlD token user interface 1.21 
specification in the directory of the VMS. 
Step 2. Double-click with left mouse button. 0.41 
Step 3. Go to the "Request a Token" section in the 2.21 
speci fication. 
Step 4. Replace token type wording from RSA 0.45 
SecurlD Toolbar to RSA SecurID Windows 
MobileS? 
Total Execution Time 4.28 
57 RSA-The Security Division of EMC. May 23, 2010 <hllp://www.rsa.com/node.aspx.)id=2571> 
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The Total Execution Time for Task scenario: T2 Update the SecurID token 
user interface specification is shown below: 
-
Task scenario: T2 Update the SecurlD token user interface specification 
Methods Sub-Execution Time(s) 
Method for goal: Open the EMC-VPN application 3.53 
Method for goal: Log into the system 28.13 
Method for goal: Get authorization from the system to 4.84 
the protected resource. 
Method for goal: Enable the software configuration 4.53 
management system (CMS). 
Method for goal: Open the SecurlD token user 4.28 
interface specification. 
Total Execution Time 45.31 
• Estimate Total Learning Time: 
The Total Learning Time for Task_ scenario: T2 Update the SecurID token 
user interface specification is shown below: 
Total Learning Time = Pure Method Learning Time + LTM Learning Time + 
Training Procedure Execution Time 
Total Learning Time = 629 secs + 42 secs + 0 secs 671 secs 
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Sub-Step 3.3 Out-of-Band A uthentication {wired and wireless network-based 
task}: 
This authentication task scenario is specified as Task_scenario: T3. 
• Generate Task Description 
Out-Of-Band Authentication (OOBA) is essentially the use of two separa te 
networks, for instance wired and wireless networks, working concurrently in order to 
authenticate a user. Consider this scenario: Alice, who has her Blackberry mobile 
device number stored on the bank authentication server, wants to transfer an amount 
of money to a different bank account. First she logs onto the bank's website with her 
credentials (username and password). Then she goes to the money transfer section and 
selects from the drop down menu list to transfer more than $15,000 to another bank 
account; this selection triggers the server to send a code to Alice. According to the 
bank's security policy, this transaction requires an additional authentication method. 
Third, the bank sends a code to Alice's Blackberry via Short Messaging Service 
(SMS). Finally, Alice types this code in the TextField on the bank's Website screen 
and clicks Submit; if this code matches the one the ban!< has just sent then the 
transaction is successful. For more detail, see Section 2.2.5.4 Out-Of-Band 
Authentication (OOBA). 
• Describe a List ofHigh-Level User Goals 
The topmost goal of the use is: Transfer $15 / 000 to the Bank of 
America. The set of the user's high level goals considered are: 
• Go to the bank w bsJte. 
• Log on 0 the system. 
• Make a electronic unds tr nsfer. 
• Ret rn with go l ccomplishe . 
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• Dejine Operators and Write Methods/or Accomplishing User Goals 
Method for goal: Go to the ballk website. 
Step 1. Open the Web browser on a desktop computer.
 
Step 2. Type the bank's website address.
 
Step 3. Retum with the goal accomplished.
 
Method for goal: Log on to the system. 
Step 1. Locate the "Online Banking" log-on section on the bank's home page.
 
Step 2. Read your online ID that has been already fil1ed in by the system (e.g. a saved
 
online ID such as "g04t****").
 
Step 3. Locate the "Sign ln" button.
 
Step 4. Move the cursor to the "Sign In" button.
 
Step 5. Click on the "Sign ln" button with the left mouse button.
 
Step 6. Verify that it is a secure connection by checking if the bank's address bar
 
contains the prefix "https" when the "Contirm that your SiteKey is correct" page is
 
displayed.
 
Step 7. Verify that it is a secure connection by checking if the Uniform Resource
 
Locator (URL) is correct and no errors were encountered on the same page.
 
Step 8. Think- of the closed yellow padlock icon as indicating that it is a secure
 
connection on the bottom right of the Windows task bar.
 
Step 7. Locate the SiteKey phrase field.
 
Step 8. Read the SiteKey phrase.
 
Step 9. Recognlze the SiteKcy phrase (e.g. "Whales are fascinating creatures"),
 
retrieve it from LTM, and retain il.
 
Step 10. Verify that the SiteKey phrase IS correct according to the user's online
 
account setup.
 
Step Il. Read the SiteKey image.
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Step 12. Recognize your SiteKey image Ce.g. "a whale image"), retrieve it from LTM
 
and retain it.
 
Step 13. Verify that the SiteKey image Ce.g. "a whale image") is correct according to
 
the user's online account setup.
 
Step 14. Locate the "Passcode" field.
 
Step 15. Verify that the cursor has been already placed in the "Passcode" field on the
 
page 10ad.
 
Step 16. Recall the passcode Ce.g. Light70cean), retrieve it from LTM and retain it.
 
Step 17. Type the passcode within the "Passcode" field.
 
Step 18. Verify that asterisks are displayed while entering the passcode within the
 
"Passcode" field.
 
Step 19. Verify that the passcode has been correctly typed in.
 
Step 20. Forget passcode
 
Step 21. Locate the "Sign In" button.
 
Step 22. Click on "Sign In" button with left mouse button
 
Step 23. Verify that the system has been granted access and the "Accounts" page is
 
displayed.
 
Method for goal: ake an electrolli.c fUllds transfer.
 
Step 1. Verify that you are in the "Accounts Overview" tab.
 
Step 2. Locate the "Transfers" tab and click on it.
 
Step 3. Verify that you are in the "Transfers" page.
 
Step 4. Verify that you are in the "Make Transfer" sub-tab.
 
Step 5. Locate the "From" field and select the account.
 
Step 6. Locate the "To" field and select the account.
 
Step 7. Locate the "Amount" field and type the amount of$15,000.
 
Step 8. Locate the "Continue" button and click on it.
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Step 9. Read a warning message on the top of the next page which says that "You will 
have to provide an additional authentication credential in order to proceed with 
transfers over $10,000. Do you want to continue?" 
Step 10. Verify the "OK" and "Cancel" buttons. 
Step II. Locate the "OK" button and click on it. 
Step 12. Verify that you are in the "Additional Authentication Credentials" page. 
Step 13. Locate the instructions section on this page. 
Step 14. Read the instructions about the 4-digit numerical code that has to be sent to 
the BJackberry mobile device using Short Messaging Service (SMS). After 15 
seconds, verify that an SMS text message has been sent by the bank to the Blackberry 
mobile device. Then enter this same code in the "Code" field on this page. 
Step 1S. Wait for a sound alert for SMS notification to the Blackberry after 15 
seconds, indicating that the 4-digit numerical code has been sent by the bank. Then 
open your "Messages" application on your Blackberry. 
Step 16. Listen to the auditory stimulus in the form of a sound alert for SMS 
notification on the Blackberry with the 4-digit numerical code that has been sent by 
the ban!< to the Blackberry-, retrieve it from the auditory LTM, and retain it. 
Step 17. The auditory stimulus information (sound alert) disappears from LTM and is 
no longer available. 
Step 18. Open your "Messages" appl ication. 
Step 19. Verify that you have received an SMS text message with the 4-digit 
numerical code sent by the bank. 
Step 20. Read the 4-digit numerical code directly from the subject field of the message 
row. 
Step 21. Memorize the 4-digit numerical code- and retain it in the STM. 
Step 22. Locate the "Code" field on the "Additional Authentication Credentials" Web 
page. 
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Step 23. Locate the "Code" field on the page.
 
Step 24. Type the 4-digit numerical code in the "Code" field.
 
Step 25. Verify that asterisks are displayed while entering the code within the "Code"
 
field.
 
Step 26. Forget code.
 
Step 27. Verify the "Send" and "Cancel" buttons are dispJayed below the "Code" field
 
on the page.
 
Step 28. Click on the "Send" button with the left mouse button.
 
Step 29. Verify that you have been directed to the confirmation page which states that
 
you have successfully transferred the amount of $15,000 to the desired destination
 
account.
 
Step 30. Return with the goal accomplished.
 
• Estimate Total Execution rime 
The time measurement related to the execution time for Task scenario: T3 
Transfer $15 , 000 ta the National Bank of Canada is listed in seconds below. 
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Method for 2oal: Go to the banli website.
 
Step 1. Open the Web browser in a desktop
 
computer.
 
Step 2. Type the bank's website address.
 
Step 3. Verify that the bank's Home page IS
 
displayed.
 
Total Execution Time
 
Method for 2oal: L02 into the system 
Step 1. Locate the "Online Banking" log-on 
section on the bank's home page. 
Step 2. Read your online ID that has been already 
fi lied in by the system (e.g. g04t* ***). 
Step 3. Locate the "Sign ln" button. 
Step 4. Move cursor to "Sign ln" button. 
Step 5. Click on "Sign ln" button with left mouse 
button 
Step 6. Verify that it is a secure connection by 
checking if the bank's address bar contains the 
prefix "https" when the "Confirm that your 
SiteKey is correct" page is displayed. 
Step 7. Verify that it is a secure connection by 
checking if the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) 
is correct and no errors were encountered on the 
same page. 
Step 8. Think-of the closed yellow padlock icon 
as indicating that it is a secure connection on the 
bottom right of the Windows task bar. 
Step 7. Locate the SiteKey phrase field. 
Step 8. Read the SiteKey phrase. 
Step 9. Recognize the SiteKey phrase (e.g. 
"Whales are fascinating creatures"), retrieve it 
from LTM and retain it. 
Step 10. Verify that the SiteKey phrase is correct 
according to the user's online account setup. 
Step Il. Read the SiteKey image. 
Step 12. Recognize your SiteKey image (e.g. "a whale 
image"), retricve it from LTM and rctain il. 
Step 13. Verify lhal the SiteKey image (e.g. "a whale 
image") is correcl accarding ta lhe user's anline accaunl 
setup. 
Sub-Execution Time(s) 
0.91 
3.01 
1.21 
5.13 
Sub-ExcclItion Time(s) 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
1.11 
0.21 
1.21 
1.21 
0.29 
1.21 
1.51 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
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Step 14. Locate the "Passcode" field. 
Step 15. Verify that the cursor has been a1ready
 
p1aced in the "Passcode" field on the page load.
 
Step 16. Recall the passcode (e.g. Light7ocean),
 
retrieve it from LTM and retain it.
 
Step 17. Type the passcode within the "Passcode"
 
field.
 
Step 18. Verify that asterisks are displayed while
 
entering the passcode within the "Passcode" field.
 
Step 19. Verify that the passcode has been
 
correctlv tvped in.
 
Step 20. Forget passcode
 
Step 21. Locate the "Sign ln" button.
 
Step 22. Click on "Sign In" button with left
 
mouse button
 
Step 23. Verify that the system has been granted
 
access and the "Accounts" page is displayed.
 
Total Execution Time
 
Method for goal: Ma1<.e an electronic funds 
transfer. 
Step 1. Verify that you are in the "Accounts
 
Overview" tab within "Accounts" page.
 
Step 2. Locate the "Transfers" tab and click on it.
 
Step 3. Verity that vou are in the "Transfers" page.
 
Step 4. Verify that you are in the "Make Transfer"
 
sub-tab.
 
Step 5. Locate the "From" field and select the
 
account.
 
Step 6. Locate the "To" field and select the
 
account.
 
Step 7. Locate the "Amount" field and type the
 
amount of $ j 5,000.
 
Step 8. Locate the "Continue" button and click on
 
it.
 
Step 9. Read a warning message on the top of the next
 
page which says that "You will have to provide an
 
additional autbentication credential in order to proceed
 
with transfers over $] 0,000. Do you want to continue?"
 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
0.51 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
0.21 
1.21 
26.83 
Sub-Execution Time( ) 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
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Step 10. Verify the "OK" and "Cancel" buttons. 1.21 
Step Il. Locate the "OK" button and click on it. 1.21 
Step 12. Verify that you are in the "Additional 1.21 
Authentication Credentials" page. 
Step 13. Locate the instructions section on this 1.21 
page. 
Step 14. Read the instructions about the 4-digit 10.01 
number code that has to be sent to the Blackberry 
mobile device using Short Messaging Service 
(SMS). After 15 seconds, verify that an SMS text 
message has been sent by the bank to the 
Blackberry mobile device. Then enter this same 
code in the "Code" field on this Web page. 
Step 15. Wait for a sound alert for SMS 15.00 
notification to the Blackberry after 15 seconds 
indicating that the 4-digit number code has been 
sent by the bank. 
Step 16. Listen the auditory stimulus in the form of 1.21 
a sound alert for SMS notification on the 
Blackberry with the 4-digit number code has been 
sent by the bank to the Blackberry.), retrieve it 
from the auditory LTM, and retain it. 
Step 17. Auditory stimulus infonnation (sound 1.01 
alert) dissipates from LTM and is no longer 
available. 
Step 18. Open the "Messages" application on the 2.01 
Blackberry. 
Step 19. Verify that you have received a SMS text 1.21 
message with the 4-digit number code sent by the 
bank. 
Step 20. Read the 4-digit number code directly 1.21 
from the subject field of the message row. 
Step 21. Memorize the 4-digit number code, and 6.00 
retain it in the STM. 
Step 22. Locate the "Code" field on the 1.21 
"Additional Authentication Credentials" web page. 
Step 23. Type the 4-digit number code in the 2.16 
"Code" field.
 
Step 24. Verify that asterisks are displayed while
 1.21 
entering the code within the "Code" field. 
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Step 25. Forget code. 1.21 
Step 26. Verify the "Send" and "Cancel" buttons 1.21 
are displayed below the "Code" field on the page. 
Step 27. Click on "Send" button with left mouse 0.21 
button 
Step 28. Verity that you have been directed to the 1.21 
confirmation page which states that you have 
successfully transferred the amount of $15,000 to 
the desired destination account. 
Total Execution Time 61.81 
The Total Execution Time for Task scenario: T3 Transfer $15,000 to the 
Bank of America is shown below: 
Task scenario: T3 Transfer $15,000 to the Bank of America 
Methods Sub-Execution Time(s) 
Method for goal: Go to the bank website. 5.13 
Method for goal: Log into the system 26.83 
Method for goal: Make an electronic funds transfer 61.81 
Total Execution Time 93.77 
• Estimate Total Learning Time: 
The Total Leaming Time for Task_ scenario: T3 Transfer $15,000 to the Bank 
of America is shown below: 
Total Learning Time = Pure Method Learning Time + LTM Learning Time +
 
Training Procedure Execution Time
 
Total Learning Time = 833 secs + 102 secs + 0 secs 935 secs 
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Sub-Step 3.4 Fingerprint Recognition {wireless network task}: 
•	 Generate Task Description 
This task is basically a wireless network and electronic access control-based 
task using a portable Universal SeriaI Bus (USB) device that allows remote employees 
to swipe their finger to access corporate network resources (Figure 2-24). 
It recognizes a fingerprint, providing a secure way of accessing a protected resource. 
Users have to install the USB fingerprint suite software on the desktop or laptop 
computer; then plug the USB fingerprint into the USB port; and finally - swipe their 
finger on the fingerprint reader to log - into Windows, for example, or to access ­
password-protected Web sites. A pre-condition is that users have to set up a one-time 
registration for aH their accounts to authenticate witb the USB, but once that is set up, 
users can make use of the USB fingerprint. For more details on fingerprint 
recognition, see Section 2.2.5.9.1: Fingerprint Recognition. 
•	 Describe a List ofHigh-Level User Goals 
The topmost user's goal is: l<.ccess a file on a perSQ. al lap - p. The set 
of the user's high level goals considered are: 
• og inLo the system. 
•	 Go ta the f~le directory. 
•	 Open the file. 
•	 Re urn with goal accomplished. 
•	 Define Operators and Write Methods for Accomplishing User 
Goals 
Method for goal: Log into the system
 
Step 1. Read fingerprint logon Welcome screen containing finger Image and
 
"Password" field on the laptop computer.
 
Step 2. Refer to the Universal Seriai Bus (USB)-based biometric fingerprint reader.
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Step 3. Locate the fingerprint sensor on the USB fingerprint reader.
 
Step 4. Moye finger to the USB fingerprint reader.
 
Step 5. Position last knuckle joint oyer the center of the fingerprint sensor.
 
Step 6. Swipe the finger without lifting it oyer the fingerprint sensor, and read
 
computer screen.
 
Step 7. Verify that you haye been granted access to the system.
 
Step 8. Return with goal accomplished.
 
Method for goal: Go to the file directory. 
Step 1. Open the file manager application (e.g. Windows or MAC Explorer) on the
 
laptop computer.
 
Step 2. Verify that the Explorer application is opened.
 
Step 3. Locate the C: directory on the Explorer.
 
Step 4. Moye cursor to the C: directory and click on it.
 
Step 5. Verify that the Explorer application is on the C: directory.
 
Step 6. Return with goal accompli shed.
 
Method for goal: Open the file. 
Step 1. Locate the "read.txt" file on C: directory.
 
Step 2. Moye cursor to the "read.txt" file icon.
 
Step 3. Double-click on "read.txt" file ieon.
 
Step 4. Verify that the "read.txt" file is opened.
 
Step 5. Access the "read.txt" file.
 
Step 6. Return with goal accomplished.
 
• Estimate Total Execution Time 
The time measurement related to the execution lime for Task scenario: T4 
Access a file 0) a e sonal lap op is listed in seconds below. 
Method for goal: Log into the system 
Step 1. Read fingerprint logon Welcome screen 
containing finger image and "Password" field on the 
laptop computer. 
Step 2. Refer to the Universal Seriai Bus (USB)-based 
biometric fingerprint reader. 
Step 3. Locate the fingerprint sensor on the USB 
fingerprint reader. 
Step 4. Move finger to the USB fingerprint reader. 
Step 5. Position last knuckle joint over the center of the 
fingerprint sensor. 
Step 6. Swipe the finger without lifting it over the 
fingerprint sensor. 
Step 7. Verify that you have been granted access to the 
system. 
Total Execution Time 
.-
Method for goal: Go to the file directory 
Step 1. Open the file manager application (e.g. Windows 
or MAC Explorer) on the laptop computer 
Step 2. Verify that the Explorer application is opened 
Step 3. Locate the C: directory on the Explorer 
Step 4. Move cursor to the C: directory and click on it 
Step 5. Verify that the Explorer application is on the C: 
directory 
Total Execution Time 
Method for oal: Open the file 
Step 1. Locate the "read.txt" file on C: directory.
 
Step 2. Move cursor to the "read.txt" file icon.
 
Step 3. Double-click on "read.txt" file icon.
 
Step 4. Verify that the "read.txt" file is opened.
 
Step 5. Access the "read.txt" file.
 
Total Execution Time
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Su b-Execution 
Time(s) 
2.1 J 
1.10 
1.21 
1.1 1 
1. J 1 
1.31 
1.21 
9.16 
Sub-Execution 
Time(s) 
0.41 
1.21 
1.21 
1.11 
1.21 
5.15 
Sub- · xecution 
Time(s) 
2.21 
1.11 
0.41 
1.21 
1.21 
6.15 
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The Total Execution Time for Task scenario: T4 Access a file on a 
personal laptop is shown below: 
Task scenario: T4 Access a file on a personal laptop 
Methods Sub-Execution Time(s) 
Method for goal: Log into the system 9.16 
Method for goal: Go to the file directory 5.15 
Method for goal: Open the file 6.15 
Total Execution Time 20.46 
• Estimate Total Learning Time: 
The Total Learning Time for Task_scenario: T4 Access a file on a 
personal laptop is shown below: 
Total Learning Time = Pure Method Learning Time + LTM Learning Time + 
Training Procedure Execution Time 
Total Learning Time = 289 secs + 48 secs + 0 secs = 337 secs 
3.2.2.3.5 A Time Level Analysis of the NGOMSL 
This section presents a time analysis of the data gathered for each set of four 
task scenarios. As described above, the design information obtained from NGOMSL 
has been the operator sequences, execution times, and procedure learning times. 
As shown in Table 3.1, the user took 28.85 seconds which, is the total execution 
time (TET) to check business email (T 1) using the Password/P1N authentication 
method and so forth for the tasks T2, T3, and T4. It is worth mentioning that what is 
important is not to measure the TET the user has spent in each task as a whole, but 
rather just the TET to "Log into the system". It is irreJevance to only measure how 
long it would take, for instance, to check business e-mail (i.e. 28.85 seconds), update a 
specification (i.e. 45.31 seconds), make an electronic funds transfer (i.e. 93.77 
seconds), or access a file (i.e. 20.46 seconds). These tasks can significantly vary in 
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terms of time, application type, and the context in which they have been performed. 
However, the TET does vary depending on the type of the authentication method 
used. In fact it takes more time if the user employs an OOBA method rather than 
another method- because the amount of user interaction when authenticating to a 
system with OOBA is more demanding than the other authentication methods as 
shown in Table 2. 
Task Scenario Description	 Authentication Total Execution
 
Method Time(s)
 
TI Check Business	 Password/PIN 28.85 
E-mail 
T2 Update the SecurID OTP	 45.31 
token U1spec 
T3 Transfer 15,000 to OOBA	 93.77 
the Bank of 
America 
T4 Access a file on a Fingerprint	 20.46 
personal laptop 
Table 3.1: Total Execution Time by task scenario. 
The results of this research show the total execution time for the set of four 
authentication benchmark methods, which is the profile for the e hod for goal: 
Log into the SYSLem in Table 3.2. The profile includes the total time in seconds 
spent using this method and the percentage of the time spent on it. What this thesis is 
more concemed with is -an investigation of the authentication portions of the tasks 
scenarios. These portions are in fact the time related to the l'1ethod f r goa 1: Log 
in::o the system. 
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Task Scenario Method for Authentication % of Total Execution 
goal Method Total Time(s) 
TI Password/PIN 83.93 23.25 
T2 Log into the OTP 12.75 28.13 
T3 system OOBA 25.16 26.83 
T4 Fingerprint 1.88 9.16 
Table 3.2: Execution time by task scenario, authentication method type, and Me· ad 
for goal: og into the sy tem. 
As mentioned previously, the main factors influencing the amount of time a user 
spends authenticating to a system are the number of different artifacts to interact with 
and the authentication method type. For instance, in OOBA method Alice needs to 
interact with the bank.'s Website and then a mobile device in order to accomplish the 
Method for g al: Log into the system. AIso, the authentication method type 
such as Password/PIN takes more time to be performed, 23.25 seconds, when 
compared to Fingerprint recognition, 9.16 seconds. The former is a Knowledge-Based 
Authentication (KBA), which requires users to prove the knowledge of a single secret, 
memorize items, and recall them wh en accessing a specifie system. On the other hand, 
the latter is Biometries, which recognizes users physically through their fingers; no 
cognitive process is directly involved. 
Using OTP takes a little more time than OOBA, given that either users need to 
interact with different artifacts and make use of KBA which directly involves 
cognitive processes. With OTP users are required to refer to a hardware authentication 
token, then type the code displayed there on their application (e.g. VPN application). 
In addition, users need to remember the PIN (i.e. 4-digit) but not the password (i.e. 
strong password like RtyrnnM!), which facilitates memory retrieval, although this 
authentication method is the one that takes more time. 
As expected, the fingerprint authentication method (Biometrics)- takes the least 
amount of time out of ail the methods. No cognitive process is directly involved (e.g. 
not KBA), and there is minimal interaction with artifacts when using a USB drive. lt 
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is important to note that it is the acquisition of the user credentials (e.g. the biometric 
reader captures fingerprint samples from users) that takes less time when compared 
with the other authentication methods presented in Table 3.2. The exact authentication 
processing time can vary considerably depending on the infrastructure, the equipment, 
and also on different versions of (the same) authentication methods. 
3.2.2.4 Step 4: Develop the Authentication Risk Assessment Matrix 
If we don't identify where the most critical vulnerabilities are - when related 
either to security and usability - then how can we secure our system's information 
infrastructure? The Authentication Risk Assessment Matrix must be developed prior 
to the development of the usable security inspection method itself. 1t is in fact a 
crucial step to acknowledge and understand the main threats and security 
vulnerabilities related especially to online user authentication (user-to-machine). lt 
determines which "Security Review" should be considered within each "Usability 
Criterion" in the USS. To this end, Computer Security research has been conducted in 
order to identify and classify those threats and vulnerabilities. Among industry 
recognized security sources such as (OWASP, 2009; CVE, 2009;SANS, 2009; CIO, 
2009), the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) was finally selected as 
the primary data source for identifying the top ten security threats and vulnerabilities. 
The primaty attacks considered in this dissertation are the following: eavesdropper, 
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM), replay, session hijacking, and verifier impersonation 
attacks. 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is an open-source 
application security project. The OWASP community consists of corporations, 
educational organizations, and a variety of security experts worldwide who share their 
knowledge of vulnerabilities, threats, attacks and countermeasures. 
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This community works to generate freely-available articles, methodologies, 
documentation, tools, and technologies. OWASP is not affiliated with any technology 
organization or company, although it supports the knowledgeable use of security 
technology. OW ASP has avoided affiliation as it believes freedom from 
organizational pressures may make it easier for it to offer impartial, practical, cost­
effective information about application security. As a matter of fact, the U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission strongly recommends that organizations use the OWASP Top Ten 
and ensure that their partners do the same. In addition, the U.S. Defense Information 
Systems Agency has listed the OW ASP Top Ten as key best practices that should be 
used as part of the 000 Information Technology Security Certification and 
Accreditation (C&A) Process (DITSCAP). For these reasons, this thesis has adopted 
OW ASP as the primary source for identifying the most criticaJ security vulnerabilities. 
The OWASP Top Ten provides a powerful awareness document and minimum 
standard for web application security (OWASP, 2009). It represents a broad consensus 
on the most critical web application security flaws, including authentication. For more 
information regarding the methodology used by OWASP to select the security 
vulnerabilities, go to: http://www.owasp.org/index.phplTop_1 0_2007-Methodology. 
It is worth noting that 5 out of the top 10 security vulnerabilities are directly or 
indirectly related to authenticatiol1. The top ten most critical Web application security 
vulnerabilities are described as follows (the symbol "0" located next to the security 
vulnerability means that it is specificaJ1y related to authentication): 
1.	 Unvalidated input: Information from web requests is not validated before 
being used by a web application. Attackers can use these flaws to attack back­
end components through a web application. 
2.	 Broken access control 0: Restrictions on what authenticated users are allowed 
ta do are not properly enforced. Attackers can exploit these flaws to access 
other users' accounts, view sensitive files, or use unauthorized functions. 
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3.	 Broken authentication and session management 0: Account credentials and 
session tokens are not properly protected. Attackers that can compromise 
passwords, keys, session cookies, or other tokens can defeat authentication 
restrictions and assume other users' identities. 
4.	 Cross Site Scripting (XSS) flaws 0: The web application can be used as a 
mechanism to transport an attack to an end user's browser. A successful attack 
can discJose the end user's session token, attack the local machine, or spoof 
content to fool the user. 
5.	 Buffer overflows: Web application components in some languages that do not 
properly validate input can be crashed and, in some cases, used to take control 
of a process. These components can include CGI, libraries, drivers, and web 
application server components. 
6.	 Injection .f1aws 0: Web applications pass parameters when they access 
external systems or the local operating system. If an attacker can embed 
malicious commands in these parameters, the external system may execute 
those commands on behalf of the web application. 
7.	 Improper error handling: Errol' conditions that occur during normal operations 
are not handled properly. If an attacker can cause elTors to occur that the web 
application does not handle, they can gain detailed system information, deny 
service, cause security mechanisms to fail, or crash the server. 
8.	 Insecure storage: Web applications frequently use cryptographie functions to 
protect information and credentials. These functions and the code to integrate 
them have proven difficult to code properly, frequently resulting in weak 
protection. 
9.	 Denia! ofservice (DOS): Attackers can consume Web application resources to 
the point where ather legitimate users can no longer access or use the 
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application. Attackers can also lock users out of their accounts or even cause 
the entire application to fail. 
10. Insecure configuration management 0: Having a strong server configuration 
standard is critical to a secure web application. Tbese servers have many 
configuration options that affect security and are not secure out of the box. 
The following paragraphs present the Authentication Risk-Assessment Matrix 
(Table 3.3), which describes the user authentication assets, threats, and vulnerabilities 
along with their corresponding descriptions and mitigation strategies. It also shows the 
types of rating scales for Threat, Vulnerability, CIA (Confidentiality, lntegrity, and 
Authorization model), Probability, Asset Value and Asset Exposure Classifications, 
Total Impact and Total Risk Ratings, and finally Risk Reduction Strategy. 
Matrix Legend: 
O=A specifie authentication/OWASP top ten security vulnerability. 
T=Threat. 
V=Vulnerability. 
CP/E=Compromise/Exploit. 
RA=Risk Assessment 
OP=Overall Probability Rating is the sum of the Threat and the Vulnerability Rating 
(OP=T+V). 
Tl=Total Impact Rating is the sum of the Asset Value Classification and the Asset 
Value Exposure (TI=A VC+A VE). 
TR=Total Risk Rating is the product of the Overall Probability and the Total Impact 
(TR=OP x Tl). 
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Definitions: 
A threat is a circumstance, event, or person with the potential to cause harm to a 
system in the form of destruction, disclosure, data modification, and/or Deniai of 
Service (DoS). 
Vulnerability is a hole or a weakness in the application, which can be a design flaw or 
an implementation bug that allows an attacker to cause harm to the stakeho1ders of an 
application. Stakeholders include the application owner, application users, and other 
entities that rely on the application. 
Risk Assessment is a computation of risk. Risk is a threat that exploits sorne 
vulnerability that could cause harm to an asset. The risk algorithm computes the risk 
as a function of the assets, threats, and vulnerabilities. One instance of a risk within a 
system is represented by the formula Risk=Asset x Threat x Vulnerability. 
Total risk for a network equates to the sum of ail the risk instances. 
Ratings: 
The ratings described by Shadow (2008) in the next paragraphs have been 
applied in the Authentication Risk Assessment Matrix. 
Threat, Vulnerability and Overall Probability Scales: 
Threat Rating 
1.	 Very low or negligible probability ofthreat. Little or no motivation to 
launch attack. Almost no probability of threat for non-hum an threat agent. 
2 Low probability of threat. 
3.	 Medium probability of threat. 
4.	 High probability of threat. 
5.	 Extremely high, almost certain probability ofthreat. 
Vulnerability Ratin2 
1.	 Very low or negligible. Vulnerability requires extensive 
effort/knowledge/resources to exploit; exploit ofvulnerability does not lead 
to exposure of additional vulnerabilities in other services/systems/processes. 
2	 Low. Vulnerability requires significant effort/knowledge/resources to
 
exploit. Low probability exploit will create exposure to additional
 
vulnerabilities in and threats to other services/systems/processes.
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3.	 Medium. Vulnerability requires moderate amount of
 
effortlknowledge/resources to exploit. Moderate probability exploit will
 
create exposure to additional vulnerabilities in and threats to other
 
services/systems/processes.
 
4.	 High. Vulnerability requires sorne resources to exploit. High probability
 
exploit will create exposure ofadditional vulnerabilities in and threats to
 
other systems/services/processes.
 
s5.	 Very High. Vulnerability requires Jittle knowledge, effort, or skills to 
exploit. Very high probability that exploit will create exposure of additional 
vulnerabilities in and threats to other systems/services/processes. 
Overall Probability Matrix (Threat / Vulnerability) 
Vulnerability:
 
Threat Rating 0 1 2 3 4 5
 
Very Low 1 2 3 4 5 6
 
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7
 
Medium 3 4 5 6 7 8
 
High 4 5 6 7 8 9
 
Very High 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
Exposure / Impact Rating Scales 
Asset Value Classification 
1.	 Negligible asset value. NegligibJe or no impact on business if
 
confidentiality or integrity of asset is compromised. Compromise of
 
availability results in negligible or no increase of support costs or Joss of
 
productivity.
 
2	 Low asset value. Low impact on business that cannot be measured if
 
confidentiality or integrity of asset is compromised. Compromise of
 
availability results in distractions that are easily absorbed by internai
 
business process - possible slight increase in support costs.
 
3.	 Medium asset value. Medium impact on business (internai processes, etc.) if 
confidentiality or integrity is compromised, resulting in revenue loss and 
increase in support costs. Compromise of availability results in work delays 
with noticeable increase in support costs and loss of productivity. 
4	 Substantial asset value. Serious impact on business if confidentiality or 
integrity of asset is compromised, resulting in loss of profitability or 
success. Compromise of availability results in work interruptions, causing a 
quantifiable increase in support costs or delay in business commitments 
Ce.g., clients and customers are unable to connect to Web sites, unable to 
make commitments for contract deliverables on time, etc). 
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5.	 High asset value. Severe or catastrophic impact on business if 
confidentiality of assets is compromised, resulting in high losses to business 
profitability or success. Compromise of availability results in significant 
work stoppages, causing substantial increase in support costs or cancellation 
of business commitments. 
Exposure Classification 
1.	 Negligible or no loss or asset confidentiality, integrity, or availability. 
Effects of compromise to asset severely contained with no subsequent threat 
of compromise to other assets. 
2.	 Low loss of asset confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Effects of
 
compromise to assets tightly contained with negligible or low subsequent
 
threat to other assets.
 
3.	 Moderate or limited loss of asset confidentiality, integrity, or availability. 
Effects of compromise to assets can involve more than one system or 
service and cause an increased threat to other assets. Compromise or exploit 
may be externally visible. 
4.	 Serious loss of asset confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Effects of 
compromise are likely to have negative effects on other assets and cause a 
noticeable increase in threats to other assets. Compromise or exploit may be 
externally visible. 
5	 Severe or complete loss of asset confidentiality, integrity, or avaiJabi litY.
 
Results in significant increase in threats to other assets. High probability
 
compromise or exploit may be externally visible.
 
Total Impact Matrix 
Exposure Factor: 
1 = Negligible, 2 = Low, 3 = Medium, 4 = Seriolls, 5 = Severe 
Asset Value a	 1 2 3 4 5Classification
 
1 = Very low or
 1	 2 3 4 5 6
negligible
 
2= Low 2 3 4 5 6 7
 
3 = Medium 3 4 5 6 7 8
 
4 = Substantial 4 5 6 7 8 9
 
5 = High 5 6 7 8 9 la
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x Total lm act 
Overall 
Probabilit 
1 
2
 
3
 
4
 
5 
6
 
7
 
8
 
9
 
10 
Risk Summary Ranges 
Low 1- 19 
Medium 20 - 40 
High 41 - 100 
Additional explanation of some of the security vulnerabilities mentioned in the 
Authentication Risk Assessment Matrix is provided in the remainder of this section. 
Cross Site Scripting (XSS)68 
XSS is generally believed to be one of the most common application layer 
hacking techniques. Generally speaking, XSS refers to that hacking technique that 
leverages vulnerabilities in the code of a web application to allow an attacker to send 
malicious content from an end-user and collect some type of data from the victim. 
Today, websites rely heavily on complex web applications to deliver different output 
or content to a wide variety of users according to set preferences and specifie needs. 
This arms organizations with the ability to provide better value to their customers and 
prospects. However, dynamic websites suffer from serious vulnerabilities, rendering 
68 Cross Site Scripling Atlack. Web Application Securily. Acunelix, Inc. May 26, 2010 
<h Up ://www.acunelix.com/websi lesecuri 1y/eross-si le-seri pl ing. h1m> 
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organizations helpless and prone to cross site scripting attacks on their data. A web 
page contains both text and HTML markups that are generated by the server and 
interpreted by the client browser. Web sites that generate only static pages are able to 
have full control over how the browser interprets these pages. Web sites that generate 
dynamic pages do not have complete control over how their outputs are interpreted by 
the client. The heart of the issue is that if mistrusted content can be introduced into a 
dynamic page, neither the web site nor the client has enough information to recognize 
that this has happened and take protective actions. XSS allows an attacker to embed 
malicious JavaScript, YBScript, ActiveX, HTML, or Flash into a vulnerable dynamic 
page to fool the user, executing the script on his machine in order to gather data. 
The use of XSS might compromise private information, manipulate or steal cookies, 
create requests that cao be mistaken for those of a valid user, or execute malicious 
codes on the end-user systems. The data is usually formatted as a hyperlink containing 
malicious content and which is distributed over any possible means on the internet. 
Buffer Overflows 
Buffer overflow exploits constitute the largest single threat to enterprises today. 
These exploits have the most power, are the easiest to use, and are ail too common. 
No advanced technical knowledge is necessary to run pre-writteo buffer overflow 
exploit codes. Buffer overflow exploits are very powerful, and in many cases, the 
malicious code that executes as a consequence of a buffer overflow will run with 
admioistrator-Ievel privileges, and thus can do anything it wants to the server. 
Broken Authentication 
For example, when a user provides his login name and password to authenticate 
and prove his identity, the application assigns the user specific privileges to the 
system, based on the identity established by the supplied credentials. Highjacking­
Control of a connection is taken by the attacker after the user authentication has been 
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established. This kind of attack is not a technological security ho le in the Operating 
System or server software. Rather it depends -on how securely stored and complex the 
passwords are and on how easy it is for the attacker to reach the server (network 
security). 
Password Guessing 
Password guessing can be one of the most efficient techniques to defeat web 
authentication. This technique can be carried out either manually or via automated 
procedures. Table 3.4 shows sorne common usernames and passwords used by 
attackers in authentication guessing attacks: 
Username Guessing Password Guessing 
(NULL) (NULL) 
root, administrator, admin (NULL), root, administrator, admin, password 
(company name) 
operator, webmaster, backup (NULL), operator, webmaster, backup 
guest, demo, test, trial (NULL), guest, demo, test, trial 
member, private (NULL), member, private 
(company name) (NULL), (company name), password 
(company name) (NULL), (known name) 
Table 3.4: Usemame and Password Guessing (Scambray et al., 2006). 
Brute-Force Attack 
A Brute Force Attack is the most widely known password cracking method. If 
password guessing renders no results, the next step for an attacker is to try other 
password combinations using special custom tools, such as WebCracker which is 
freely available on the internet. This custom tool attempts to authenticate into the 
system, making use of predefined lists of usernames and passwords, dictionary 
attacks, and brute-force attacks. A dictionary attack uses pre-computed wordlists like 
dictionaries to try to authenticate on the Web applications by trying thousands of 
combinations of these dictionary words as usemames and passwords. 
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LM Hash Aigorithm 
One setback with this enclyption scheme is that ail characters are converted to 
uppercase prior to encryption. This in fact removes 26 characters from the set of 
choices from which a user may possibly select a password, making a dictionary attack, 
or even a brute-force attack, considerably less work for a cracker. Another weakness 
of the LM Hash scheme is an even greater one, however, because of the method used 
to prepare the password for encryption. The number of characters in an LM password 
is exactly 14, no matter how many characters a user chooses. Perhaps a J4-character 
password seems like a good one, but this is not the case. Each user password of less 
than 14 characters is padded with null characters (ASCli zero) to ex tend its length. 
The result is then split into two 7 character parts, each of which is encrypted 
separately. Along with a predictable parity value, the results are hashed, concatenated, 
and stored. 
Password History and Password Aging 
Password expiration is not efficient unless users choose different passwords 
from those previously used. Password history is the retention of one or more prior 
passwords or password hashes for comparison against new passwords or password 
hashes. A new password is checked to make sure that it has not been used during the 
specified history. The period is typically defined as either a certain number of prior 
passwords or a period of time. Password age in turn is an attribute directly related to 
password history. The minimum password age is the amount of time that must pass 
between password changes. As Scarfone and Souppaya (2009) point out, to diminish 
the effort necessary in remembering passwords, a significant number of users will 
cycle through passwords after expiration until they have exceeded the password 
histolY retention buffer and then change their password back to the original one. 
Although enforcing a minimum password age does not prevent this, at least it is a 
restriction. 
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There are sorne password history mechanisms that are also capable of 
identifying passwords that are not satisfactorily different from previous passwords. 
When forced to choose a new password, the majority of users has a tendency to 
employ variations of old passwords (e.g., changing "secretOS" to "secret06"). This 
makes it easy for an attacker who knows the old password to guess or crack the new 
one rapidly. Sorne existing password history mechanisms can be configured to refuse 
new passwords that have a certain number of characters in corn mon with previous 
passwords. Without such a mechanism, it is usualJy trouble-free for users to append 
counters to their passwords (e.g. "secretOS"). This makes password expiration mostly 
unproductive, and may in fact cause users to select weaker passwords than they would 
have without password expiration. 
Password history usually only works on a single authentication mechanism and 
cannot check the history from multiple mechanisms. This enables users to employ the 
identical password (and prior passwords) on several systems at once. Users frequently 
do this because it decreases the number of passwords that they have to remember, but 
this increases the risk to the enterprise by entitling an attacker who compromises one 
password to reuse it to gain access to additional resources. Additionally, 
administrators will sometimes reuse passwords between a local user account on a 
personal workstation and an account that has domain or centralized administrative 
privileges. This can pose a major risk to the enterprise because the security of 
centralized password management is generally higher than on individual workstations. 
An attacker who compromises the workstation and is able to crack the domain 
administrator password will have significant access to enterprise resources. 
There is generally no easy way to detect password reuse across systems, 
particularly when both internai and external systems are involved. To attempt to 
reduce the likelihood of password reuse, organizations can have their password 
management policies prohibit use of the same or closely-related passwords on the 
organizational 1T system and external systems. The password management policy can 
also explicitly forbid the reuse of centralized (e.g., domain) administrative level 
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credentials with user or local (e.g., local administrator or root) accounts. Proper user 
training that stresses the importance of proper password management and protection 
and explains the risks of password reuse should also be implemented. However, 
without an enforcement mechanism, it is unlikely that policies against reuse will be 
significantly effective in reducing reuse, given the number of passwords that users 
typically need to remember. 
Shoulder Surfing 
Shoulder surfing is using direct observation techniques, such as looking over 
someone's shoulder, to get information. Shoulder surfing is an efficient way to get 
information in packed places because it's quite simple to stand next to someone and 
watch as they fill out a form, enter a PIN number at an ATM machine, or use a calling 
card at a public pay phone. Shoulder surfing can also be done long distance with the 
assistance of binoculars or other vision-enhancing devices. To prevent shoulder 
surfing, experts advise that you protect paperwork or your keypad from view by using 
your body or hand. 
Phishing 
Phishing is the criminally fraudulent process of attempting to obtain sensitive 
information such as usernames, passwords and credit card details by masquerading as 
a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication. Phishing is typically carried out 
bye-mail or instant messaging. A typical example is an e-mail that directs users to 
visit a website where they are asked to update personal information, such as 
passwords and credit card, social security, and bank account numbers that the 
legitimate organization already has. The Web site, however, is forged and set up only 
to steal the user's information. 
Phishing is one of the social engineering techniques employed to trick users, and 
exploits the poor usability of existing web security technologies. 
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Hard-Coded Password 
Using a hard-coded password greatly increases the possibility of password 
guessing. The consequences in Authentication are the following: If hard-coded 
passwords are used, it is almost certain that attackers will gain access through the 
account in question. They continue to be used to this day, sometimes in high-profile 
software, despite the significant risk they pose. An example of a hard-coded password 
in the Java programming language is shown in Figure 3.3. The 8-digit characters 
Boa t 6 sea! is the hard-coded password. 
int VerifyAdmin(String password) { 
if (passwd.Equals(IBoat6sea!")) 
return (0) 
} 
return(l); 
Figure 3.3: Hard-coded password (Boat6sea!): JAVA code snippet. 
Trojan Horse 
A Trojan horse is a rogue program that takes the identity of a trusted application 
to collect information or avoid detection. In a typical Trojan horse attack, the user is 
presented with a logon screen that appears to be genuine. The user enters their user 
name and password, and are either Jogged on, or presented with an error message that 
she has to type their logon credentials again. Often, the rogue logon application exits 
after the first request passed the user on to the real logon. Users are easily fooled into 
thinking that they probably typed the wrong password and must re-enter the 
information again, never suspecting that their logon credentials are compromised. 
Man-In-The-Middle Attack 
ln a Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack, a malicious party intercepts a 
legitimate communication between two friendly parties. The malicious host then 
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controls the flow of communication and can eliminate or alter the information sent by 
one of the original participants without the knowledge of either the original sender or 
the recipient. ln this way, an attacker can fool a victim into disclosing confidential 
information by "spoofing" the identity of the original sender, who is presumably 
trusted by the recipient. Here is an example of a MlTM attack against a Web-based 
financial system: A bank demands authentication from the user (i.e., a password, a 
one-time code from a token, etc.). The attacker sitting in the middle receives the 
request from the bank and passes it on to the user. The user responds to the attacker, 
who passes that response to the bank. Now the bank assumes it is talking to the 
legitimate user, and the attacker is free to send transactions directly to the bank. This 
kind of attack completely bypasses any two-factor authentication mechanisms, and is 
becoming a more popular identity-theft tactic. 
Broken Authentication 
User authentication on the web usua11y involves the use of a user ID and 
password. Stronger methods of authentication are commercially available, such as 
software and hardware based cryptographie tokens or biometrics, but such 
mechanisms are cost prohibitive for most web applications. A wide array of account 
and session management flaws can result in the compromise of user or system 
administration accounts. Development teams frequently underestimate the complexity 
of designing an authentication and session management scheme that adequately 
protects credentials in ail aspects of the site. Web applications must establish sessions 
to keep track of the stream of requests from each user. HTTp69 does not provide this 
capability, so web applications must create it themselves. Frequently, the web 
application environment provides a session capability, but many developers prefer to 
create their own session tokens. ln either case, if the session tokens are not properly 
69 Hypertext Transfer ProtocoJ (HTTP) is an application-Ievel protocol for distributed, collaborative, 
hypennedia information systems. Ils use for retrieving inter-linked resources led to the establishment of 
the World Wide Web. 
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protected, an attacker can hijack an active session and assume the identity of a user. 
Creating a scheme to create strong session tokens and protect them throughout their 
lifecycle has proven obscure for many developers. Unless ail authentication 
credentials and session identifiers are protected with SSL7ü at aIl times and protected 
against disclosure from other flaws, such as XSS, an attacker can hijack a user's 
session and assume their identity. 
SQL Injection 
SQL Injection attacks are very common, and this is due to two factors: the 
significant prevalence of SQL Injection vulnerabilities and the attractiveness of the 
target (e.g., the database usually contains ail the appealing and critical data for your 
application). There are many successful SQL Injection attacks that occur, because it is 
tremendously simple to introduce SQL Injection vulnerabi]ities in the code. Basically, 
SQL Injection flaws are introduced when software developers create dynamic 
database queries that include user supplied input. To avoid SQL injection flaws is 
simple. Developers need to either - stop writing dynamic queries- and/or prevent user 
supplied input which contains malicious SQL from affecting the logic of the executed 
query. 
Privilege Escalation 
Privilege escalation occurs when a user gains access to more resources or 
functionality than they are normally allowed, and such elevation/changes should have 
been prevented by the application. This is typicalJy caused by a flaw in the 
application. The result is that the application performs actions with more privileges 
70 Secure Sockels Layer (SSL) is a prolocol developed by Nelscape for lransmj[ling privale documents 
via the Inlernet. SSL uses a cryplographic system lhal uses Iwo keys 10 encrypl dala - a public key 
known to everyone and a privale or secret key known only lo the recipienl of Ihe message. Both 
Netscape Navigator and Internel Explorer support SSL, and many Web sites use the protocol 10 obtain 
confidential user information, such as credit card numbers. By convention, URLs that require an SSL 
conneclion slart with <https:> instead of <htlp>. 
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than those intended by the developer or system administrator. The degree of escalation 
depends on which privileges the attacker is authorized to possess and which privileges 
can be obtained in a successful exploit. For example, a programming error that allows 
a user to gain extra privilege after successful authentication limits the degree of 
escalation, because the user is already authorized to hold sorne privilege. Usually, we 
refer to vertical escalation when it is possible to access resources granted to more 
privileged accounts (e.g., an lntemet banking account that acquires administrative 
privileges as an Admin), and to horizontal escala/ion when it is possible to access 
resources granted to a similarly configured account (e.g., a- user accesses information 
related to a different user on an online banking website). 
Real-Time Man-in-the-middle Attacks: Session-Hijacking Trojans 
As mentioned in 15. OOBA Trojan horse Authentication Asset/Target item in the 
matrix, this attack installs a type of proxy on the user's computer that interacts with 
the financial institution's genuine site on the user's behalf. As the Trojan interacts 
with the financial institution's site through the user's computer, it allows the fraudster 
to imitate the user's profile. Sorne Trojans of this type wait until the user logs onto the 
genuine site and performs a concurrent web session automatically. Thus the Trojan 
will appear to be transacting from the same IP and device as the user. This type of 
Trojan circumvents many existing security methods that rely on the compromised 
computer to communicate. ln other words, it uses compromised devices to prompt 
users to supply challenge questions, one-time passwords, and other types of 
information that can be used to perpetrate fraud. Session-hijacking Trojans are one of 
the most difficult forms of attacks to combat. 
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3.2.2.5 Step 5: Generate the usable security principles 
Sub-Step 5./ Classify and prioritize the cognitive processes generated by the 
NGOMSL model: 
See description in Section 3.2.2.3Step 3: Develop the NGOMSL Model (Natural 
Goals, Methods, Selection Language). 
Sub-Step 5.2 Classify and develop a cross-cognitive and usable security 
principles analysis in order to specify the final usable security principles targeted to 
user authentication. 
Our interest in this section is to describe the most relevant correlations between 
some of the most recognized principles of Hel (Nielsen, 1994) and each of the main 
categories of authentication methods. This will serve as part of the basis for the 
construction of the UsabJe Security Symmetry inspection method. 
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Password/Passphrases/PINs 
Principle	 Correlation 
Visibility	 Users hardly see the password they type, or if they do, the password 
is hidden under asterisks. The interface cannot provide visual cues, 
reminders, lists of choices, or other aids; the system cannot display 
the typed password as it is since it would be an open door for 
eavesdropping and Social Engineering attacks. 
Feedback	 Most systems only mention success or failure. If an error is made, 
(Enor	 the system should be able to detect the error and offer simple, 
Handling)	 comprehensible mechanisms for handling the error. However, if it 
gives us clues like "the password has to contain letters" we will be 
exposed to dictionary, eavesdropping, and Social Engineering 
attacks. 
Consistency This authentication method in general consistently presents - the 
same layout and terminology (e.g. prompts for passwords, 
username/password windows). The prompts are weil recognized by 
users (e.g. corporate and techy users) as a securi ty mechanism for 
accessing network systems. Besides, the association of a typed 
password with asterisks is very common among users. 
Compatibil ity This authentication method demands a lot of a user's STM load. The 
human mind can recognize better than recall, and this authentication 
method fails to provide enough information to the user so that the 
user can take action without recalling a lot. 
Simplicity It is simple and straightforward, but sorne functionalities like 
"Help" and "Forget Your Password?" are hidden (but can be 
activated on the links) from the users. 
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Challenge-Response Calcula tors (CRC) 
Principle Correlation 
Visibility Users hardly see the password and PIN they type, or if they do-, the 
password and PIN are hidden under asterisks. The interface cannot 
provide visual cues, reminders, lists of choices, or other aids; the 
system cannot display the typed password or PIN as it is since il 
would be an open door for eavesdropping and Social Engineering 
attacks. CRC must provide for the ease of use by simple 
commands, or better, the user's task to authenticate her/himself 
should become as automatic as possible, increasing its speed, 
efficiency, and usability. 
Feedback The system only mentions success or failure related to passwords, 
(Error PINs, and "challenges". If an error is made, the system should be 
Handling) able to detect the error and offer simple, comprehensible 
mechanisms for handling the error. 
Consistency The user has to navigate to multiple screens in order to complete a 
task. The authentication process is as follows: The user enters a 
PIN -> and the server send a "challenge" to the user -> The user 
reads the "challenge" [rom the token display and enters it on the 
token keypad -> A response is calculated by the servel' -> The user 
reads the response on the display and enters it on the computer 
terminal -> The responses calculated by the token and by the server 
are compared, and if they are equal, the user is sllccessfully 
authenticated. The challenge response security dialog can be very 
annoying, which can negatively affect the user's experience. 
Compatibility The CRC requires several extra steps (e.g. PIN + challenge + 
password) and additional memory load for the user, which can be 
very time consuming. A stronger password including other 
characters other than digits will demand an even larger CRC 
keypad, which is not desirable. 
Simplicity A CRC that the user has logged into should be shut offwithin a 
given timeframe if nat used ta prevent illicit users from gaining­
access while the token is left unattended. However, this can -be 
very annoying for the user, who might have to login with the token 
several times. Besides, handling an electronic device in a proper 
manner can be quite a challenge to many users. 
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Public Key (PK) Authentication 
Principle Correlation 
Visibility The controls of the PK method are not obviously visible and 
intuitive, and their functions are not recognizabJe; it is not clear 
when something has been encrypted and when it has not. 
Feedback Very few en"ors are revertible, even ifthey demand sorne time and 
(Error effort to rebuild the intended state. There are numerous irreversible 
Handling) actions in the PK system, such as accidentally deleting the private 
key, publicizing a key or revoking a key, forgetting the passphrase, 
and finally, failing to back up the key rings. 
Consistency To encrypt or sign a file, PK presents the user with a status message 
that indicates it is now "encoding"; it would better to say 
"encrypting" or "signing", since being able to see terms that 
unequivocally match the operation being executed helps to create a 
clear mental model for the user. 
Compatibility The user needs to have a sensorial perception of the PK method in 
order to allow him/her- to interact with the system in working 
toward his/her goals, which doesn't occur in this type of 
authentication method since the he PK model is not clear to the 
user. With this method, users are unlikely to put too much effort 
into tasks for which they don't understand the need. 
Simplicity The PK system is difficult to leam and use, and displays too much 
infonnation. A separate certificate is needed for each Certificate 
Authority for different services and certificate expiration. Using a 
computer, installing and importing a certificate to other applications 
might be difficult, as it can only be used at the location where it is 
installed. To use a smart card, a reader is necessary, and the user 
must carry the token with her/him. A crucial task such as making a 
backup revocation certificate is not easy to perform. Ail these 
factors are not so convenient from the point of view of the user. 
Furthermore, the PK model is too demanding for the user as we ean see 
in the authentication process as fol10ws: 1. the user supplies her/his 
certifieate with the Certificate Authority, a signature, and the PK to the 
authentication system; 2. the user proves possession of the secret private 
key (PRK)- by presenting the file or inserting the smartcard into a reader; 
3. the allthentication system checks if the PK in the certificate 
corresponds to the private secret key. Ifthey correspond, the user has 
proven possession of the secret key and is successflllly authenticated. 
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Biometries 
Principle Correlation 
Visibility Generally speaking, registration, identification, and authentication 
processes are very time consuming71 
Feedback Most systems only mention success or fa ilure, and the user might bc 
(Error erroneously rejected. 
Handling) 
Consistency In fingerprint recognition, exact placement of the fingeltip on the 
scanning surface is very significant for reliablc performance (there is 
elastic distoltion from one samplc to the next) and can be difficult for the 
user. With face recognition, the conccpt of recognition itself is weil 
known by the users, generally reslliting in high user acceptance. 
Compatibility Much training and education is necessary to prevent false rejects. Many 
biometrics cannot handle variations to the lIsers' charactcristics (c.g. 
aging, iIlness, or injury). 
Simplicity With the voice recognition method, for example, it might have to givc 
numerous live samples. 
3.2.2.6 Step 6: Formulate the Usable Security Symmetry (USS) 
Identify the usabllity factors and usability criteria (Section 5.2 Usability Factors and
 
Usability Criteria);
 
Define user authentication use cases (5.3.1 User Authentication Use Cases);
 
Specify project lead and development activities, (5.4.2 Usable Security Protocol
 
(USP) Sub-Methodology);
 
Specify usability severity ratings (5.4.2.2.1 Usability Severity Ratings);
 
Specify security severity ratings (5.4.2.2.2 Security Severity Ratings).
 
3.2.2.7 Step 7: Demonstrate the Usable Security Symmetry (USS) 
See Section 5.5: The Demonstrational Approach. 
71 Alan E. Zuckennan, M.D., Kenneth A. Moon, M.D., and Kenneth Eaddy: 2007. Comparison of 
Fingerprint and Iris Biometrie Authentication for Control of Digital Signatures. May 27, 2010 
<http://www.nebi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2244356/pdf/proeamiasympOOOO 1-1249.pdf> 
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3.2.3 The Usable Security Protocol Methodology Reuse 
The current push toward shortening product (and design) development times 
and the urge to go-to-market have led customers to adopt new strategies such as 
reusing to reduce waste and streamlining the product development process. 
Reusability of design has been practiced by the vast majority of companies, but 
mostly at the high granularity level (Figure 3.4). This thesis's author agree with 
Gautam et al. (2007) that "Reuse is not only the process of using physical components 
or associated designs but also the process of implementing or updating product 
information using existing 'assets'. Assets can be specifications, designs, user 
documentation, test plans, test results, etc." The scope for reuse is in fact frequently 
limited to the physical components (i.e., reuse of hardware components). 
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Figure 3.4: Reusability Pyramid (Gautam et al 2007). 
Reuse can and should also be implemented at a low granularity Jevel to speed up 
the product development process. This is where USP methodology reuse can be 
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applied in the Reusability Pyramid, in the Requirements and Pel:formance Standards 
layer as shown in Figure 3.4 (red oval). 
The USP methodology allows users to reuse its framework by essentially 
specifying their own parameters and adapting them to their own products. 1t uses a 
summarized USS Quick Setup process and a set of Design Artifacts which can be a]] 
seen in Appendix 0: Usable Security Protocol (USP) Reuse Methodology. 
Additionally, the Usability Factors and Usability Criteria Mapping mentioned in 
Chapter 6 can be re-used independently of the USS framework to study the 
relationship between other usability factors, for instance Usability and Portability (i.e. 
wireless devices): Usability is the extent to which the software is easy to learn and 
opera te; Portability is the ease with which the software can be transferred to new 
operating environments, hardware platforms, and operating systems. For more 
information, see Appendix D, section 0.2 Design Artifacts for Reuse, Design Artifact 
1: Specifying the usability factors and usability criteria. 
Summary of the topies diseussed in Chapter 3: The Usable Seeurity ProtoeoJ. 
ln concluding Chapter 3, the USP methodology has been laid out by presenting 
the following steps: Step 1: Define the mission and conceptual design objective, Step 
2: Identify the most representative user authentication methods categories, Step 3: 
Develop the NGOMSL Model (Natural Goals, Methods, Selection Language), Step 4: 
Develop the Authentication Risk Assessment Matrix, Step 5: Generate the usable 
security principles, Step 6: Formulate the UsabJe Security Symmetry (USS) 
inspection method, and Step 7: Demonstrate the USS. AIso, this chapter discussed ­
how to reuse the USP methodology design artifacts by essentially specifying yom own 
parameters and adapting them to yom own product. 
CHAPTERIV
 
THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE AXIS
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the Cognitive Axis of this thesis by identifying and 
explaining the main cognitive areas of focus relating to user authentication (e.g. 
perception, attention and memory, etc.). Also it specifies a Cognitive Model of User 
Authentication (CM UA) in order to understand how and what cognitive processes 
(and flow) are involved for each of the main categories of user authentication 
methods. lt serves as the basis for the deveJopment of the USS inspection method. 
The Cognitive Axis is defined as one part of the two-part vital holistic approach 
in conjunction with the Computer Science Axis to undertake the usable security of 
user authentication. It is also the intersection point of perceptual and cognitive 
processes. 
Cognitive analysis for HCI lends itself to two related interpretations: 1) the 
analysis of cognition-intensive interactions with computers, such as learning, 
problem-solving, or reading and 2) the analysis of cognitive content, structures, and 
processes involved in any interaction with a computer. This dissertation ad dresses 
both interpretations by providing methods for anaJyzing cognition with a focus on 
interactions specifically related to user authentication and that involve cognitive 
processes such as Perception, Memory (LTM, STM, Visual Recognition Memory), 
Information Retrieval (Recall and Recognition), and Mental Models. ln addition, the 
analysis of users' cognition should not be restricted to an early design phase (as task 
analysis typically is), but should be an important activity throughout the entire design 
process. However, many designers have little training in the methods used to measure 
cognition. 
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Security systems must be viewed as socio-technical systems that depend on the 
social context in which they are embedded to function correctly. Security systems will 
only be able to provide the intended protection when people actually understand and 
are able to use them correctly. There are very real differences between the degree ta 
which systems can be considered theoretically secure (assuming they are correctly 
operated) and actually secure (acknowledging that often they will be operated 
incorrectly) (J0sang et al., 2007). In many cases, there is a trade-off between usability 
and theoretical security. lt can be meaningfuJ to reduce the level of theoretical security 
to improve the overall level of actual security. For example, the strongest passwords, 
from a theoretical perspective, are randomly generated. However, since it is very 
difficult to remember such passwords, people will write them down, and thereby 
undermine the system's security. Thus, it may be meaningful to allow people ta 
choose passwords that are easier to remember. Although this reduces the theoretical 
strength of the passwords, it increases the security of the system as a who le. 
lt is important to step back and remind ourselves_about the concept of cognition. 
The term cognition (Latin cognoscere, "to know" or "to recognize") is a concept used 
in different ways by different disciplines, but is generally accepted to mean the 
process of thought. It refers to a faculty for the processing of information, applying 
knowledge, and changing preferences. Within psychology or philosophy, the concept 
of cognition is closely related to abstract concepts such as the mind, reasoning, 
perception, intelligence, learning, and many others that describe capabilities of the 
mind and expected properties of an artificial "mind". Cognition is considered an 
abstract property of advanced living organisms and is studied as a direct property of a 
brain (or of an abstract mind) on - the factual and symbolic levels. For example, in 
psychology and cognitive science it refers to an information processing view of an 
individual's psychological functions. 
Cognitive Informatics (CI) is an emergmg discipline that studies the naturaJ 
intelligence and internai information processing mechanisms of the brain, as well as 
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the processes involved in perception and cognition. CI provides a coherent set of 
fundamental theories, in conjunction with contemporary mathematics, which form the 
foundation for most information and for knowledge-based science and engineering 
disciplines such as computer science, cognitive science, neuropsychology, systems 
science, cybernetics, software engineering, and knowledge engineering. 
ln psychology and in artificial intelligence, cognition is used to refer to the 
mental functions, mental processes (thoughts), and states of intelligent entities 
(humans, human organizations, highly autonomous machines). In particular, the field 
focuses on the study of specifie mental processes such as comprehension, inferencing, 
decision-making, planning, and learning. 
The advent of (and constantly evolving) Information Technology (IT) has 
pJaced heavy cognitive demands on workers under normal conditions. These demands 
are amplified significantly when workarounds are needed, when problems occur, and 
when time is short. Howell and Cooke (1989) found that advances in technoIogy and 
machine intelligence had in fact augmented, not lowered, the cognitive demands on 
humans. Basically what has remained for humans are the complex aspects of works 
such as tasks demanding judgment, assessment, diagnostic power, decision making, 
and the ability to plan and anticipate. Aiso the complexity of the work can boost 
cognitive demands such as the number of different factors to track, their diversity, and 
their level of interaction. Workers struggle to figure out how things interact and how 
outputs are produced from inputs. Braz et al. (2007) have demonstrated that users 
have to manage complexity wh en authenticating to an MTM with a cell phone. They 
are equipped with a special chip that is able to communicate with the MTM. In 
addition, users will still be required to authenticate to the system by entering a PIN. 
Basically, the scenario here involves a user making her monthly mortgage payment. ln 
this case, the user has to deal with different services offered through different types of 
communication channels such as MTM, the Web, and Wireless Networks. Although it 
might be considered a convenient service when one does not have physical access -to 
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an MTM, it does place the burden on the users with regards to the coordination of the 
MTM with the cell phone. 
User authentication systems are ultimately used by people, so their ease of use, 
understandability, satisfaction, and their implicit cognitive dimensions must be 
addressed as well. The cognitive dimensions can be essentially considered as the 
interaction occurring between users and security mechanisms (e.g. Jogging into a 
system, interacting with an authentication token or smart card, etc.). When a user 
performs a task, that is, activi ties that are undertaken to achieve a goal (e.g. a user logs 
on to ieee.com using her/his BlackBerry to access her/his mylEEE account), sorne of 
these activities can be considered physica! (e.g. a user enters a password on the 
BlackBerry' s keyboard), while others can be considered cognitive ones (e.g. a user 
retrieves a password stored in her/his memory). In particular, interface is viewed by 
this thesis's author either as a software component (e.g. Jogin Web page or as a 
hardware component (e.g. an authentication token, a smartphone, etc.) through which 
the interaction/information travels between the interface and the user (Maffezzini, 
2006). 
Most usability inspection techniques do not overtly take into account users' 
thinking, "even though psychology-based inspection techniques supplied key insights 
into how thinking shapes interaction" (Hombrek and Fmkjrer, 2004). Evidence shows 
that the well known Knowledge-Based Authentication does not take into account how 
people think (Adam and Sasse, 1999). Also, empirical research (Zurko and Simon, 
1996; Whitten and Tygar, 1998; Chiasson and Biddle, 2007) has shown that cognitive 
dimensions definitely influence the usability of security mechanisms under which 
user authentication methods are included. Researchers argue that security concepts 
used in security mechanisms are not easily g understood by many users. Hence 
security designers should place additional effort into understanding the users' mental 
model and be certain to employ concepts the users can recognize. For example, in a 
typical authentication task, Alice tries to log into a corporate computer system with a 
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user ID and password. The activities that are undertaken to achieve this goal can be 
considered physical (e.g. Alice types in a password on a desktop keyboard)- or 
cognitive - (e.g. Alice retrieves a strong password such as Gyz! 152# stored in her 
memory which often results in a huge demand on her memory). A strong password 
must be enforced, given that it makes the attacker's job much harder in guessing 
predictable passwords. This is not an easy task given that the cognitive capacity of a 
user to remember a password is quite limited (Sasse et 0/.,2001). But what is a strong 
password policy? ft must contain at least eight characters, one uppercase alphabet (A­
Z), one lowercase alphabet (a-z), one Arabie numeral (0-9), one non-alphanumeric 
character excluding" @ ~". At this moment the system has blocked her account due 
to three unsuccessful attempts to log into the system. An authentication system should 
o priori promote strong passwords which account for security while still preserving 
memorizability, which in tum accounts for usability. Another example is the poorly 
understood, overly complex, and hard to use (for end users) Public Key authentication 
method according to usability evaluations (Whitten and Tygar, 1999; Williams and 
Voigt, 2004). For example, when Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is in the process of 
encrypting or signing a file, it gives the user a status message indicating that it is 
presently "encoding." However, a better tenn would be "encrypting" or "signing", 
given that employing tenns that overtly match the operations being executed helps to 
create an understandable mental model for the user. 
These facets of understanding how users cope (or not) with different types of 
user authentication methods explain our interest in studying its cognitive dimensions 
in order to give a cognitive ergonomies account of user authentication design using 
Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) (Hollnagel, 2003). CTA describes the physical tasks 
and cognitive plans required of a user to accomplish a particular work goal. The 
GOMS mode! was the method chosen to perform the CTA for this dissertation. The 
CTA and GOMS model are explained in detail- in Section 2.3.2 GOMS: A Method for 
Cognitive Task Analysis. The GOMS CTA method provides the capability of 
218 
identifying, describing, and detailing the cognitive thought processes involved in the 
preparation and successful execution of user authentication procedures. 
As stated previously, our objective is to develop a usable security protocol for 
user authentication, also taking into consideration their respective cognitive 
dimensions. Therefore, a cognitive model for user authentication has been developed 
as described in Section 4.4: The Cognitive Model of User Authentication (CMUA). 
There are three reasons why two basic sections of this thesis, the state-of-the-art 
of cognitive processes and the Cognitive Model of User Authentication (CMUA), 
have been brought together here in Chapter 5: i) background knowledge is provided 
first, followed by its related implementation. For instance, the background of a 
cognitive process like memory (e.g. definition, types of memory, etc.) is located right 
before its implementation (function) within the CMUA. ii) the Cognitive Computing 
doctoral program explicitly requires ta separa te the Cognitive axis from the Computer 
Science axis. iii) to facilitate the flow of thinking, reading, and -accessing related 
information (see example in i) above). 
4.2 Cognitive Ergonomies 
HCl involves systems comprised of people, computers, and their interactions. 
Cognitive Ergonomies (CE), however, is concerned with the mental aspects of the 
interaction, that is, the analysis of cognitive processes such as perception, memory, 
reasoning, and motor response required of operators in modem industries. CE is also 
concerned with developing specifications of the knowledge required by the human ta 
interact with the computer to perform work effectively. These specifications are 
implementable as an interaction. lt places particular emphasis on the analysis of 
cognitive processes (e.g., diagnosis, decision making and planning) required of 
operators in modern industries. CE aims to enhance the performance of cognitive 
tasks through - several interventions, including: 
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•	 user-centered design of human-machine interaction and human-computer 
interaction (HCI), 
•	 design of information technology systems that support cognitive tasks (e.g., 
cognitive artifacts), 
•	 development of training programs, and 
•	 work redesign to manage cognitive workload and increase human reliability. 
CE also studies the competencies and 1imitations of workers in their interactions 
with the work system (e.g. errors, strategies, cognitive workload), in particular with 
the cognitive artifacts they use to achieve their goals as weIl as with the co-operation 
with other actors. CE is mostly important in the design of complex (e.g. computer 
security applications), high-tech, or automated systems. 
A major factor when designing security applications that must be ta ken into 
consideration by designers is that for the vast majority of users, security is an 
"enabling task" to one or more "production tasks" (e.g. access a database, shop online, 
etc.). Such an "enabling task" is perceived as an obstacle. In addition to that, cognitive 
demands required by authentication tasks are becoming increasingly complex. To 
reduce management and support costs, organizations are placing more and more of the 
burden of authentication on the user, forcing them to perform - at the enterprise 's 
discretion - lifecycle-management tasks such as token requests and activation, 
password replacement, certificate renewal, etc. 
The cognitive demands required by an assessment item are related to the 
number and strength of connections of concepts and procedures that a user needs to 
make in order to generate a response, in this particular thesis, when authenticating to a 
system (the assessment item). The cognitive processes are typically comprised of 
recall and recognition (e.g. face recognition authentication) and identification and 
classification (e.g. KBA such as SiteKey (BankofAmerica, 2009): first you recognize 
a unique image you chose and image title you created to accompany your image, then 
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you mentally group Image and title carry10g out 10 this way collection and 
comparison). 
Traditionally CE has used the "human information-processing" model of 
cognition (Wickens, 1992), which models human cognition through a computer 
metaphor. 
Central in CE is the notion of domain: Domain is the larger environment in 
which the worksystem must operate, and presents both constraints and opportunities 
for the worksystem. The domain influences the approach followed, as the degree of 
coupling among its constituents, the level of top-down causality, and the degree of 
human intentionality in decision making shapes the validity of the models used 
(Dowell and Long, 1998) (Figure 4.1). 
Perlorrnance~=-~~~~ 
D domain of {W} cognitive 
cognitive work worksystem 
-objects -cognitive structures 
-attrlb ut esistates -cognitive behaviours 
-goals 
-task quality L:Q - user costs LK 
"'~I-----
Figure 4.1: Worksystem and a domain (Dowell and Long, 1998). 
CE also studies the competencies and limitations of the workers 10 their 
interactions with the worksystem in general (e.g. attention, perception errors, 
strategies, cognitive workload), and in particular the cognitive artifacts they use to 
achieve their goals as weIl as their co-operation with other actors. The worksystem is 
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the system of agents interacting with each other to perform work by intentionally 
changing the states of domain objects. 
CE is especially important in the design of complex, high-tech, or automated 
systems. A poorly designed cellular phone user-interface may not cause an accident, 
but it may weil cause great frustration on the part of the consumer and result in a 
marketplace-driven business failure. A pOOl' interface design on industrial automated 
equipment, however, may result in decreased production and qua lity, or even a life­
threatening accident. 
4.2.1 Methods 
The methods used by CE are those whose product yields specifications of 
knowledge. That is, the representations and processes required to support the user's 
behavior, such that, in interacting, the user and the computer achieve the desired 
perfOimance. A wide range of methods are used in CE, but the most common methods 
are the Hierarchical Task Analysis (Kirwan el a/., 1992) and Cognitive Task Analysis 
(Hollnagel, 2003; Kieras, 1996). Section 2.3.4 Natural GOMS Language (NGOMSL) 
describes the adopted GOMS mode] (Kieras, 1996) as the basis for thc dcvelopment of 
the CTA. 
4.2.2 The Cognitive Approach 
The Cognitive approach permits the analyst to gather information and 
understand operation up to the thought process level. It allows a deeper understanding 
of the business problems or needs. This thorough understating can then be translated 
into better decision making. Overall, the Cognitive approach is comprised of the 
rigorous practice of gathering information, human information processing, analysis, 
business modeling, and simulation. 
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4.2.2.1 Gathering information 
Instead of relying only on meetings, surveys, or internai documentation, 
information is gathered in the field with "thinking out loud" techniques while people 
are performing their tasks. This ensures a deeper understanding of the current 
situation. Even if a process is total1y changed, gathering information with the 
cognitive approach exceeds the risks of not doing so. 
4.2.2.2 Information processing 
To understand the thinking process, goals, and knowledge, aCTA is performed 
which is in this thesis undertaken by the GOMS mode!. Cognitive goals, sub-goals, 
and methods are then described hierarchically. Methods are extracted with "how" 
questions, and goals are extracted with "why" questions. At the end of the process, 
management will have a deep understanding of the operations, problems, and 
strategies. This ensures an effective way to optimize any process. CTA serves also as 
input for defining the requirements of an information system. 
4.2.2.3 Process Modeling 
The business is modeled as a hierarchy of systems and processes. The highest 
level is the mission, followed by generic functions, specifie functions, and ultimately, 
at the most detailed level, the structural elements. The gathering techniques along with 
the CTA ensure that the business model will be grounded in reality. This provides a 
complete and exact picture of the operation to management. 
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4.2.2.4 Simulation 
Before executing a plan, each risk is analyzed and addressed by simulation and 
calculation. For example, in Information Technology (lT), user acceptance is often the 
prime risk. Simulating the user interface prior to writing any line of code ensures that 
the both the user's and the business 's needs are met first. 
The application of the Cognitive Approach helps an organization learn and 
translate that learning into rapid action, which is the vital competitive advantage. 
4.3 Main Cognitive Areas of Focus ReJating to User Authentication 
This section addresses the main cognitive processes specifically related to 
Human Computer Interaction (HCI) and user authentication. As already stressed ID 
Section S.I Introduction, the cognitive dimensions are considered as the interaction 
occurnng between users, security (authentieation) mechanisms, and 
Web/Mobile/Wireless eomponents. 
4.3.1 Perception 
Perception is our awareness and understanding of the elements and objects of 
our environment through the physical sensation of our various senses, including sight, 
sound, smell, and so fOlth. Each sense organ is part of a sensory system which 
receives sensory inputs and transmits sensory information to the brain. Perception is 
influenced in part by experience. We classify stimuli based on models stored in our 
memories, and in this way achieve understanding. Basically, we tend to match objects 
or sensations perceived to things we already know. Other perceptuaJ characteristics 
that are relevant to the user authentication subject matter include: 
•	 Proximity: Our eyes and mind see objects as belonging together if they are 
near each other in space. 
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•	 Similarity: Our eyes and mind see objects as be10nging together if they share a 
common visual property, such as color, size, shape, brightness, or orientation. 
•	 Matching patterns: We respond in the same way to the same shape in different 
sizes. For example, the 1etters of the alphabet have the same meaning, 
regardless of physical size. 
According to Dowell and Long (1998), the user's cognitive behaviors are the 
processing of representations. So, perception is a process whereby a representation of 
the domain, often mediated by tools, is created. Neisser (1964) emphasizes that human 
experiencc depends on the stored mental schema, which guide exploring behavior and 
the perception of external contexts. 
There are numerous theoretical accounts of perception, which can, in general, be 
divided into two groups: Bottom-up processing and Top-down processing. Bottom-up 
processing is a1so known as data-driven processing, because perception begins with 
the stimulus itself. Processing is carried out in one direction from the retina to the 
visual cortex, with each successive stage in the visual pathway carrying out ever more 
complex analyses of the input. Top-down processing refers to the use of contextual 
information in pattern recognition. For example, understanding difficult handwriting 
is easier when reading complete sentences than when reading single, isolated words. 
This is because the meaning of the surrounding words provides a context to aid 
understand ing. 
4.3.2 Memory 
Memory is just one of many phenomena that show the brain's complexity72. On 
a basic leve1, memory IS the capacity for storing and retrieving information, but 
memones are not simply recorded and neatly stored. Our memories are selected, 
72As already poinled oul, one of lhe main goals of this thesis was to identify the main user 
authentication task scenarios. Thus the employed use cases for aIl tasks scenarios did not consider ail 
possible and alternative memory related scenarios such as changing a password, resetting a password, 
losing a password, etc. due to the fact that they are outside the scope of this thesis. 
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constructed, and edited not just by us but by the world around us. We have an 
amazing, unlimited capacity for memory, but our memories are also faulty, full of 
holes and distortions, and vulnerable due to unreliable data retrieval systems. 
Memory can store, identify, and classify- detailed sensory images, facts about 
the world, tasks mechanics, and experiences. Three processes are involved in memory: 
encoding, slorage, and retrieval. AIl three of these processes determine whether 
something is remembered or forgotten. 
4.3.2.1 Encoding 
Processing information into memory is called encoding. People automatically 
encode sorne types of information without being aware of it. For example, most 
people probably can recall where they ate lunch yesterday, even though they didn't try 
to remember this information. However, other types of information become encoded 
only if people pay attention to it. College students will probably not remember aIl the 
material in their textbooks unless they pay close attention while they're reading. There 
are several different ways of encoding verbal information: 
•	 Structural encoding focuses on what words look like. For instance, one might 
note whether words are long or short, in uppercase or lowercase, or 
handwritten or typed (e.g., a strong password Bli t z4 three$). 
•	 Phonemic encoding focuses on how words sound. 
•	 Semantic encoding focuses on the meaning of words. This requires a deeper 
level of processing than structural or phonemic encoding and usually results in 
better memory. 
4.3.2.2 Storage 
After information enters the brain, it has to be stored or maintained. To describe 
the process of storage, many psychologists use the three-stage model of memory 
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proposed by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) as shown in Figure 4.2. According to this 
model, infonnation is stored sequentially in three memory systems: Sensory Memory, 
STM, and LTM. 
MULTI-STORE MODEL 
transfer 
sensory attention short-telm long-term 
memory memory 
retrieval 
memory 
T 1 
refiearsal 
Figure 4.2: The three-stage processing model of memory 
(Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968). 
The memory system can be classified into two main types of memory: - LTM 
and STM, as shown in Figure 4.3. The LTM is divided into Declarative and 
Procedural memories. The Declarative memory is in tum sub-divided inta Semantic 
and Episodic memories, fallowed by the Procedural Memory, which is sub-divided 
into Priming and Procedural Memory. 
Short-Term ~Iemory 
Semaof1c 
~lemory 
Figure 4.3: Classification of memory. 
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A detailed explanation of each type of memory is given in the next paragraphs. 
4.3.2.2.1 Sensory Memory 
Sensory memory, or sensory register, notes or registers sensory stimuli as they 
are experienced. lt consists of representations of the outside world as experienced 
through the senses such as touch, sight, or smel!. It holds information for 
approximately one to two seconds. If, for instance, you glance at the ocean and turn 
away, the image of the ocean will be lost in one to two seconds unless the image is 
quickly transferred into the STM system. The contents of sensory memory are 
constantly changing as new stimuli are perceived. Information that does not fade from 
sensory memory enters STM. 
4.3.2.2.2 Working Memory (or Short-Term Memory) 
Working Memory (WM) is thought to process information by actively 
repeating, grouping, and summarizing it to aid its storage in LTM. Information is 
thought to last within STM for only a short period of time before it is either passed 
into LTM or discarded. For information to be transferred into LTM, it must be 
rehearsed or repeated. WM is generally considered to have limited capacity. The 
earliest quantification of the capacity limit related with WM was the 7 ± 2 (i.e. the 
magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two) "chunks" of information rule introduced 
by Miller (1956). He noticed that the memory span of young adults was around seven 
elements, called chunks, regardless of whether the elements were digits, letters, words, 
or other units. The 7 ± 2 is that the capacity of STM is seven plus or minus two pieces 
of information (sorne people can hold five or six items, while others can ho Id eight or 
nine). 
However, in a more recent study about the mental storage capacity of the STM, 
Cowan (2001) noted a number of other Iimits of cognition that relates to a "magical 
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number four". He argues that Miller's number was in fact meant more "as a rough 
estimate and a rhetorical device than as a real capacity limit. Others have since 
suggested that there is a more precise capacity limit, but that it is only three to five 
chunks." ln his study Cowan put together a broad range of data on capacity limits, 
asserting that the "smaller capacity limit is real". 
In general, WM can hold five to nine units of information for between twenty 
seconds to one minute in length. It holds information for as long as it is actively 
thought about, or until new information basically forces it out. Unless we repeat the 
information and purposely try to retain it, most (or ail) of it will be lost. A good 
example of this process can be seen when you look up a new phone number and repeat 
it to yourself as you dial it. After dialing it, within a few seconds you will usually 
forget it. However, if you do this repeatedly (repctition or rehearsal), as in the case of 
a friend with a new phone number, it will in the end up entering LTM. These "units" 
of information can represent single pieces of information, such as an individual's 
name, or the units can be single pieces of information that represent a number of 
different pieces of information, as in the last name of a family representing ail of the 
family's members. The process of using a single item to represent a number of items is 
called chunking, and researchers have found that WM's information holding capacity 
can be significantly improved with this process. 
lt seems there are many factors that determine what information enters LTM, 
two of the strongest being repetition and intense emotion. If something is repeated 
often enough, such as multiplication tables, it will enter LTM. And it is hard to forget 
intensely emotional experiences, such as being involved in a scrious car accident or 
falling in love. 
4.3.2.2.3 Long-Term Memory (LTM) 
LTM has been the focus of most research and theory on the memory system. It 
holds aIl the information that has managed to pass through the sensory and STM 
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systems. ln contrast to both of those systems, LTM is thought to be able to hold 
potentia11y unlimited amounts of information for an indefinite period of time, possibly 
for a lifetime. There is a structure for storing a representation of the knowledge we 
accumulate over time in the LTM. It is thought to hold a11 of the memories of our life, 
as well as our knowledge of the world in general. Information entering the LTM is 
assumed to be permanent. ln LTM, one might find memories as diverse as the first 
person you ever had a crush on, knowledge of how to ride a bike or cook scrambled 
eggs, or a second language. It is also where mental models are stored. Whereas STM 
genera11y ho Ids between five and ni ne items, scientists say there are no limits on the 
capacity of LTM given that people have associations for those memories. That is why, 
for example, people have a natural inclination to choose passwords based on familjar 
things such as children's birthdays or favorite sports team rather than 
incomprehensibJe strings like 3B#$Ir or 7*$3fg. 
LTM stores and operates quite differently depending on the type of information 
involved. - One of the most influential theoretical divisions of LTM is the division 
between Declarative Memory (episodic memory and semantic memory) and 
Procedural memory as described below: 
•	 Declarative memory (DM) is recalJ of factuaJ infOimation such as dates, 
words, faces, events, and concepts. 1t is so called because it refers to memories 
that can be consciously discussed, or declared. It applies to standard textbook 
learning and knowledge, as well as remembering the capital of Germany, the 
rules for playing ice hockey, and what happened in the last game of the 
Montreal Canadiens, for instance, as each of these involves declarative 
memory. DM is often considered to be explicit because it involves conscious, 
intentional remembering. lt is subject to forgetting, but reguJarly accessed 
memories can last indefinitely. OMs are best estabJished by using active recall 
combined with mnemonic techniques and spaced repetition. A mnemonic 
device is a memory and/or learning aid. Mnemonics are frequently verbal, 
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something such as a very short poem or a special word used to help a person 
remember something, particularly a list, but they may also be visual, 
kinesthetic, or auditory (Tulving and Schacter, 1990). Declarative memory is 
divided in two types: 
o	 Semantic and Episodic. Semantic Memory is the recall of general facts, 
while Episodic Memory is the recall of personal facts. Remembering 
the capital of Germany and the rules for playing football uses semantie 
memory; remembering what happened in the last game of the Alouttes 
uses episodic memory. 
o	 Episodic memory is the conscious recollection or recall of specifie 
experiences from a person's life. These memories often include the 
time and place of the experience, as weil as a representation of the raie 
the individual who is remembering played in it. Episodic Memories 
seem to be more affected by the passage of time than are procedural or 
semantic memories, such that if the event is not recalJed and thought of 
relatively often, details of the event, if not the event itself, seem- to 
fade or be forgotten over time. Two specific types of mental 
representations hypothesized to be used by the semantic memory 
system to organize information are schemas (Anderson, 1977) and 
categories. Schemas are ordered frameworks or outlines of world 
knowledge that help us organize and interpret new information. They 
are like maps or blueprints into which new related information will be 
fitted. KnowJedge of your home town or city, with its streets, various 
buildings, and neighborhoods is an example of a schema. Schemas also 
help people to reconstruct, or try to remember, information that may 
have been forgotten. For example, if a friend brings up a time when 
you both went out to eat dinner a few months aga and you don't 
remember it clearly, you might ask for more information, and then use 
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your schema for the usual sequence of events in eating out to try to 
remember or reconstruct what happened. Categories are another 
representational form of tbought used by semantic memory to organize 
infonnation. Categories are sets of objects, experiences, or ideas that 
are grouped together because they are similar to one another in some 
respect. For example, apartments, bouses, huts, and igloos, might be 
grouped under the category of dwellings. Like schemas, categories help 
us make sense of, and organize, the countless aspects of the world. 
o	 Typically, recognition memory has been defined as the ability to assess 
accurately that a stimulus has been encountered before. There can also 
be discrimination components in which the learner may be able to 
distinguish between a stimu lus that had been previously presented and 
a new stimulus, without any further knowledge of either one. 
Visual Recognition Memory is the ability to recognize elements in the 
sUITounding environment, such as faces or places, as weil as the ability 
to learn about and orient ourselves within that environ ment, both of 
which are crucial to our functioning in the world. We need to recognize 
individuals, such as family members, and to be able to navigate from 
one place to another. Thus neural systems have evolved to interpret 
incoming sensory information, with neurons that are capable of 
distinguishing nove! and familial' visuaJ e!ements. Systems based on 
recognition of visual items for authentication have been receiving 
much attention lately. For example, both Déjà Vu (Dhamija and Perrig, 
2000) and Passfaces™ (Passfaces, 2009) present users with panels of 
images, from which tbey have to recognize and select their pass 
Images., The most significant difference between the two systems 
involves the content of the images: Déjà Vu employs randomly 
generated art, while Passfaces uses photographs of strangers' faces in 
232 
an attempt to exploit people's ability to process and remember faces. 
These systems have perfonned we]] in laboratory-style tests, producing 
reca]] rates of up to 80% even after up to 3 months of non-use 
(Valentine, 1998). 
•	 Procedural Memory (PM) pertains to the storage of skills and procedures. This 
type of memory has also been referred to as "tacit knowledge" or "implicit 
knowledge". PM is involved in tasks such as remembering how to play squash 
or how to ride a bike. This is "know how" memory; it often can only be 
expressed by performing the specifie skill, and people have problems 
verbalizing what they are doing and why. Procedural memory is therefore very 
important in human motor performance. An important feature of procedural 
memory is that it tends to persist; ifs resistant to change -can be useful since 
you don't want to have to keep re-Iearning behaviors. But this also means that 
you can't change a procedure, unless and until you pay attention to how and 
when it operates. An interesting characteristic of PM is that procedural patterns 
take a while to unlearn. Consider this scenario: You like to play tennis and 
have played for years. You decide to take sorne lessons. The instructor shows 
you how to swing the racquet more effectively. But you soon discover that you 
just can't - tell yourself to swing it differently. The old pathways interfere with 
the new ones. It's hard to interrupt a well-established procedure. In fact, those 
original neural pathways, though weakened, will always be there, for we 
currently have no reason to think that they will deteriorate. Under conditions 
resembling the initial circumstances in which they were laid down, they may 
even be reactivated. However, the new regulated pathways will eventually 
override the old ones. 
•	 Priming refers to an increased sensitivity to certain stimuli due to pfJor 
experience. Because priming is believed ta accur outside of conscious 
awareness, it is different from memory that relies on the direct retrieval of 
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information. Direct retrieval utilizes explicit memory, while priming relies on 
implicit memory. Priming can be conceptual or perceptual. Conceptual 
priming occurs where related ideas are used to prime the response, and is 
enhanced by semantic tasks. For example, table will show priming effccts on 
chair, because table and chair belong to the same category. Perceptua/ 
priming is based on the form of the stimulus and is enhanced by the match 
between the early and later stimuli, for example, where a partial picture is 
completed based on a picture seen earlier. 
4.3.2.3 information Retrieval 
There are two types of information retrieval: recalJ and recognition 73 . In 
recognition, the presentation of the information provides the knowledge that the 
information has been seen before. Recognition is of lesser complexity, as the 
information is provided as a cue. However, the recall can be assisted by the provision 
of retrieval cues, which enable the subject to quickly access the information in 
memory. 
4.3.2.3.1 Recall 
One of the most critical Hel principles IS to avoid unaided recall wherever 
possible, since it is known to place a considerable burden on users' cognitive load and 
overall ability to perform. There are authentication mechanisms that use cued recall 
and recognition, for example: 
73 As already mentioned, one of the goals of Ihis thesis was 10 idenlify Ihe main user aUlhentication lask 
scenarios. They have been -built onJy taking inLo consideration ils main use cases, which- in the case of 
Passwords/PINs scenarios, is "a user success ü1y 10gs in Lo a system." So this use 
case considered a strong password as the standard example of passwords (e.g., "Boat6paper!" as shown 
in Sub-Slep 3.1 Username and Password Login {wired nelwork-based lask}). Also, this use case did 
nol consider ail possible and allernative recalJ and/or recognition scenarios such as passwords lhal have 
been changed, passphrases hints, and others due 10 the facl that they are out of Ihe scope of Ihis thesis. 
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•	 SiteKey (BankofAmerica, 2009), as already described in Chapter 2, is a web­
based security system that provides one type of mutual authentication between 
end users and websites. lts primary purpose is to deter phishing. 
•	 Cognitive passwords involve a series of questions (e.g. security questions) 
about the user's personal preferences and history: After a certain number of 
correct answers, the user is considered to have passed authentication. 
•	 Associative passwords employ word pair or phrase associations in a similar 
manner (e.g. Dear-God, Spring-Step), while avoiding word association 
stereotypes. 
•	 The pass sentence mechanism is an unaided recall mechanism in the first 
place. However, if the user does not get the secret completely right, the user is 
prompted with questions about the pass senlence, and when the user answers 
enough questions correctly, login is allowed. 
4.3.2.3.2 Recognition 
Recognition is one of the three basic memory tasks. It involves identifying 
objects or events that have been encountered before. Recognition (re+cognition) is a 
process that occurs in thinking when sorne event, process, pattern, or object recurs; it 
involves knowing or feeling that someone or something present has been encountered 
before. Coming from the base cognition, recognition has various uses in different 
fields of study, and has generally been accepted as referring to- the process of 
awareness or thought. 
[n psychology, cognition is used for information processing view of a person's 
psychological functions. This takes place as we process stimuli in relation to previous 
memories and experiences; also we make connections between the current stimuli and 
our memories. Thus, in order for something to be recognized, it must be familiar. This 
recurrence allows the recognizer to more properly react. Hence recognition is a 
survival mechanism. Humans and animais will recognize certain food s, which are 
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poisonous through taste, as they have tasted them before. This works also for sounds 
and alarms, which we are trained to react to, such as fire alarms. 
Without Recognition, we would go through life reliving everything without 
leaming from the past. Experiences would be pointless, as they would not be 
remembered. Recognition is the easiest of the memory tasks. That is why multiple­
choice tests are often considered easier than other tests. ln multiple-choice tests, you 
only need to recognize the right answer. You do not have to come up with the answer 
on your own. Recognition uses the memories we have in place to help with the current 
situation. When the recognizer has correctly responded, this is a measure of 
understand ing. 
4.3.2.4 Password Memorability Issues 
The user characteristic that has the major impact on password design is 
memorability. The Password authentication mechanism is in fact a huge component of 
the study of usable security of user authentication. As a Knowledge-Based 
Authentication (KBA) mechanism, it requires users to memorize items and recall them 
when accessing a specific system. Asking users to recall a single password and user 
ID for one system may seem reasonable, but with the proliferation of passwords, users 
are increasingly unable to cope. Research on human memory is extensive, but 
according to Sasse et a!. (2001), the most important issues related to passwords can be 
summarized as follows: 
•	 the capacity ofworking memory is limited; 
•	 memory decays over time, meaning that people may not recall an item, or may 
not recall it 100% correctly; 
•	 recognition of a familiar item is easier than unaided recall; 
•	 frequently recalled items are easier to remember than infrequently used ones, 
and retrieval of very frequently recaJIed items becomes 'automatic'; 
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•	 people cannot "forget on demand" items will linger in memory even when they 
are no longer needed; 
•	 items that are meaningful (such as words) are easier to recall than non­
meaningful ones (sequences of letters and numbers that have no particular 
meaning); 
•	 distinct items can be associated with each other to facilitate recall, yet similar 
items compete against each other on recall. 
Research conducted by Sasse et al. (2001) regarding Jogin faiJure (i.e. users 
forgetting passwords) found that the 10gin usually failed because: 
•	 they recalled the password partly, but not 100% correctly; 
•	 they recalled a different password from the one required (i.e. a previously used 
password for the same machine, or a password for a different machine). 
As pointed out by Sasse et al. (2001), this demonstrates the basic memory 
mechanisms (described above) in action: Items decay in memory unless they are 
frequently recalled, and recall of simiJar items causes interference. The likelihood of 
100% correct recall of infrequently used items is extremely low. This means that a 
password mechanism that demands ]00% accurate recall every time is an extremely 
bad match for infrequently used systems. That the results for 6-digit PINs are even 
worse confinns the importance of password content. It also indicates that a token-PIN 
combination, frequently proclaimed as a more usable substitute for passwords, is 
likely to cause more problems with infrequently used systems than a standard 
password. ln Study 2 (the analysis of the password resets), the author found that 
91.7% of resets were caused by "normal users" (i.e., more than 90% of users cannot 
cope with the password mechanism in the way they were expected to, which is a 
negative result in terms of the usability of password mechanisms). 
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4.3.2.4.1 Password Policies 
The growing number of systems with which users have to interact creates 
memory problems (see section above). The problem is often exacerbated by password 
policies, which usually state rules, for example, that: 
•	 passwords must be strong, such as a pseudo-random mixture of letters
 
(upper/lowercase), numbers, and characters;
 
•	 users should have a different password for each system; 
•	 passwords should be changed at regular intervals, and accounts ofusers who 
do not comply are deleted or suspended. 
4.3.2.4.2 Varying Systems 
In most password systems, there is a great variability of user IDs and passwords 
across different systems (e.g., UN IX takes up to 8 characters, Windows 95/98 up to 
14, and Windows 2000 up to 127). Sorne systems have highly elaborate content 
restrictions, or more specifically, password policies (e.g. a password must include 
upper/lowercase, at least six characters, alpha-numeric, and special characters), but 
these vary from system to system. The result is a huge demand on users' memories: 
•	 users not only have to remember passwords, but also the system and user ID 
with which it is associated; 
•	 users have to remember which password restrictions apply to which system; 
•	 users have to remember whether they have changed a password on a particular 
system, and what they have changed it to. 
4.3.3 Mental Models 
Mental models are representations of the function and/or structure of objects in 
peoples' minds. Designing something requires that you understand what the person 
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wants to get done. Empathy with a person is distinct from studying how a person uses 
something. Empathy extends to knowing what the person wants to accomplish 
regardless of whether she has or is aware of the thing you are designing. You need to 
know the person 's goals and what procedure and philosophy she follows to 
accomplish them. So mental models give you a deep understanding of people's 
motivations and thought-processes, along with the emotional and philosophical 
landscape in which they are operating. 
" 1 /, 
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Figure 4.4: Mental Models (Norman, J988). 
Another important point is the "system causality conveyance" raised by Norman 
(1988), who made this a popular Hel debate within the research community. He used 
mental models to describe how a system is designed and implemented on the basis of 
the designer's mental mode!. Similar to the reader of a passage of text, the user 
develops a mental model of how s/he thinks the system works through interaction with 
the system as shown in Figure 4.4. This model is used to come to an understanding of 
the system, to anticipate system behavior, and to explain why the system reacts as it 
does. In other words, the designer materializes her mental model of a given design 
(e.g. a computer system), which becomes the only means of conveying her mental 
model to the user. Sorne characteristics of mental models are: 
• may be incorrect or incomp1ete; 
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•	 can be "executed"; 
•	 are analogical representations, or a combination of analogical and 
propositional representations; 
• are dynamically constructed when required. 
There are two main types of mental models: 
•	 functional models (good for everyday use); 
•	 structural models (good for breakdown situations; difficult to acqUlre from 
usage experience only). 
ln short, computer systems should be designed in such a way that users can 
quickly acquire a good functional model of the system which is in accordance with 
their task mode!. 
Chiasson and Biddle (2007) have found that in the usable security literature, and 
within their own studies, discussions invariably turn to the problem of mental models. 
User interfaces for security fall short of fostering useful mental models for users. One 
frequently cited explanation is that security is a complex issue and that users need 
more education in the area. This thesis' author disagrees with this argument. Not only 
is it shortsighted to assume that users will be adequately trained, but it is unrealistic to 
place such a burden on users. 
The user interface should convey the information necessary for users to be able 
to easily predict and understand the consequences of their actions. This does not mean 
that users need to know the intricate details of how the system operates, but that they 
can form a reliabJe explanation in their minds that lets them interact successfully. The 
file managing metaphor is a good example: Users understand that files can be placed 
in folders, opened, c1osed, thrown into the recycle bin, and so on. But at no point do 
users need to know the underlying details of file storage and manipulation, such as 
disk blocks, index tables, and disk head scheduling. 
Security interfaces do not yet help users form such mental models, and in fact 
still assume that users will have an understanding of underlying security concepts. 
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This places users in a vulnerable position. They lack the necessary knowledge, they 
must rely on inadequate interfaces to deduce what is happening, and they must make 
decisions that could potentially place them at risk. A wrong decision can give 
attackers valuable information or leave a user's system vulnerable. Alternatively, a 
wrong decision can also hinder a user's productivity because the security mechanisms 
now prohibit desired activities. It is not surprising that users prefer not to deal with 
security issues if they can avoid them. 
Security interfaces must foster useful mental models. Therefore, researchers and 
designers must also be careful to accurately identify users' mental models when 
running usability studies so that an accurate and unbiased understanding of the 
usability of systems can be obtained. These are not easy tasks, but ones that must 
nevertheless be accomplished to achieve usable security. 
4.4 The Cognitive Mode) of User Authentication (CMUA) 
Based on the careful consideration of the information presented in the previous 
chapter, this thesis presents the Cognitive Model of User Authentication (CMUA) to 
explain how and what cognitive processes such as attention and memory, are involved 
specifically in user authentication tasks. The goal of developing this model is to have 
an understanding of human cognition related to user authentication and the 
interactions involved74 . CMUA also serves as the basis for the development of the 
Usable Security Symmetry inspection method. In addition, the GLEAN3 (GOMSL) 
and SOAR cognitive architectures which have been adapted for the development of 
the CMUA are briefly described in this section. 
74 An alternative approach to demonstrate the CM UA would be by showing how (Miller, 1956)'s works 
would appear in SOAR (Laird, 2008), then in CMUA, and afterward- how these works would influence 
the creation of the USS review questions and operators-or even further, what - impact they would have 
al the end on the execution time of the operators or other factors. Despite the fact tha! this is an 
interesting approach, it is out of the scope of this thesis. 
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4.4.1 Why Use a Cognitive Architecture? 
Before proceeding with CMUA, it is worth noting wbat a cognitive architecture 
is and what the approach to modeling is. Cognitive architectures are an approach to 
modeling behavior that presupposes that there are two components to behavior, the 
architecture and knowledge. The architecture is comprised of cognitive mechanisms 
that are fixed across tasks and essentially fixed across individuals. These mechanisms 
usually comprise sorne type of perception and motor output, some sort of central 
processor, sorne working memory or activation of declarative memory, and sorne way 
to store and apply procedures. These mechanisms are used to apply task knowledge to 
generate behavior. The airn is to outline a cognitive architecture that captures a 
selection of cognitive processes in an integrated manner, and therefore to provide 
integrated explanations of a broad array of data (Laird and Congdon, 2009; Ritter, 
2004). 
Cognitive architectures must ernbody strong hypotheses about the building 
blocks of cognition that are shared by ail tasks, and bow different types ofknowledge 
are learned, encoded, and used, making a cognitive architecture a software 
implementation of a general theory of intelligence. 
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Figure 4.5: A basic cognitive architecture (Laird, 2009). 
A basic cognitive architecture for which the Goal is to bring ail existing 
Knowledge to allow select- actions (Task Environment, Body) to achieve goals is 
shown in Figure 4.5. Learning is implied in Knowledge. 
There are several types of architectures that are or that could be used for 
evaluating interfaces and predicting task time and errors. These include descriptive 
architectures (Kieras, 1999), symbolic (Laird et al., 1987) and hybrid architectures, 
intelligent agent architectures, and connectionist architectures. CMUA looks at how 
cognitive processes take place in a particular cognitive architecture. To this end, this 
thesis adapts and refines two recognized architectures for cognitive modeling such as 
GLEAN3 (GOMSL) (Kieras, 1999) and SOAR (Laird, 2008) in order to build the 
CMUA. The result is a descriptive architecture which helps in system design, and 
offers a first view of how the human interaction process occurs in user authentication. 
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4.4.1.1 GLEAN3 Cognitive Architecture 
GLEAN3 (GOMS Language Evaluation and Analysis) is a computationally 
realized version of the Model Human Processor (MHP), being based more on the 
EPIC (Executive-ProcesslInteractive Control) architecture (Kieras and Meyer, 1997) 
for human information processing that precisely accounts for the thorough timing of 
human perceptual, cognitive, and motor activity. EPIC provides a framework for 
constructing models of human-system interaction that are precise and comprehensive 
as much as necessary to be useful for practical design purposes. EP IC depicts a state­
of-the-art synthesis of results on human perceptual/motor performance, cognitive 
modeling techniques, and task analysis methodology, implemented in the form of 
computer simulation software. GLEAN has been used in numerous domains including 
militaI)' command and control, aircraft maintenance, and web-applications. Current 
development is extending GLEAN to better support errar analysis and error-tolerant 
design (Kieras, 1996). 
The GLEAN3 basic architectural structure is shown in Figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.6: The GLEAN3 cognitive architecture (Kieras, 1999). 
Human performance in a task is simulated by programming the cognitive 
processor with production rules organized as methods for accomplishing task goals. 
The EPIC model then is run in interaction with a simulation of the external system and 
performs the same task as the human operator would. The model generates events 
(e.g. eye movements, key strokes, vocal utterances) whose timing is accurately 
predictive of human performance. 
4.4.1.2 SOAR Cognitive Architecture 
The SOAR (State Operator and Result) architecture is a symbolic cognitive 
architecture, created by Laird et al. (1987) (Figure 4.7). It is both a vision of what 
cognition is and an implementation of that vision through a computer programming 
architecture for ArtificiaJ Intelligence (Al). SOAR has been broadly used by Al 
researchers to mode) diverse aspects of human behavior. 
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The main goal of the SOAR project is to be capable to handle the full range of 
capabilities of an intelligent agent, from highly routine to exceedingly complex open­
ended problems. To this end, it needs to be capable to generate representations and use 
appropriate forms of knowledge (i.e. procedural, declarative, episodic, and possibly 
iconic). SOAR should then deal with a collection of mechanisms of the mind. Also 
underlying the SOAR is the vision that a symbolic system is required and enough for 
general intelligence. This is known as the physical symboJ system hypothesis by 
Newell and Simon (1997) which states that "A physical symbol system has the 
necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent action." 
,/ 
Symbolic Long-Tel111 :'1emory
 
Procedural
 
c=J c::::=J
 
c=J ~ c::::=J
 
c::::J c::::=J
 
'-
... 1 / 
1 Onmkmg 1
 
'Y
 
.---
Symbobc ShOlt-Tèl111 I\·'lemolY ~CJ ':; tt. 
M. r, r, ,.. ­... C;..~ <: 0 ? r-t r-t 
-
1 Perception 1 Ac lion 1 1 
Body 
~ 
Figure 4.7: The SOAR (State Operator and Result) architecture (Laird el al, 1987). 
SOAR consistently illustrates Short-Term Knowledge (STK) as a network of 
active symbols. Long-term knowledge (LTK) is a collection of condition-action ruJes. 
The conditions of each rule build up a pattern to match against the active symbol 
network. When a nIie 's condition matches, the rule runs by carrying out its actions. 
These actions might entai! -adding (or deleting) symbols in the STK structure. 
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Ta deal with complexity, SOAR includes a goal hierarchy, allowing successive 
decomposition of problems into component sub-problems. SOAR includes 
mechanisms to generate new goals automatically in response to a system 's LTK and 
existing situation. SOAR depicts perceptual and conceptual knowledge consistently in 
STM; therefore, new actions tlow from preceding actions and from changes in the 
external environment. The rule system also incorporates pattern-matching technology, 
allowing quick processing. Hence, SOAR is well suited for the development of 
intelligent systems that must produce actions in time analogous to human decision 
time. 
SOAR incJudes an automatic learning mechanism based on the psychological 
concept of chunking. SOAR learns new chunks by compiling sequences of actions 
that change STM in particular ways. New chunks tit consistently into a system's 
existing long-term rule set. Therefore, a SOAR system can incrementally learn new 
facts about the world, as weil as more proficient representations of its original LTK. 
4.4.2 CMUA Cognitive Architecture 
A cognitive mode! is a representation of sorne aspects of the user's 
understanding, knowledge, intentions or processing. Building a model of how a user 
works allows us to foresee how s/he will interact with the interface. One of the 
available modeling techniques, as already explained in previous section, is Model 
Human Processor (MHP). A basic model of human performance, it is intended to offer 
gross predictions of system behavior. MHP also considers humans as information 
processing systems such as a collection of memories and processors, as weil as a set of 
principJes ("principles of operation"). 
The CMUA is a cognitive model which has been built for the purposcs of 
comprehension of the user authentication methods related to cognitive processes. It is 
focused on how and what cognitive processes interact (e.g., perception, memory, etc.). 
Figure 4.8 shows the basic architectural structure ofCMUA, version 0.1. 
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Figure 4.8: The CMUA cognitive architecture.
 
Adapted from (Kieras, 1999) and SOAR (Laird, 2008).
 
The CMUA consists of a LTM, which is encoded as production rules, and a 
STM, which is encoded as a symbolic graph structure so that objects are able to be 
represented with propel1ies and relations. Symbolic STM holds the agent's evaluation 
of the current situation derived from perception and via retrieval of knowledge from 
its LTM. Action in an environment takes place through creation of motor commands 
in a buffer in SIM. The decision procedure selects opera/ors and detects impasses. At 
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the lowest level, CMUA's processing consists of matching and firing rules. Rules 
provide a flexible, context-dependent representation of knowledge, with their 
conditions matching the current situation and their actions retrieving information 
relevant to the CUITent situation. ln fact, many rule-based systems select a single rule 
to fire at a given time, and this serves as the venue of choice in the system - where 
one action is chosen instead of another. 
CMUA lets additional knowledge to exert influence on a decision by 
introducing operators as the venue for choice and employing rules to propose, assess, 
and apply operators. Rules perform as an associative-memory that retrieves 
information pertinent to the present situation, so because of this, rules fire in parallel. 
ln CMUA, there are rules that propose operators that generate a data structure in 
working memory representing the operator and an acceptable preference so that the 
operator is able to be taken into consideration for selection. There are also rules that 
evaluate operators and generate other categories of preferences that prefer one 
operator to another or provide some sign of the usefulness of the operator for the 
present situation. Lastly, there are rules that apply to the operator by making changes 
to working memory that reflect the actions of the operator. These changes might be 
solely internaI or start extemal actions in the environment. This approach supports a 
flexible representation of knowledge about operators. There can be many reasons for 
proposing, selecting, and/or applying an operator, some that are very specifie and 
others that are quite general. 
CMUA possesses a shared STM where knowledge from Perception and LTM 
are combined to offer an integrated representation of the current situation. It has an 
"incline" decision procedure that supports context-dependent reactive behavior, but in 
addition supports automatic impasse-driven sub-goals and meta-reasoning. Chunking 
is CMUA's learning mechanism that converts the outcomes of problem solving in 
sub-goals into rules compiling knowledge and behavior from deliberate to reactive 
(Laird,2008). 
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The four most representative categories of user authentication methods are 
demonstrated within the CMUA as follows: PasswordlPlNs (PPs) , One-Time 
Password (OTP), Out-OfBand-Authentication (OOBA) , and Fingelprint Recognition 
(FR). Figure 4.8 depicts the user authentication tasks with their corresponding 
cognitive and motor process- flows shown in colored arrOWS as follows: -+ PPs -+ 
OTP OOBA -+ FR. 
A description of the CM UA components is given in the next paragraphs. 
4.4.2.1 CMUA Components 
•	 Stimulus from External Environment: The external environment consists of 
PPs, OTP, OOBA, and FR user authentication tasks. 
•	 Body: Users receive stimuli through their sense organs, the five senses 
(sensory information). Sensory memory corresponds approximately to the 
initial 200-500 milliseconds after an item is perceived. 
•	 Perception: The Perception component is represented by the brain, which 
selects, organizes, and interprets sensory information. 
•	 Auditory: The Auditory memory eomponent aecepts either speech or sound 
inputs and makes them available to the WM. It is the capability to remember 
what an individual has heard. It involves being able to take in information that 
is introduced to you, process that information, store it in STM, and then recall 
what you have heard. Mostly, it involves the task of attending to, Iistening, 
processing, storing, and recalling. 
•	 Visual Imagery: The CM UA provides a set of processes and memones to 
support visual imagery, which includes depicted representations. The ST 
Visual Imagery module includes a STM where images are built and 
manipulated; a LTM that includes images that can be retrieved into the STM; 
processes that manipulate images in STM, and processes that generate 
symbolic structures from the visual images. VisuaI imagery is controlled by 
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tbe symbolic system, wbicb emits commands to build, manipuJate, and inspect 
visual images. Additionally, visual imagery allows processing tbat is not 
possible witb only symbolic reasoning, sucb as determining wbich letters in 
the alphabet are symmetric along the vertical axis (A, H, 1, M, 0, T, U, V, W, 
X, Y) (Laird, 2008). 
•	 Visual Memory: Visual memory is an individual's capability to remember 
wbat she has seen. Typically, three types of visual memory are found: 
Photographie memory, !conie memory, and Spatial memory. Photographie 
memOl'Y is the capability to recall images and/or objects in memory with great 
precision and in plentiful volume). leonie memory. is the sensory store for 
vision, a type of ST visual memory. Experiments performed by Sperling 
(1960) offers indication for a speedily decaying sensory trace, lasting only 
roughly 250 milliseconds after the offset of a display. Finally, Spatial memOl'Y 
can be considered a sub-category of visual memory because it relies on a 
cognitive map. Cognitive mapping is a sort of mental processing by which a 
person is able to acquire, code, store, recall, and decode infonnation about the 
relative locations and attributes of events in their daily or symbolic spatial 
environment. 
•	 Tactile/Gestures: A gesture is "an imprecise, context-dependent event that 
conveys the user's intentions" (Voyles et al., 1995). ln this case, the gestures 
are force impulses - nudges - on the end-effector. Because gestures are context 
dependent, state information must be associated witb eacb gesture. This state 
information is generally application specifie. Using a linguistic analogy, the 
raw gestures form a gestural alphabet along with the state information. 
Gestural words are assembled from the raw gesture and its associated context 
by tbe gesture recognizers (preprocessors in Figure 5). 
•	 Clustering: Classification is a basic human conceptual activity. For example, 
children gain very early knowledge of classifying objects in their environment 
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and correlating the resulting classes with nouns in their language. "Cluster 
analysis" is a broad telm used for a multiplicity of procedures that can be 
employed to create subtypes (i.e. classification). These procedures form 
"clusters" or groups of highly similar entities. More particularly, a c1ustering 
method is a multivariate statistical procedure that starts with a data set 
including information about a sample of entities and attempts to rearrange 
these entities into somewhat homogeneous groups. The Clustering component 
detects statistical regularities in the flow of experiences and automatically and 
dynamically creates new symbolic structures that represent those regularities, 
providing a mechanism for automatically generating new symbols and thus 
concepts that can be used to classify perception (Laird, 2008). Those new 
symbolic structures enrich that state representation. Clustering is in fact sub­
symbolic, where non-symbolic perceptual structures are amalgamated 
collectively to create symbols. 
•	 Symbolic Short-Tenn Memory: Symbolic STM holds the agent's assessment 
of the cun·ent situation derived from perception and via retrieval of knowledge 
from its LTM. STM allows recalJ for a period of severa] seconds to a minute 
without rehearsal, and its capacity is also very restricted. According to Miller's 
(1956) experiments, the store of STM was 7±2 items, the Magical Number 
Seven, Plus or Minus Two. 
•	 Decision Procedure: The decision procedure selects operators and detects 
impasses. It helps context-dependent reactive behavior, but also helps 
automatic impasse-driven sub-goals and meta-reasoning. 
•	 Chunking: Chunking signifies arranging items into familiar, manageable units. 
Each chunk collects a number of parts of information from the environment 
into a particular unit. Chunking refers to an approach for making more 
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proficient use of STM by recoding information. ln general, Herbert A. Simon75 
has used the term chunk to indicate LTM structures that can be employed as 
units of perception and meaning, and chunking as the Jeaming mechanisms 
guiding -the acquirement of these chunks. 
•	 Semantic Learning: Declarative knowledge can be separated into elements that 
are known (i.e. facts) and elements that are remembered (i.e. episodic 
experiences). Semantic Learning and memory provide the capabil ity to stock 
up and retrieve declarative facts about the world, such as cars have wheels, 
eggplant is a vegetable, and pyramids are in Egypt. This capability increases 
the ability to create agents that reason and employ general knowledge about 
the world. Semantic Learning is built up from structures that take place in 
STM. A structure from Semantic Learning is retrieved by generating a cue in a 
particular buffer in STM. The cue is then employed to seek for the best partial 
match in semantic memory, which is then retrieved into STM. 
•	 Episodic Leaming: Episodic memory is the type of memory that remembers 
events that are observed through experience (Nuxoll and Laird, 2004) (e.g. a 
snapshot from one's past experience). It includes specific instances of the 
structures that occur in STM at the same time, providing the capability to 
remember the context of past experiences as weil as the temporal relationships 
between experiences (Nuxoll and Laird, 2004). An episode is retrieved by 
generating a cue in a particular buffer in STM. The cue is then employed to 
seek -the best partial match in semantic memory, which is then retrieved into 
STM. The next episode can also be retrieved, providing the capability to replay 
an experience as a succession of retrieved episodes. Episodic memory is task­
75 Herbert. A. Simon was an American psychoJogis! whose research ranged across the fields of 
cognitive psychology, computer science, public administration, economics, management, philosophy of 
science and sociology. He was a professor al Carnegie Mellon University, Pillsburgh, PA (US). Wj[h 
nearly a thousand frequently -quoted publications, he is one of the most aulhoritative social scientists of 
the 20th century. 
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independent and therefore available for every problem, providing a memory of 
experience not available from other mechanisms. 
•	 Symbolic Long-Term Memory: Symbolic LTM contains images that can be 
retrieved into the STM, and which are encoded as production rules. See also 
4.3.2.2.3 Long-Term Memory (LTM). 
•	 Action: Action in an environment takes place through generation of motor 
commands in a buffer in STM. 
4.4.2.2 CMUA Processing Cycle 
•	 input. Users receLve stimuli through their sense organs, the five senses. 
"Stimulus from the external environment" is represented by the user 
authentication tasks (sensory information). 
•	 Perception is carried out through different perceptual processors such as visual 
memory, visual lmagery, tactile gestures, and auditory. ln visual memory 
SiteKey is an example where first you recognize a unique image you chose 
and an image title such as "Whales are fascinating creatures" that you created 
to accompany your image). ln visual imagery, an example is when a user 
visualizes a 4-digit- PIN like "2222" in his mind and associates it visually with 
swans). ln tactile gestures, a user places his finger on a device that reads the 
thumbprint), and finally in audi tory, a user gets a sound alert such as a beep or 
a tone- on her wireless device warning her that she has just received a text 
message, which includes the token code that she must authenticate with when 
using OOBA) depending on the CUITent type of user authentication task being 
performed. 
•	 Changes to perception are processed, and clustering is undertaken if needed. 
Then changes are sent to the Symbolic STM. 
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•	 Chunking, Semantic Learning, and/or tpisodic Learning are undertaken, if 
needed. Chunking, in a random IO-character password, a chunk is a symbol, 
and as Miller (1956) probably would c!aim, -the majority of people cannot 
remember ] 0 random symbols. Users are probably more certain to remember a 
IO-character pass phrase comprised of 2 or 3 words or chunks, let's say 
memorizing a passphrase (i.e. a long password with inserted spaces) such as 
"My voice is my password"). ln Semantic Learning, an emphasis is given on 
the importance of the interactive and psychological situations in which 
leaming occurs. Lcarning is identified with acquisition of knowledge (e.g. user 
is required to memorize a sequence of 4 images of the same category 
(enrollment): let's say that the category is racquet sports so this would 
represent by the following sports: badminton, racquetball, squash and tennis). 
Then when later she authenticates to the system, she is presented with a series 
of images from categories that she pre-selected mixed with images from 
random categories. After that she retrieves it from LTM by entering that 
sequence in a fixed order). Finally in Episodic Learning, a change in behavior 
takes place as a result of an event (e.g. to change a password, users enter and 
confirm a new password that is at least eight characters long and which 
inc!udes at least one number. Users cannot re-use any of their previous 
passwords). 
•	 Elaboration. Rules compute entailments of STM. For example, a rule might 
test if the goal is to grasp a hardware token, the hardware token 's distance, and 
the user's reach, and then create a structure signifying whether the hardware 
token is within reach. 
•	 Operator Application. The actions of an operator are carried out by rules that 
match the present situation and the present operator structure. Several rules can 
shoot in parallel and in sequence offering a means for encoding operator 
actions. 
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• Output (Action). Any output commands are passed on to the motor system. 
Summary of the topics discussed in Chapter 4: The Cognitive Science Axis. 
This chapter introduced the cognitive axis approach as fol1ows: Cognitive 
Ergonomies, the Main Cognitive Areas of Focus Relating to User Authentication, and 
the Cognitive Model of User Authentication (CMUA). The CMUA provides a 
relevant contribution to the understanding of what and how cognitive processes are 
involved in user authentication. On the basis of this forma!ization, CMUA is the first 
attempt to build a cognitive mode] (architecture) for user authentication. 
CHAPTER V
 
THE COMPUTER SCIENCE AXIS
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has dealt with the cognitive processes involved in user 
authentication and their application in a cognitive architecture - the Cognitive Model 
of User Authentication (CMUA). Now that we understand what the cognitive 
processes are and how they should produce responses when users authenticate to a 
system, it is time to put those cognitive processes into operation by making use of the 
Computer Science Axis. 
The Computer Science Axis is defined as one of the two-part vital holistic 
approach in conjunction with the Cognitive Science Axis to demonstrate the Usable 
Security Protocol (USP) which encompasses the USS inspection method and the 
demonstrational approach. 
Human-computer interaction (HCI) is an area of research and practice that 
emerged in the early 1980s, initially as a specialty area in Computer Science. HCI has 
expanded rapidly and steadily for three decades, attracting professionals from many 
other disciplines and incorporating diverse concepts and approaches. To a 
considerable extent, HCI now aggregates a collection of semi-distinct fields of 
research and practice in human-centered infOlmatics. 
Security has been an important quality factor in many types of computer-based 
information systems, including, for instance, authentication mechanisms, -banking 
software such the ones used in MTMs, and many others. Due to the fact that such 
systems are characterized by their user interface components, usability is also 
required. Furthermore, there is a common but false belief that security is only related 
to the software functionality and can be designed independently from the software 
usability which is related to the User Interface (Ul) component (Seffah and Metzker, 
2004). In fact, the meaning of what -a UI is and how usability is defined are perhaps 
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major underlying obstacles that explain such erroneous conceptions. Indeed, it gives 
the impression that the UI is a thin layer sitting on top of the "real" system and that 
usability can be conceived of independently from the other quality factors such as 
security. 
The Human Computer Interaction Security (HCl-SEC) research community has 
constantly been reporting the bad usability of security systems and its consequences, 
vulnerabilities, and threats (Whitten and Tygar, 1999; Stiegler et a!., 2004; Saltzer and 
Schroeder, 2000). Aiso a significant number of usability problems causing security 
failures were found in the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) study (Whitten and Tygar, 
1999), a public key encryption program mainly intended for email privacy and 
authentication. This thesis's author agrees with the idea fundamentaI1y supported by 
Whitten and Tygar (1999) that there is a need for a comprehensive model of usable 
security more specifically for user authentication methods. This model should include 
either process-and-product related usability characteristics such as effectiveness, 
efficiency, satisfaction, security, and learnability. 
Usable Security is defined in this thesis as the study of how security information 
and usability factors should be handled either in the front-end and back-end processes, 
taking into consideration resources and costs. Usable Security is imperative from the 
user's perspective (e.g., authenticating appropriately in a computer system without 
circumventing the security policy), from the developer's perspective (e.g., success or 
breakdown of a token provisioning application), and from the management's 
perspective (e.g., enforcing a strong password policy can be a major constraint to the 
usability of a system). 
Modeling is always a goal-driven activity smce every model has a purpose. 
Testing and validation (or demonstration) has to be done with the purpose of the 
model in mind. To this end, the validation phase is based on a design-driven 
demonstration of the Cognitive Model of User Authentication (CMUA) by using one 
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of the most representative authentication methods used for user authentication: One­
Time-Password (OTP). 
The Development of an Authentication Method (AM) is subject to the following 
phases: Evaluation, Definition, Development, and finally Readiness, as shown in 
Figure 5.1. 
Requiremcnts analysis 
(regulations, etc.) 
Ensure AM is
 
complete and of sufficient
 
quality, and deliver it ta the
 
Operations team for
 
release ta manufacturing.
 
AM requirements 
Document, verify, and
 
implement the
 
AM requirements.
 
Figure 5.1: Authentication Method Development Life Cycle. 
ln Step l, the "Evaluation" is made by establishing the AM Requirements Document 
(AMRD) version O.X, which is the input, and the AMRD version 1.0 which is the 
output comprised of a list of AM requirements. Next, in Step 2, the "Definition" takes 
over by defining the AM System Requirements (AMSR), a- UXD Spec O.X document, 
and the AM schedule. Then, in Step 3, the development phase proceeds by executing 
the UXD Spec version 1.0, prototyping, usability testing, and testing (i.e. Quality 
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Engineering); finally in Step 4, the Readiness phase releases the AM to manufacturing 
and market. 
5.2 Security as a UsabiJity Characteristic 
Researchers, as weil as standard organizations, have provided an additional 
perspective on usability that refers to a specifie usability characteristic, which is 
Security. Figure 5.2 lists sorne of the standards where security is included within their 
usability model as follows: 
•	 JTSEC: Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria IEC 300: It 
presents software as security-critical. 
•	 International Standards Organization (ISO) ISO/IEC 13407: It describes 
human-centered design as a multidisciplinary activity incorporating human 
factors and ergonomic and technical knowledge with the objective of raising 
efficiency and effectiveness, improving human working conditions, and 
opposing possible unfavourable effects of use on human health, security, and 
performance. 
•	 ISO/lEC 9126: It defines security, which is a sub-characteristic, as a set of 
software attributes that relate to its ability to prevent unauthorized access, 
whether accidentai or deliberate, to programs and data. 
•	 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): Security is a characteristic of the 
CHI, which is particuJarly important in an industrial context. 
These standards consider that good usability is a significant condition for human 
security in criticaJ systems, such as medical apparatus or nuclear power stations. 
Within our modeJ, this thesis adopts this perspective of security. 
The usable security community acknowledges that for a system to be secure, it 
has to be usabJe. This means that even the most secure system can fail if it is not used 
appropriately. ln Whitten and Tygar's (1998) study, the authors demonstrated that 
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usability of security has different requirements than usability of JT in gencral. As 
ah-eady mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, it is broadJy held that security and 
usability are two opposed goals in system design (Cranor and Garfinkel, 2005; Josang 
et al., 2007; Nielsen, 2000), However, there are several cases in which security and 
usability can be synergistically enhanced by reviewing the usable security approach. 
For example, improving the interface and changing the way users interact with the 
system (Yee, 2004 Nielsen, 2000; Sasse el al., 2001). Additionally, Polaris (Stiegler et 
al., 2004) allows users to configure most applications so that they launch with only the 
rights they need in order to get the job done (i.e. Principle of Least Authority), thereby 
demonstrating that it is feasible to build systems that are more secure, more 
functional, and easier to use. 
ITS EC IEC 300 
Software as 
security-critical 
FAA ISO/IEC 9126 
SECURITYCharacteristic Set of software 
AS...
of the CHI attributcs
 
ISO 13407
 
User Centered
 
Design
 
Figure 5.2: Security as a usability characteristic.
 
End-users, lT administrators, developers, and security designers are the main concern 
for the field of usable security. According to Zurko and Simon (1996), software 
developers working on UI design and evaluation lack UCD tools. Tools are needed to 
support security designers in acquiring and sharing UCD and software engineering 
best practices. This is especially the case with user authentication. USS aims to help 
security designers to design, inspect, and evaluate the usability as weil as the security 
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aspects of user authentication mechanisms. From this thesis research perspective, a 
security designer is an expert in computer security and possesses a reasonable 
understanding of the skills, mindset, and background of the users who are expected to 
perfonn an authentication task. USS integrates usable security earlier into the 
requirements and design phases of the user authentication methods development 
lifecyc1e. 
5.3 Usability Factors and lJsability Criteria Mapping 
Generally speaking, the quality of a software product is specified by its internaI 
and external capability to assist users to achieve their goals, and the organization 's 
goals, therefore improving productivity and human health. The (ISO/IEC 9126­
1:2001) standard is founded on a quality mode! for software products that consists of 
two parts: (1) external and internai quality and (2) quality in use. In brief, internaI 
quality refers to properties of the non-executable portion of a software product during 
its development, and metrics for internai quality in general refers to the quality of 
intennediary deliverables, for instance the source code for a prototype version. 
External quality in turn refers to the behavior of the computer system of which the 
software product is a part. 
To build the usability factors and usability criteria mapping, an adaptation of the 
Quality in Use lntegrated Measurement (QUIM) (Seffah et al, 2005) hierarchical 
model has been used. "Quality in use is a kind of higher-order software quality 
construct, and it concerns whether a software product enables particular users to 
achieve specified goals with effectiveness, productivity, safety, and satisfaction in a 
specifie context ofuse." 
QUIM adopts the viewpoint of most Hel standards that serve to foster quality in 
use in different factors: Usability is broken down into factors, then into criteria. For 
the purposes of this thesis, nine (9) usability factors and eight (8) usability criteria 
have been developed as follows: 
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1.	 Efficiency: the capability of the software product to provide appropriate 
performance, relative to the amount of resources used under stated conditions. 
2.	 EfJecliveness: the capability of the software product to enable users to achieve 
specified goals with accuracy and completeness in a specified context ofuse 
3.	 .Productivity: the capability of the software product to enable users to expend 
appropriate amounts of resources in relation to the effectiveness achieved in a 
specified context of use. 
4.	 Satisfaction: the capability of the software product to satisfy users ln a 
specified context of use. 
5.	 Learnability: the ease with which a user can mas ter the required features for 
achieving his or her goals. 
6.	 Safety: whether a software product limits the risk of harm to people or other 
resources. 
7.	 Trustfillness: the degree of faithfulness a software product offers to its users. 
8.	 Accessibility: the capability of a software product to be used by permanently or 
temporarily disabled persons (i.e. vision, hearing, motor, cognitive and 
language impairment). 
9.	 Universality: whether a software product accommodates a diversity of users 
(e.g., takes cultural considerations into account). 
10.	 Usefillness: the degree to which a software product actually helps to solve 
users' practicaJ problems. 
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Each factor is broken down into criteria as follows: 
1.	 Minimal Action: capability of the application to help users achieve their tasks 
in a minimum number of steps. 
2.	 Minimal Memory Load: whether a user is required to keep minimal amount of 
information in mind in order to achieve a specified task. 
3.	 Operability: amount of effort necessary to operate and control an application. 
4.	 Privacy: whether users' personal information is appropriately protected. 
s.	 Security: capability of the application to protect information and data so that 
unauthorized persons or systems cannot read or modify them and authorized 
persans or systems are not denied access. 
6.	 Load Time: time required for the application to load (i.e., how fast it responds 
to the user). 
7.	 Resource Saiety: whether resources including people are handled properly 
without any hazard. 
Consider this example to illustrate the applicability of the usability factors and 
their corresponding criteria using a MTM as shown in Table S.I. It demonstrates 9 
usability factors and 7 usability criteria. The relation between, for instance, the 
usability factor Efficiency is assumed to correspond to the criteria Minimal Action, 
Operability, Privacy, Resource Safe/y, and Minimal Memory Load. 
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5.3.1 User Authentication Use Cases 
The following user authentication use cases have been developed to serve as the task 
scenarios (Table 5.2): Authenticate to the MTM and sub-systems, Transfer funds to an 
international bank account, Buy a concert ticket, Access your MTM with your cell 
phone, Deposit your check using checking image, and finally Send a silent alarm. 
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m
m
u
n
ica
tio
n 
ch
an
ne
ls 
in 
an
 
u
n
so
lic
ite
d 
w
ay
 su
ch
 a
s 
e
a
v
e
sd
ro
pp
in
g 
(a 
m
an
-in
-th
e­
m
id
dl
e 
at
ta
ck
, w
he
re
 s
om
eo
ne
 
m
ig
ht
 c
ut
 o
ut
 a
 fe
w 
da
ta 
bl
ac
ks
 a
nd
 re
pl
ac
e 
th
em
 w
ith
 
o
th
er
 d
ata
 to
 c
ha
ng
e 
fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e 
tra
ns
ac
tio
n 
am
o
u
n
ts
); 
in
te
rr
up
tio
n 
0/
 
o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 (th
e c
ar
d 
m
ov
es
 in
 
the
 e
lec
tro
m
ag
ne
tic
 fi
eld
, t
h u
s 
the
 c
o
m
m
u
n
ica
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
the
 re
ad
er
 an
d 
the
 c
ar
d 
m
ay
 
be
 in
ter
ru
pt
ed
 a
t a
ny
 ti
m
e 
w
ith
ou
t n
ot
ice
. T
he
 u
se
r 
m
ay
 
m
ov
e 
the
 c
ar
d 
ou
t o
f t
he
 fi
eld
 
R
eq
ui
re
d 
Fe
at
ur
es
 
To
 lo
g 
in
to
 th
e 
M
TM
: 
•
	 
In
se
rt 
yo
ur
 
M
pC
C 
in 
th
e 
M
TM
's 
ca
rd
 
slo
t; 
•
 
En
te
ry
ou
r P
IN
. 
To
 a
u
th
cn
tic
at
e 
to
 
a 
m
ed
ic
al
 
in
st
itu
tio
n 
lo
gg
in
g 
o
n
 t
o 
a 
c
o
m
pu
te
r 
w
ith
 th
e 
M
pC
C:
 
•
	 
In
sc
rt 
yo
ur
 
ca
rd
 in
 th
e 
sm
ar
t 
ca
rd
 
re
ad
er
; 
•
	 
En
te
r y
ou
r 
PI
N
. 
To
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
e 
to
 
a 
fa
ci
lit
y 
(e.
g.,
 
bu
ild
in
g)
 th
at
 is
 
ph
ys
ic
al
 a
cc
es
s 
co
n
tr
ol
 w
hi
ch
 
au
th
en
tic
at
es
 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
an
d 
pe
nn
its
 a
cc
es
s 
to
 
ph
ys
ic
al
ly
 s
ec
u
re
 
ar
ea
s:
 
U
SA
B
IL
IT
Y
 
Pr
ob
le
m
 
U
se
r 
C
on
ve
ni
en
ce
 
(d
ea
lin
g 
w
ith
 
m
u
lti
pu
rp
os
e 
v
s.
 o
n
e
 
pu
rp
os
e 
sm
a
rt
 c
a
rd
s).
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 
A
n 
M
pC
C
 im
pr
ov
es
 in
 
fa
ct
 u
se
r 
c
o
n
v
e
n
ie
nc
e,
 n
o
t 
ha
vi
ng
 to
 c
a
rr
y 
se
v
e
ra
l 
c
a
rd
s 
a
n
d 
u
su
a
lly
 
m
e
m
o
ri
zi
ng
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 P
IN
 
c
o
de
s.
 H
ow
ev
er
, 
it 
ra
is
es
 
th
e 
ri
sk
 i
f t
he
 c
a
rd
 is
 l
os
t 
o
r 
ge
ts
 s
to
le
n,
 a
n
d 
a
ls
o 
if
 
th
e 
c
a
rd
 is
 f
or
go
tte
n 
by
 th
e 
c
u
st
om
er
 in
 t
he
 r
e
a
de
r o
f 
th
e 
M
T
M
. 
U
si
ng
 a
 o
n
e
 p
ur
po
se
 c
a
rd
 
is 
m
o
re
 s
e
c
u
re
, 
bu
t m
e
a
n
s 
th
e 
u
se
r 
w
ill
 n
e
e
d 
to
 c
a
rr
y 
o
n
e
 c
a
rd
 f
or
 e
a
c
h 
a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
w
hi
ch
 is
 n
o
t 
so
 
c
o
n
v
e
n
ie
nt
. 
e
m
be
dd
ed
 s
m
a
rt
 
c
a
rd
 s
e
c
u
re
 
m
ic
ro
co
nt
ro
ll
er
, 
in
te
rn
aI
 m
e
m
o
ry
 
a
n
d 
a 
sm
a
ll
 
a
n
te
nn
a 
a
n
d 
c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
es
 
w
ith
 a
 r
e
a
de
r 
th
ro
ug
h 
a 
c
o
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 R
F 
in
te
rf
ac
e.
 
•
	 
B
ri
ng
 l'
ou
r 
M
pC
C
 c
lo
se
 to
 
a 
c
a
rd
 r
e
a
de
r.
 
T
o 
de
bi
t a
n
 
a
m
o
u
n
t 
fr
om
 a
 
c
lc
ct
ro
ni
c 
pu
rs
e(
i.e
., 
th
e 
c
a
rd
 
e
a
n
 b
e 
lo
ad
ed
 
w
ith
 "
e
Je
ct
ro
ni
c"
 
v
a
lu
e 
th
at
 c
a
n
 b
e 
de
er
em
en
te
d 
a
s 
pu
re
ha
se
s 
a
re
 
m
a
de
): 
•
	 
Pa
l' 
l'o
ur
 lu
nc
h 
w
it
h 
l'o
ur
 
l1
1u
lti
pu
rp
os
e 
c
o
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 
s
m
a
lt
 c
a
rd
 in
 
th
e 
c
a
fe
te
ri
a.
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w
ith
ou
t b
ei
ng
 a
w
a
re
 o
f i
t a
n
d 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 a
n
d 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
n
e
e
d 
to
 e
n
su
re
 t
ha
t 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 c
o
m
e
 to
 a
 r
eg
ul
ar
 
en
d.
 F
or
 e
x
a
m
pl
e,
 in
 t
ic
ke
tin
g 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
, t
he
 s
ys
te
m
 n
ee
ds
 
to
 e
n
su
re
 t
he
 u
se
r 
is 
n
o
t 
c
ha
rg
ed
 tw
ic
e,
 b
ut
 a
c
tu
al
ly
 
jus
t o
n
ce
); 
c
o
v
e
r/
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 
(fr
au
du
len
t m
er
ch
an
ts
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
u
se
r'
s 
ca
rd
, t
rig
ge
rin
g 
fo
rg
ed
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 u
si
ng
 fo
rg
ed
 
re
ad
er
s. 
Fo
r e
x
a
m
pl
e,
 s
llc
h 
m
e
rc
ha
nt
s 
c
o
u
ld
 p
ro
ce
ss
 a
 
n
u
m
be
r o
f t
ra
ns
ac
tio
ns
 
in
st
ea
d 
o
f o
n
ly
 o
n
e
); 
an
d 
fin
al
ly
 d
en
ia
l a
/s
er
vi
ce
 (t
he
 
u
se
r 
an
d 
th
e 
is
su
er
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 
a
w
a
re
 o
f t
he
 d
en
ia
l o
f s
er
v
ic
e 
at
ta
ck
, i
n 
w
hi
ch
, f
or
 e
x
a
m
pl
e 
ai
l m
o
n
et
ar
y 
u
n
ils
 c
o
u
ld
 b
e 
de
bi
te
d 
fro
m
 th
e 
c
a
rd
 a
t 
a 
di
st
an
ce
, t
hu
s 
de
ny
in
g 
th
e 
u
se
r 
a
c
c
e
ss
 to
 t
he
 s
e
rv
ic
e 
s/
he
 
ha
s 
pa
id
 f
or
) 
(H
an
ds
ch
uh
20
04
). 
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U
SE
 C
A
SE
 
U
SA
B
IL
lT
Y
 
SE
C
U
R
IT
Y
 
# 
N
am
e 
Sc
en
ar
io
 
R
cq
ui
re
d 
Fc
at
ur
es
 
Pr
ob
le
m
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 
Pr
ob
le
m
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 
2 
T
ra
ns
fe
r 
C
us
to
m
er
 m
u
st
 
W
he
n 
pr
om
pt
ed
, 
W
ei
gh
ty
 
C
us
to
m
er
 h
as
 to
 d
ea
l w
ith
 
A
cc
es
s 
In
 h
ig
h-
va
lu
e 
fi
na
nc
ia
l 
fu
nd
s 
to
 a
n
 
pr
ov
e 
hi
s 
c
u
st
om
er
 p
la
ce
s 
W
or
kl
oa
d 
bo
th
 a
c
c
e
ss
 c
o
n
tr
ol
 a
n
d 
C
on
tr
ol
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 e
n
v
ir
on
m
en
t, 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
id
en
tit
y 
a
ga
in
 to
 
hi
s 
ha
nd
 o
n
 t
he
 
st
ro
ng
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n,
 th
at
 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 to
 c
o
n
tr
ol
 
ba
nk
 
pr
ot
ec
t a
c
c
e
ss
 
pa
lm
 s
c
a
n
n
e
r.
 
is,
 i
n 
th
is
 c
a
se
 t
hr
ee
-f
ac
to
r 
a
c
c
e
ss
 t
o 
se
v
e
ra
l a
re
a
s 
o
f 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t 
to
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
as
 d
es
cr
ib
ed
 
th
e 
c
a
rd
 b
ec
om
e 
se
n
si
tiv
e 
be
lo
w
: 
pr
ed
om
in
an
tly
 im
po
rt
an
t. 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 
B
io
m
et
ri
c 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
T
he
 d
eg
re
e 
o
f s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 
(i.
e.,
 
(p
alm
 sc
a
n
n
in
g)
: c
u
st
om
er
 
c
ha
ng
es
 w
i th
 t
he
 d
eg
re
e 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
is 
n
o
t 
ha
bi
tu
at
ed
 w
ith
 
o
f s
e
n
si
tiv
ity
 o
f t
he
 d
at
a 
fo
r h
ig
h-
va
lu
e 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n.
 I
n 
re
la
te
d 
to
 t
he
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n.
 
fi
na
nc
ia
l 
fa
ct
, 
th
is
 c
u
st
om
er
 h
as
 
T
he
 is
su
e 
o
f d
at
a 
se
c
u
ri
ty
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
) 
a
lr
ea
dy
 b
ee
n 
id
en
tif
ie
d 
by
 
be
co
m
es
 m
o
re
 c
o
m
pl
ex
 
th
ro
ug
h 
a 
a 
tw
o-
fa
ct
or
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
fo
r 
e
x
a
m
pl
e 
in
 a
 h
ig
h­
bi
om
et
ri
c-
ba
se
d 
m
e
th
od
 a
c
c
o
rd
in
g 
to
 t
he
 
v
a
lu
e 
fi
na
nc
ia
l 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
ta
sk
 1
. H
ow
ev
er
, h
e 
w
a
n
ts
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
be
ca
us
e 
th
e 
m
e
th
od
 
to
 p
er
fo
rm
 a
 h
ig
he
r r
is
k 
a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
re
qu
ir
es
 a
 
(S
ee
 fi
gu
re
s 
in
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
so
 c
u
st
om
er
 h
as
 
di
ff
er
en
t l
ev
el
 o
f 
th
e 
n
e
x
t 
pa
ge
). 
to
 p
ro
ve
 a
ga
in
 h
is
 i
de
nt
ity
 
se
c
u
ri
ty
. S
om
e 
to
 t
he
 s
ys
te
m
. 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 m
a
y 
re
qu
ir
e 
n
o
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
; o
th
er
s 
m
a
y 
be
 s
u
ff
ic
ie
nt
ly
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
 
by
 a
 P
IN
; o
th
er
s 
m
a
y 
re
qu
ir
e 
th
e 
u
se
 o
f 
bi
om
et
ri
cs
 to
 p
ro
te
ct
 
a
c
c
e
ss
 t
o 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
ly
 
se
n
si
tiv
e 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 
w
hi
ch
 is
 t
he
 c
a
se
 h
er
e.
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Th
us
, c
o
n
tr
ol
 o
f a
c
c
e
ss
 to
 
re
so
u
rc
e
s 
in
 a
 s
ys
te
m
 is
 
an
 i
m
po
rt
an
t f
ea
tu
re
 in
 
o
rd
er
 to
 p
ro
vi
de
 in
te
gr
ity
, 
c
o
n
fi
de
nt
ia
lit
y 
a
n
d 
a
v
a
ila
bi
lit
y,
 c
o
n
si
st
in
g 
o
f 
tw
o 
pa
rts
: 
v
e
ri
fy
in
g 
th
e 
c
la
im
ed
 id
en
tit
y 
o
f t
he
 
c
u
st
om
er
 (a
ut
he
nt
ica
tio
n)
 
a
n
d 
th
er
ea
fte
r, 
gi
ve
 a
 
pr
op
er
ly
au
th
en
tic
at
ed
 
c
u
st
om
er
 a
c
c
e
ss
 t
o 
th
e 
rig
ht
 re
so
u
rc
e
 
(a
ut
ho
riz
ati
on
) w
hi
ch
 th
is
 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 o
n
e
 h
as
 
re
st
ric
te
d 
a
c
c
e
ss
 (i
.e.
, 
tr
an
sf
er
 fu
nd
s 
to
 a
n
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
c
c
o
u
n
t).
 
2 
27
0
 
C
on
tin
ue
dfr
om
 #
 2.
 
# 
N
am
e 
M
T
M
 w
ith
 a
 
pa
lm
 s
c
a
n
n
e
r 
e
m
be
dd
ed
 in
 
th
e 
so
ft
w
ar
e 
(tû
 
th
e 
ri
gh
t o
n
 t
he
 
sc
re
e
n
). 
M
T
M
 w
ith
 a
 
pa
lm
 s
c
a
n
n
e
r 
pl
ac
ed
 û
ut
si
de
 
th
e 
M
T
M
 (o
n 
th
e 
rig
ht
). 
U
SA
B
lL
IT
Y
 
R
eq
ui
re
d 
Fe
at
ur
es
 
Pr
ob
le
m
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 
SE
C
U
R
IT
Y
 
Pr
ob
le
m
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 
In
 f
ac
t, 
w
e 
ad
d 
th
e 
bi
om
et
ric
 
fe
at
ur
e 
as
 a
n
o
th
er
 se
cu
rit
y 
la
ye
r t
o 
th
e 
CU
IT
en
t s
ys
te
m
. 
Th
e 
Pa
lm
 R
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
au
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
 is
 b
ui
ld
 
up
 a
ro
u
n
d 
ta
ki
ng
 a
 th
re
e 
di
m
en
sio
na
l v
ie
w
 o
f t
he
 h
an
d 
in 
o
rd
er
 to
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
ge
om
et
ry
 a
n
d 
m
et
ric
s 
o
f s
u
ch
 
v
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
s 
le
ng
th
 a
n
d 
th
ic
kn
es
s 
o
f f
in
ge
rs
. 
H
ow
 it
 
w
o
rk
s?
 F
irs
t, 
an
 i
nf
ra
re
d 
sc
an
 
is 
ta
ke
n 
o
f t
he
 v
ei
ns
 o
n 
th
e 
cu
st
om
er
's
 p
al
m
, a
n
d 
th
e 
da
ta
 
fro
m
 th
e 
sc
an
 is
 s
to
re
d 
in 
an
 
In
te
gr
at
ed
 C
irc
ui
t (
IC
) c
hi
p 
em
be
dd
ed
 in
 lh
e 
ca
sh
 c
ar
d,
 o
r 
di
re
ct
ly
 a
l t
he
 M
TM
 b
io
m
et
ric
 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
. W
he
n 
u
si
ng
 th
e 
A
TM
, t
he
 c
u
st
om
er
 p
la
ce
s 
hi
s 
ha
nd
 o
n
 t
he
 p
al
m
 s
ca
n
n
er
, 
w
hi
ch
 v
er
ifi
es
 w
he
th
er
 th
e 
pa
tte
m
 o
f v
ei
ns
 m
at
ch
es
 lh
at
 
st
or
ed
 o
n
 t
he
 c
ar
d 
o
r 
in 
th
e 
M
TM
. 
H
an
d 
ge
om
et
ry
 c
an
 o
n
ly
 b
e 
u
se
d 
fo
r 
v
er
ifi
ca
tio
n.
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U
SE
 C
A
SE
 
U
SA
B
lL
IT
Y
 
SE
C
U
R
lT
Y
 
# 
N
am
e 
Sc
en
ar
io
 
R
eq
ui
re
d 
Fe
at
ur
es
 
Pr
ob
le
m
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 
Pr
ob
le
m
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 
3 
B
uy
 a
 t
ic
ke
t 
A
fte
r t
he
 
•
 
C
lic
k 
o
n
 
C
um
be
rs
om
 
C
us
to
m
er
 h
as
 to
 e
n
te
r 
Se
ns
iti
ve
 
Sh
ou
ld
 th
e 
c
u
st
om
er
 
c
o
n
c
e
li
 
c
u
st
om
er
 h
as
 
"
B
uy
a 
e 
u
se
r 
in
pu
t 
se
n
si
tiv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 h
er
e 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
e
n
te
r 
se
n
si
tiv
e 
m
ad
e 
a 
ba
nk
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n,
 s
he
 
de
ci
de
s 
to
 b
uy
 a
 
co
n
ce
rt
 ti
ck
et
 th
at
 
sh
e 
ha
s j
us
t s
ee
n
 
in 
th
e 
"
B
uy
 a
 
Co
nc
er
t T
ic
ke
t t
o 
C
on
ce
rt
 
T
ic
ke
t t
o 
"
T
he
 C
ur
e"
 
T
od
ay
!"
 
se
ss
IO
n;
 
•
 
Se
le
ct
 th
e 
re
qu
ir
em
en
t 
s 
th
e 
c
re
di
t c
a
rd
 n
u
m
be
r,
 
e
a
c
h 
tim
e 
sh
e 
pu
rc
ha
se
s 
a 
c
o
n
c
e
rt
 t
ic
ke
t. 
lt
 d
oe
s 
n
o
t 
pr
ov
id
e 
c
o
n
v
e
n
ie
nc
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
c
u
st
om
er
. 
T
he
 
c
u
st
om
er
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 a
bl
e 
to
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
o
n
ly
 a
t 
re
gi
st
ra
tio
n 
o
r 
e
a
c
h 
tim
e 
a 
c
o
n
c
e
rt
 t
ic
ke
t i
s 
pu
rc
ha
se
d?
 T
he
 fi
rs
t 
m
e
th
od
 m
a
ke
s 
a 
"
o
n
e
­
c
lic
k 
fe
at
ur
e"
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 
"
Th
e 
C
ur
e!
" 
n
u
m
be
r 
o
f 
e
n
te
r 
se
n
si
tiv
e 
in
fO
lm
at
io
n 
m
e
a
n
in
g 
th
e 
c
u
st
om
er
 
se
ss
io
n 
at
 t
he
 
se
a
ts
; 
o
n
ly
 a
t 
re
gi
st
ra
tio
n.
 
o
n
ly
 h
as
 to
 s
e
le
ct
 a
n
 
M
TM
. T
hi
s 
•
 
Se
le
ct
 y
om
 
o
pt
io
n 
to
 o
rd
er
 th
e 
tic
ke
t, 
cu
st
om
er
 h
as
 
c
re
di
t c
a
rd
 
pr
ov
id
in
g 
c
o
n
v
e
n
ie
nc
e 
al
re
ad
y 
bo
ug
ht
 a
 
co
n
ce
rt
 t
ic
ke
t 
fro
m
 a
n 
M
TM
 
o
n
ce
. 
A
t t
ha
t 
tim
e,
 s
he
 e
n
te
re
d 
se
n
si
tiv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
su
ch
 
br
an
d;
 
T
ap
 y
ou
r
•
 
c
re
di
t c
a
rd
 
n
u
m
be
r;
 
•
 
T
ap
 c
re
di
t 
c
a
rd
's
 m
o
n
th
 
fo
r 
he
r. 
N
ev
er
th
el
es
s 
th
e 
se
c
o
n
d 
m
e
th
od
 is
 m
u
c
h 
be
tte
r 
fr
om
 a
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e,
 b
ut
 
re
qu
es
tin
g 
m
o
re
 a
c
tiv
ity
 
o
n
 t
he
 c
u
st
om
er
 p
ar
t. 
as
 h
er
 c
re
di
t c
ar
d 
a
n
d 
ye
ar
 o
f 
n
u
m
be
r b
ef
or
e 
to
 
e
x
pi
ra
tio
n.
 
bu
y 
th
e 
tic
ke
t. 
H
ow
ev
er
, n
o
w
 
th
e 
M
TM
 
re
qu
es
ts
 a
ga
in
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
c
u
st
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5.3.2 Demonstrating the USS using a Muitifunction Teller Machine 
The good old ATM cannot defeat what this thesis designates as the new 
Multifunction Te lier machine (MTM) in several aspects especially in the 
"transaction" factor. Being capable to perform up to 150 kinds of transactions 
ranging from straightforward cash withdrawals and deposits to fund transfer, to 
trading in stocks, to purchasing mutual funds or to cash a check using check imaging, 
to something as ordinary as processing the payment of electricity bills, booking air­
tickets, purchasing concert tickets and making hotel reservations. A MTM is in 
effect the next generation of an ATM, fully integrated cross-bank MTM network 
providing functionalities which are not straightforwardly associated to the 
management of one's own bank account, such as loading monetary value into pre­
paid cards (e.g., cell phones, tolls, service and shopping payments, etc.). Aiso the 
MTMs can provide advanced authentication capabilities such as palm recognition. 
To illustrate how USS can be applied in a real world application, and how the 
USS elements such as usability and security factors were selected and determined for 
the MTM example, this thesis depicts one of the use cases described in the previous 
section: a three-factor authentication which is "Transfer funds to an international 
bank account". The USS has been applied to determine which type of authentication 
method should be used for this particular use case. 
A user, Bob, needs to transfer US$5,000 to an international account by dealing 
either with access control and strong authentication. He first authenticates himself to 
the MTM using a smart card and a PIN (the bank PIN policy states that a PIN must 
have 4 digits and I letter). In high-value financial transactions environment, 
procedures to control access to several areas of the card become predominantly 
important. The degree of security changes with the degree of sensitivity of the data 
related to the application. The issue of data security becomes more complex in a 
high-value financial transaction because the application requires another layer of 
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security to the current system: Biometries. As this represents a high- value 
transaction, the MTM asks for Bob to prave again his identity. So in addition to the 
bank card and PIN, Bob must employ a biometric authentication such as palm 
recogni~sm - a multiple factor authentication. 
5.4 The Usable Security Symmetry (USS) Inspection Method 
The goal of making a system secure and usable will be successful only if it is a 
pre-hoc consideration. This strengthens the argument made by other Hel-SEC 
researchers (Balfanz et al., 2004; Flechais et al., 2003; Yee, 2004) that security and 
usability must be developed in unison from conception right through to deveJopment 
as an integral part of the system if they are ever to align perfectly. This thesis's 
author agrees with Yee (2006) that security and usability not only must be ta ken into 
consideration early and iteratively, but also toge/her. According to Yee (2006), 
integrated iterative design means iterative development processes based on repeated 
analysis, design, and evaluation cycles, rather than Iinear processes in which security 
or usability testing occurs at the end. Although many teams have adopted iterative 
processes, few seem to incorporate security and usability throughout. Not only is it 
important to examine these issues early and often, it is vital to design the Ul and 
security measures together. lterating offers the opportunity to see how security and 
usability decisions affect each other. Moreover, since usabJe security requires UI 
design priorities that are not similar as those of universal consumer software, it 
should also require usability evaluation methods that are appropriate to security. 
Standard usability evaluation methods possibly will treat security functions as if they 
were primai)' rather than secondary goals for the user, leading to f1awed conclusions. 
Symmetry also plays an important role in understanding the framework of the 
USS and how it has been built. Among a variety of definitions of symmetry, a 
generalized concept of the term has been adopted which is defined as follows: 
"Symmetry is a relationship of characteristic correspondence, equivalence, or 
277 
identity among constiruents of an entity or between different entities,,76. The entities 
are defined as security and usability, and the mentioned relationship is the final 
outcome which is the usable security. Another (notable) definition which relates to 
the definition of Symmetry for the purposes of this thesis is from Weyl (1952) who 
states that: "Symmetry, as wide or as narrow as you may define its meaning, is one 
idea by which man through the ages has tried to comprehend and create order, 
beauty, and perfection." The word, order, is in fact a synonym of harmony. The 
utmost goal is that security and usability will no more be two separate entities, but 
will work in harmony to produce secure and easy to use authentication methods. 
5.4.1 Definition 
USS is a usable security inspection method which involves having a group of 
evaluators -systematically examine a user interface and judge its compliance with 
security and usability principles. Interface is regarded, in this thesis, as both software 
(e.g. user login Web page) and hardware components (e.g. authentication token as 
shown in Figure 2-13) toward- which the interactionlinformation transits between 
software and/or hardware components, networks, and users. 
USS can be used to guide a design decision or to assess a design that has 
already been created. It integrates usable security earlier into the requirements and 
design phase which helps security designers make more informed and therefore 
better decisions, and influence the design in its early stage when traditionally the 
bulk of the feature design is done. 
As USS provides very specifie and practical reVlew questions (not general 
ones), it is common to unfold issues and as weil opportunities for feature 
improvement other than only those related to security and usability. This can be 
76 The Free Dictionary by Fm·lex. 2010. <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/symmetr>. Retrieved on 
July 29, 2010. 
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helpful when designing an authenrication method and it is in fact much appreciated 
given that we are talking about a computer security application. 
According to Nielsen (1992), usability specialists were much better than those 
without usability expertise at finding usability problems by heuristic evaluation. 
Moreover, usability specialists with specific expertise (e.g., security) did much better 
than regular usability specialists without such expertise, especially with regard to 
certain usability problems that were unique to that kind of interface. Thus, USS is 
developed as a usable security inspection method for system designers (acting also as 
evaluators) who have knowledge 111 computer security (especially user 
authentication), and a general knowledge ofusability techniques and requirements. 
5.4.2 Usable Security Protocol (USP) Sub-Methodology 
The USS inspection method is the sub-methodology within the Usable Security 
Protocol Methodology (USP), therefore continuing on from the work done in Section 
4.2 The USP Methodology, which details step by step how the USS is created and 
generated, including goals, Jogistics, and the content behind each step. Also it shows 
how the USP methodology brings together the cognitive and computer science 
approaches to finally generate, as the outcome, the design requirements inspection 
method tool for the design of user authentication methods: the Usable Security 
Symmetry. 
5.4.2.1 Usable Security Symmetry (USS) Inspection Method 
USS is a checklist-based inspection method. A checklist IS a valuable 
evaluation method when carefully developed and applied. A robust evaluation 
checklist clarifies the criteria that as a minimum should be considered when 
evaluating something in a particular area; aids the evaluator not to forget key criteria; 
and final1y enhances the assessment's impartiality, reliability, and reproducibility. 
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Another relevant benefit of employing checklists lies in the fact that they offer 
an organizational framework for quick recal1 of critical information and current best 
practices. 
Such a checklist is useful in the authentication method life cycle process such 
as planning an authentication method, monitoring and guiding its operation, and 
assessing its outcomes. 
Moreover, checklists are useful for both formative and summative evaluations 
(Stufflebeam, 2000). USS makes use of the Formative eva/uation, which is a process 
of ongoing feedback on performance. The purposes are to specify aspects of 
performance that need improvement and to provide corrective suggestions. 
Summative evaluation in turn is a process of specifying larger patterns and trends in 
perf0l111ance, and judging these review statements against criteria to get performance 
ratings. 
A snapshot of the USS checklist short form is shown below. Depending on the 
evaluation been carried out, the checklist can be quite long, so that users should be 
able to collapse or expand each checklist item (e.g., # 1.3), thereby facilitating results 
data visualization (Table 5.3). 
The long form checklist will show aIl rows expanded as can be seen in the next 
paragraphs. 
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The sub-methodology is described as follows: 
•	 Project Lead activities: 
o	 Identify and define the usability criteria that will be used to evaluate 
the authentication method. 
o	 Identify one (or up to 5) security designers and/or usabili ty 
professionals to examine the system on an individual basis. 
o	 Gather materials that facilitate the evaluators to become familiar with 
the purpose of the system and of its users (e.g., system specification, 
user tasks, use case scenarios, etc). 
o	 Gather and analyze primary, secondary, and tertiary data available for 
building the inspection method. 
•	 Development activities: 
o	 Develop the usability Review Questions m conjunction with the 
Occurrences. 
•	 Asking questions is a crucial component of finding infonnation. 
The questioning method adopted for USS is a combination of 
Review and Survey Questions which has been named for the 
purposes of this thesis, a Review Question. A Review Question 
presents users with a question or statement to which they 
answer using a predefined set of scales (see Occurrences 
section beJow). The goal of the Review Question is to sum up 
and ask for agreement or otherwise. 
•	 The Review Questions should be developed by taking into 
account the following quality guidelines: 
i)	 Ensure each Review Question IS completed 
properly with the ultimate goal of providing 
usable security for user authentication. 
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ii)	 Make certain that the Review Question is 
pertinent to each specifie - usability criterion 
(e.g. Review Question: Minimal action - Has the 
requirement of data entry by the user been 
limited when the data can he derived hy the 
application or hrowser?); 
iii)	 lnclude the cognitive process involved, 
implicitly or explicitly; 
iv)	 ldentify particuJar error-prone areas (e.g. 
Review Question: Minimal Action - Should PINs 
longer than 6 digits he avoided?); 
v)	 Utilize nomenclature well-known in the domain 
(Computer Security and Usability) for efficient 
communication; 
vi)	 Consider the expertise of the Computer Security 
and/or Usability experts (i.e. target user). 
o	 Occurrences are represented by the following letters: Y (Yes), N (No), 
and NA. Y (Y es) represents that the authentication method being 
reviewed for example complies with the Usability Review question; N 
(No) represents that the authentication method does not comply with 
the Usability Review question; and finally, NA (Not Applicable) 
represents that the Usability Review question doesn't apply for that 
particular authentication method. The default value for the Occurrences 
fields is empty (none). 
•	 Each Occurrence has a specifie value field that has to be filled 
out with a symbol when applicable. For example if the 
authentication method does comply with the Usability Review 
question then a symbol has to be entered in the Y field, and- the 
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N and NA fields are left blank. It is important to note that the 
importance of visual effectiveness on the inspection method: 
The- appearance of information and the use of visual 
characteristics can influence largely the effectiveness of the 
inspection method. Therefore, it is recommended to use a 
colored square in the Occurrences value fields for easier data 
visualization: green for Y, red for N, and gray for NA. For 
visually impaired evaluators sorne alternatives are the use of 
gray scales, check marks, or even numbers. 
o	 Create a Comments column. Include in this column any comments 
needed. If there are no comments, include a dash "-" (or any other sign 
meaning "no data") within the respective field since leaving it blank 
may mislead evaluators into thinking that data are missing. 
•	 Evaluating the system: 
o	 Review the materials provided to familiarize with the system design. If 
possible carry out the user actions that will be taken to perform the user 
tasks. 
o	 Identify and list any areas of the system that might be opposed to the 
usability principles. List ail of the concerns that you note in the 
Comments fields. 
•	 Showing the outcome: 
o	 The main outcome of the USS is a list of usability and security 
problems in the interface with references to those usability criteria and 
security aspects (See Sections 5.4.2.2.1.1 Usability Severity Ratings 
and Recommendations for MTM Study Case and 5.4.2.2.2.1 Security 
Severity Ratings and Recommendations for MTM Study Case). 
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•	 Analyzing the results: 
o	 Review each of the concerns that have been written down ln the 
checklist evaluated. 
o	 Assess and judge each concern for its compliance with your defined 
criterion. 
o	 Allocate a severity level for each grouped concern based on the impact 
to the end-user (See section 5.4.2.2 Severity Ratings). 
o	 Establish recommendations to fix the problem. Ensure that each 
recommendation relates to the criterion. 
o	 If needed, finally, use a holistic approach to revlew aU 
recommendations and verify that there are no major (or none at al!) 
conflicts among them. If any, make an assessment and implement only 
those recommendations that address high-priority functional system 
requirements as defined by your stakeholders. 
The output of the USS inspection method is a list of usability and security probJems
 
and their severity ratings (and their recommendations), which will be described in the
 
next paragraphs. But before addressing the severity ratings, the USS inspection
 
method checklist is shown in Table 5.4. Usable Security Symmetry checklist.
 
Abbreviations used in the inspection method:
 
AM = Authentication Method.
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a 
si
ng
le
 k
ey
 s
tr
ok
e 
a
n
d 
re
o
pe
ne
d 
by
 
e
n
te
ri
ng
 a
 f
ou
r­
di
gi
t P
IN
. 
H
ow
ev
er
 th
e 
a
dv
an
ta
ge
 o
f t
he
 
EP
 is
 r
e
a
lly
 in
 i
ts 
c
o
m
pa
ri
so
n 
w
ith
 
c
a
sh
: 
o
n
c
e
 u
se
rs
 
ha
ve
 o
bt
ai
ne
d 
th
ei
r c
a
sh
 f
ro
m
 a
 
M
T
M
, a
n
yo
ne
 
c
a
n
 s
pe
nd
 it
. 
29
1 
1.
9	 
A
re
 th
e 
ite
m
s 
di
sp
la
ye
d 
su
c
c
in
ct
ly
 (i
.e.
, s
ho
rt
er
 re
a
di
ng
 
tim
es
, s
m
a
lle
r e
rr
o
rs
)?
 
l.I
O
	 
Is 
th
e 
pa
ss
w
or
d 
u
sa
bl
e 
(i.
e.,
 
m
e
a
n
in
gf
ul
 a
n
d 
c
o
n
c
a
te
na
te
 
/in
te
rs
pe
rs
ed
 w
o
rd
s 
w
/ 
c
ha
ra
ct
er
s)?
 
l.
it
	 
Is 
a 
pa
11
ic
ul
ar
 c
u
e
 g
iv
en
 to
 u
se
rs
 
fo
r r
e
m
e
m
be
ri
ng
 p
as
sw
or
ds
? 
1 
Th
is
 d
ep
en
ds
 o
n
 
a 
pr
ed
ef
in
ed
 
pa
ss
w
or
d 
po
lic
y.
 
U
se
rs
 c
a
n
 
c
ho
os
e 
a 
m
e
a
n
in
gf
ul
 a
n
d 
c
o
n
c
a
te
na
te
 
pa
ss
w
or
d 
as
 
lo
ng
 a
s 
it 
re
sp
ec
ts
 th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 
pa
ss
w
or
d 
po
lic
y.
 1 
A
re
 r
e
qu
ire
d 
ite
m
s 
a
ss
o
c
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 s
e
n
si
tiv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ke
pt
 
to
 a
 m
in
im
um
? 
D
o 
pa
ss
w
or
ds
 fo
llo
w
 s
tr
ic
t
 
se
c
u
ri
ty
 p
ol
ic
ie
s?

 
A
re
 te
xt
fi
el
d'
 p
os
tla
be
ls
 th
at
 
pr
ov
id
e 
tip
s 
fo
r 
re
m
e
m
be
ri
ng
 
pa
ss
w
or
ds
 a
n
d 
PI
N
s 
a
v
o
id
ed
? 
Il
 
fi 
1 
1 
B
as
ic
al
ly
 
u
se
rn
a
m
e
 a
n
d 
e
m
a
il 
a
dd
re
ss
 a
re
 
re
qu
ire
d.
 
Pa
ss
w
or
d 
po
lic
y 
re
qu
ir
es
 a
 s
tr
on
g 
pa
ss
w
or
d 
w
hi
ch
 
m
u
st
 c
o
n
ta
in
 a
t 
le
as
t e
ig
ht
 
c
ha
ra
ct
er
s,
 o
n
e
 
u
pp
er
ca
se
 
a
lp
ha
be
t (
A-
Z)
, 
o
n
e
 lo
w
er
ca
se
 
a
lp
ha
be
t (
a-
z)
, 
o
n
e
 A
ra
bi
c 
n
u
m
e
ra
l (
0-
9)
, 
o
n
e
 n
o
n
­
a
lp
ha
nu
m
er
ic
 
c
ha
ra
ct
er
 
e
x
c
lu
di
ng
 @
 ~.
 
W
he
n 
c
re
a
tin
g 
a 
pa
ss
w
or
d,
 a
 li
nk
 
is 
di
sp
la
ye
d 
su
c
h 
as
 W
ha
t's
 a
 v
a
lid
 
pa
ss
w
or
d?
 n
e
x
t 
to
 t
he
 p
as
sw
or
d 
fie
ld
. 
W
he
n
 u
se
rs
 
m
o
u
se
o
v
e
rs
 it
 a
 
po
p 
w
in
do
w
 
29
2 
1. 
J 2
 
Is
 S
in
gl
e 
Si
gn
-O
n 
lo
gi
n 
sy
st
em
 
u
se
d?
 
1 
A
s 
m
e
n
tio
ne
d,
 
m
e
m
o
ra
bi
lit
y 
is 
A
re
 s
tr
on
g 
pa
ss
w
or
ds
 u
se
d?
 
fu
rt
he
r 
im
pr
ov
ed
 
by
 th
e 
u
se
 o
f 
m
n
e
m
o
n
ic
s 
to
 
ai
d 
th
ei
r r
e
c
a
ll.
 
In
te
ro
pe
ra
bi
lit
y 
is 
v
e
ry
 d
if
fi
cu
lt 
fo
r 
n
o
w
. 
sh
ow
s 
u
p 
a
n
d 
di
sp
la
y 
th
e 
pa
ss
w
or
d 
po
lic
y.
 
So
m
et
im
es
 a
 
re
m
in
de
r o
f w
ha
t 
th
e 
po
lic
y 
is 
di
sp
la
ye
d 
in
 
si
ng
le
 o
n
e
 
se
n
te
nc
e 
n
e
x
t 
to
 
th
e 
te
xt
fi
el
d.
 
W
he
n 
u
se
rs
 l
og
 
in
to
 th
e 
a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
to
 
bu
y 
a 
c
o
n
c
e
rt
 
tic
ke
t w
hi
ch
 
re
qu
ir
es
 2
nd
­
le
ve
l 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n,
 
th
ey
 w
i 11
 f
ir
st
 
n
e
e
d 
to
 c
o
m
pl
et
e 
ls
t-
le
ve
l 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
as
 
th
ey
 n
o
rm
a
lly
 d
o 
by
 u
si
ng
 th
ei
r 
sm
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 a
n
d 
PI
N
. 
A
ft
er
 
su
c
c
e
ss
fu
l 
fir
st
­
le
ve
l 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n,
 
29
3 
u
se
rs
 a
re
 
pr
om
pt
ed
 to
 
pr
es
en
t t
he
ir 
pa
lm
s 
1(b
io
me
tri
cs
) t
o 
c
o
m
pl
et
e 
th
e 
2n
d 
le
ve
lo
f 
1.
13
 
H
as
 th
e 
re
qu
ir
em
en
t o
f d
at
a 
e
n
tr
y 
bl
' t
he
 u
se
r 
be
in
g 
lim
ite
d 
1 
O
nl
y 
fo
r 
2"
J _
lev
el 
au
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
Is
 t
he
 u
se
 o
f d
ef
au
lt 
"
c
o
o
ki
es
"s
, 
a
v
o
id
ed
 w
he
n 
u
si
ng
 1
-f
ac
to
r 
Il 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n.
 
St
or
in
g 
c
re
de
nt
ia
ls
 in
 a
 
w
he
n 
th
e 
da
ta
 c
a
n
 b
e 
de
riv
ed
 b
l' 
th
e 
a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
o
r 
br
ow
se
r?
 
w
he
re
 o
n
e 
o
f t
he
 
di
ff
er
en
t t
yp
es
 o
f 
au
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
m
et
ho
ds
 w
ill
 b
c 
pr
es
en
te
d 
to
 u
se
rs
 
si
nc
c 
th
ey
 a
re
 
ac
ce
ss
ll1
g 
"
ex
te
rn
al
" 
o
n
lin
e 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
(e.
g.,
 
u
se
m
a
m
e
/p
as
sw
or
d)
 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
m
e
th
od
? 
1 
de
fa
ul
t c
o
o
ki
e 
ha
s 
th
e 
di
sa
dv
an
ta
ge
 th
at
 
e
v
e
ry
on
e 
w
ho
 
ha
s 
a
c
c
e
ss
 t
o 
th
e 
M
T
M
 a
n
d 
ha
s 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
a
bo
ut
 
W
eb
 a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
. 
it 
c
a
n
 v
e
ry
 e
a
si
ll'
 
M
os
t c
o
m
m
o
n
 is
 
se
e
 t
he
 u
se
r'
s 
U
sc
l1
1a
m
e/ 
pa
ss
w
or
d 
bl
' 
Pa
ss
w
or
d:
 u
su
al
ly
 
lo
ok
in
g 
at
 t
he
 
it 
sa
v
es
 
st
or
ed
 c
o
o
ki
es
. 
cr
ed
en
tia
ls
 in
 a
 
co
o
ki
e 
so
 u
se
r 
do
es
n'
t n
ee
d 
to
 
lo
gi
n 
cv
cr
y 
tim
e 
br
ow
sc
r c
lo
se
s. 
81
 
A
 c
o
o
ki
e 
is 
a 
sm
all
 p
iec
e 
o
f t
ex
l 
slo
re
d 
on
 
a 
u
se
r's
 c
o
m
pu
ter
 b
y 
a 
w
eb
 b
ro
ws
er
. 
[1 
co
n
sis
ts 
o
f o
ne
 o
r 
m
or
e 
n
am
e-
v
alu
e 
pa
irs
 c
o
n
ta
in
in
g 
bi
ts 
o
f 
in
fo
rm
ati
on
 s
uc
h 
as
 u
se
r 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
s, 
sh
op
pi
ng
 c
ar
t c
o
n
te
nt
s,
 t
he
 id
en
tif
ier
 fo
r a
 s
er
v
er
-b
as
ed
 se
ss
io
n,
 o
r 
o
th
er
 d
ata
 u
se
d 
by
 w
eb
sit
es
. 
29
4 
1.
14
 
D
oe
s 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 s
pe
ed
 d
at
a 
e
n
tr
y 
by
 s
e
tt
in
g 
de
fa
ul
t v
a
lu
es
? 
li 
A
lth
ou
gh
 d
ef
au
lt 
v
a
lu
es
 a
re
 
A
re
 d
ef
au
lt 
v
a
lu
es
 a
v
o
id
ed
 
e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 fo
r s
e
n
si
tiv
e 
Il
 
A
lth
ou
gh
 d
ef
au
lt 
v
a
lu
es
 a
re
 
di
ff
er
en
t t
ha
n 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
(e.
g. 
u
se
rn
a
m
e
 a
n
d 
di
ff
er
en
t t
ha
n 
u
si
ng
 a
 c
o
o
ki
e 
pa
ss
w
or
d)
? 
1 
u
si
ng
 a
 c
o
o
ki
e 
fo
r 
u
se
rn
a
m
e
 
fo
r 
u
se
rn
a
m
e
 a
n
d 
a
n
d 
pa
ss
w
or
d 
it 
pa
ss
w
or
d 
it 
is 
is 
so
m
e
w
ha
t 
so
m
e
w
ha
t r
e
la
te
d 
1.
15
 
D
oe
s 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 a
c
c
o
m
m
o
da
te
 
bo
th
 e
x
pe
ri
en
ce
d 
a
n
d 
n
o
v
ic
e 
u
se
rs
 (e
.g.
, s
ho
rt
 c
u
ts
 a
re
 
a
v
a
ila
bl
e 
to
 e
x
pe
ri
en
ce
d 
u
se
rs
)?
 
r 1 
t 1 
t 
re
la
te
d 
to
 1
.1
4 
A
ft
er
 e
n
te
ri
ng
 
PI
N
 a
t 
th
e 
M
T
M
 
e
x
pe
rt
 u
se
rs
 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 c
lic
k 
di
re
ct
ly
 o
n
 t
he
 
"
Fa
st
 C
as
h"
 
(sh
or
t c
u
t) 
A
re
 s
u
c
c
in
ct
 e
n
·o
r 
m
e
ss
a
ge
s 
di
sp
la
ye
d 
fo
r 
n
o
v
ic
e 
u
se
rs
 
a
v
o
id
in
g 
se
ri
ou
s 
e
rr
o
rs
? 
fi 
+
 
1 ,
 
to
 1
.1
4 
Su
cc
in
ct
 e
rr
o
r 
m
e
ss
a
ge
s 
a
re
 
di
sp
la
ye
d 
fo
r 
bo
th
 n
o
v
ic
e 
a
n
d 
e
x
pe
rt
 u
se
rs
. 
bu
tto
n 
in
st
ea
d 
o
f 
"
E
nt
er
" 
to
 
c
o
m
pl
et
e 
th
e 
1 
1 
lo
gi
n 
pr
oc
es
s.
 
N
ov
ic
e 
u
se
rs
 
1 
1 
l. 
16
 
A
re
 P
IN
s 
lo
ng
er
 th
an
 6
 d
ig
its
 
a
v
o
id
ed
? 
+. 
t Il
 
1 •
 
u
su
a
lly
 c
lic
k 
o
n
 
"
E
nt
er
" 
fir
st
. 
4-
di
gi
t P
IN
. 
D
oe
s 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 u
se
 w
e
a
k 
PI
N
 
c
ha
ng
e 
pr
ot
oc
ol
s?
 
1 
U
se
rs
 c
irC
lIm
ve
nl
 
PI
N
 f
or
ge
tfu
ln
es
s 
th
ro
llg
h 
in
se
cl
ire
 
be
ha
vi
or
s 
(e.
g.,
 
w
rit
in
g 
do
w
n 
th
ei
r 
PI
N
s, 
m
ak
e 
th
em
 a
il 
th
e 
sa
m
e,
 o
r 
di
sc
lo
se
 
th
em
 to
 f
rie
nd
s 
an
d 
fa
m
ily
). 
29
5 
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 1
A
re
 P
IN
s 
e
m
pl
oy
ed
 m
o
st
ly
 fo
r 
fr
eq
ue
nt
ly
 u
se
d 
sy
st
em
s 
(in
fre
qu
en
tly
 us
e
d 
PI
N
s 
a
re
 t
he
 
o
n
e
s 
th
at
 a
re
 m
o
st
 o
ft
en
 
fo
rg
ot
te
n)
? 
1.
18
 1
 D
oe
s 
th
e 
sm
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 p
ro
vi
de
 
Il
in
te
ro
pe
ra
bi
lit
y 
a
c
ro
ss
 s
e
rv
ic
es
? 
1.
19
	 
If
 u
se
rs
 m
u
st
 s
w
itc
h 
be
tw
ee
n 
di
ff
er
en
t s
ys
te
m
s 
a
re
 d
ua
l­
in
te
rf
ac
é2
 c
hi
p 
sm
a
rt
 c
a
rd
s8
3 
u
se
d?
 
4-
di
gi
t P
IN
 is
 
A
re
 s
m
a
rt
 c
a
rd
s 
u
se
d 
in
 
u
se
d.
 
c
o
n
jun
cti
on
 w
ith
 P
IN
 to
 p
ro
vi
de
 
st
ro
ng
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n?
 
U
se
rs
 s
o
m
e
tim
es
] H
as
 th
e 
u
se
r 
th
e 
o
pt
io
n 
to
 c
ho
os
e 
ge
t l
os
t w
ith
 s
o
 
to
 u
se
 ju
st 
o
n
e
 P
IN
 o
r 
se
pa
ra
te
 
m
a
n
yo
pt
io
ns
 
PI
N
s 
fo
r 
e
a
c
h 
a
pp
lic
at
io
n?
 
an
d 
a
ls
o 
di
ff
er
en
t l
ev
el
s 
an
d 
ty
pe
s 
o
f 
1 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n.
 
1 
U
se
rs
 s
w
itc
h 
to
 
C
an
 c
a
rd
 is
su
er
s 
re
c
o
rd
 a
n
d 
W
eb
 
1 
u
pd
at
e 
a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 p
riv
ile
ge
s 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 n
o
t 
fr
om
 a
 s
in
gl
e 
c
e
n
tr
al
 lo
ca
tio
n?
 
fr
om
 th
e 
ca
rd
o 
l,
 1 1
	 
PI
N
 is
 r
e
qu
ir
ed
 
o
n
ly
 o
n
c
e
 w
he
n 
u
se
rs
 f
irs
t l
og
in
 
at
 t
he
 M
TM
. 
1 
82
 S
in
gl
e 
c
a
rd
 s
o
lu
tio
n 
fo
r c
o
n
ta
ct
 a
n
d 
c
o
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
.
 
~3 
A
 m
ic
ro
co
nt
ro
lle
r 
c
hi
p 
c
a
rd
 (e
.g.
, a
 c
a
rd
 t
ha
t o
pe
ns
 a
 d
oo
r 
by
 ju
sl 
br
in
gi
ng
 th
e 
c
a
rd
 c
lo
se
 t
o 
th
e 
c
a
rd
 r
e
a
de
r 
a
n
d 
lh
al
 s
a
m
e
 c
a
rd
 a
ls
o 
pr
ov
id
es
 l
og
ic
al

 
a
c
c
e
ss
 t
o 
c
o
m
pu
te
rs
 a
n
d 
n
e
tw
or
ks
).

 
29
6 
1.
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F
or
 p
hx
si
ca
l 
a
n
d 
lo
gi
ca
l 
a
c
c
e
s
s
 84
 a
pp
li
ca
ti
on
s,
 d
oe
s 
th
e 
1 
C
ur
re
nt
ly
 t
he
 
s
ys
te
m
 a
do
pt
s 
a 
F
or
 s
tr
o
n
ge
r 
s
e
c
u
ri
 ty
, h
as
 a
 3
rd
­
fa
ct
or
 a
u
th
en
ti
ca
ti
on
 i
nt
ro
du
ce
d 
1 
H
an
d 
ge
om
et
ry
 is
 
u
se
d 
fo
r 
s
ys
te
m
 u
s
e
s
 m
u
lt
ip
le
­
te
c
h
n
o
lo
g
l5
 c
o
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 
te
c
h
n
o
lo
g
l6
? 
c
o
n
ta
ct
 c
a
rd
o 
A
il
-i
n-
on
e 
c
o
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 
Ce
.g
., 
bi
om
et
ri
cs
)?
 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
in
 
c
o
n
ju
nc
tio
n w
ith
 
th
e 
sm
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 p
lu
s 
PI
N
. 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 c
a
rd
 
w
o
u
ld
 b
e 
n
ic
e 
to
 
Ph
ys
ie
a!
 a
e
c
e
ss
: 
H
ow
ev
er
 p
la
st
ic
 
ha
ve
. 
V
er
y 
c
a
rd
s 
w
ill
 b
e 
so
o
n
 
c
o
n
v
e
n
ie
nt
 to
 
o
bs
ol
et
e 
si
nc
e 
u
s
e
rs
 s
tr
u
gg
li
ng
 
c
o
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 
w
it
h 
s
e
v
e
ra
l 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 is
 
de
bi
t, 
c
re
di
t, 
a
n
d 
gr
ow
in
g 
w
ith
 a
 
o
th
er
 p
la
st
ic
 
v
a
ri
et
y 
o
f f
om
1 
c
a
rd
s 
in
 t
he
ir
 
fa
ct
or
s 
(e.
g. 
a 
w
a
ll
et
s.
 
m
o
bi
le
 p
ho
ne
). 
So
rn
e 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 
a
n
a
ly
st
s 
su
c
h 
a
s 
Pe
nn
 (2
00
8)
 fr
om
 
FO
IT
es
te
r 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
sa
y 
th
at
 w
ith
in
 f
iv
e 
ye
ar
s,
 m
o
bi
le
 
ph
on
es
 in
 U
S 
w
ill
 
be
 a
bl
e 
to
 m
a
ke
 
e
le
ct
ro
ni
c 
84
 
Lo
gi
ca
l 
ac
ce
ss
 r
ef
er
s 
to
 t
he
 c
o
n
n
ec
tio
n 
o
f o
n
e 
de
vi
ce
 o
r 
sy
st
em
 to
 a
n
o
th
er
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
u
se
 o
f s
o
ftw
ar
e.
 T
he
 s
o
ftw
ar
e 
m
ay
 r
u
n
, 
sa
y 
as
 t
he
 r
es
u
lt 
o
f a
 
u
se
r 
po
w
er
in
g 
a 
PC
, w
hi
ch
 th
en
 e
x
ec
u
te
s 
th
e 
lo
gi
n 
se
qu
en
ce
, o
r 
it 
m
ay
 b
e 
th
e 
re
su
lt 
o
f i
nt
er
na
i p
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
be
tw
ee
n 
sy
st
em
s..
 
W
he
re
as
 p
hy
si
ca
l a
cc
es
s 
is 
be
in
g 
ab
le
 to
 p
hy
si
ca
lly
 to
uc
h 
an
d 
in
te
ra
ct
 w
ith
 c
o
m
pu
te
rs
 a
n
d 
n
et
w
or
k 
de
vi
ce
s. 
85
 M
ul
tip
le
-te
ch
no
Jo
gy
 e
n
ab
le
s 
a 
ca
rd
 c
an
 
be
 p
ro
du
ce
d 
w
ith
 c
o
n
ta
ct
 o
r 
co
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 s
m
ar
t 
ch
ip
 t
ec
hn
ol
og
y,
 m
ag
ne
lic
 s
lri
pe
, 
ba
r 
co
de
s, 
o
pl
ic
al
 s
lri
pe
 
an
d/
or
 1
25
 k
H
z 
pr
ox
im
ity
 a
n
te
nn
a.
 A
 c
ar
d 
co
n
ta
in
in
g 
se
v
er
al
 ty
pe
s 
o
f r
ea
d/
w
rit
e 
m
ed
ia
 is
 g
en
er
al
ly
 c
al
le
d 
a 
m
u
lti
pl
e 
le
ch
no
lo
gy
 ca
rd
o 
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Co
nt
ac
tle
ss
 t
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
o
ffe
rs
 r
el
ia
bl
e 
an
d 
fa
st 
th
ro
ug
hp
ut
. 
If
 a
n
o
th
er
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
fa
ct
or
 i
s 
in
tro
du
ce
d 
th
e 
th
ro
ug
hp
ul
 a
dv
an
la
ge
s 
o
ff
er
ed
 b
y 
co
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
 a
re
 d
ec
re
as
ed
, b
ut
 th
e 
st
re
ng
th
 o
f s
ec
u
rit
y 
an
d 
au
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
is 
in
cr
ea
se
d.
 
1 
29
7
 
1 
pa
ym
en
ts
, o
pe
n 
do
or
s,
 a
c
c
e
ss
 
su
bw
ay
s,
 c
lip
 
c
o
u
po
ns
 a
n
d 
a
c
t 
as
 
a
n
o
th
er
 fo
rm
 o
f 
id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n.
 
Lo
gi
ca
l a
c
c
e
ss
: 
CU
lT
en
tly
, c
o
n
ta
ct
 
tc
ch
no
lo
gy
 
pr
ov
id
es
 a
 
c
o
n
v
e
n
ie
nt
 a
n
d 
c
o
st
-e
ff
ec
tiv
e 
w
a
y 
to
 t
ra
ns
fc
r 
si
gn
if
ic
an
t 
a
m
o
u
n
ts
 o
f d
at
a 
be
tw
ee
n 
a 
c
a
rd
 a
n
d 
a 
re
a
de
rl
ho
st
 
sy
st
em
 q
ui
ck
ly
 a
n
d 
pc
rf
or
m
 c
o
m
pl
ex
 
c
ry
pt
og
ra
ph
ie
 
o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 f
or
 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
. F
or
 
th
es
c 
l'c
as
on
s, 
c
o
n
ta
ct
 s
m
a
rt
 c
a
rd
s 
a
re
 a
 p
ro
m
in
en
t 
so
lu
tio
n 
fo
r 
n
c
tw
or
k 
se
c
u
ri
ty
 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
ns
. 
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1.2
1 
O
oe
s 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 p
ro
vi
de
 th
e 
c
a
pa
bi
lit
y 
to
 u
se
rs
 t
o 
be
 
1 
lt 
n
e
e
ds
 s
ys
te
m
 
1 
re
v
ie
w
 to
 
Is 
th
e 
R
ol
e-
B
as
ed
 A
cc
es
s 
C
on
tro
l (
RB
AC
) 8
7 
u
se
d 
to
 
1 
1 
R
B
A
C
 d
iv
er
ge
s 
fr
om
 A
cc
es
s 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
ed
 b
y 
gr
ou
p/
ro
le
 (e
.g.
 
e
v
a
lu
at
e 
th
e 
m
a
n
a
ge
 u
se
rs
 w
ho
 h
as
 s
ig
ne
d 
u
p 
C
on
tr
ol
 L
is
ts
 
a 
gr
ou
p 
o
f u
se
rs
 (t
wo
 o
r 
m
o
re
) 
fe
as
ib
ili
ty
 o
ft
hi
s 
fo
r 
th
is
 s
e
rv
ic
e?
 
(A
CL
s) 
u
se
d 
in
 
c
a
n
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
sa
m
e
 
fu
nc
tio
na
lit
y.
 
c
o
n
v
e
n
tio
na
l 
c
re
de
nt
ia
ls
)? 
di
sc
re
tio
na
ry
 
a
c
c
e
ss
 c
o
n
tr
ol
 
sy
st
em
s 
in
 t
ha
t i
t 
a
ss
lg
ns
 
pe
rm
is
si
on
s 
to
 
1 
c
e
rt
ai
n 
gr
ou
ps
 to
 
sp
ec
if
ie
 
o
pe
ra
tio
ns
. 
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ol
e-
ba
se
d 
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ce
ss
 c
o
n
lro
l (
RE
AC
) i
s 
a 
ge
ne
ra
l s
ec
u
ril
y 
m
o
de
l I
ha
l s
im
pl
ifi
es
 a
dm
in
is
lra
lio
n 
by
 a
ss
ig
ni
ng
 r
ai
es
 la
 u
se
rs
 a
n
d 
Ih
en
 a
ss
ig
ni
ng
 
pe
rm
iss
io
ns
 to
 t
ho
se
 ro
les
. 
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9 
U
sa
bl
e 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 S
ym
m
et
ry
 C
he
ck
-L
is
t 
2. 
U
sa
bi
lit
y 
C
ri
te
ri
on
: 
O
PE
RA
BI
LI
TY
 
A
m
ou
nt
 o
f e
ff
or
t n
e
c
e
ss
a
ry
 to
 o
pe
ra
te
 a
n
d 
c
o
n
tr
ol
 a
n
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
# 
U
sa
bi
lit
y 
R
ev
ie
w
 
O
cc
un
en
ce
 
N
 ~
/\ 
C
om
m
en
ts
 
Se
cu
rit
y 
R
ev
ie
w
 
Oc
cu
rre
nc
e 
y 
N
 
N
/\ 
C
om
m
en
ts
 
2.
1 
C
an
 (s
om
e)
 sy
st
em
's
 
m
e
c
ha
ni
sm
s8
8 
be
 c
o
n
fi
gu
re
d 
by
 
001
 
H
av
in
g 
th
e 
po
ss
ib
ili
ty
 o
f s
el
ec
t 
D
oe
s 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 o
ff
er
 d
iff
er
en
t 
c
o
m
bi
na
tio
ns
 o
f a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
Il
 
u
se
rs
 t
o 
o
pe
ra
te
 in
 c
e
rt
ai
n 
w
a
y 
(e.
g.,
 se
le
ct
 a
 p
re
fe
ne
d 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
m
e
th
od
)?
 
w
ha
t a
u
th
cn
tic
at
io
n 
m
et
ho
d 
u
sc
rs
 w
o
u
ld
 
lik
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
us
e 
o
f i
s 
st
ill
 in
 it
s 
in
fa
nc
y.
 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
 a
re
 ju
st 
m
e
th
od
s 
to
 u
se
rs
 t
ha
t i
nc
lu
de
s 
st
ro
ng
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
(e.
g. 
OT
P 
pl
us
 b
io
m
et
ric
s,
 o
r 
c
o
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 
sm
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 p
lu
s 
pa
ss
w
or
d)
? 
st
ar
tin
g 
to
 o
ffe
r 
di
ffe
re
nt
 w
ay
s 
o
f 
au
th
en
tic
at
in
g 
to
 a
 
sy
ste
m
 b
ut
 th
is 
is 
ta
ki
ng
 p
la
ce
 in
 
co
rp
or
at
e 
en
v
iro
nm
en
ts 
(e.
g. 
u
su
al
ly
 
au
th
cn
tic
at
io
n 
o
pt
io
ns
 a
rc
 g
iv
en
 1
0 
sy
ste
m
 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
to
rs
). 
Co
ns
um
er
s 
ca
n
n
o
t 
se
le
ct
 th
ei
r p
re
fe
rre
d 
au
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
so
 fa
r. 
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 F
or
 c
u
st
om
iz
ed
 a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 (p
er
so
na
liz
ali
on
 ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
) i
n 
o
rd
er
 1
0 
e
n
ha
nc
e 
c
u
st
om
er
 e
x
pe
ri
en
ce
 r
e
du
ci
ng
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
sp
ee
d 
w
hi
le
 a
t 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
tim
e 
ad
din
g 
va
lue
. 
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C
an
 u
se
rs
 c
u
st
om
iz
e 
th
e 
u
se
r 
in
te
rf
ac
e 
to
 t
he
ir
 s
pe
ci
fi
e 
n
e
e
ds
 
(e.
g.,
 p
er
so
na
liz
ed
 lo
ok
 a
n
d 
Fe
el
) a
t 
th
e 
M
T
M
? 
2.
3	
 
If
 a 
v
a
ri
et
y 
o
f a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
m
e
th
od
s 
is 
re
qu
ir
ed
, i
s 
th
at
 th
e 
si
m
pl
es
t o
n
e
s?
 
2.
4	
 
Is 
th
e 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
m
e
th
od
 u
sa
bl
e 
a
n
d 
e
a
sy
 to
 u
se
? 
It 
n
e
e
ds
 to
 b
e 
1 
im
pl
em
en
te
d.
 
1 
Pa
lm
 r
e
c
o
gn
iti
on
. 
C
an
 u
se
rs
 c
u
st
om
iz
e 
o
n
ly
 N
O
 
se
n
si
tiv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
a
n
d 
se
c
u
ri
ty
-r
el
at
ed
 c
o
n
te
nt
 it
em
s?
 
Is 
3-
rd
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
fa
ct
or
 
1
re
qu
ir
ed
 to
 p
ro
te
ct
 a
c
c
e
ss
 t
o 
se
n
si
tiv
e 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 (e
.g.
, 
bi
om
et
ric
s)?
 
H
as
 th
e 
c
ho
se
n 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
1 
m
e
th
od
 th
e 
lo
w
es
t F
al
se
 R
eje
ct 
R
at
e 
(F
RR
) (
i.e
., 
a 
le
gi
tim
at
e 
u
se
r 
is 
re
jec
ted
 by
 t
he
 
a
c
qu
is
iti
on
 d
ev
ic
e?
 
Il

 
W
he
n 
m
a
ki
ng
 a
n
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
fu
nd
s 
tr
an
sf
er
 
a
bo
ve
 $
5,
00
0 
a
t 
th
e 
M
T
M
. 
U
se
rs
 li
ke
 p
al
m
 
a
n
d 
fi
ng
er
pr
in
t 
re
c
o
gn
iti
on
 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 a
re
 
n
o
t 
in
tr
us
iv
e,
 
re
lia
bl
e,
 l
ow
 
c
o
st
, 
a
n
d 
o
n
ly
 
ha
ve
 a
 0
.1
%
 
FR
R
 w
hi
ch
 is
 
o
n
e
 o
f t
he
 l
ow
es
t 
in
 th
e 
bi
om
et
ri
cs
 
in
du
st
ry
. 
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2.
5 
Is 
th
e 
u
se
r 
ta
sk
' w
o
rk
lo
ad
 
lig
ht
? 
R
el
at
iv
el
y 
si
m
pl
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
c
o
rp
or
at
e/
co
ns
um
er
 
c
o
m
pu
te
r a
v
e
ra
ge
 
u
se
r.
 A
s 
m
e
n
tio
ne
d 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 u
se
s 
sm
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 p
lu
s 
PI
N
 
(1 
st
 le
ve
l 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n)
 th
en
 
2n
d 
le
ve
l 
u
se
m
a
m
e
/p
as
sw
or
d 
,
 
ha
nd
 r
e
c
o
gn
iti
on
, 
o
r 
O
TP
. 
Is
 t
he
 u
se
r 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
fl
ow
 
1
si
m
pl
e 
to
 a
v
o
id
 d
an
ge
ro
us
 
be
ha
vi
or
s 
(e.
g.,
 se
n
si
tiv
e 
da
ta
 
le
ak
ag
e)
? 
G
en
er
al
ly
 
sp
ea
ki
ng
 s
m
a
rt
 
c
a
rd
 p
lu
s 
PI
N
 
ta
ke
s 
2 
st
ep
s.
 F
or
 
U
se
m
am
e/
 
Pa
ss
w
or
d,
 
a
c
c
o
rd
in
g 
ta
 t
he
 
G
O
M
S 
a
n
a
ly
si
s 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
in
 t
hi
s 
th
es
is
, t
he
re
 a
re
 
pr
ec
is
el
y 
19
 s
te
ps
 
(2
4.4
0 s
e
c
o
n
ds
 
c
o
m
pn
sl
l1
g 
c
o
gn
iti
ve
 a
n
d 
m
o
to
r 
pr
oc
es
se
s).
 
H
ow
ev
er
 t
he
 c
o
re
 
pr
oc
es
s 
ta
ke
s 
3 
st
ep
s 
th
at
 is
 u
se
r 
in
pu
ts
 u
se
rn
a
m
e
, 
th
en
 p
as
sw
or
d 
a
n
d 
fin
al
ly
 c
lic
ks
 o
n
 
"
Su
bm
it"
 b
ut
to
n.
 
Fo
r O
TP
, 
a
c
c
o
rd
in
g 
to
 t
he
 
G
O
M
S 
a
n
a
ly
si
s,
 
pr
cc
is
el
y 
21
 s
te
ps
 
(2
8.1
3 
se
c
o
n
ds
 
c
o
m
pn
sm
g 
c
o
gn
iti
ve
 a
n
d 
m
o
to
r 
pr
oc
es
se
s).
 
H
ow
cv
er
 t
he
 c
o
re
 
pr
oc
cs
s 
ta
kc
s 
4 
30
2

 
st
ep
s 
th
at
 is
 u
se
r 
in
pu
ts
 P
IN
, t
he
n 
ge
ts
 to
ke
nc
od
e,
 
th
en
 a
pp
en
ds
 
to
ke
nc
od
e 
to
 t
he
 
PI
N
, a
n
d 
fin
a I
ly
 
c
lic
ks
 o
n
 "
Su
bm
it"
 
bu
tto
n.
 F
or
 H
an
d 
Pa
lm
 R
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
(p
re
tty
 si
m
ila
r t
o 
Fi
ng
er
pr
in
t),
 
a
c
c
o
rd
in
g 
to
 t
he
 
G
O
M
S 
a
n
a
ly
si
s,
 
th
er
e 
a
re
 p
re
ci
se
ly
 
7 
st
ep
s 
(9
.16
 
se
c
o
n
ds
 
co
m
pn
Sl
l1
g 
c
o
gn
iti
ve
 a
n
d 
m
o
to
r 
pr
oc
es
se
s).
 
H
ow
ev
er
 th
e 
c
o
re
 
pr
oc
es
s 
ta
ke
s 
2 
st
ep
s 
th
at
 is
 u
se
r 
pl
ac
es
 h
er
 h
an
d 
pa
lm
 o
v
e
r 
th
e 
pa
lm
 s
e
n
so
r,
 t
he
n 
ge
ts
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
ed
 
by
 th
e 
sy
st
em
. 
30
3 
2.
6	
 
Is 
th
e 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
' s
e
qu
en
ce
 
sm
o
o
th
 w
he
n 
v
a
ry
in
g 
le
ve
ls
 o
f 
a
c
c
e
ss
? 
2.
7	
 
Fo
r 
lo
gi
ca
l a
c
c
e
ss
 (i
.e.
 a
c
c
e
ss
 
to
 M
T
M
 s
o
ft
w
ar
e 
a
n
d 
W
eb
 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
), 
a
re
 t
he
re
 v
e
ry
 
fe
w
 v
a
ry
in
g 
le
ve
ls
 o
f a
c
c
e
ss
? 
1 
B
ut
 it
 d
ep
en
ds
 o
n
1 
w
hi
ch
 s
e
rv
ic
es
 
u
se
rs
 a
re
 a
c
c
e
ss
m
g.
 
Fo
r e
x
a
m
pl
e 
bu
yi
ng
 
a 
c
o
n
c
e
rt
 t
ic
ke
t 
.
.
re
qU
ire
s 
go
m
g 
o
n
lin
e 
w
he
re
as
 
u
si
ng
 a
 c
he
ck
 
im
ag
e 
fe
at
ur
e 
is 
a 
lo
ca
l s
e
rv
ic
e 
a
n
d 
do
es
 n
o
t 
n
e
e
d 
a
n
o
th
er
 le
ve
l o
f 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n.
 
W
he
n 
v
a
ry
in
g 
le
ve
ls
 o
f a
c
c
e
ss
, 
1
is 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
o
r 
u
se
r 
v
a
lid
at
io
n 
re
qu
ir
ed
? 
H
av
e 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 c
o
n
si
de
re
d 
a 
1
hi
gh
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
-c
om
pu
tin
g 
e
n
v
ir
on
m
en
t (
i.e
., 
th
is
 is
 
re
qu
ir
ed
 fo
r 
Pu
bl
ic
 K
ey
 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 (P
KI
) a
n
d/
or
 
bi
om
et
ri
cs
 s
e
rv
ic
es
)?
 
U
se
rs
 a
e
e
e
ss
 
se
rv
ic
es
 fr
om
 t
he
 
M
T
M
 a
n
d 
fr
om
 
e
x
te
m
al
 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
, m
o
st
ly
 
e
-e
o
m
m
e
re
e
 o
n
e
s.
 I
n 
o
rd
er
 to
 r
u
n
 W
eb
 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 b
as
ed
 
o
n
 M
T
M
 a
 r
e
a
l-
tim
e 
W
eb
 s
e
rv
ic
e 
st
ru
ct
ur
e.
 
A
ls
o 
as
 p
eo
pl
e 
a
re
 
m
o
re
 c
o
n
e
e
rn
e
d 
w
ith
 p
ri
va
cy
 r
is
ks
 in
 
B
io
m
et
ri
es
 s
ys
te
m
s 
a
n
d 
M
T
M
 d
oe
s 
m
a
ke
 u
se
 o
f n
e
tw
or
k 
a
n
d 
di
st
ri
bu
te
d 
sy
st
em
s,
 s
o
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
u
se
 o
f e
n
c
ry
pt
io
n 
is 
e
ri
tic
al
. T
he
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 
o
f t
he
 b
io
m
et
ri
c 
sy
st
em
 r
e
lie
s 
o
n
 t
he
 
in
te
gr
ity
 a
n
d 
a
u
th
en
tic
ity
 o
f t
he
 
bi
om
et
ri
e 
in
fo
Il1
1a
tio
n,
 w
hi
ch
 
c
a
n
 b
e 
a
c
c
o
m
pl
is
he
d 
u
si
ng
 P
K
l o
n
c
e
 t
he
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
en
ro
lle
d. 
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Fo
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m
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ri
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, a
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 lo
ca
l a
n
d 
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1 
-
-
­
1 
Is 
th
e 
lo
ca
l a
c
c
e
ss
 s
e
t 
u
p 
to
 
Il
 
It 
n
e
e
ds
 to
 b
e 
re
m
o
te
 a
c
c
e
ss
e
s 
a
v
a
ila
bl
e 
to
 
de
fa
ul
t (
i.e
., 
n
o
 n
e
e
d 
to
 b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d.
 
u
se
r 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
(i.
e.,
 if
 o
n
­
1 J 
tr
an
sm
itt
ed
 o
v
e
r 
th
e 
n
e
tw
or
k)
? 
1 
lin
e 
sy
st
em
s 
a
re
 d
ow
n 
du
ri
ng
 
1 
1 
a
n
 o
u
ta
ge
 o
r 
o
th
er
 
1 
1 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
)?
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2.
9 
Is
 e
n
ro
llm
en
t d
at
a 
m
a
in
ta
in
ed
 
c
e
n
tr
al
ly
 o
r 
lo
ca
lly
 (i
.e.
 u
se
r 
fi 
U
se
rs
 s
ho
ul
d 
e
n
ro
ll 
o
n
c
e
 a
n
d 
th
is
 b
e 
Is
 a
 s
m
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 u
se
d 
to
 s
to
re
 
u
se
r'
s 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
da
ta
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
1 
It 
n
cc
ds
 to
 b
e 
im
pl
cm
cn
te
d.
 
c
o
n
v
e
n
ie
nc
e 
-
a 
ke
y 
is
su
e 
in
 
J 
se
rv
e
d 
as
 t
he
 b
as
is
 
u
se
r 
pr
of
ile
 a
n
d 
e
n
ro
lm
en
t?
 
1 
A
lth
ou
gh
 u
se
rs
 
se
le
ct
in
g 
c
a
rd
 is
su
an
ce
 
1 
o
f f
ut
ur
e 
m
ay
 s
ee
 t
he
 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
)? 
1 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
be
ne
fit
 o
f 
a
c
ro
ss
 a
 r
a
n
ge
 o
f 
le
ve
ra
gi
ng
 a
n 
sy
st
em
s.
 
1 
ex
is
tin
g 
en
ro
lm
en
t 
as
 m
en
tio
ne
d 
in 
1 
th
e 
2.
9 
U
sa
bi
lit
y 
1 
re
v
le
w
 lJ
1 
1 
1 
co
m
m
en
ts
 (o
n 
th
e 
le
ft)
, t
he
y 
m
ay
 b
e 
,
 
1 
su
sp
ic
io
us
 o
f 
1 
po
te
nt
ia
l d
at
a 
2.
10
 
Is 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
u
se
d 
(i.
e.,
 m
o
re
 u
se
r 
t Il
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 b
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 o
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re
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 f
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at
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c
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 m
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f t
ra
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 o
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 f
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 d
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 p
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t c
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ra
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 re
ce
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 c
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c
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 p
ro
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f l
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 p
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 d
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 c
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If
 im
ag
in
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ch
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re
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re
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l o
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ra
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he
n 
u
si
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 c
he
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in
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ch
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lo
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 d
ig
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he
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n
n
e
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d 
c
he
ck
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 c
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 c
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t f
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 c
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c
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f t
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c
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 p
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 m
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 m
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t c
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at
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 c
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f l
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at
io
n 
o
pt
io
n 
to
 l
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 o
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 c
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c
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v
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re
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s.
 
th
er
e's
 n
o 
o
th
er
 
o
pt
io
n 
fo
r n
ow
. 
Bu
t 
an
o
th
er
 o
pt
io
n 
sh
ol
iid
 
be
 p
ro
vi
de
d.
 
It 
n
ee
ds
 to
 b
e 
ill
lp
le
lll
en
te
d.
 
D
ES
 e
n
cr
yp
tio
n 
is 
lIs
ed
 th
ou
gh
 le
ss
 
se
cu
re
. 
U
sa
bi
lit
y 
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 
o
fu
si
ng
 3
D
ES
 
co
rr
es
po
nd
 to
 t
he
 
A
dm
in
ist
ra
to
r, 
n
ot
 
En
d-
U
se
r l
ev
el 
(Se
e 
5.4
.2.
2.1
 U
sa
bi
lit
y 
Se
vc
rit
y 
Ra
tin
gs
. 
Pr
ob
lel
ll 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
29
. P
riv
ac
y 
an
d 
In
te
gr
at
io
n.
). 
D
oe
s 
th
e 
s
ys
te
m
 i
s 
bl
oc
ke
d 
a
ft
er
 
th
re
e 
P
IN
 f
ai
le
d 
a
tt
em
pt
s 
to
 a
c
c
e
s
s
 
th
e 
s
ys
te
m
? 
If
 lo
gi
n 
fa
ils
, d
oe
s 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 a
v
o
id
 
in
di
ca
tin
g 
w
ha
t p
ar
t o
f t
he
 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
th
at
 w
a
s 
in
co
rr
ec
t 1
20
 (i
.e.
.
 
n
o
 e
rr
o
r 
fe
ed
ba
ck
)?
 
D
o
es
 t
he
 s
y
st
em
 p
ro
vi
de
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
na
1 
in
te
gr
it
y?
 
Is
 T
ri
pl
e-
D
E
S
 (
3D
ES
) 1
22
 
e
n
c
ry
pt
io
n 
e
m
p1
0y
ed
 p
ro
vi
di
ng
 
th
us
 g
re
at
er
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
? 
D
o
es
 t
he
 s
y
st
em
 p
ro
vi
de
 
a
u
di
ti
ng
 c
a
pa
bi
1i
ti
es
? 
1

 
Il
 
1
1 
~I 
r 
~ 
1 
1 
Il Il 
B
u
t 
s
y
st
em
 n
e
e
ds
 
u
pd
at
e 
w
it
h 
C
U
IT
en
t b
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 b
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c
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, c
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5.4.2.2 Severity Ratings 
The usability problems can greatly be eliminated or reduced through the 
severity rates where evaluators are able to identify the security and usability problems 
that should be tackled and fixed. The ratings also aid in the allowance of resources for 
treating the user interface problems. If the severity ratings indicate that several 
disastrous usability problems remain in an interface, it will most likely be 
unadvisable to release it. However one might choose to go forward with the release of 
a system with several usability problems if they are all judged as being cosmetic in 
nature. 
According to Nielsen (1994), the severity of a usability problem consists a 
combination of three elements: frequency ranges (i.e. from ordinary problems to 
atypical ones), impact (i.e., establishes the ease or difficulty with which users recover 
from a problem), and persistence (i.e., ranges from just one problem that might be 
surmounted to the problem that continually replicate itself becoming bothersome to 
users). 
Last but not least, it is recommended to assess the market impact of the 
usability problem since certain usability problems can have a destructive effect on the 
popularity of a product, even if they are fairly easy to overcome. 
Severity ratings are gathered in a questionnaire after the actual evaluation 
session, listing the entire set of usability and security problems that have been 
discovered, and the evaluator is asked to rate the severity of each problem. The 
descriptions are synthesized by the evaJuator from the comments made for each 
problem. Typically, the evaluator needs only spend about 30 minutes to give their 
severity ratings. The experience shows that severity ratings from a single evaluator 
are unreliable to be trusted (Nielsen, 1994). As more evaluators are asked to judge the 
severity of usability problems, the quality of the mean severity rating increases 
322 
rapidly, and using the mean ofa sel ofralings j'rom Ihree eva/ualors is satisfactory for 
many practical purposes. 
5.4.2.2.1 Usability Severity Ratings 
The 0 la 4 raling sca/e can be employed to rate the severity of usability 
problems (Nielsen, 1994). Table 5.5 shows an example of a usability problem and its 
severity rate: 
•	 0 = 1don't agree that this is a usability problem at ail. 
•	 1 = Cosmetic problem only: need not be fixed unless extra time is available 
on project 
•	 2 = Minor usability problem: fixing this should be given low priority 
•	 3 = Major usability problem: important to fix, so should be given high priority 
• 4 = Usability catastrophe: imperative to fix this before product can be released 
The Recommendations column suggests a solution for the problem. 
Problem Name of the Severity	 Explanation Relationships Recommend 
Description criterion Rate	 of the with other ations
 
Usability problems
 
Issue
 
Vertical Consistency 1 Only two Speediness Give user
 
and and screens of the task more
 
horizontal standards have scroll IS control
 
scrolling is Bars. compromised.
 
not possible
 
in each
 
window
 
Table 5.5: Example of a usability problem and its severity rate. 
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ty
 
o
f A
M
s 
w
he
n 
ac
ce
ss
in
g 
di
ff
er
en
t s
er
v
ic
es
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 
n
e
tw
or
ks
 n
o
t 
o
n
ly
 lo
ca
lly
 a
t 
th
e 
m
a
c
hi
ne
. 
Si
ng
le
 S
ig
n-
O
n 
c
a
n
 b
e 
th
e 
so
lu
tio
n.
 
n
o
t 
sim
pl
e.
 S
ev
er
al
 le
ve
ls 
o
f 
ac
ce
ss
 s
u
ch
 a
s 
ph
ys
ic
al
 a
n
d 
lo
gi
ca
l a
cc
es
s 
fo
r d
iff
er
en
t 
se
rv
ic
es
 w
hi
ch
 c
an
 b
e 
lo
ca
te
d 
in 
th
e 
M
TM
 L
oc
al
 A
re
a 
N
et
w
or
k 
(L
AN
), 
W
id
e 
A
re
a 
N
ct
w
or
k 
(W
A
N
), 
o
r 
In
te
m
et
 
(W
eb
 ap
ps
). 
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. U
nb
al
an
ce
d 
O
pe
ra
bi
lit
y 
2 
L
eg
it
im
at
e 
u
se
rs
 m
a
y 
ge
t 
T
hr
ou
gh
pu
t 
Th
e 
a
c
c
u
ra
c
y 
o
f e
a
c
h 
sy
st
em
 c
a
n
 b
e 
FR
R
 a
n
d 
FA
R
 o
fh
an
d 
ge
om
et
ry
 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
re
v
ie
w
 2
.1
2)
 
ir
ri
ta
te
d 
if
 th
e 
sy
st
em
 
do
es
n'
t a
c
c
e
pt
 th
em
. 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
ad
jus
ted
. H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
re
 a
re
 s
o
m
e
 
dr
aw
ba
ck
s 
to
 d
oi
ng
 s
o
 (e
.g.
, c
ha
ng
in
g 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 s
e
n
si
tiv
ity
 to
 r
cd
uc
e 
fa
ls
e 
re
jec
tio
ns
 m
ay
 in
cr
ea
se
 tà
ls
e 
a
c
c
e
pt
an
ce
s ).
 
Zh
an
g 
(2
00
4)
 h
as
 d
oc
um
en
te
d 
re
c
o
gn
iti
on
 s
ys
te
m
' h
an
d 
ge
om
et
ry
 
sc
a
n
n
e
rs
 a
s 
be
in
g 
ab
le
 to
 o
pe
ra
te
 w
ith
 a
 
lo
w
 F
A
R
 o
f 0
.0
96
%
 a
n
d 
re
a
so
n
a
bl
e 
FR
R
 
o
f 
1.
05
%
. 
Il
. 
L
oc
ke
d 
o
u
t 
O
pe
ra
bi
lit
y 
4 
U
se
rs
 c
a
n
 o
n
ly
 r
e
se
t 
th
ei
r 
U
na
va
il
ab
ili
ty
 o
f 
Fo
r t
he
 ti
m
e 
be
in
g,
 a
 s
ho
rt-
te
rm
 s
o
lu
tio
n 
u
se
r 
-
PI
N
s 
by
 g
oi
ng
 in
to
 th
e 
se
rv
Ic
es
. 
is 
th
e 
ba
nk
 to
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
 s
ys
tc
m
-
Fo
rg
ot
te
n 
PI
N 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
re
v
ie
w
 2
.1
4)
 
ba
nk
 a
n
d 
do
in
g 
it 
in
 p
er
so
n.
 
A
ls
o 
u
se
rs
 a
re
 n
o
t 
a
ll
ow
ed
 
to
 d
o 
it 
o
v
e
r 
th
e 
ph
on
e.
 
T
hi
s 
se
c
u
ri
ty
 p
ol
ic
y 
re
pr
es
en
ts
 a
 d
is
as
te
r 
ge
ne
ra
te
d 
PI
N
 u
po
n 
u
se
rs
' 
re
qu
es
t a
n
d 
m
ai
l 
it 
to
 u
se
rs
. 
Th
is
 ty
pi
ca
lly
 ta
ke
s 
5 
bu
si
ne
ss
 d
ay
s 
bu
t i
f u
se
r 
is 
o
u
t 
o
f t
he
 
c
o
u
n
tr
y 
it 
w
ill
 t
ak
c 
2 
w
e
e
ks
 o
r 
m
o
re
. 
A
 lo
ng
-t
en
n 
so
lu
tio
n 
is 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
 P
IN
 
œ
se
t 
v
ia
 a
 s
e
c
u
re
 W
eb
 in
te
rf
ac
e.
 A
no
th
er
 
tr
an
sJ
at
ed
 to
 i
nc
on
ve
ni
en
ce
 
o
pt
io
n 
is 
an
 o
n
-d
em
an
d 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
or
 
a
n
d 
di
ss
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
fo
r 
u
se
rs
 
w
hi
ch
 g
ra
nt
s 
"
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
" 
a
c
c
e
ss
 to
 a
 
w
ho
 n
e
e
d 
to
 a
c
c
e
ss
 t
he
ir
 
tr
ad
iti
on
al
 to
ke
n 
u
se
r 
w
ho
 m
ay
 h
av
e 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t 
a
t 
th
at
 v
e
ry
 
te
m
po
ra
ril
y 
m
is
pl
ac
ed
 a
 t
ok
en
 (e
.g.
 le
ft 
a 
m
o
m
e
n
t 
a
t 
th
e 
M
T
M
. 
to
ke
n 
at
 h
om
e),
 iI
Te
tri
ev
ab
ly
 lo
st
 a
 t
ok
en
 
o
r 
fo
rg
ot
te
n 
a 
PI
N
. B
y 
su
c
c
e
ss
fu
lly
 
c
o
m
pl
et
in
g 
lif
e 
qu
es
tio
n 
c
ha
lle
ng
es
 f
ro
m
 
th
e 
da
ta
ba
sc
, u
sc
rs
 c
a
n
 k
ee
p 
m
a
ki
ng
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 b
y 
re
qu
es
tin
g 
o
n
-d
em
an
d 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
e
v
e
n
 in
 o
ff
-h
ou
r 
sc
en
ar
io
s. 
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12
.ln
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
O
pe
ra
bi
lit
y 
3 
Th
e 
M
TM
 s
ys
te
m
 is
 
U
na
va
ila
bi
lit
y 
o
f 
Sy
st
em
 n
e
e
ds
 to
 b
e 
u
pd
at
ed
 
M
ea
n 
T
im
e 
u
n
av
ai
la
bl
e 
at
 c
er
ta
in
 v
er
y 
se
rv
ic
es
. 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 i
nf
ra
st
ru
ct
ur
e.
 
B
et
w
ee
n 
sh
or
t p
er
io
ds
 o
f t
im
e. 
U
se
rs
 
H
ig
h 
a
v
a
ila
bi
lit
y 
­
o
ft
en
 
Fa
ilu
re
s 
(M
TB
F)
­
ha
rd
w
ar
e 
r
el
ia
bi
lit
y 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
m
ig
ht
 tr
y 
to
 lo
g 
in 
to
 t
he
 
sy
st
em
 at
 t
ha
t e
x
ac
t 
m
o
m
en
t. 
Th
er
e 
is 
no
 w
ay
 o
f e
st
im
at
in
g 
on
 h
ow
 lo
ng
 th
e 
fa
ilu
re
 c
o
u
ld
 
la
st 
an
d 
w
ha
t e
x
ac
tly
 c
an
 
ca
u
se
 a
 fa
ilu
re
. F
ai
lu
re
s 
m
ig
ht
 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
w
ith
 f
ai
lo
ve
r 
c
1u
st
er
in
g,
 
lo
ad
 b
al
an
ce
d 
c
lu
st
er
in
g,
 w
a
rm
 
st
an
db
y 
se
rv
e
rs
, 
a
n
d 
lo
g 
sh
ip
pi
ng
. 
re
v
ie
w
 2
.1
6)
 
o
cc
u
r 
fro
m
 th
e 
n
et
w
or
k 
fo
r a
 
n
u
m
be
r o
f r
ea
so
n
s.
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. H
ig
h 
ra
te
 o
f 
O
pe
ra
bi
lit
y 
3 
Sy
st
em
 re
lia
bi
lit
y 
w
hi
ch
 
U
na
va
ila
bi
lit
y 
o
f 
Sy
st
em
 m
u
st
 h
av
e 
a
n
 M
T
T
R
 o
f z
e
ro
, 
M
ea
n 
Ti
m
e 
To
 
a
ff
ec
ts
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
ta
sk
s 
se
rv
ic
es
. 
w
hi
ch
 m
e
a
n
s 
th
at
 it
 h
as
 r
e
du
nd
an
t 
R
ep
ai
r 
a
n
d 
a
v
a
ila
bi
lit
y 
o
f s
e
rv
ic
es
 
c
o
m
po
ne
nt
s 
w
hi
ch
 c
a
n
 t
ak
e 
o
v
e
r 
th
e 
(M
TT
R)
 
to
 u
se
rs
. 
in
st
an
t t
he
 p
ri
m
ar
y 
o
n
e
 fa
ils
. 
(U
sa
bil
ity
 
re
v
ie
w
 2
.1
7)
 
14
. H
ig
h 
T
ot
al
 
O
pe
ra
bi
lit
y 
2 
U
se
r t
hr
ou
gh
pu
t 
is 
to
o 
hi
gh
 
T
as
k 
in
co
m
pl
et
io
n,
 
3T
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
a
dju
ste
d t
o 
a 
m
in
im
um
 
T
ra
ns
ac
ti
on
 
fo
r 
a 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
A
M
 
u
n
a
v
a
il
ab
il
it
yo
f 
o
f 4
 a
n
d 
m
a
x
im
um
 o
f 
10
 s
e
c
o
n
ds
 f
or
 
T
im
e 
(3
Ts
) 
c
o
m
pa
re
d 
to
 n
o
n
-b
io
m
et
ri
c 
se
rv
ic
es
, a
n
d 
a 
si
ng
le
 u
se
r.
 
fo
r 
bi
om
et
ri
cs
 
o
n
e
s.
 T
ho
ug
h 
is
ol
at
ed
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 fo
r 
H
an
d 
ge
om
et
ry
 u
se
s 
lo
w
 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 th
at
 ta
ke
 1
5 
c
o
rp
or
at
e 
u
se
rs
. 
c
o
m
pu
ta
tio
na
l c
o
st
 a
lg
or
ith
m
s,
 w
hi
ch
 
re
v
ie
w
 2
.1
8)
 
se
c
o
n
ds
 m
ig
ht
 b
e 
le
ad
s 
to
 f
as
t r
e
su
lts
. 
a
c
c
e
pt
ab
le
 in
 s
o
m
e
 
e
n
v
ir
on
m
en
ts
, t
hi
s 
c
o
u
ld
 b
e 
le
ss
 th
an
 id
ea
l f
or
 
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 a
 l
ar
ge
 n
u
m
be
r 
o
f u
se
rs
 in
 t
he
 M
T
M
 c
a
se
. 
U
se
rs
 m
a
y 
fe
el
 
u
n
c
o
m
fo
rt
ab
le
 u
si
ng
 th
e 
sy
st
em
 b
ec
au
se
 it
 t
ak
es
 to
o 
33
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m
u
c
h 
tim
e 
to
 c
a
pt
ur
e 
th
ei
r 
sa
m
pl
es
 (s
ati
sfa
cti
on
) a
n
d 
to
 l
ea
m
 th
e 
in
te
rf
ac
e 
(le
am
ab
ili
ty
). 
In
 a
dd
iti
on
, 
u
se
rs
 c
a
n
n
o
t 
u
se
 t
he
 
pr
od
uc
t q
ui
ck
ly
 
(e
ff
ic
ie
nc
y)
. 
A
s 
a
lr
ea
dy
 m
e
n
tio
ne
d,
 th
e 
3T
s 
c
o
rr
e
sp
on
ds
 to
 t
he
 ti
m
e 
fo
r a
 s
in
gl
e 
u
se
r 
to
 p
re
se
nt
 
th
e 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
(a
cq
ui
sit
io
n 
tim
e)
, a
n
d 
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 ti
m
e.
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. H
id
de
n 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
1 
T
he
 p
ri
va
cy
 p
ol
ic
y 
is 
Li
ab
ili
ty
 
Pr
ov
id
e 
a 
"
Pr
iv
ac
y 
Po
lic
y"
 l
in
k 
pr
iv
ac
y 
po
lic
y 
lo
ca
te
d 
u
n
de
r t
he
 
w
hi
ch
 d
ir
ec
ts
 u
se
rs
 t
o 
th
e 
pr
iv
ac
y 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
"
Se
cu
ri
ty
" 
lin
k 
in
 th
e 
po
lic
y 
in
 t
he
 W
el
co
m
e 
sc
re
e
n
. 
re
v
ie
w
 2
.1
8)
 
M
T
M
's
 W
ei
c
o
m
e
 s
c
re
e
n
. 
16
. N
o 
u
se
rs
 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
3 
Pr
iv
at
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Li
ab
ili
ty
 a
n
d 
be
st
 
U
se
r 
pr
iv
ac
y 
is 
a 
se
ri
ou
s 
to
pi
c 
a
n
d 
co
n
tr
ol
 o
v
e
r
 
is 
pr
ec
io
us
 to
 m
a
n
y 
In
te
rn
et
 
bu
si
ne
ss
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ta
ke
n 
v
e
ry
 s
e
ri
ou
sl
y 
if
 an
 
th
ei
r 
pr
iv
at
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
es
. 
U
se
rs
 a
re
 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
w
a
n
ts
 t
o 
be
 c
re
di
bl
e 
to
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
u
n
a
w
a
re
 t
ha
t t
he
y 
a
re
 n
o
t 
in
 
its
 c
u
st
om
er
s 
as
 it
 is
 t
he
 c
a
se
 o
f t
hi
s 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
c
o
n
tr
ol
 o
f t
he
ir
 p
ri
va
te
 
sy
st
em
's
 o
w
n
e
r.
 
re
v
ie
w
 3
.4
) 
in
fo
nn
at
io
n.
 I
nc
re
as
in
g 
Th
e 
fo
l1
ow
in
g 
po
lic
y 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
se
t 
u
p:
 
pr
ac
tic
e 
o
f 
c
o
m
m
e
rc
ia
liz
in
g 
pr
iv
ac
y 
by
 p
ub
lic
ly
 b
us
in
es
se
s 
pr
og
re
ss
iv
el
y 
c
re
a
te
s 
n
e
w
 
ri
sk
s 
fo
r 
u
se
rs
 in
 r
e
tu
m
 f
or
 
lit
tle
 to
 n
o
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
o
r 
re
w
a
rd
. 
•
 
In
di
ca
te
 w
hy
 s
ys
tc
m
's 
o
w
n
er
 is
 
co
l1
cc
tin
g 
da
ta
 a
n
d 
w
he
th
er
 it
 
in
te
nd
s 
to
 s
ha
re
 it
 w
ith
 o
th
er
 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
; 
A
sk
 fo
r 
u
se
r'
s 
c
o
n
se
n
t 
to
 u
se
 t
he
ir
 
pr
iv
at
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
w
he
n
 
c
o
lle
ct
in
g 
it 
fr
om
 o
n
lin
e 
a
c
tiv
iti
es
. 
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17
. I
nc
on
ve
ni
en
ce
 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
2 
T
he
 s
ys
te
m
's
 o
w
n
e
r 
do
e
s 
A
va
il
ab
il
it
yo
f 
A
do
pt
 a
 c
en
tr
al
iz
ed
 d
at
ab
as
e 
sa
 t
ha
t i
t 
to
 u
se
rs
 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
re
v
ie
w
 3
.6
) 
n
o
t 
m
a
in
ta
in
 b
ac
ku
p 
da
ta
 in
 
a 
c
e
n
tr
al
 l
oc
at
io
n,
 s
o
 if
 th
e 
ca
rd
 is
 lo
st,
 th
e 
ca
rd
ho
ld
er
 
se
rv
ic
es
, s
ys
te
m
 
e
ff
ic
ie
nc
y.
 
w
ill
 b
e 
ea
si
er
 fo
r u
se
rs
 t
o 
re
po
pu
la
te
 th
e 
re
pl
ac
em
en
t c
a
rd
 w
he
n 
th
e 
o
rig
in
al
 c
ar
d 
is 
lo
st.
 
m
u
st
 g
o 
to
 s
ev
er
al
 lo
ca
tio
ns
 to
 
re
po
pu
la
te
 th
e 
ca
rd
o 
18
. D
an
ge
ro
us
 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
3 
Pr
iv
at
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Li
ab
ili
ty
 a
n
d 
be
st
 
D
is
tr
ib
ut
ed
 p
ri
va
cy
 p
re
se
rv
in
g 
da
ta
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is 
pr
ec
io
us
 to
 m
a
n
y 
In
te
rn
et
 
bu
si
ne
ss
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
. 
m
in
in
g 
to
ol
s 
a
re
 v
ita
l 
fo
r m
in
in
g 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
bu
si
ne
ss
es
. U
se
rs
 a
re
 
m
u
lti
pl
e 
da
ta
ba
se
s 
w
ith
 a
 m
in
im
um
 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
u
n
a
w
a
re
 t
ha
t t
he
y 
a
re
 n
o
t 
in
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
di
sc
lo
su
re
. 
re
v
ie
w
 3
.6
) 
c
o
n
tr
ol
 o
f t
he
ir
 p
ri
va
te
 
in
fo
m
la
tio
n.
 I
nc
re
as
in
g 
pr
ac
tic
e 
o
f 
c
o
m
m
e
rc
ia
liz
in
g 
pr
iv
ac
y 
by
 p
ub
lic
ly
 b
us
in
es
se
s 
pr
og
re
ss
iv
eI
l' 
c
re
a
te
s 
n
e
w
 
ri
sk
s 
fo
r 
u
se
rs
 in
 r
e
tu
m
 f
or
 
[it
tle
 to
 n
o
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
o
r 
re
w
a
rd
. 
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. I
na
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
2 
Sy
st
em
 r
e
sp
on
se
 t
im
e 
is 
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 fo
r 
O
ne
 s
o
lu
tio
n 
fo
r 
e
x
a
m
pl
e 
is 
to
 u
se
 
en
cr
yp
ti
on
 
sl
ow
 w
he
n 
n
o
t 
u
si
ng
 
c
o
rp
or
at
e 
u
se
rs
, 
v
id
eo
 e
n
c
ry
pt
io
n 
a
lg
or
ith
m
s 
w
hi
ch
 
po
lic
y 
a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 e
n
c
ry
pt
io
n 
pa
rt
ia
l f
ul
fi
lli
ng
 o
r 
fo
cu
s 
o
n
 p
ro
te
ct
in
g 
th
e 
m
o
re
 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
po
lic
ie
s,
 a
n
d 
by
 
a
ba
nd
on
m
en
t o
f a
 
im
po
rt
an
t p
ar
ts
 o
f a
 v
id
eo
 s
tr
ea
m
, 
re
v
ie
w
 3
.9
) 
c
o
n
se
qu
en
ce
 th
e 
u
se
r 
ta
sk
. 
th
er
eb
y 
re
du
ci
ng
 th
e 
to
ta
l a
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
e
x
pe
ri
en
ce
 s
u
ff
er
s.
 
da
ta
 e
n
c
ry
pt
ed
 a
n
d 
pr
ov
id
in
g 
a 
fa
st
er
 
re
sp
on
se
 t
im
e 
w
hi
ch
 e
n
ha
nc
es
 th
e 
e
n
d-
us
er
 e
x
pe
ri
en
ce
. 
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20
. U
se
r 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
2 
Lo
ss
, m
is
us
e,
 m
o
di
fic
at
io
n 
o
r 
H
ig
he
r 
1. 
U
si
ng
 s
tr
on
g 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
in
se
cu
ri
ty
 
r
eg
ar
di
ng
 
se
n
si
tiv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
re
v
ie
w
 3
.\
0)
 
u
n
a
u
th
or
iz
ed
 a
c
c
e
ss
e
s 
to
 
se
n
si
tiv
e 
in
fo
nn
at
io
n 
(e.
g.,
 
so
c
ia
l s
e
c
u
rit
y 
n
u
m
be
rs
, 
c
re
di
t c
ar
d 
n
u
m
be
rs
, a
n
d 
dr
iv
er
 li
ce
ns
e 
n
u
m
be
rs
) 
n
e
ga
tiv
cl
y 
a
ff
ec
t t
he
 p
riv
ac
y 
o
f u
se
rs
 d
ep
en
di
ng
 o
n
 t
he
 
a
u
th
en
ti
ca
ti
on
 
"
a
ba
nd
on
m
en
t"
 
ra
te
s,
 p
al
ii
a\
 
fu
lf
il1
in
g 
o
r 
ta
sk
 
a
ba
nd
on
m
en
t. 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 a
n
d 
o
th
er
 a
c
c
e
ss
 c
o
n
tr
ol
s 
to
 m
a
ke
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
u
sa
bl
e 
by
 
a
u
th
or
iz
ed
 in
di
vi
du
al
s. 
2.
 
R
ed
uc
in
g 
th
e 
v
o
lu
m
e 
o
f c
o
lle
ct
ed
 
an
d 
re
ta
in
ed
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
to
 t
he
 
m
ll1
lm
U
m
 n
e
c
e
ss
a
ry
; 
3.
 
Li
m
iti
ng
 a
c
c
e
ss
 t
o 
o
n
ly
 th
os
e 
le
ve
l o
f s
e
n
si
tiv
ity
 a
n
d 
n
at
ur
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
w
ho
 m
u
st
 h
av
e 
su
c
h 
o
f t
he
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n.
 
a
c
c
e
ss
; 
4.
 
En
cr
yp
tin
g 
da
ta
. 
21
. F
ai
le
d 
a
n
d 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
3 
If
 u
se
rs
 f
or
ge
t 
th
ei
r 
PI
N
 
A
va
il
ab
il
it
yo
f 
If
 a 
c
a
rd
ho
ld
er
 b
lo
ck
s 
th
ei
r c
a
rd
 b
y 
a
n
n
o
yi
ng
 
(a
fte
r i
ns
er
ti
ng
 th
ei
r 
c
a
rd
s)
 
se
rv
Ic
es
. 
e
n
te
ri
ng
 a
n
 i
nv
al
id
 P
IN
, t
he
 
\o
gi
n 
th
e 
s
ys
te
m
 b
lo
ck
s 
u
se
rs
 
c
a
rd
ho
ld
er
 s
ho
ul
d 
ha
ve
 t
he
 c
a
pa
bi
li
ty
 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
a
ft
er
 3
 f
ai
le
d 
a
tt
em
pt
s 
to
 
to
 u
n
bl
oc
k 
th
e 
ca
rd
o 
W
he
n 
th
e 
re
v
ie
w
 4
.1
) 
lo
g 
o
n
. 
T
hi
s 
is
 e
x
tr
em
el
y 
c
a
rd
ho
ld
er
's
 c
a
rd
 is
 i
ni
tia
l1
y 
se
tu
p,
 a
 
a
n
n
o
yi
ng
 f
or
 u
se
rs
 a
n
d 
sp
ec
ia
l 
u
n
bl
oc
k 
c
o
de
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 
m
o
re
 a
gg
ra
va
ti
ng
 
ge
ne
ra
te
d,
 e
n
c
ry
pt
ed
 a
n
d 
th
e
n
 s
to
re
d 
e
sp
ec
ia
l1
y 
if
 th
ey
 a
re
 in
 a
 
in
 t
he
 c
a
rd
 m
a
n
a
ge
m
en
t s
ys
te
m
. 
hu
rr
y 
o
r 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
. 
33
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22
. F
ai
le
d 
a
n
d 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
3 
W
he
n 
tr
yi
ng
 to
 l
og
in
 u
si
ng
 
A
va
il
ab
il
it
yo
f 
M
os
t u
se
rs
 a
re
 m
u
c
h 
be
tte
r 
a
n
n
o
yi
ng
 
K
B
A
 o
v
e
r 
th
e 
ph
on
e,
 u
se
rs
 
se
rv
ic
es
. 
re
m
e
m
be
ri
ng
 4
-d
ig
it 
ra
n
do
m
 P
IN
s 
lo
gi
n 
w
he
n 
do
in
g 
K
B
A
 
n
e
e
d 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
 P
IN
 a
s 
a 
21
1d 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
fa
ct
or
 
th
an
 a
n
y 
o
th
er
 ty
pe
 o
f r
a
n
do
m
 
pa
ss
w
or
d.
 
o
v
e
r
 t
he
 
bu
t i
f t
he
y 
fo
rg
et
 th
ei
r 
PI
N
, 
If
us
er
s 
fo
rg
et
 th
ei
r P
IN
, p
ro
vi
de
 
te
le
ph
on
e 
th
ey
 w
ill
 n
e
e
d 
to
 g
o 
th
em
 w
ith
 th
e 
se
c
u
ri
ty
 q
ue
st
io
ns
 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
th
ro
ug
h 
o
th
er
 A
M
s 
in
 o
rd
er
 
o
pt
io
n 
to
 r
e
pl
ac
e 
th
e 
PI
N
. 
Fo
r 
re
v
ie
w
 4
.3
) 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 th
at
 2
11
d 
se
c
u
ri
ty
 r
e
a
so
n
s,
 i
f t
he
y 
do
n'
t 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
fa
ct
or
 
re
m
e
m
be
r t
he
m
 a
s 
w
e
il 
so
 u
s
er
s 
w
ill
 
(st
ro
ng
 au
th
en
tic
at
io
n)
. 
n
e
e
d 
to
 s
e
t 
u
p 
th
ei
r P
IN
 a
n
d/
or
 
Th
is
 is
 a
n
n
o
yi
ng
 to
 u
se
rs
 
se
c
u
ri
ty
 q
ue
st
io
ns
 a
t 
th
e 
br
an
ch
 o
r 
o
n
 
e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 i
f t
he
y 
fo
rg
et
 
th
e 
ph
on
e.
 U
se
rs
 w
ill
 r
e
c
e
iv
e 
th
ei
r 
e
v
e
ry
th
in
g 
so
 t
he
n 
th
ey
 w
ill
 
re
se
ts
 b
y 
m
a
il.
 A
dd
iti
on
al
ly
, u
se
rs
 
n
e
e
d 
to
 g
o 
to
 t
he
 b
ra
nc
h 
to
 
m
u
st
 e
n
su
re
 t
he
ir
 T
el
ep
ho
ne
 B
an
ki
ng
 
ha
ve
 th
ei
r c
re
de
nt
ia
ls
 re
se
t.
 
PI
N
 is
 n
o
t 
si
m
ila
r t
o 
th
ei
r 4
-d
ig
it 
PI
N
 
u
se
d 
fo
r M
T
M
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
. 
23
. S
lo
w
 a
n
d 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
2 
In
co
nv
en
ie
nc
e 
to
 u
se
rs
 
Sy
st
em
 
B
io
m
et
ri
cs
 c
a
n
 b
e 
u
se
d 
w
ith
 th
e 
c
a
rd
 
u
n
pr
ot
ec
te
d 
w
he
n
 o
n
-c
a
rd
 b
io
m
et
ri
c 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
, 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
 d
is
cu
ss
ed
 a
bo
ve
 (e
.g.
, 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 
m
a
tc
h 
is 
n
o
t 
pr
ov
id
ed
. 
in
te
ro
pe
ra
bi
lit
y,
 
sm
a
rt
 c
a
rd
s),
 w
he
re
 b
io
m
et
ri
c 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
T
he
re
 is
 a
 s
e
pa
ra
te
 p
hy
si
ca
l 
sc
a
la
bi
lit
y.
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is 
st
or
ed
 o
n
 t
he
 c
a
rd
 a
n
d 
re
v
ie
w
 4
.5
) 
a
c
c
e
ss
 c
o
n
tr
ol
 s
ys
te
m
 
th
en
 v
e
ri
fi
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
re
c
e
iv
ed
 
da
ta
ba
se
, m
a
n
a
ge
d 
by
 th
e 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
a
t 
th
e 
po
in
t o
f i
nt
er
ac
tio
n.
 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n,
 
O
n-
ca
rd
 b
io
m
et
ri
c 
m
a
tc
h 
is 
th
e 
w
hi
ch
 m
a
in
ta
in
s 
a
n
 
c
o
n
c
e
pt
 o
f e
ith
er
 m
a
tc
hi
ng
 a
n
d 
e
m
pl
oy
ee
's
 p
hy
si
ca
l a
c
c
e
ss
 
st
or
in
g 
ha
nd
 g
eo
m
et
ry
 o
r 
fi
ng
er
pr
in
t 
c
o
n
tr
ol
 p
ri
vi
le
ge
s 
a
n
d 
o
n
 a
 s
m
a
rt
 c
ar
do
 
is
su
es
 th
e 
pr
ox
im
ity
 c
ar
do
 
T
he
re
's
 n
o
 n
e
e
d 
o
f a
 d
at
ab
as
e.
 
M
at
ch
in
g 
ha
nd
 g
eo
m
et
ry
 (o
r 
fi
ng
er
pr
in
t) 
in
fo
nn
at
io
n 
in
 th
e 
c
a
rd
 
33
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re
m
o
v
e
s 
th
e 
u
n
c
e
rt
ai
nt
y 
o
f m
a
tc
hi
ng
 
o
n
 a
 n
e
tw
or
k-
co
nn
ec
te
d 
de
vi
ce
, a
n
 
e
x
te
rn
al
 s
e
rv
e
r,
 o
r 
a 
da
ta
ba
se
. T
hi
s 
pr
ov
id
es
 fa
st
er
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 
(p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
), 
u
se
r 
a
c
c
e
pt
an
ce
 a
n
d 
m
o
re
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
. 
O
n-
bi
om
et
ri
c 
c
a
rd
 m
a
tc
h 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 
is 
a 
go
od
 c
a
n
di
da
te
 to
 r
e
pl
ac
e 
PI
N
s 
an
d 
pa
ss
w
or
ds
 ir
re
sp
ec
tiv
e 
o
f t
he
 
ca
rd
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
, o
r 
th
e 
a
pp
lic
at
io
n.
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24
. D
iff
ic
ul
ty
 to
 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
2 
O
ve
rw
he
lm
 c
u
st
om
er
s 
w
ith
 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
, 
M
in
im
iz
e 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
hi
le
 k
ee
pi
ng
 
c
o
pe
 w
ith
 
di
ff
er
en
t 
co
m
pl
ex
ity
, h
ea
vy
 f1
0w
 o
f 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n,
 a
n
d 
m
em
o
ra
bi
lit
y 
a
v
a
il
ab
il
it
yo
f 
se
rv
Ic
es
. 
th
e 
m
o
st
 im
po
rt
an
t s
e
rv
ic
es
 a
l w
a
ys
 
a
v
a
ila
bl
e.
 R
ed
uc
e 
th
e 
n
u
m
be
r o
f 
c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
 
n
s 
ch
an
ne
ls
? 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
re
v
ie
w
 4
.1
0)
 
iss
ue
s 
w
he
n 
de
al
in
g 
w
ith
 
di
ffe
re
nt
 c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n 
ch
an
ne
ls.
 
Cu
sto
m
er
s 
ha
ve
 to
 m
an
ag
e 
co
m
pl
ex
ity
 w
he
n 
de
al
in
g 
w
ith
 
di 
ffe
re
nt
 s
er
v
ic
es
 o
ffe
re
d 
a
c
tio
ns
 r
e
qu
ir
ed
 to
 p
er
fo
rm
 th
e 
re
qu
ir
ed
 ta
sk
s.
 
Pr
ov
id
e 
o
th
er
 s
e
rv
ic
es
 b
y 
fl
ag
gi
ng
 a
s 
o
pt
io
na
l o
r 
c
u
st
om
iz
ab
le
 s
e
rv
ic
es
 b
ut
 
m
a
in
ta
in
 a
 c
o
lle
ct
io
n 
o
f"
co
re
 
th
ro
ug
h 
di
ffe
re
nt
 ty
pe
s 
o
f 
se
rv
ic
es
".
 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n 
ch
an
ne
ls 
su
ch
 
as
 M
TM
, W
eb
, a
n
d 
W
A
P.
 
A
lth
ou
gh
 it
 m
ig
ht
 b
e 
co
n
sid
er
ed
 a
 c
o
n
v
en
ie
nt
 
se
rv
ic
e 
w
he
n 
o
n
e 
do
es
 n
o
t 
ha
ve
 a
cc
es
s 
ph
ys
ic
al
ly
 to
 a
 
M
TM
, i
t d
oe
s 
pl
ac
e 
th
e 
bu
rd
en
 o
n 
th
e 
cu
st
om
er
 w
ith
 
re
ga
rd
s 
to
 t
he
 c
o
-o
rd
in
at
io
n 
o
f 
th
e 
M
TM
 w
ith
 th
e 
ce
ll 
ph
on
e. 
In
 a
dd
iti
on
, c
u
st
om
er
s 
w
ill
 
st
ill
 b
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 
au
th
en
tic
at
e 
to
 t
he
 s
ys
te
m
 b
y 
en
te
rin
g 
a 
PI
N
. U
nli
ke
 
pa
ss
wo
rd
s, 
PI
Ns
 h
av
e 
no
 
m
ea
ni
ng
 to
 th
e 
cu
sto
l11
er,
 a
nd
 
the
n 
it 
m
igh
l b
e e
ve
n 
ha
rd
er 
to
 
re
l11
el1
1b
er 
th 
an
 a
 p
as
sw
or
d 
(i.e
., 
pa
ss
w
or
ds
 c
an
 b
e c
re
ale
d 
10
 b
e 
pr
on
ou
nc
ea
bl
e).
 P
IN
s 
be
co
m
e 
ha
rd
er
 to
 r
em
el1
1b
er 
for
 
cll
slo
m
er
s 
w
ho
 h
av
e 
di
ffe
re
nl
 
on
es
 1
0 
ke
ep
 tr
ac
k 
of
. 
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25
. L
en
gt
hy
 
L
oa
d 
T
im
e 
2 
C
om
pu
ta
tio
na
l 
lo
ad
 is
 t
he
 
Sy
st
em
 
M
T
M
 s
ho
ul
d 
c
o
n
su
m
e
 m
in
im
um
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
le
ng
th
 o
f t
im
e 
n
e
e
de
d 
to
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
, 
c
o
m
pu
ta
tio
na
l 
lo
ad
. 
B
ut
 h
ow
 c
a
n
 t
he
 
co
m
pu
ta
tio
na
J 
c
a
rr
y 
o
u
t 
a 
c
o
m
pu
ta
tio
na
l 
pa
l1
ia
l 
fu
lf
ill
in
g 
o
r 
sy
st
em
'S
 o
w
n
e
r 
pr
ov
id
e 
fe
ed
ba
ck
 
Jo
ad
 
pr
oc
es
s.
 
ta
sk
 a
ba
nd
on
m
en
t. 
w
hi
le
 w
a
iti
ng
 f
or
 s
e
rv
e
r 
re
sp
on
se
s 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
U
se
rs
 g
et
 ir
ri
ta
te
d 
w
he
n
 a
 
w
he
n 
re
qu
ir
ed
? 
re
v
ie
w
 5
.2
) 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
o
r 
pa
ge
 ta
ke
s 
T
he
 fu
ll 
le
ng
th
 o
f a
n
 o
pe
ra
tio
n 
c
a
n
 b
e 
to
o 
m
u
c
h 
tim
e 
to
 l
oa
d 
o
n
 
de
te
rm
in
ed
 a
n
d 
yo
u 
c
a
n
 t
el
l 
th
e 
u
se
r 
th
e 
sc
re
e
n
. 
T
hi
s 
de
cr
ea
se
s 
ho
w
 m
u
c
h 
o
f t
he
 p
ro
ce
ss
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
th
e 
u
se
r 
e
x
pe
ri
en
ce
 
c
o
m
pl
et
ed
. 
si
gn
if
ic
an
tly
. A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 
A
 p
ro
gr
es
s 
in
di
ca
to
r 
he
lp
s 
m
a
in
ta
in
 
N
ie
ls
en
 (1
99
3)
, t
he
re
's
 a
 
th
e 
u
se
r'
s 
a
tt
en
tio
n,
 i
m
pr
ov
es
 th
e 
Iim
it 
o
fp
eo
pl
e'
s 
a
bi
lit
y 
to
 
u
se
r'
s 
u
n
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
o
f h
ow
 th
e 
ke
ep
 th
ei
r a
tt
en
tio
n 
fo
cu
se
d 
sy
st
em
 w
o
rk
s,
 a
n
d 
a
ls
o 
w
hi
le
 w
a
iti
ng
 w
hi
ch
 is
 n
o
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
es
 th
at
 th
e 
sy
st
em
 is
 s
til
l 
m
o
re
 t
ha
n 
te
n 
se
c
o
n
ds
 f
or
 
a
liv
e 
e
v
e
n
 i
f a
 r
e
sp
on
se
 h
as
n'
t y
et
 
W
eb
 p
ag
es
. 
o
c
c
u
rr
e
d.
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26
. S
lo
w
 
L
oa
d 
T
im
e 
2 
Pe
op
le
 a
re
 i
m
pa
ti
en
t a
t 
th
e 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
, 
Ja
va
 c
a
rd
 is
 a
 r
o
bu
st
 m
u
lti
fu
nc
tio
n 
c
a
rd
 
R
es
po
ns
e 
tim
e 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
re
v
ie
w
 5
.4
) 
M
T
M
. T
he
y 
a
re
 in
 a
 h
ur
ry
. 
T
he
y 
w
a
n
t 
to
 g
et
 th
in
gs
 
do
ne
. 
A
nd
, t
he
y 
do
 n
o
t 
w
a
n
t 
yo
u 
to
 w
a
s
te
 t
he
ir
 
ti
m
e.
 A
ny
th
in
g 
th
at
 s
lo
w
s 
a
v
a
il
ab
il
it
yo
f 
s
e
rv
ic
es
, p
ar
ti
al
 
fu
lf
il
li
ng
 o
r 
ta
sk
 
a
ba
nd
on
m
en
t. 
c
o
n
ta
in
in
g 
a 
c
ry
pt
og
ra
ph
ie
 p
ro
ce
ss
or
 a
n
d 
se
c
u
re
 s
to
ra
ge
 to
ke
n 
o
ff
er
in
g 
a 
so
lid
 
pl
at
fo
rm
 o
n
 w
hi
ch
 to
 s
e
c
u
re
ly
 s
to
re
 a
 
di
gi
ta
l h
an
d 
ge
om
et
ly
 (o
r f
in
ge
rp
ri
nt
) 
te
m
pl
at
e 
a
n
d 
to
 e
x
e
c
u
te
 a
n
 o
n
-c
a
rd
 
bi
om
et
ri
e-
m
at
ch
 f
un
ct
io
n.
 S
ee
 a
ls
o 
th
em
 d
ow
n 
w
ill
 f
ru
st
ra
te
 
th
em
. 
Sl
ow
 r
e
s
po
ns
e 
ti
m
e 
Pr
ob
le
m
 D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
23
. S
lo
w 
a
n
d 
u
n
pr
ot
ec
te
d 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 a
bo
ve
. 
c
a
n
 d
is
tr
ac
t u
se
rs
 i
n 
th
ei
r 
A
dd
iti
on
al
 m
e
a
su
re
s 
ar
e:
 T
o 
he
lp
 th
e 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
it
h 
th
e 
M
T
M
. 
sp
ee
d 
o
f r
e
tr
ie
va
l 
it 
is 
im
po
rt
an
t t
ha
t 
T
hi
s 
m
a
ke
s 
it 
m
o
re
 
o
n
ly
 e
ss
e
n
tia
l i
nf
om
1a
tio
n 
be
 d
is
pl
ay
ed
. 
a
n
n
o
yi
ng
 a
n
d 
di
ff
ic
ul
t f
or
 
G
ra
ph
ie
 im
ag
es
 u
su
a
lly
 c
a
u
se
 t
he
 M
T
M
 
u
se
rs
 t
o 
c
o
m
pl
et
e 
a 
sy
st
em
 to
 d
ow
nl
oa
d 
sl
ow
er
. 
In
 a
dd
iti
on
, 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
(i.
e. 
fu
nd
s 
tr
an
sf
er
) o
r 
pu
rs
ue
 o
th
er
 
go
al
s 
(e
.g
. b
uy
 a
 c
o
n
c
e
rt
 
ti
ck
et
). 
pa
ge
s 
bu
ilt
 w
ith
 to
o 
m
u
c
h 
c
o
de
 (l
on
g 
st
yl
e 
sh
ee
ts
, m
a
n
y 
sc
ri
pt
s,
 e
tc
.).
 A
n 
a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 b
al
an
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
sp
ee
d 
a
n
d 
de
si
gn
 f
or
 u
sa
bi
lit
y 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
c
st
ab
lis
he
d.
 
T
he
 id
ca
l s
ta
nd
ar
d 
gu
id
el
in
es
 f
or
 
re
sp
on
se
 ti
m
es
 a
c
c
o
rd
in
g 
to
 N
ie
ls
cn
 
(19
93
) a
re
 a
s 
fo
llo
w
s:
 
•
 
0.1
 s
ec
o
n
d 
(on
e t
en
th
 o
fa
 se
co
n
d):
 id
ea
l 
re
sp
on
se
 ti
m
e. 
Th
e 
u
se
r 
do
es
n't
 s
en
se
 
an
y 
in
te
rru
pt
io
n.
 
•
 
1 s
ec
o
n
d:
 h
ig
he
st 
ac
ce
pt
ab
le
 re
sp
on
se
 
tim
e. 
D
ow
nl
oa
d 
tim
es
 a
bo
ve
 1
 se
co
n
d 
in
te
rru
pt
 th
e 
u
se
r 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e.
 
•
 
10
 s
ec
o
n
ds
: u
n
ac
ce
pl
ab
le
 re
sp
on
se
 li
m
e. 
Th
e 
u
se
r 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
is 
in
tel
Tl
lp
ted
 a
t a
n 
al
ar
m
in
g 
hi
gh
 r
aI
e 
an
d 
th
e 
u
se
r 
is 
lik
el
y 
to
 le
av
e 
lh
e 
sit
e 
o
r 
sy
ste
m
. 
33
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. I
ne
xi
st
en
t 
L
oa
d 
T
im
e 
2 
If
 P
IN
 is
 f
or
go
tte
n,
 t
he
re
's
 
A
va
il
ab
il
it
yo
f 
T
he
 s
ys
te
m
 s
ho
ul
d 
pr
ov
id
e 
a
n
 
a
u
th
en
ti
ca
ti
on
 
n
o
 o
th
er
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
se
rv
ic
es
, t
as
k 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
sc
re
e
n
 t
ha
t p
ro
m
pt
s 
m
et
ho
d 
m
e
th
od
 o
pt
io
n 
to
 l
og
in
 to
 
a
ba
nd
on
m
e
n
t.
 
th
em
 to
 e
n
te
r 
th
ei
r 
PI
N
, a
n
d 
a 
lin
k 
o
pt
io
n 
th
e 
sy
st
em
. T
hi
s 
is 
th
at
 w
ill
 a
llo
w
 th
em
 to
 c
re
a
te
 t
he
ir
 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
a
n
n
o
yi
ng
 a
n
d 
to
ta
lly
 b
lo
ck
s 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
pr
of
ile
 a
ga
in
 a
n
d,
 th
us
, 
re
v
ie
w
 S
.l 
0) 
u
se
rs
 o
n
 t
he
ir
 g
oa
ls
. 
c
ho
os
e 
a 
n
e
w
 P
IN
 c
re
a
tin
g 
th
ei
r 
c
u
st
om
er
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
pr
of
ile
 a
ga
in
. 
28
. I
ne
xi
st
en
t 
L
oa
d 
T
im
e 
2 
C
he
ck
 im
ag
e 
qu
al
ity
, 
A
v
a
ila
bi
lit
y 
o
f 
M
ak
e 
u
se
 o
f a
 s
o
ft
w
ar
e 
th
at
 p
er
fo
rm
s 
im
ag
e 
qu
al
ity
 
u
sa
bi
lit
y 
a
n
d 
in
te
gr
ity
 a
re
 
se
rv
ic
es
, t
as
k 
a 
br
oa
d 
ra
n
ge
 o
f i
m
ag
e 
qu
al
ity
 a
n
d 
a
n
d 
im
ag
e 
u
n
do
ub
te
dl
y 
ho
t t
op
ic
s.
 
a
ba
nd
on
m
e
n
t.
 
u
sa
bi
lit
y 
te
st
s 
o
n
 e
a
c
h 
im
ag
e 
a
n
d 
u
sa
bi
lit
y 
Po
or
 q
ua
lit
y 
im
ag
es
 b
ri
ng
 
"
fl
ag
s"
 th
os
e 
ite
m
s 
w
hi
ch
 r
e
pr
es
en
t a
 
c
o
m
po
ne
nt
s 
e
x
po
su
re
 to
 f
ra
ud
 a
n
d 
qu
al
ity
, u
sa
bi
lit
y 
o
r 
n
e
go
tia
bi
lit
y 
ris
k 
in
 c
he
ck
 
lia
bi
lit
y 
is
su
es
. 
fo
r 
a 
fi
na
nc
ia
l 
in
st
itu
tio
n.
 T
he
 
im
ag
in
g 
A
is
o 
c
u
st
om
er
 is
 l
ik
el
y 
to
 
so
ft
w
ar
e 
sh
ou
ld
 a
ls
o 
a
dd
re
ss
 i
m
ag
e 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
be
lie
ve
 th
e 
sy
st
em
's
 o
w
n
e
r 
qu
al
ity
 c
o
n
c
e
m
s 
o
n
 b
ot
h 
a 
pe
r-
im
ag
e 
re
v
ie
w
 S
.I
I)
 
is 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
fo
r 
a
n
y 
a
n
d 
sc
a
n
n
e
r 
le
ve
l. 
T
hr
ou
gh
 th
is
 
qu
al
ity
 is
su
es
. C
le
ar
ly
, t
hi
s 
a
pp
ro
ac
h,
 s
ys
te
m
's
 o
w
n
e
r 
ha
s 
th
e 
w
ill
 n
e
ga
tiv
el
y 
im
pa
ct
 
a
bi
lit
y 
to
 "
c
a
tc
h-
an
d-
co
rr
ec
t"
 i
m
ag
e 
c
u
st
om
er
 c
o
n
fi
de
nc
e.
 
qu
al
ity
 a
n
d 
u
sa
bi
lit
y 
is
su
es
 b
ef
or
e 
th
ey
 b
ec
om
e 
c
o
n
c
e
rn
s.
 
Im
ag
e 
qu
al
ity
 re
v
ie
w
 fu
nc
tio
na
lit
y 
is 
a
ls
o 
e
ss
e
n
tia
l, 
a
llo
w
in
g 
fo
r p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
by
 r
e
v
ie
w
in
g 
im
ag
es
 r
e
c
e
iv
ed
 a
n
d 
re
jec
tin
g t
ho
se
 th
at
 a
re
 p
oo
r q
ua
lit
y 
a
n
d 
u
n
u
sa
bl
e.
 
A
ss
ur
an
ce
 e
n
su
re
s 
th
e 
im
ag
es
 y
ou
r 
in
sti
 tu
tio
n 
u
se
s 
fo
r 
fo
rw
ar
d 
pr
es
en
tm
en
t m
e
e
t 
th
e 
im
ag
e 
qu
al
ity
 
a
n
d 
u
sa
bi
lit
y 
de
fin
iti
on
s.
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29
. P
ri
va
cy
 a
n
d 
L
oa
d 
T
im
e 
2 
D
ES
 is
 n
o
t 
su
ita
bl
e 
fo
r 
A
v
a
ila
bi
lit
y 
o
f 
D
es
pi
te
 th
e 
st
re
ng
th
 o
f t
he
 D
ES
 
In
te
gr
at
io
n 
c
o
n
fi
de
nt
ia
l d
at
a.
 
se
rV
ic
es
, 
a
lg
or
ith
m
 Im
-g
ely
 u
se
d 
w
o
rl
dw
id
e,
 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
A
s 
a
lr
ea
dy
 m
e
n
tio
ne
d,
 
in
te
ro
pe
ra
bi
lit
y.
 
a
dv
an
ce
s 
in
 c
o
m
pu
te
r s
pe
ed
 a
n
d 
re
v
ie
w
 5
.1
2)
 
u
sa
bi
lit
y 
a
sp
ec
ts
 in
 th
is
 
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 p
ow
er
 a
re
 a
pp
ro
ac
hi
ng
 th
e 
c
a
se
 c
o
rr
e
sp
on
d 
to
 t
he
 
po
in
t w
he
re
 b
ru
te
-f
or
ce
 s
e
a
rc
he
s 
o
f 
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
or
 (n
ot
 E
nd
­
its
 5
6-
bi
t k
ey
 s
pa
ce
 c
a
n
 b
e 
U
se
r) 
le
ve
l. 
H
er
e 
a
re
 t
he
 
a
c
c
o
m
pl
is
he
d 
w
ith
in
 7
 d
ay
s 
(N
IS
T,
 
u
sa
bi
lit
y 
a
sp
ec
ts
: 
20
01
 ). 
•
 
3D
ES
 w
a
s 
th
e 
a
n
sw
e
r 
T
he
 r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
da
tio
n 
is 
to
 u
se
 t
he
 
to
 m
a
n
y 
o
f t
he
 
3D
ES
 a
lg
or
ith
m
 w
hi
ch
 a
n
sw
e
rs
 t
hi
s 
lim
ita
tio
ns
 o
f D
ES
. 
pr
ob
le
m
 b
y 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 th
e 
ke
y 
le
ng
th
 
Si
nc
e 
it 
is 
ba
se
d 
o
n
 t
he
 
to
 1
68
 b
its
. T
hi
s 
3D
ES
 
D
ES
, i
t i
s 
v
e
ry
 e
a
sy
 to
 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
w
a
s 
re
le
as
ed
 a
n
d 
m
o
di
fy
 e
x
is
tin
g 
de
sc
ri
be
d 
in
 A
N
SI
 (1
99
8)
. 
so
ft
w
ar
e 
to
 u
se
 3
D
ES
. 
3D
ES
 is
 a
n
 o
u
ts
ta
nd
in
g 
a
n
d 
re
lia
bl
e 
•
 
A
dv
an
ce
d 
En
cr
yp
tio
n 
c
ho
ic
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
se
c
u
ri
ty
 n
e
e
ds
 o
f 
St
an
da
rd
 (A
ES
) i
s 
th
e 
hi
gh
ly
 s
e
n
si
tiv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
su
bs
tit
ut
e 
fo
r 
D
ES
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
PI
N
 (i
f D
ES
 is
 u
se
d 
to
 
(N
IS
T,
 2
00
9)
 b
ut
 3
D
ES
 
e
n
c
ry
pt
 P
IN
 s
o
 P
IN
 is
 v
u
ln
er
ab
le
 to
 
w
ill
 b
e 
m
a
in
ta
in
ed
 fo
r 
a
tt
ac
k)
. 
c
o
m
pa
tib
i/i
ty
 r
e
a
so
n
s 
Fi
na
lly
, t
o 
im
pr
ov
e 
tr
an
sm
is
si
on
 
fo
r 
se
v
e
ra
l y
ea
rs
 a
ft
er
 
sp
ee
d 
o
f 3
D
ES
 th
er
e 
is 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 
th
at
. 
th
at
 e
n
a
bl
es
 it
 to
 r
e
du
ce
 b
ac
ku
p 
si
ze
s 
•
 
A
ES
 w
ill
 b
e 
a
t 
le
as
t a
s 
a
n
d 
sp
ee
d 
th
e 
tr
an
sm
is
si
on
 o
f t
he
 
st
ro
ng
 a
s 
3D
ES
 a
n
d 
c
u
st
om
er
's
 b
ac
ku
p 
v
ia
 th
e 
In
te
rn
et
 
pr
ob
ab
ly
 l7
1u
ch
fas
ter
. 
(Id
era
, 2
01
0)
. 
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30
. E
xt
en
si
ve
 
L
oa
d 
T
im
e 
2 
E
xt
en
si
ve
 a
u
to
m
at
ic
 lo
gs
 
A
va
il
ab
il
it
yo
f 
Se
t u
p 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 to
 t
yp
ic
al
ly
 n
o
 
a
u
to
m
at
ic
 
ta
ke
 a
 l
ot
 o
f p
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
se
rv
ic
es
, t
as
k 
a
u
to
m
at
ic
 !o
gs
 a
n
d 
c
o
n
fi
gu
re
 th
e 
a
u
di
t l
og
sl3
3 
tim
e,
 l
ow
er
in
g 
sy
st
em
 
a
ba
nd
on
m
en
t. 
sp
ec
if
ie
 ty
pe
s 
o
f a
u
di
t l
og
s 
th
e 
M
T
M
 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
pe
rf
on
na
nc
e,
 w
hi
ch
 c
a
n
 b
e 
sh
ou
ld
 r
e
c
o
rd
. M
ak
e 
a 
ba
la
nc
e 
re
v
ie
w
 5
.1
3)
 
fr
us
tr
at
in
g 
fo
r 
u
se
rs
. 
be
tw
ee
n 
n
o
 lo
gs
 a
n
d 
re
c
o
rd
in
g 
A
ut
om
at
ic
 lo
gs
 c
a
n
 b
e 
u
se
d 
sp
ec
if
ie
 ty
pe
s 
o
f l
og
s 
(i.
e. 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 s
o
ft
w
ar
e-
ba
se
d 
lo
gs
). 
pr
od
uc
ts
 to
 k
ee
p 
a 
re
c
o
rd
 
o
f a
ll 
u
se
r 
in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
 a
n
d 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 b
ut
 th
ey
 c
a
n
 
ha
ve
 th
e 
di
sa
dv
an
ta
ge
 th
at
 
th
ey
 w
ill
 a
ls
o 
pi
ck
 u
p 
a
c
c
id
en
ta
i a
c
tio
ns
. 
31
. M
em
or
ab
ili
ty
 
is
su
es
 w
ith
 
M
in
im
um
 
M
em
or
y 
2 
Th
e 
m
o
st
 c
o
m
m
o
n
 c
o
m
pu
te
r 
au
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
m
et
ho
d 
is 
to
 
A
va
il
ab
il
it
yo
f 
se
rv
ic
es
, t
as
k 
Th
e 
m
ai
n 
ar
gu
m
en
t f
or
 u
si
ng
 re
co
gn
iti
on
 
f
' 
l'
 
h' 
1 
d 
13
4 
o
 
v
isu
a 
Ite
m
s 
o
r 
gr
ap
 I
ca
 
pa
ss
w
or
 s
 .
 
a
lp
ha
nu
m
er
ic
al
 
L
oa
d 
u
se
 a
lp
ha
nu
m
cr
ic
al
 
a
ba
nd
on
 m
e
n
t.
 
is 
th
at
 p
eo
pl
e 
ar
e 
be
tte
r a
t 
m
em
o
riz
in
g 
u
se
r
n
a
m
e
s 
u
se
rn
am
es
 a
n
d 
pa
ss
w
or
ds
. I
t 
gr
ap
hi
ca
l p
as
sw
or
ds
 th
an
 te
xt
-b
as
ed
 
a
n
d 
ha
s 
be
en
 s
ho
w
n 
to
 h
av
e 
m
ajo
r 
pa
ss
w
or
ds
. A
no
th
er
 in
te
re
st
in
g 
fa
ct
 is
 
pa
ss
w
or
ds
 
a
u
th
en
ti
ca
ti
on
 
m
et
ho
d 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
re
v
ie
w
 6
.5
) 
dr
aw
ba
ck
s. 
Fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e, 
us
er
s 
ar
e 
in
cli
ne
d 
to
 c
ho
os
e 
pa
ss
w
or
ds
 
tha
t c
an
 b
e e
ffo
rtl
es
sly
 g
ue
ss
ed
. 
On
 th
e 
ot
he
r h
an
d, 
if 
a 
pa
ss
w
or
d 
is 
to
ug
h 
to
 g
ue
ss
, t
he
n 
it 
is 
fre
qu
en
tly
 to
ug
h 
to
 r
em
em
be
r. 
th
at
 it
 is
 m
o
rc
 d
iff
tc
ul
t t
o 
br
ea
k 
gr
ap
hi
ca
l 
pa
ss
w
or
ds
 u
si
ng
 th
e 
tr
ad
iti
on
al
 a
tt
ac
k 
m
et
ho
ds
 s
u
ch
 a
s 
br
ut
e 
fo
rc
e 
se
ar
ch
, 
di
ct
io
na
ry
 a
tta
ck
, o
r 
sp
yw
ar
e.
 
A
 g
ra
ph
ic
al
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
m
et
ho
d 
m
ig
ht
 
be
 a
 s
o
lu
tio
n.
 E
xa
m
pl
es
 a
re
 S
ite
K
ey
 
Fr
om
 B
an
k 
o
f A
m
er
ic
a,
 P
as
sf
ac
e,
 e
tc
. 
13
3 
Au
dit
 lo
g 
is 
a 
ch
ro
no
lo
gi
ca
l s
eq
ue
nc
e 
o
f a
ud
it 
re
co
rd
s, 
ea
ch
 o
f w
hi
ch
 c
on
ta
in
s 
ev
id
en
ce
 d
ire
ctl
y 
pe
rta
in
in
g 
to
 a
nd
 re
su
lti
ng
 fi
'om
 th
e 
ex
ec
u
tio
n 
o
f a
 b
us
in
es
s 
pr
oc
es
s 
or
 s
ys
tem
 f
un
cti
on
. 
Au
dit
 r
ec
or
ds
 t
yp
ica
lly
 r
es
ul
t 
Fr
om
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 s
uc
h 
as
 
tra
ns
ac
tio
ns
 o
r 
co
m
m
u
n
ica
tio
ns
 b
y 
in
di
vi
du
al 
~e
op
le
, 
sy
ste
m
s, 
ac
co
u
n
ts
 o
r 
ot
he
r e
n
tit
ies
. 
34
 
A
 g
ra
ph
ica
l 
pa
ss
w
or
d 
is 
an
 
au
th
en
tic
ati
on
 s
ys
tem
 t
ba
t 
w
or
ks
 b
y 
ha
vi
ng
 t
he
 u
se
r 
se
lec
t 
Fr
om
 i
m
ag
es
. 
in 
a 
sp
ec
ifi
e 
o
rd
er
, 
pr
es
en
ted
 1
11
 
a 
gr
ap
hi
ca
l u
se
r 
in
ter
fa
ce
 (G
UI
). 
Fo
r t
bis
 re
as
on
, 
the
 g
ra
ph
ica
l-p
as
sw
or
d 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 is
 s
om
et
im
es
 c
a 
lie
d 
gr
ap
hi
ca
l u
se
r 
au
th
en
tie
ati
on
 (G
UA
). 
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32
. F
ai
le
d 
to
 
R
es
ou
rc
e 
2 
U
se
rs
 c
a
n
 g
et
 s
u
rp
ri
se
d 
if
 fo
r 
A
va
il
ab
il
it
yo
f 
A
ut
om
at
ic
 u
pd
at
es
 p
us
he
d 
to
 t
he
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
e 
u
pd
at
es
 m
a
de
 
r
eg
ar
di
ng
 
Sa
fe
ty
 
e
x
a
m
pl
e 
a 
n
e
w
 e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 
a
c
c
e
ss
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
m
e
th
od
 h
as
 
be
en
 i
nt
ro
du
ce
d 
in
 t
he
 s
ys
te
m
 
a
n
d 
th
er
e 
w
a
s 
n
o
 p
ri
or
 
se
rv
ic
es
, u
se
rs
' 
in
se
cu
ri
ty
, 
di
sc
om
fo
rt
. 
sy
st
em
. 
Se
nd
 o
u
t 
n
o
tif
ic
at
io
ns
/u
pd
at
es
 
c
o
n
c
e
m
in
g 
se
c
u
ri
ty
 s
e
rv
ic
es
 to
 
la
te
st
 s
ec
u
ri
ty
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n 
a
bo
ut
 il
. 
U
se
rs
 
c
u
st
om
er
s 
by
 m
a
il,
 e
m
a
il,
 o
r 
pr
ov
id
e 
se
rv
ic
es
 
c
a
n
 b
e 
in
se
cu
re
 o
r 
u
n
su
re
 i
ft
he
y 
a 
lin
k 
in
 t
he
 M
T
M
's
 W
el
co
m
e 
pa
ge
 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
re
v
ie
w
 7
.2
) 
a
re
 p
er
fo
rm
in
g 
th
e 
ri
gh
t 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
m
e
th
od
. G
oo
d 
c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n 
e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 
to
 t
he
 S
ec
ur
ity
 U
pd
at
e 
Se
rv
ic
e 
se
c
tio
n 
in
 t
he
 M
T
M
. 
re
la
te
d 
to
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 f
ie
ld
 i
s 
c
ru
c
ia
l 
to
w
ar
ds
 c
u
st
om
er
s.
 
33
. N
o 
R
ev
er
se
 
R
es
ou
rc
e 
4 
C
us
to
m
er
 is
 a
bl
e 
to
 s
e
n
d 
a 
U
se
r 
ph
ys
ic
al
 
T
he
 a
do
pt
io
n 
o
f a
 R
ev
er
se
 P
IN
 f
or
 
PI
N
 a
v
a
ila
bl
e 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
re
v
ie
w
 7
.4
) 
Sa
fe
ty
 
si
le
nt
 a
la
rm
 u
si
ng
 a
 
R
ev
er
se
 P
IN
 i
n 
re
sp
on
se
 to
 
a 
th
re
at
 a
t 
th
e 
M
T
M
 a
n
d 
se
c
u
ri
ty
, s
ys
te
m
 
tr
us
t.
 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 a
id
s 
u
se
rs
 in
 r
e
m
e
m
be
ri
ng
 il
. 
So
 
if
 th
e 
PI
N
 is
 2
63
7 
u
se
rs
 e
n
te
rs
 7
36
2.
 T
hi
s 
w
o
u
ld
 a
v
o
id
 h
av
in
g 
a 
n
e
w
 e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 P
IN
 
is
su
ed
 a
n
d 
th
e 
bo
th
er
so
m
e 
ta
sk
 to
 u
se
rs
 t
o 
ge
t h
el
p 
fr
om
 t
he
 b
an
k.
 
re
m
e
m
be
r a
n
o
th
er
 P
IN
. 
U
se
rs
 h
av
e 
di
ff
ic
ul
ty
 
M
TM
 R
ev
er
se
 P
IN
. 
re
m
e
m
be
ri
ng
 P
IN
s 
e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 u
n
de
r p
re
ss
ur
e.
 
A
ft
er
 u
se
r 
e
n
te
rs
 t
he
 c
o
rr
e
c
t 
PI
N
 in
 r
e
v
e
rs
e
 
o
rd
er
. t
he
 a
c
c
o
u
n
t-
ho
ld
er
's
 is
 a
u
to
m
at
ic
al
ly
 
lo
ck
ed
 a
n
d 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 t
ri
gg
er
s 
a
n
 e
rr
o
r 
m
e
ss
a
ge
 o
n
 t
he
 s
c
re
e
n
 s
a
yi
ng
 th
at
 th
e 
u
se
r'
s 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t 
ha
s 
be
en
 l
oc
ke
d.
 A
t 
th
e 
sa
m
e
 t
im
e 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 a
ls
o 
di
al
s 
th
e 
pr
ec
on
fi
gu
re
d 
N
at
io
na
l 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 F
or
ce
 n
u
m
be
r 
to
 h
av
e 
th
e 
ro
bb
er
 tr
ap
pe
d.
 T
hi
s 
is 
c
le
ar
ly
 a
 r
e
so
u
rc
e
 
sa
fe
ty
 f
ea
tu
re
 t
ha
t 
M
T
M
 o
ff
er
s 
to
 it
s 
c
u
st
om
er
s.
 
T
o 
u
n
lo
ck
 u
se
r'
s 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t,
 h
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
re
qu
ir
ed
 
to
 m
a
ke
 a
 p
ho
ne
 c
a
li 
to
 c
u
st
om
er
 s
e
rv
ic
e 
pr
ov
id
in
g 
fo
r 
e
x
a
m
pl
e 
se
c
u
ri
ty
 q
ue
st
io
ns
 a
s 
a
n
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
m
e
c
ha
ni
sm
 
a
n
d/
or
 c
o
n
fi
rm
in
g 
hi
s 
pr
iv
at
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
st
or
ed
 in
 t
he
 s
ys
te
m
 o
w
n
e
r"
s 
da
ta
ba
se
. 
34
2

 
34
. L
ac
k 
o
f 
R
es
ou
rc
e 
2 
A
s 
w
ir
el
es
s 
de
vi
ce
s 
U
se
r s
a
tis
fa
ct
io
n,
 
Sy
st
em
's 
o
w
n
e
r 
sh
ou
ld
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
s 
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
Sa
fe
ty
 
be
co
m
e 
pr
og
re
ss
iv
el
y 
m
o
re
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
, u
se
r 
m
u
c
h 
a
c
c
e
ss
 a
s 
n
e
e
de
d 
to
 t
he
ir
 
w
ith
 w
ir
el
es
s 
pe
rv
as
iv
e 
a
n
d 
e
ss
e
n
tia
l 
in
 
ph
ys
ic
al
 s
e
c
u
rit
y.
 
c
u
st
om
er
s 
pr
ov
id
in
g 
c
o
n
n
e
c
tiv
ity
 
n
et
w
or
k 
th
e 
u
se
rs
' 
liv
es
 s
o
 is
 t
he
ir
 
a
n
yw
he
re
 a
n
d 
a
n
yt
im
e 
e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 in
 
(U
sa
bi
lit
y 
n
e
e
d 
fo
r c
o
n
st
an
t 
th
e 
c
a
se
 o
f u
se
r 
e
m
e
rg
en
ci
es
. 
re
v
ie
w
 7
.7
) 
c
o
n
n
e
c
tio
n 
to
 d
iff
er
en
t 
U
se
rs
 c
a
n
 s
e
n
d 
a 
R
ev
er
se
 P
IN
 f
ro
m
 
n
e
tw
or
ks
 s
u
c
h 
as
 I
nt
er
ne
t, 
th
ei
r w
ir
el
es
s 
de
vi
ce
s 
th
ro
ug
h 
Sh
or
t 
c
o
rp
or
at
e 
n
e
tw
or
k,
 e
tc
. 
M
es
sa
ge
 S
er
vi
ce
 (S
M
S)
in
 th
e 
c
a
se
 o
f 
W
he
n 
se
n
di
ng
 a
 s
ile
nt
 
M
T
M
 s
ys
te
m
 f
ai
lu
re
 (i
.e.
 u
se
r 
a
la
rm
 fr
om
 a
n
 M
T
M
 
c
o
n
v
e
n
ie
nc
e 
a
n
d 
ph
ys
ic
al
 s
e
c
u
rit
y)
. 
e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
Th
is
 s
e
rv
ic
e 
is 
o
n
ly
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
fo
r 
in
st
al
le
d 
in
 th
e 
w
ir
el
es
s 
c
u
st
om
er
s 
w
ho
 h
av
e 
su
bs
cr
ib
ed
 to
 it
 
de
vi
ce
, u
se
rs
' 
de
vi
ce
s 
c
a
n
 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
ba
nk
. S
ee
 a
ls
o 
be
 c
o
m
pr
om
is
ed
 a
s 
c
a
n
 
Pr
ob
le
m
 D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
33
. N
o 
R
ev
er
se
 
M
T
M
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
. 
PI
N
 a
v
a
ila
bl
e,
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
. 
U
se
rs
 a
re
 a
bl
e 
to
 s
e
n
d 
a 
si
le
nt
 a
la
rm
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
M
T
M
's
 e
m
e
rg
en
cy
 
a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
fr
om
 t
he
ir
 
m
o
bi
le
 d
ev
ic
es
. 
343 
5.4.2.2.2 Security Severity Ratings 
The security severity ratings are based on six aspects in the USS: 
•	 authentication (i.e. user identity proofing and verification). 
•	 confidentiality (i.e. information is not made available or disclosed to 
unauthorized individuals, entities or processes). 
•	 integrity (i.e., data has not been modified or destroyed 10 an unauthorised 
manner). 
•	 non-repudiation (i.e., the author of a document cannot later cJaim not to be the 
author; the "document" may be an e-mail message, or a credit-card order, or 
anything that might be sent over a network). 
•	 access Control (i.e., granting access to data or performing an action; an 
authentication method is used to check a user login, then the access control 
mechanism grants and revokes privileges based on predefined rules). 
•	 availability (i.e., a computer system as set must be available to authorized 
parties when needed). 
The 4 ta I (Critical ta Law) rating scale can be employed to rate the severity of 
security probJems. It has been developed by taking into account the work done in 
Section 3.2.2.4 Step 4: Develop the Authentication Risk Assessment Matrix. The 
rating scale is described as follows: 
•	 4=Critical Impact: 
oThis rating is set to fiaws that could be effortlessly exploited by a 
remote unauthenticated attacker and lead to system compromise (e.g., 
arbitrary code execution l3S ) without involving user interaction. These 
categories of vulnerabilities can be exploited by worms. However 
135 Arbilrary code execulion is employed 10 describe an attacker's abilily to execule any commands of 
the attacker's choice on a large! machine or in a large! process. 
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flaws that involve an authenticated remote user, a local user, or an 
improbable configuration would not be categorized as Criticallmpact. 
• 3=lmportant Impact: 
oThis rating is set to flaws that can effortlessly compromise the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of resources. These categories 
of vulnerabilities aJJow the following: local users to gain privileges, 
unauthenticated remote users to view resources that should be secured 
by authentication, authenticated remote users to perform arbitrary 
code, or local or remote users to effortlessly originate a denial of 
servIce. 
• 2=Moderate Impact: 
oThis rating is set to flaws that might be harder or more improbable to 
be exploitable but given the right conditions could still lead to sorne 
compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 
resources. These categories of vulnerabilities are the ones that may 
wei] have had a Critica/ impact or Important impact but are less 
effortlessly exploited based on a technical evaluation of the flaw, or 
have an effect on improbable configurations. 
• i=Low impact: 
oThis rating is set to ail other issues that include a security impact. 
These categories of vulnerabilities require improbable circumstances 
ta be capable of being exploited, or where a successful exploit would 
entai] negligible consequences. 
Table 5.6 presents an example of security problems related to usability criteria 
and their severity rates for a MTM. 
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Problem Name of Severity Explanation Relationships Recommendations 
Description the 
usability 
criterion 
Rate of the 
Security 
Issue 
with other 
problems 
MTM requires Minimal 2 Systems A 2-factor Remove PIN as a 
only a PIN Action requiring only authentication rcquircment and 
(and the smart a PIN and is not as implcment a 
card) when smart card strong for biometric 
us mg common (2-factor authcntication authentication 
functionalities. authentication) as it was 5 mcthod (e.g., 
ha ve became a years ago (or fingerprint) used 
pretty less). in conjunction 
common with the smaJ1 
authentication cardo This will 
method and ease user 
more interaction and 
exploitable by improve security. 
hackers. As 
technology 
advances, 
modern 
hackers are 
increasingly 
more 
malicious and 
savvy. 
Table 5.6: Example of a security problem and its usability criterion and severity rate. 
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N
s 
to
 u
se
rs
 
e
x
ha
us
tiv
e 
se
a
rc
h 
o
r 
a
tt
em
pt
s,
 th
e 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t 
o
f t
he
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
di
ct
io
na
ry
 a
tt
ac
ks
) i
fc
ue
s 
u
se
r 
is 
lo
ck
ed
 fo
r s
o
rn
e
 t
im
e.
 
re
v
ie
w
 1
.1
2)
 
a
re
 g
iv
en
 to
 u
se
rs
. 
T
he
se
 
D
el
ay
ed
 R
es
po
ns
e:
 t
he
 s
e
rv
e
r 
a
tt
ac
ks
 a
re
 d
iff
ic
ul
t t
o 
pr
ov
id
es
 a
 d
el
ay
ed
 r
e
sp
on
se
 to
 t
he
 
c
o
n
tr
ol
 a
n
d 
he
nc
e 
po
se
 a
 
u
se
r 
re
qu
es
t (
e.g
., 
n
o
t 
fa
st
er
 th
an
 o
n
e
 
m
a
jor
 pr
ob
le
m
 in
 th
e 
a
n
sw
e
r 
pe
r s
e
c
o
n
d)
. 
fu
nc
tio
ni
ng
 o
f p
as
sw
or
d 
Ad
op
t C
AP
TC
H
A 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n:
 o
n
e
 
ba
se
d 
sy
st
em
s.
 
o
f i
ts 
v
e
rs
io
ns
 a
llo
w
s 
u
se
rs
 t
o 
T
he
 li
ke
lih
oo
d 
o
f 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
e 
as
 a
 h
um
an
 b
y 
re
m
e
m
be
ri
ng
 s
e
v
e
ra
l 
re
c
o
gn
iz
in
g 
w
ha
t o
bje
ct 
is 
c
o
m
m
o
n
 
pa
ss
w
or
ds
 is
 n
o
t 
at
 a
il 
th
at
 
in
 a
 s
e
t o
f i
m
ag
es
 -
im
ag
e-
ba
se
d 
gr
ea
t. 
H
al
f t
he
 p
eo
pl
e 
w
ho
 
re
c
o
gn
iti
on
. T
hi
s 
is 
e
a
sy
 fo
r 
hu
m
an
s 
sa
y 
th
ey
 n
e
v
e
r 
w
ri
te
 d
ow
n 
to
 r
e
sp
on
d 
to
 b
ut
 ra
th
er
 d
iff
ic
ul
t f
or
 
th
ei
r p
as
sw
or
ds
 u
su
a
lly
 
c
o
m
pu
te
rs
 to
 a
n
sw
e
r.
 It
 is
 u
se
fu
l 
n
e
e
d 
ta
 h
av
e 
th
ei
r 
n
o
tin
g 
he
re
 th
at
 a
n
 o
n
lin
e 
a
tt
ac
ke
r i
s 
pa
ss
w
ar
ds
 r
e
se
t 
be
ca
us
e 
a
f 
fu
nd
am
en
ta
lly
 a
 p
ro
gr
am
m
ed
 
fa
rg
et
tin
g.
 
c
o
m
pu
te
r. 
U
se
rs
 g
et
 fr
us
tra
te
d 
if
 th
ey
 
c
a
n
n
o
t 
la
gi
n 
ta
 t
he
 s
ys
te
m
 
gi
ve
n 
th
at
 th
ey
 h
av
e 
a 
sp
ec
if
ie
 g
oa
l t
a 
a
c
hi
ev
e 
(e.
g. 
w
ith
dr
aw
 m
a
n
e
y)
. 
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4. 
U
ns
ec
ur
e 
M
in
im
al
 
3 
W
he
ne
ve
r 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 
Pe
rf
on
na
nc
e,
 
A
 s
im
pl
e 
a
n
d 
se
c
u
re
 s
o
lu
tio
n 
by
 s
til
l 
de
fa
ul
t c
o
o
ki
es
 
A
ct
io
n 
pr
ov
id
es
 f
ie
ld
s 
th
at
 a
lr
ea
dy
 
a
v
a
il
ab
il
it
yo
f 
u
si
ng
 c
o
o
ki
es
 is
 t
he
 o
n
e
 w
hi
ch
 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
ha
ve
 v
a
lu
es
, t
he
 s
ys
te
m
 
se
rV
ic
es
, u
se
r 
in
di
ca
te
s 
th
at
 th
e 
c
o
o
ki
e 
sh
ou
ld
 o
n
ly
 
re
V
le
w
 
sh
ou
ld
 r
e
du
ce
 th
e 
tim
e 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n.
 
be
 a
c
c
e
ss
ib
le
 v
ia
 S
SL
 o
n
 a
 p
ag
e 
u
si
ng
 
1. 
14
/1
.1
5)
 
u
se
rs
 s
pe
nd
 ty
pi
ng
 a
n
d 
th
e 
H
T
T
PS
 p
ro
to
co
l. 
A
li 
o
th
er
 d
ef
au
lt 
im
pr
ov
e 
th
ei
r 
a
c
c
u
ra
c
y.
 
a
sp
ec
ts
 o
f t
he
 c
o
o
ki
e 
re
m
a
in
 th
e 
U
se
rs
 c
a
n
 s
til
l o
v
e
rr
id
e 
th
e 
sa
rn
e
. 
T
o 
se
t 
a 
se
c
u
re
 c
o
o
ki
e 
c
o
de
, 
de
fa
ul
t v
a
lu
es
, i
fr
eq
ui
re
d.
 
u
se
 t
he
 "
se
c
u
re
" 
o
pt
io
n 
w
hi
ch
 c
re
a
te
s 
a 
se
c
u
re
 c
o
o
ki
e 
by
 s
e
tt
in
g 
th
e 
"
se
c
u
re
" 
o
pt
io
n 
to
 t
ru
e.
 A
s 
m
e
n
tio
ne
d,
 th
is
 s
o
lu
tio
n 
w
ill
 o
n
ly
 
w
o
rk
 i
f t
he
 p
ag
e 
c
a
ll
in
g 
th
is
 c
o
de
 
u
se
s 
th
e 
H
T
T
PS
 p
ro
to
co
l, 
o
th
er
w
is
e 
th
e 
c
o
o
ki
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
ge
ne
ra
te
d 
w
ith
 
de
fa
ul
t o
pt
io
ns
. 
5. 
U
ns
af
e 
PI
N
 
M
in
im
al
 
1 
PI
N
s 
ta
ke
 le
ss
 t
im
e 
to
 e
n
te
r 
A
v
a
ila
bi
lit
y 
o
f 
So
rn
e 
re
c
o
m
m
e
n
da
tio
ns
 f
or
 f
ra
ud
 
c
r
e
de
nt
ia
l 
A
ct
io
n 
th
an
 p
as
sw
or
ds
. T
he
y 
a
re
 
se
rv
ic
es
, b
ac
k-
en
d 
pr
ev
en
tio
n 
a
re
 t
he
 f
ol
lo
w
in
g:
 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
c
o
n
si
de
re
d 
lo
w
-s
ec
ur
ity
 
e
ff
ec
ti
v
e
n
e
ss
, 
P
IN
 C
ha
ng
e 
P
r%
co
/:
 
re
v
ie
w
 1
.1
7)
 
c
o
m
pa
re
d 
to
 p
as
sw
or
ds
. 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
. 
A
ny
tim
e 
a 
c
u
st
om
er
 c
a
lls
 th
e 
PI
N
s 
a
re
 s
e
ld
om
 e
m
pl
oy
ed
 
C
us
to
m
er
 S
er
vi
ce
 C
en
te
r t
o 
a
c
c
e
ss
 
a
s 
th
e 
o
n
ly
 f
O
lm
 o
f 
a
c
c
o
u
n
ts
, 
in
fO
lm
at
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
fo
r 
a 
sy
st
em
 
re
qu
es
te
d 
su
c
h 
a
s 
th
e 
m
o
st
 r
e
c
e
n
t 
a
c
c
e
ss
 (i
.e.
 o
n
e
-f
ac
to
r 
st
at
em
en
t 
ba
la
nc
e 
o
r 
th
e 
a
n
sw
e
r 
to
 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n)
. 
c
u
st
om
er
-s
el
ec
te
d 
se
c
u
ri
ty
 q
ue
st
io
ns
 
B
es
id
es
 w
e
a
k 
P
IN
 C
ha
ng
e 
to
 v
e
ri
fy
 th
e 
id
en
tit
y 
o
f t
he
 c
u
st
om
er
. 
pr
%
co
ls
, a
 c
o
rn
m
o
n
 t
hr
ea
t 
C
us
to
m
er
 re
pr
es
en
ta
tiv
es
 m
u
st
 n
o
t 
is 
P
IN
 S
el
ec
tio
n:
 A
li 
it 
pr
ov
id
e 
a
n
y 
pe
rs
on
al
 i
nf
on
na
ti
on
 o
r 
ta
ke
s 
is 
a 
st
ol
en
 S
oc
ia
l 
m
a
ke
 c
ha
ng
es
 to
 a
 c
u
st
om
er
's
 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 n
u
m
be
r a
n
d 
so
rn
e
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t 
w
ith
ou
t v
e
ri
fy
in
g 
th
ei
r 
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1

 
o
th
er
 p
ri
va
te
 in
fo
nn
at
io
n 
id
en
tit
y.
 F
in
ai
ly
, i
t m
u
st
 b
e 
fo
rb
id
de
n 
Ce
.g
., 
m
o
th
er
's
 m
a
id
en
 
to
 c
ha
ng
e 
c
u
st
om
er
-s
e1
ec
te
d 
PI
N
s 
a
t 
n
a
m
e
) a
n
d 
an
 a
tt
ac
ke
r c
a
n
 
a
n
y 
tim
e 
by
 te
1e
ph
on
e.
 
c
a
il 
a
n
 in
st
itu
tio
n 
pr
et
en
di
ng
 to
 b
e 
a 
P
IN
 S
el
ec
tio
n:
 
1e
gi
tim
at
e 
u
se
r 
re
qu
es
tin
g 
a 
T
he
se
 d
ay
s,
 th
e 
a
v
e
ra
ge
 u
se
r 
m
u
st
 
PI
N
 c
ha
ng
e.
 O
nc
e 
th
e 
re
m
e
m
be
r a
 p
1e
th
or
a 
o
f P
IN
s 
a
n
d 
a
tt
ac
ke
r h
as
 th
e 
PI
N
 
pa
ss
w
or
ds
. 
N
ev
er
th
e1
es
s,
 th
e 
be
st
 
c
ha
ng
ed
, s
he
 c
a
n
 a
c
c
e
ss
 a
il 
de
fe
ns
e 
a
ga
in
st
 b
ec
om
in
g 
th
e 
v
ic
tim
 
th
e 
u
se
r'
s 
a
c
c
o
u
n
ts
 t
he
 
o
f f
ra
ud
 c
a
n
 b
e 
se
1e
ct
in
g 
a 
PI
N
 o
r 
sy
st
em
 h
as
 ti
ed
 to
 t
ha
t P
IN
 
pa
ss
w
or
d 
th
at
 is
 n
o
t 
e
a
si
ly
 g
ue
ss
ed
. 
n
u
m
be
r. 
A
no
th
er
 th
re
at
 is
 
Au
to
m
al
ed
 P
IN
 C
he
ck
in
g:
 
Au
to
m
at
ed
 P
IN
 C
he
ck
in
g.
 
Lo
ck
 a
c
c
e
ss
 t
o 
an
 a
c
c
o
u
n
t 
a
ft
er
 th
re
e 
So
m
e 
ha
ck
er
s 
em
p1
0y
 m
o
re
 
in
co
n'
ec
t P
IN
 a
tt
em
pt
s.
 T
o 
u
n
1o
ck
, a
 
hi
gh
-t
ec
h 
m
e
th
od
s 
to
 
e
u
s
to
m
er
 m
u
st
 c
ai
l a
n
d 
v
e
ri
fy
 th
ei
r 
di
sc
ov
er
 y
ou
r 
PI
N
 n
u
m
be
r. 
id
en
tit
y.
 
C
om
pu
te
rs
 c
a
n
 b
e 
e
m
p1
0y
ed
 to
 r
u
n
 h
un
dr
ed
s 
o
f c
o
m
bi
na
tio
ns
 o
f a
c
c
o
u
n
t 
n
u
m
be
rs
 a
n
d 
PI
N
s 
at
 h
ig
h 
sp
ee
d 
u
n
ti1
 t
he
 e
x
a
c
t 
PI
N
 is
 
e
n
te
re
d.
 
35
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6. 
Ph
ys
ic
al
 a
n
d 
M
in
im
al
 
2 
A
lth
ou
gh
 a
 3
-f
ac
to
r 
U
bi
qu
ito
us
 
Ph
ys
ic
a/
 A
cc
es
s 
C
on
tr
ol
 
L
og
ic
al
 A
cc
es
s 
A
ct
io
n 
au
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
is 
u
se
d 
(ha
nd
 
co
m
pu
tin
g 
(i.e
., 
au
th
en
tic
at
es
 in
di
vi
du
al
s 
an
d 
pe
rm
its
 
D
im
in
is
he
d 
ge
om
et
ry
), 
it 
is 
n
o
t 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 re
tr
ea
ts
 
ac
ce
ss
 t
o 
ph
ys
ic
al
ly
 s
ec
u
re
 a
re
as
. 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
u
si
ng
 a
 
io
to
 th
e 
Lo
gi
ca
/ A
cc
es
s 
C
on
tr
ol
 in
 tu
m
 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
co
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
 
ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
 o
f o
u
r 
au
th
en
tic
at
es
 in
di
vi
du
al
s 
an
d 
pe
rm
its
 
re
v
ie
w
 1
.2
1) 
w
hi
ch
 a
ff
ec
ts
 p
er
fo
m
1a
nc
e 
liv
es
), 
ac
ce
ss
 t
o 
ac
co
u
n
ts
 a
n
d 
n
et
w
or
ks
. 
an
d 
se
cu
rit
y.
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
, a
n
d 
Fo
r p
hy
sic
al
 a
cc
es
s 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
, 
re
l ia
bi
1it
y.
 
co
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
re
lia
bl
e 
th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 (i
.e.
 in
te
rc
ha
ng
e 
o
f d
at
a).
 If
bi
om
et
ric
s 
is 
u
se
d,
 th
e 
th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 a
dv
an
ta
ge
s 
o
ff
er
ed
 b
y 
co
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
 a
re
 d
ec
re
as
ed
, 
bu
t t
he
 s
tr
en
gt
h 
o
f s
ec
u
rit
y 
an
d 
au
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
is 
in
cr
ea
se
d.
 
A
s 
al
re
ad
y 
st
re
ss
ed
, u
sa
bl
e 
se
cu
rit
y 
in
vo
lv
es
 tr
ad
eo
ffs
 b
et
w
ee
n 
se
cu
rit
y 
an
d 
u
sa
bi
lit
y.
 A
s 
th
e 
au
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
m
et
ho
d 
u
se
d 
is 
bi
om
et
ric
 w
hi
ch
 is
 
co
n
si
de
re
d 
qu
ite
 u
sa
bJ
e 
th
er
e'
s 
n
o
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 im
pa
ct
 in
 th
e 
u
sa
bi
lit
y 
st
an
dp
oi
nt
. 
A
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 u
sin
g 
co
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 s
m
ar
t 
ca
rd
s 
su
pp
or
t m
an
y 
se
cu
rit
y 
fe
at
ur
es
 
th
at
 e
n
su
re
 t
he
 in
te
gr
ity
, 
co
n
fid
en
tia
lit
y 
an
d 
pr
iv
ac
y 
o
f 
in
f0
ll1
1a
tio
n 
st
or
ed
 o
r 
tr
an
sm
itt
ed
, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g:
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1.	
 
En
ha
nc
es
 S
ec
ur
ity
: 
A
 k
ey
 s
m
a
rt
 
c
a
rd
 a
dv
an
ta
ge
 is
 i
ts 
c
a
pa
bi
lit
y 
to
 
c
a
rr
y 
e
ith
er
 a 
di
gi
ta
l c
e
rt
if
ic
at
e 
o
r 
a 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
te
m
pl
at
e 
to
 e
n
ha
nc
e 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
o
f t
he
 c
a
rd
ho
ld
er
's 
id
en
tit
y.
 S
m
ar
t c
a
rd
s 
pr
ov
id
e 
th
e 
to
ol
s 
to
 e
n
a
bl
e 
m
o
re
 s
e
c
u
re
 
a
c
c
e
ss
 t
o 
bu
ild
in
gs
, s
e
c
u
re
 a
re
a
s,
 
a
n
d 
e
le
ct
ro
ni
c 
sy
st
em
s.
 T
he
 s
m
a
rt
 
c
a
rd
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
a 
se
c
u
re
 t
ok
en
 to
 
ho
ld
 th
e 
ke
y 
pa
irs
 th
at
 e
n
a
bl
e 
th
e 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
o
f t
he
 r
e
c
ip
ie
nt
 a
n
d 
o
ri
gi
na
to
r o
f t
ra
ns
ac
tio
ns
 a
c
ro
ss
 
pu
bl
ic
 n
e
tw
or
ks
, a
n
d 
if
 de
si
re
d,
 
th
at
 c
a
n
 b
e 
u
se
d 
to
 e
n
c
ry
pt
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
. I
n 
c
o
n
jun
cti
on
 w
ith
 
sm
a
rt
 c
a
rd
s,
 b
io
m
et
ri
cs
 c
a
n
 
pr
ov
id
e 
st
ro
ng
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 fo
r 
PK
l 
c
re
de
nt
ia
ls
 h
el
d 
o
n
 t
he
 c
a
rd
s,
 th
us
 
pr
ov
id
in
g 
gr
ea
te
r t
l1
lst
 in
 P
K
l 
se
rv
ic
es
, e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 d
ig
ita
l 
si
gn
at
ur
es
 fo
r 
n
o
n
-r
e
pu
di
at
io
n.
 
2.	
 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
: W
ith
 th
e 
a
dv
en
t o
f 
im
pr
ov
ed
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
sy
st
em
s 
su
c
h 
as
 J
av
a 
C
ar
d 
a
n
d 
fa
st
er
 
pr
oc
es
so
rs
, t
he
 ti
m
e 
to
 r
e
a
d 
da
ta
 
fr
om
 a
n
d 
w
ri
te
 d
at
a 
to
 t
he
 c
hi
p 
ha
s 
be
en
 re
du
ce
d 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
. 
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3.	
 
M
ut
ua
l a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n:
 F
or
 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 r
e
qu
ir
in
g 
se
c
u
re
 c
a
rd
 
a
c
c
e
ss
, 
th
e 
c
o
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 s
m
a
rt
 c
a
rd
­
ba
se
d 
de
vi
ce
 c
a
n
 v
e
ri
fy
 th
at
 th
e 
re
a
de
r i
s 
a
u
th
en
tic
 a
n
d 
c
a
n
 p
ro
ve
 
its
 o
w
n
 a
u
th
en
tic
ity
 to
 t
he
 r
e
a
de
r 
be
fo
re
 s
ta
rt
in
g 
a 
se
c
u
re
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n.
 
4.	
 
St
ra
ng
 in
for
ma
tio
n s
e
c
u
ri
ty
: 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
st
or
ed
 o
n
 c
a
rd
s 
c
a
n
 
be
 e
n
c
ry
pt
ed
 a
n
d 
c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
c
o
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 s
m
a
rt
 
c
a
rd
-b
as
ed
 d
ev
ic
e 
a
n
d 
th
e 
re
a
de
r 
c
a
n
 b
e 
e
n
c
ry
pt
ed
 to
 p
re
ve
nt
 
e
a
v
e
sd
ro
pp
in
g.
 
5.	
 
St
ro
ng
 c
o
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 d
ev
ic
e 
se
c
u
ri
ty
: 
It'
s 
e
x
tr
em
el
y 
di
ff
ic
ul
t t
o 
du
pl
ic
at
e 
o
r 
fo
rg
e 
a
n
d 
ha
s 
bu
ilt
-in
 
ta
m
pe
r-
re
si
st
an
ce
. 
6.	
 
Au
th
en
tic
at
ed
 a
n
d 
a
u
th
or
iz
ed
 
in
for
ma
tio
n a
c
c
e
ss
: 
T
he
 c
a
rd
 h
as
 
th
e 
a
bi
lit
y 
to
 p
ro
ce
ss
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
a
n
d 
re
a
c
t 
to
 it
s 
e
n
v
ir
on
m
en
t 
a
llo
w
s 
it 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
ed
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
a
c
c
e
ss
 a
n
d 
pr
ot
ec
t t
he
 
pr
iv
ac
y 
o
f p
er
so
na
l i
nf
or
m
at
io
n.
 
T
he
 c
a
rd
 c
a
n
 v
e
ri
fy
 th
e 
a
u
th
or
ity
 
o
f t
he
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
re
qu
es
to
r a
n
d 
th
en
 a
llo
w
 a
c
c
e
ss
 o
n
ly
 to
 t
he
 
35
5 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
re
qu
ir
ed
. A
cc
es
s 
to
 
st
or
ed
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
c
a
n
 a
ls
o 
be
 
fu
rt
he
r 
pr
ot
ec
te
d 
by
 a
 p
er
so
na
l 
id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n 
n
u
m
be
r (
PI
N)
 o
r 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
to
 p
ro
te
ct
 p
ri
va
cy
 a
n
d 
c
o
u
n
te
r 
u
n
a
u
th
or
iz
ed
 a
c
c
e
ss
. 
7.	
 
St
ro
ng
 s
u
pp
or
t fo
r i
nfo
rm
ati
on
 
pr
iv
ac
y:
 T
he
 c
a
rd
 e
n
su
re
s 
th
e 
a
bi
lit
y 
o
f a
 s
ys
te
m
 to
 p
ro
te
ct
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 p
ri
va
cy
. 
U
nl
ik
e 
o
th
er
 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
, s
m
a
rt
 c
a
rd
-b
as
ed
 
de
vi
ce
s 
c
a
n
 i
m
pl
em
en
t a
 p
er
so
na
l 
fi
re
w
al
l 
fo
r 
a
n
 in
di
vi
du
al
, 
re
le
as
in
g 
o
n
ly
 th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
re
qu
ir
ed
 a
n
d 
o
n
ly
 w
he
n 
it 
is 
re
qu
ir
ed
. T
he
 a
bi
lit
y 
to
 s
u
pp
or
t 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
ed
 a
n
d 
a
u
th
or
iz
ed
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
a
c
c
e
ss
 a
n
d 
th
e 
st
ro
ng
 
c
o
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 d
ev
ic
e 
a
n
d 
da
ta
 
se
c
u
ri
ty
 m
a
ke
 c
o
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 s
m
a
rt
 
c
a
rd
s 
e
x
c
e
lle
nt
 g
ua
rd
ia
ns
 o
f 
pe
rs
on
al
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
a
n
d 
in
di
vi
du
al
 p
ri
va
cy
 (G
SA
, 2
00
4)
. 
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7. 
N
o 
M
in
im
al
 
1 
U
se
rs
 a
re
 o
v
e
rw
he
lm
ed
 
A
va
il
ab
ili
ty
of
 
st
an
da
rd
lb
e
st
 
A
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 s
o
 m
a
n
y 
th
in
gs
 ta
 d
o 
se
rV
ic
es
, 
pr
ac
tic
es
 fo
r 
th
at
 it
 is
 d
iff
ic
ul
t t
o 
c
o
pe
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
. 
R
ol
e-
B
as
ed
 
w
ith
 e
v
e
ry
th
in
g 
es
pe
ci
a1
1y
 
A
cc
es
s 
re
m
e
m
be
ri
ng
 th
ei
r 
C
on
tr
ol
 
u
se
rn
a
m
e
s,
 p
as
sw
or
ds
, a
n
d 
(R
BA
C)
 
PI
N
s!
 A
s 
a
lr
ea
dy
 s
tr
es
se
d 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
in
 th
is
 th
es
is
, s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 is
 a
 
re
v
ie
w
 1
.2
2)
 
se
c
o
n
da
ry
 ta
sk
 fo
r 
u
se
rs
. 
Be
st
 P
ra
ct
ic
es
: 
T
he
 u
se
 o
f R
B
A
C
 to
 
m
a
n
a
ge
 u
se
r 
pr
iv
ile
ge
s 
w
ith
in
 a
 
si
ng
le
 s
ys
te
m
 o
r 
a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
is 
e
x
te
ns
iv
el
y 
a
c
c
e
pt
ed
 a
s 
a 
be
st
 
pr
ac
tic
e.
 S
ys
te
m
s 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
M
ic
ro
so
ft
 
A
ct
iv
e 
D
ir
ec
to
ry
, M
ic
ra
so
ft
 S
QL
 
Se
rv
er
, S
EL
in
ux
, g
rs
ec
ur
ity
, 
Fr
ee
B
SD
, S
ol
ar
is
, O
ra
cl
e 
D
B
M
S,
 
Po
st
gr
eS
QL
 8.
1,
 S
A
P 
RJ
3 
a
n
d 
m
a
n
y 
o
th
er
s 
su
c
c
e
ss
fu
lly
 im
pl
em
en
t s
o
rn
e
 
fo
m
l o
f R
B
A
C
. 
A
 k
ey
 f
ea
tu
re
 o
f t
hi
s 
m
o
de
l 
is 
th
at
 a
il 
a
c
c
e
ss
 is
 t
hr
ou
gh
 r
o
le
s. 
A
 r
o
le
 is
 
es
se
n
tia
11
y 
a 
c
o
lle
ct
io
n 
o
f 
pe
rm
is
si
on
s,
 a
n
d 
ai
l u
se
rs
 r
e
c
e
iv
e 
pe
rm
is
si
on
s 
o
n
ly
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
ro
le
s 
to
 
w
hi
ch
 th
ey
 a
re
 a
ss
ig
ne
d,
 o
r 
th
ro
ug
h 
ra
ie
s 
th
ey
 i
nh
er
it 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
ra
ie
 
hi
er
ar
ch
y.
 
W
ith
in
 a
 s
ys
te
m
 (o
rg
an
iza
tio
n)
, r
o
le
s 
a
re
 c
re
a
te
d 
fo
r 
v
a
ri
ou
s 
U
ob
) 
fu
nc
tio
ns
. 
T
he
 p
er
m
is
si
on
s 
to
 
pe
rf
or
m
 c
e
rt
ai
n 
o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 a
re
 
a
ss
ig
ne
d 
to
 s
pe
ci
fi
c 
ro
le
s. 
M
em
be
rs
 
o
f s
ys
te
m
 u
se
rs
 a
re
 a
ss
ig
ne
d 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 ra
ie
s,
 a
n
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
os
e 
ra
ie
 a
ss
ig
nm
en
ts
 a
c
qu
ir
e 
th
e 
pe
rm
is
si
on
s 
to
 p
er
fo
rm
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
sy
st
em
 fu
nc
tio
ns
. 
35
7 
"
Tr
us
te
d-
au
th
en
tic
at
io
n"
 m
e
c
ha
ni
sm
 
(or
 b
y 
ra
ie
s):
 th
is
 m
e
c
ha
ni
sm
 
pr
ov
id
es
 a
 v
e
ry
 c
o
n
v
e
n
ie
nt
 a
n
d 
se
c
u
re
 w
a
y 
to
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
e 
to
 l
og
in
 
fo
r 
e
n
d-
us
er
s.
 
ln
cr
ea
se
d 
se
c
u
ri
ty
: 
U
se
rs
' p
ro
fi
le
s 
a
n
d 
pr
iv
ile
ge
s 
c
a
n
 b
e 
m
o
di
fi
ed
 
ra
pi
dl
y 
if
 A
dm
in
is
tr
at
or
s 
m
a
n
a
ge
 
th
em
. C
ha
ng
in
g 
po
lic
ie
s 
a
n
d 
u
pd
at
in
g 
u
se
r 
pr
of
ile
s 
in
 a
 t
im
el
y 
m
a
n
n
e
r 
c
a
n
 
he
lp
 m
a
in
ta
in
 h
ig
h 
le
ve
ls
 o
f s
e
c
u
ri
ty
. 
8. 
L
ac
k 
o
f 
O
pe
ra
bi
lit
y 
2 
A
s 
a
lr
ea
dy
 h
ig
hl
ig
ht
ed
, 
A
va
il
ab
ili
ty
of
 
Sy
st
em
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 s
e
t 
u
p 
a
s 
lo
ca
l 
fle
xi
bi
lit
y 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
tr
an
si
tin
g 
o
v
e
r 
se
rv
ic
es
, 
a
c
c
e
ss
 b
y 
de
fa
ul
t w
hi
ch
 r
e
pr
es
en
ts
 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
th
e 
In
te
rn
et
 (o
pe
n 
n
e
tw
or
k)
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. 
st
ro
ng
er
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
. I
t m
e
a
n
s 
th
at
 
re
v
ie
w
 2
.8
) 
is 
su
bje
cte
d t
o 
a
tt
ac
ks
. 
in
fo
rn
1a
tio
n 
do
es
 n
o
t 
n
e
e
d 
to
 b
e 
A
lth
ou
gh
 th
e 
sy
st
em
 u
se
s 
tr
an
sm
itt
ed
 o
v
e
r 
th
e 
n
e
tw
or
k 
so
 
e
n
c
ry
pt
io
n 
th
er
e'
s 
a
lw
ay
s 
a 
a
v
o
id
in
g 
th
e 
gr
ow
in
g 
th
re
at
 o
f o
n
lin
e 
ris
k.
 
a
tt
ac
ks
 o
n
 c
o
n
su
m
e
rs
. 
U
se
rs
 c
a
n
 g
et
 f
ru
st
ra
te
d 
if
 
re
m
o
te
 o
r 
lo
ca
l 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
is 
n
o
t 
fu
nc
tio
na
l. 
R
em
em
be
r, 
th
ey
 
ha
ve
 a
 g
oa
l t
o 
a
c
hi
ev
e 
a
n
d 
th
ey
 w
a
n
t 
to
 d
o 
it 
qu
ic
kl
y.
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9. 
L
ac
k 
o
f 
O
pe
ra
bi
lit
y 
3 
A
lth
ou
gh
 a
 3
-f
ac
to
r 
PO
lia
bi
1it
y,
 
Sa
m
e 
re
c
o
m
m
e
n
da
tio
ns
 a
s 
in
 it
em
 6
. 
st
ro
ng
er
 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
is 
u
se
d 
(h
an
d 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. 
T
he
 b
io
m
et
ri
c 
m
e
th
od
 o
f M
at
ch
-o
n­
se
cu
ri
ty
 
ge
om
et
ry
), 
it 
is 
n
o
t 
In
te
ro
pe
ra
bi
1it
y,
 
c
a
rd
 p
ro
te
ct
s 
th
e 
in
iti
al
 e
n
ro
llm
en
t 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
u
si
ng
 a
 
fle
xi
bi
lit
y.
 
te
m
pl
at
e 
si
nc
e 
it 
is 
m
a
in
ta
in
ed
 w
ith
in
 
re
v
ie
w
 2
.9
) 
c
o
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
 
th
e 
sm
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 a
n
d 
n
e
v
e
r 
tr
an
sm
itt
ed
 
w
hi
ch
 a
ff
ec
ts
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
o
ff
-c
ar
d 
(G
SA
, 2
00
4)
. 
a
n
d 
se
c
u
ri
ty
. 
A
 c
o
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 s
m
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 c
a
n
 s
u
pp
or
t 
T
he
 s
m
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 is
 n
o
t 
u
se
d 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n.
 F
or
 h
um
an
 
to
 s
to
re
 u
se
r'
s 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
s 
th
at
 n
e
c
e
ss
ita
te
 
da
ta
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
u
se
r 
pr
of
ile
 
th
e 
hi
gh
es
t d
eg
re
e 
o
f s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 a
n
d 
a
n
d 
e
n
ro
lm
en
t. 
pr
iv
ac
y,
 a
 c
o
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 c
a
rd
 c
a
n
 b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
in
 c
o
m
bi
na
tio
n 
w
ith
 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
. S
m
ar
t c
a
rd
s 
a
n
d 
bi
om
et
ri
cs
 a
re
 a
 n
a
tu
ra
l f
it 
to
 
su
pp
ly
 tw
o 
o
r 
m
u
lti
-f
ac
to
r 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n.
 A
 s
m
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 is
 t
he
 
lo
gi
ca
l s
e
c
u
re
 s
to
ra
ge
 m
e
di
um
 fo
r 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
 D
ur
in
g 
th
e 
e
n
ro
llm
en
t p
ro
ce
ss
, t
he
 b
io
m
et
ri
c 
te
m
pl
at
e 
c
a
n
 b
e 
st
or
ed
 o
n
 t
he
 s
m
a
rt
 
c
a
rd
 c
hi
p 
fo
r 
la
te
r v
e
ri
fi
ca
tio
n.
 O
nl
y 
th
e 
a
u
th
or
iz
ed
 u
se
r 
w
ith
 a
 b
io
m
et
ri
c 
m
a
tc
hi
ng
 th
e 
st
or
ed
 e
n
ro
llm
en
t 
te
m
pl
at
e 
re
c
e
iv
es
 a
c
c
e
ss
 a
n
d 
pr
iv
ile
ge
s.
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10
. H
ig
h 
FA
R
 a
n
d 
O
pe
ra
bi
lit
y 
2 
H
an
d 
ge
om
et
ry
 
A
va
il
ab
il
it
yo
f 
Sy
st
em
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 a
dju
ste
d t
o 
FR
R
 
FR
R
 fo
r 
ha
nd
 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
a
t 
th
e 
M
T
M
 
se
rV
ic
es
, 
a
bo
ut
 1
.0
5%
 a
n
d 
th
e 
FA
R
 a
bo
ut
 
ge
om
et
ry
 
c
u
rr
e
n
tly
 p
re
se
nt
s 
hi
gh
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. 
0.
1%
. 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
FR
R
 o
f5
%
 a
n
d 
FA
R
 o
f3
%
 
Z
ha
ng
 (2
00
4)
 h
as
 d
oc
um
en
te
d 
re
v
ie
w
 2
.1
2)
 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 fa
r 
fr
om
 th
e 
re
c
o
gn
iti
on
 s
ys
te
m
' h
an
d 
ge
om
et
ry
 a
s 
a
v
e
ra
ge
 r
a
te
s.
 
be
in
g 
a
bl
e 
to
 o
pe
ra
te
 w
ith
 a
 l
ow
 F
A
R
 
U
se
rs
 l
ik
e 
ha
nd
 g
eo
m
et
ry
 
o
f 0
.0
96
%
 a
n
d 
re
a
so
n
a
bl
e 
FR
R
 o
f 
a
n
d 
fi
ng
er
pr
in
t r
e
c
o
gn
iti
on
 
1.
05
%
. 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 a
re
 n
o
t 
T
he
 a
c
c
u
ra
c
y 
o
f e
a
c
h 
sy
st
em
 c
a
n
 b
e 
in
tr
us
iv
e,
 r
e
lia
bl
e,
 lo
w
 c
o
s
t, 
a
dju
ste
d w
hi
ch
 m
e
a
n
s 
th
at
 th
e 
se
c
re
t 
a
n
d 
in
 g
en
er
al
 o
n
ly
 h
av
e 
a 
is 
to
 b
al
an
ce
 th
e 
lik
el
ih
oo
ds
 o
f F
R
R
 
0.
1 
%
 F
R
R
 w
hi
ch
 is
 o
n
e
 o
f 
a
n
d 
FA
R
, s
o
 t
he
 s
ys
te
m
 b
ar
el
y 
lo
ck
s 
th
e 
lo
w
es
t i
n 
th
e 
bi
om
et
ri
cs
 
o
u
t 
le
gi
tim
at
e 
u
se
rs
 a
n
d 
it 
do
es
n'
t f
ai
l 
in
du
st
ry
. 
fo
r 
m
a
sq
ue
ra
de
s 
(S
ee
 al
so
 F
ig
ur
e 
2.
28
: 
D
yn
am
ic
 s
ig
na
tu
re
 v
e
ri
fi
ca
tio
n 
fr
om
 C
yb
er
 S
IG
N
.).
 H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
re
 
a
re
 s
o
rn
e
 d
ra
w
ba
ck
s 
to
 d
oi
ng
 s
o
 s
u
c
h 
as
 c
ha
ng
in
g 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 s
e
n
si
tiv
ity
 to
 
re
du
ce
 F
R
R
s 
m
a
y 
in
cr
ea
se
 F
A
R
s.
 
11
. P
IN
 r
es
et
 
O
pe
ra
bi
lit
y 
1 
If
 u
se
rs
 f
or
ge
t t
he
ir
 P
IN
s,
 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
, 
A
lth
ou
gh
 k
ee
pi
ng
 th
e 
sy
st
em
 C
UI
Te
nt 
is
su
es
 
th
ey
 c
a
n
n
o
t 
re
se
t 
th
em
 v
ia
 
a
v
a
ila
bi
lit
y 
o
f 
se
c
u
ri
ty
 p
ol
ic
y 
is 
a 
go
od
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
re
v
ie
w
 2
.1
4)
 
In
te
rn
et
 (i
.e.
, W
eb
-b
as
ed
 
po
rt
al
) g
iv
en
 th
at
 th
e 
se
c
u
ri
ty
 p
ol
ic
y 
re
la
te
d 
to
 
PI
N
s 
do
es
 n
o
t 
a
llo
w
 
re
se
tt
in
g 
PI
N
s 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
W
eb
. A
ec
or
di
ng
 to
 t
he
 
se
rV
ic
es
, 
e
ff
ec
tiv
en
es
s.
 
de
ei
si
on
, t
hi
s 
a
ff
ec
ts
 th
e 
u
sa
bi
lit
y 
o
f t
he
 
sy
st
em
. T
hi
s 
po
lic
y 
w
ill
 b
e 
re
qu
ir
ed
 to
 
c
ha
ng
e 
in
 t
he
 n
e
a
r 
fu
tu
re
 in
 o
rd
er
 to
 
pr
ov
id
e 
m
o
re
 e
o
n
v
e
n
ie
nc
e 
to
 u
se
rs
. 
O
ne
 s
o
lu
tio
n 
m
ig
ht
 b
e 
a 
G
U
I 
to
 t
he
 
sy
st
em
 th
at
 a
llo
w
s 
a 
u
se
r 
to
 m
o
di
fy
 th
e 
PI
N
 b
y 
pr
ov
id
in
g 
th
e 
o
ld
 P
IN
 f
or
 
sy
st
em
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 p
ol
ic
y 
th
is
 is
 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
a
n
d 
th
en
 th
e 
sy
st
em
 
c
u
rr
e
n
tI
y 
n
o
t 
po
ss
ib
le
 fo
r 
a
llo
w
s 
a 
n
e
w
 P
IN
 t
o 
be
 s
e
t 
u
p.
 A
no
th
er
 
se
cu
rit
y 
re
as
o
n
s.
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ap
pr
oa
ch
 is
 W
eb
-b
as
ed
 p
or
ta
l i
n 
th
e 
ca
rd
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t s
ys
te
m
 w
he
re
 th
e 
u
se
r 
ca
n
 
au
th
en
tic
at
e 
to
 t
he
 p
or
ta
l a
n
d 
th
en
 
n
av
ig
at
e 
to
 a
 P
IN
 r
es
et
 s
cr
ee
n
 w
he
re
 th
e 
o
ld
 P
IN
 is
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
an
d 
v
al
id
at
ed
 
em
pl
oy
in
g 
th
e 
m
ie
s 
se
t 
o
n
 t
he
 s
m
ar
t 
ca
rd
 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
ch
ip
 p
er
so
na
liz
at
io
n 
pr
oc
es
s. 
12
. H
ig
h 
er
ro
r 
O
pe
ra
bi
lit
y 
1 
In
 p
ra
ct
ic
e,
 th
e 
e
rr
o
r 
ra
te
 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
, 
It
's
 f
re
qu
en
tly
 h
ar
d 
to
 t
el
l a
t 
fi
rs
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
se
e
m
s 
to
 li
e 
so
m
e
w
he
re
 
a
v
a
ila
bi
lit
y 
o
f 
si
gh
t w
he
th
er
 a
n
 e
x
c
e
pt
io
n 
is 
du
e 
to
 
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 
be
tw
ee
n 
1 
in
 1
0,
00
0 
a
n
d 
1 
se
rv
ic
es
. 
fr
au
d 
o
r 
to
 e
n
o
r,
 a
n
d 
w
ha
t t
he
 e
n
o
r 
er
ro
rs
 
in
 1
00
,0
00
. 
ra
te
 r
a
n
ge
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
. S
o 
th
e 
lo
w
er
 th
e 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
e
n
o
r 
ra
te
, 
th
e 
be
tte
r. 
N
o 
re
v
ie
w
 2
.1
7)
 
se
c
u
ri
ty
 p
ol
ic
y 
w
ill
 e
v
e
r 
be
 
c
o
m
pl
et
el
y 
ri
gi
d;
 t
he
re
 w
ill
 a
lw
a
ys
 
ha
ve
 to
 b
e 
w
o
rk
ar
ou
nd
s 
fo
r 
pe
op
le
 to
 
c
o
pe
 w
ith
 l'
ca
l 
lif
e,
 a
n
d 
so
rn
e
 o
f t
he
se
 
w
o
rk
ar
ou
nd
s 
w
ill
 c
re
a
te
 
v
u
ln
er
ab
ili
tie
s.
 I
n 
ba
nk
in
g,
 g
en
er
al
ly
 
th
e 
e
rr
o
r 
ra
te
 s
e
e
m
s 
to
 b
e 
so
m
e
w
he
re
 
be
tw
ee
n 
1 
in
 1
0,
00
0 
a
n
d 
1 
in
 1
00
,0
00
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 (A
nd
er
so
n,
 2
00
8)
, b
ut
 
th
is
 d
ep
en
ds
 o
n
 t
he
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
do
m
ai
n.
 
13
. C
om
pr
om
is
ed
 
O
pe
ra
bi
lit
y 
2 
Th
er
c 
is 
a 
sc
pa
ra
tc
 p
hy
si
ca
l 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
, 
Sa
m
e 
re
c
o
m
m
e
n
da
tio
ns
 a
s 
in
 i
te
m
 6
. 
se
cu
ri
ty
 w
ith
 
ac
ce
ss
 c
o
n
tr
ol
 s
ys
te
m
 
a
v
a
ila
bi
lit
y 
o
f 
T
hr
ou
gh
 th
e 
u
se
 o
f l
oc
ki
ng
 
"
o
ff
 ca
rd
" 
da
ta
ba
se
, m
an
ag
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
se
rv
ic
es
, 
m
e
c
ha
ni
sm
s 
a
n
d 
e
n
c
ry
pt
io
n,
 d
at
a 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
pr
oc
es
s 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
re
v
ie
w
 2
.1
8)
 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n,
 w
hi
ch
 
m
ai
nt
ai
ns
 a
n
 c
m
pl
oy
ee
's 
ph
ys
ic
al
 a
cc
cs
s 
co
n
tr
ol
 
pr
iv
ilc
ge
s 
an
d 
iss
ue
s 
th
e 
pr
ox
im
itv
 ca
rd
o 
e
ff
ic
ie
nc
y,
 
po
rt
ab
ili
ty
. 
st
or
ed
 o
n
 s
m
a
lt
 c
a
rd
 c
hi
ps
 c
a
n
 b
e 
m
a
de
 v
e
ry
 s
e
c
u
re
 (G
SA
, 2
00
4)
 
36
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14
. D
is
cl
os
u
re
 o
f 
pe
rs
on
ne
l a
n
d 
bu
si
ne
ss
 
se
n
si
tiv
e 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
2 
Se
ns
iti
ve
 p
er
so
nn
el
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
c
o
n
si
st
s 
o
f 
pe
rs
on
ne
l a
n
d 
m
e
di
ca
l f
ile
s 
w
ho
se
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
w
o
u
ld
 
D
is
ru
pt
io
n 
o
f 
bu
si
ne
ss
 (i
.e.
 
di
sr
up
tio
n 
o
f t
he
 
M
T
M
 o
w
n
e
r'
s 
Sm
ar
t c
ar
ds
 h
el
p 
to
 p
ro
te
cl
 p
riv
ac
y 
w
ith
 
se
cu
re
 d
at
a 
st
or
ag
e.
 T
he
y 
pr
ov
id
e 
a 
m
ea
n
s 
o
f 
se
cu
re
ly
 s
to
rin
g 
da
ta
 (e
.g.
, P
IN
, p
as
sw
or
ds
, 
an
d 
bi
om
et
ric
 te
m
pl
al
e) 
on
 l
he
 c
ar
do
 T
hi
s 
da
la 
ca
n
 ju
st 
be
 a
cc
es
se
d 
lh
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
sm
ar
t 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
c
o
n
st
itu
te
 a
 c
le
ar
 
a
bi
lit
y 
to
 g
en
er
at
e 
ca
 rd
 O
S 
by
 lh
os
e 
w
ith
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 a
cc
es
s 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
re
v
ie
w
 3
.1
) 
u
n
jus
tif
iab
le 
in
va
si
on
 o
f 
pr
iv
ac
y 
(e.
g.,
 U
se
r I
D
s,
 
pa
ss
w
or
ds
, P
IN
s,
 b
an
k 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 a
n
d 
se
rv
ic
es
 a
n
d 
c
o
n
se
qu
en
tly
 
re
v
e
n
u
e
), 
sy
st
em
 
di
st
ru
st
 b
y 
u
se
rs
. 
rig
hl
s. 
Th
is 
ch
ar
ac
te
riS
lic
 c
an
 b
e 
u
se
d 
by
 a
 
sy
st
em
 1
0 
im
pr
ov
e 
pr
iv
ac
y 
(e.
g.,
 sl
or
in
g 
pe
rs
on
al
us
er
 d
al
a 
on
 lh
e 
ca
rd
 ra
lh
er
 th
an
 in
 a
 
ce
n
lra
l d
al
ab
as
e).
 ln
 l
hi
s 
ex
am
pl
e,
 th
e 
u
se
r 
ha
s 
be
lle
r k
no
w
le
dg
e 
an
d 
co
n
lro
l o
f w
he
n 
c
re
di
t c
a
rd
 n
u
m
be
rs
, S
SN
s).
 
an
d 
by
 w
ho
m
 th
e i
l' p
er
so
na
l d
al
a 
is 
be
in
g 
T
he
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
o
f p
er
so
nn
el
 
se
n
si
tiv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
c
a
n
 
re
su
lt 
in 
id
en
tit
y 
th
ef
t. 
It 
re
fe
rs
 to
 f
ra
ud
 th
at
 e
n
ta
ils
 
gr
an
le
d 
ac
ce
ss
. 
Th
e 
en
cr
yp
lio
n 
al
go
ril
hm
 3
D
ES
 o
ffe
rs
 a
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 h
ig
he
r s
ec
u
rit
y 
lh
an
 D
ES
 f
or
 th
e 
se
cu
rit
y 
n
ee
ds
 o
f h
ig
hl
y 
se
n
si
liv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
PI
N
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
. S
in
ce
 
so
m
e
bo
dy
 p
re
te
nd
in
g 
to
 b
e 
3D
ES
 is
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
al
go
rit
hm
 a
s 
so
m
e
bo
dy
 e
ls
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
in
te
nt
io
n 
o
f s
te
al
in
g 
m
o
n
e
y 
o
r 
ge
tti
ng
 o
th
er
 b
en
ef
its
. 
sin
gl
e 
D
ES
, i
t c
an
 b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
in
to
 th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
El
ec
tro
ni
c 
Fu
nd
s T
ra
ns
fe
r (
EF
T)
 
n
et
w
or
k 
w
ith
 a
 m
in
im
um
 o
f d
isr
up
lio
n.
 T
he
 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
o
f3
D
ES
 is
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
w
ith
 l
he
 
ai
m
 o
fm
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 u
se
rs
 t
ru
st
 in
 p
ay
m
en
t 
sy
st
em
s 
an
d 
10
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
 th
e 
in
le
gr
ily
 o
f 
co
n
fid
en
lia
l c
ar
dh
ol
de
r i
nf
or
m
at
io
n.
 F
or
 
m
o
re
 d
el
ai
ls,
 s
ee
 a
lso
 5
.4
.2
.2
.1
.1
 U
sa
bi
lil
y 
Se
ve
rit
y 
R
al
in
gs
 a
n
d 
R
ec
om
m
en
da
lio
ns
 fo
r 
M
TM
 S
lu
dy
 C
as
e,
 P
ro
bl
em
 D
es
cr
ip
lio
n 
29
. 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
an
d 
In
le
gr
at
io
n.
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15
. P
ri
va
te
 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
2 
T
he
 s
ys
te
m
 (M
TM
)'s
 o
w
n
e
r 
En
ab
le
s 
s
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
T
he
 c
a
rd
ho
ld
er
 e
n
su
re
s 
th
e 
a
c
c
u
ra
c
y 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is 
th
e 
fi
na
nc
ia
l 
in
st
itu
tio
n 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 g
ai
ns
, 
o
f p
er
so
na
l 
da
ta
; a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
o
w
n
e
rs
 
co
m
pr
om
is
ed
 
(b
an
k)
 w
ho
 w
o
u
ld
 "
o
w
n
"
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
 
a
re
 r
e
sp
on
si
bl
e 
fo
r 
pr
ot
ec
tin
g 
w
he
n 
u
si
ng
 
th
e 
c
a
rd
 a
n
d 
"
le
a
se
"
 
sp
ac
e 
lia
bi
lit
y.
 
pe
rs
on
al
 d
at
a 
pr
ov
id
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
di
ff
er
en
t 
to
 t
he
 th
ird
 p
ar
tie
s 
fo
r 
its
 
c
a
rd
ho
ld
er
 a
n
d 
m
a
in
ta
in
in
g 
th
e 
da
ta
ba
se
s 
u
s
e
rs
 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
. T
he
 
a
c
c
u
ra
c
y 
o
f t
ha
t d
at
a.
 T
he
 
fr
om
 d
iff
er
en
t 
fi
na
nc
ia
l 
in
st
itu
tio
n 
w
o
u
ld
 
re
c
o
m
m
e
n
da
tio
n 
he
re
 is
 t
o 
in
te
gr
at
e 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 
ha
ve
 c
o
n
tr
ol
 o
v
e
r 
th
e 
c
a
rd
 
th
e 
m
u
lti
pl
e 
da
ta
ba
se
s 
o
n
 t
he
 c
a
rd
 s
o
 
th
at
 r
es
id
e 
o
n
 
sp
ec
if
ic
at
io
n 
a
n
d 
o
pe
ra
tin
g 
th
at
 th
e 
c
o
n
te
nt
s 
o
f f
or
 e
x
a
m
pl
e 
a 
m
u
lti
­
e
n
v
ir
on
m
en
t. 
ba
dg
in
g 
sy
st
em
, p
hy
si
ca
l a
c
c
e
ss
 
a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
T
he
re
 is
 a
 c
lie
nt
 re
gi
st
ry
 b
ut
 
c
o
n
tr
ol
 p
ri
vi
le
ge
 d
at
ab
as
e,
 a
n
d 
co
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 
th
e 
c
u
n
-e
n
t 
sy
st
em
 d
oe
s 
n
o
t 
lo
gi
ca
l a
c
c
e
ss
 c
o
n
tr
ol
 p
ri
vi
le
ge
 
ca
rd
 
pr
ov
id
e 
po
in
te
rs
 to
 a
il 
da
ta
ba
se
 c
a
n
 b
e 
a
m
a
lg
am
at
ed
 in
to
 a
 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
o
w
n
e
r 
da
ta
ba
se
s 
si
ng
le
 in
te
gr
at
ed
 d
at
ab
as
e 
m
a
in
ta
in
ed
 
re
v
ie
w
 3
.5
) 
a
c
tiv
e 
o
n
 t
he
 c
ar
do
 T
he
 c
a
rd
 
as
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 c
a
rd
 m
a
n
a
ge
m
en
t 
c
o
n
ta
in
s 
di
ff
er
en
t 
sy
st
em
. T
hi
s 
a
pp
ro
ac
h 
re
du
ce
s 
th
e 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 b
ut
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 
n
e
e
d 
to
 m
a
in
ta
in
 m
u
lti
pl
e 
se
pa
ra
te
 
da
ta
ba
se
s 
c
o
e
x
is
t i
n 
th
e 
sy
st
em
s 
a
n
d 
c
o
n
se
qu
en
tly
 th
e 
le
ak
ag
e 
sa
m
e
 e
n
v
ir
on
m
en
t w
ith
ou
t 
o
f s
e
n
si
tiv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
 l
n 
a
dd
iti
on
, 
a
n
y 
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
so
 t
ha
t i
f t
he
 
th
e 
m
u
lti
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
c
a
rd
 c
a
n
 s
e
c
u
re
ly
 
ca
rd
 is
 lo
st
, 
th
e 
ca
rd
ho
ld
er
 
ho
Id
 m
u
lti
pl
e 
a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
u
se
rn
a
m
e
s 
m
u
st
 g
o 
to
 s
ev
er
al
 l
oc
at
io
ns
 to
 
a
n
d 
pa
ss
w
or
ds
, o
ff
er
in
g 
th
e 
u
se
r 
rc
po
pu
la
te
 th
e 
ca
rd
o 
c
o
n
v
e
n
ie
nt
 a
c
c
e
ss
 t
hr
ou
gh
 a
 s
in
gl
e 
PI
N
 (o
r b
io
m
et
ri
c)
 an
d 
re
du
ci
ng
 o
r 
e
lim
in
at
in
g 
th
e 
c
o
st
 o
f h
el
p 
de
sk
 
c
a
lls
. 
A
ls
o 
de
ce
nt
ra
liz
ed
 a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 
w
o
u
ld
 p
er
fo
rm
 a
il 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
, b
ut
 
ha
ve
 s
ha
do
w
 fi
le
s 
m
a
in
ta
in
ed
 in
 t
he
 
36
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c
e
n
tr
al
iz
ed
 d
at
ab
as
e 
o
f t
he
 
a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
o
w
n
e
rs
. 
Fi
na
lly
, t
he
 s
ys
te
m
's
 o
w
n
e
r 
sh
ou
ld
 
pr
ov
id
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 to
 s
a
fe
gu
ar
d 
th
e 
pr
iv
ac
y 
o
f "
s
ha
do
w
" 
da
ta
ba
se
s,
 a
n
d 
do
cu
m
en
t t
he
se
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
in
 t
he
 
c
a
rd
 is
su
er
lc
ar
dh
ol
de
r 
a
gr
ee
m
en
t (
GS
A,
 2
00
4)
. 
16
. L
ow
 s
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
2 
ln
 a
 m
a
tc
h 
o
ff
-c
ar
d 
ln
te
ro
pe
ra
bi
lit
y,
 
T
he
 r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
da
tio
n 
in
 t
hi
s 
c
a
se
 is
 to
 
o
f m
a
tc
h 
o
ff
-
te
ch
ni
qu
e 
th
e 
e
n
ro
lle
d 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. 
m
a
ke
 u
se
 o
f t
he
 m
a
tc
h 
o
n
-c
a
rd
 
ca
rd
 t
ec
hn
iq
ue
 
te
m
pl
at
e 
is 
o
ri
gi
na
lly
 
te
ch
ni
qu
e.
 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
lo
ad
ed
 o
n
to
 t
he
 s
m
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 
M
at
ch
 o
n
-c
a
rd
 te
ch
ni
qu
e 
o
ri
gi
na
lly
 
re
v
ie
w
 3
.7
) 
a
n
d 
th
en
 d
is
pe
ns
ed
 f
ro
m
 t
he
 
st
or
es
 t
he
 e
n
ro
ll
m
en
t t
em
pl
at
e 
in
to
 
sm
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 v
ia
 th
e 
th
e 
sm
a
rt
 c
a
rd
's
 s
e
c
u
re
 m
e
m
o
ry
. 
c
o
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 i
nt
er
fa
ce
 w
he
n 
W
he
n
 a
 b
io
m
et
ri
c 
m
a
tc
h 
is 
re
qu
es
te
d,
 
re
qu
es
te
d 
by
 th
e 
e
x
te
m
al
 
th
e 
e
x
te
m
al
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t s
u
bm
its
 a
 n
e
w
 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
sy
st
em
. T
he
 
liv
e 
sc
a
n
 t
em
pl
at
e 
to
 t
he
 s
m
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 
e
x
te
m
al
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t t
he
n 
w
hi
ch
 th
e
n
 c
a
rr
ie
s 
o
u
t 
th
e 
m
a
tc
hi
ng
 
c
o
m
pa
re
s 
a 
n
e
w
 l
iv
e 
sc
a
n
 
o
pe
ra
tio
n 
w
ith
in
 it
s 
se
c
u
re
 p
ro
ce
ss
or
 
te
m
pl
at
e 
o
f t
he
 b
io
m
et
ri
c 
a
n
d 
se
c
u
re
ly
 c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
es
 th
e 
w
ith
 t
he
 o
n
e
 b
ei
ng
 
o
u
tc
om
e 
to
 t
he
 e
x
te
m
al
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t 
pr
es
en
te
d 
fr
om
 t
he
 s
m
a
rt
 
(i.
e. 
w
he
n
 t
he
 s
m
ar
t c
ar
d 
its
cl
f i
s 
ca
rd
o 
T
hi
s 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
cm
pl
oy
ed
 to
 c
ar
ry
 o
u
t 
th
e 
o
n
e
-t
o-
on
e 
o
bv
io
us
ly
 h
as
 s
o
m
e
 
id
en
tit
y 
v
er
ifi
ca
tio
n 
ra
th
cr
 th
an
 e
x
te
m
al
 
se
c
u
ri
ty
 r
is
ks
 r
e
la
te
d 
to
 
tr
an
sm
itt
in
g 
th
e 
e
n
ro
lle
d 
te
m
pl
at
e 
o
ff
 th
e 
sm
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 
fo
r 
e
v
e
ry
 b
io
m
et
ri
c 
c
ha
lle
ng
e.
 S
ys
te
m
's
 o
w
n
e
r 
cq
ui
pm
cn
t, 
a 
hi
gh
 d
eg
rc
e 
o
f c
o
n
fid
en
ce
 
an
d 
se
cu
rit
y 
o
f t
he
 c
re
de
nt
ia
l's
 
v
er
ifi
ca
tio
n 
is 
ac
hi
ev
ed
). 
T
hi
s 
m
e
th
od
 p
ro
te
ct
s 
th
e 
o
ri
gi
na
l 
e
n
ro
llm
en
t t
em
pl
at
e 
si
nc
e 
it 
is 
m
a
in
ta
in
ed
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
sm
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 a
n
d 
36
4

 
sh
ou
ld
 e
n
su
re
 t
he
 
n
e
v
e
r 
tr
an
sm
itt
ed
 o
ff
-c
ar
do
 M
at
ch
in
g 
c
o
n
fi
de
nt
ia
lit
y 
a
n
d 
in
te
gr
ity
 
ha
nd
 g
eo
m
et
ry
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
 t
he
 
o
f t
he
 r
e
le
as
ed
 te
m
pl
at
e.
 
c
a
rd
 r
e
m
o
v
e
s 
th
e 
u
n
c
e
rt
ai
nt
y 
o
f 
W
ith
 m
a
tc
h 
o
ff
-c
ar
d 
m
a
tc
hi
ng
 o
n
 a
 n
e
tw
or
k-
co
nn
ec
te
d 
te
ch
ni
qu
e,
 t
he
 s
m
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 is
 
de
vi
ce
, a
n
 e
x
te
rn
al
 s
e
rv
e
r,
 o
r 
a 
st
or
in
g 
a 
te
m
pl
at
e 
(o
r 
da
ta
ba
se
. T
hi
s 
c
o
u
ld
 b
e 
re
ga
rd
ed
 a
s 
m
u
lti
pl
e 
te
m
pl
at
es
), 
bu
t h
as
 
w
e
a
k 
lin
ks
 i
n 
a 
se
c
u
ri
ty
 c
ha
in
. 
U
se
r 
n
o
 m
a
jo
r k
no
w
le
dg
e 
o
f t
he
 
pr
iv
ac
y 
is 
a
ls
o 
m
a
in
ta
in
ed
 w
ith
 th
is
 
ki
nd
 o
fb
io
m
et
ri
c 
te
ch
ni
qu
e 
si
nc
e 
th
e 
u
s
e
r'
s
 b
io
m
et
ri
c 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 n
o
r 
th
e 
te
m
pl
at
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is 
n
o
t 
re
a
da
bl
e 
c
a
pa
bi
lit
y 
to
 p
ro
ce
ss
 it
 i
n 
fr
om
 th
e 
ca
rd
o 
W
ith
 th
is
 te
ch
ni
qu
e,
 
a
n
y 
m
a
n
n
e
r 
(G
SA
, 2
00
4)
. 
th
e 
c
a
rd
 m
u
st
 b
e 
a 
m
ic
ro
co
nt
ro
l!
er
­
ba
se
d 
de
vi
ce
 a
n
d 
be
 a
bl
e 
o
f 
c
o
m
pu
tin
g 
th
e 
o
n
e
-t
o-
on
e 
m
a
tc
h 
(G
SA
,2
00
4)
. 
17
. U
ns
af
e 
PI
N
 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
3 
A
 M
T
M
 m
a
c
hi
ne
 r
e
lie
s 
o
n
 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
, 
(IS
O 
95
64
-1
 :2
00
2)
 al
lo
w
s 
fo
r P
IN
s 
fro
m
 
le
ng
th
 
sh
or
t, 
lo
w
-e
nt
ro
py
 P
IN
s 
fo
r 
e
ff
ic
ie
nc
y.
 
4 
up
 to
 1
2 
di
gi
ts,
 b
ut
 a
ls
o 
n
o
te
s 
th
at
 fo
r 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
re
v
ie
w
 4
.2
) 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n.
 
A
 f
ou
r-
di
gi
t P
IN
 c
a
n
 b
e 
br
ok
en
 in
 l
es
s 
th
an
 a
 
se
c
o
n
d,
 a
n
d 
a 
6-
di
gi
t P
IN
 i
n 
u
sa
bi
lit
y 
rc
as
o
n
s,
 a
n 
as
si
gn
ed
 n
u
m
er
ic
 
PI
N
 s
ho
ul
d 
n
o
t 
ex
ce
ed
 s
ix
 d
ig
its
 in
 
\e
ng
th
. S
o 
id
ea
lly
, u
se
 P
IN
s 
w
ith
 a
 la
rg
e 
n
u
m
be
r o
f d
ig
its
 fo
r 
in
st
an
ce
 a
 6
-d
ig
it 
PI
N
. 
a
bo
ut
 1
0 
se
c
o
n
ds
, w
hi
le
 a
 
10
-d
ig
it 
PI
N
 w
o
u
ld
 li
ke
ly
 
A
 lo
ng
er
 P
IN
 o
bv
io
us
ly
 p
ro
vi
de
s g
re
at
er
 
se
cu
rit
y 
ag
ai
 ns
t a
n 
at
ta
ck
er
 w
ho
 tr
ie
s 
to
 
ta
ke
 w
e
e
ks
 to
 c
ra
c
k.
 
gu
es
s 
a 
u
sc
r'
s 
PI
N
 o
r 
w
ho
 tr
ie
s 
to
 r
ea
d 
a 
PI
N
 o
v
er
 th
e 
sh
ou
ld
er
 o
f a
 u
se
r.
 H
en
ce
, a
 
bi
t l
on
ge
r c
o
de
 (m
ore
 th
an
 4
 d
ig
its
) i
s 
n
o
t 
a 
ha
rd
sh
ip
 g
iv
en
 th
e 
se
cu
rit
y 
be
ne
ftt
s. 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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18
. C
om
pr
om
is
ed
 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
2 
A
 s
in
gl
e 
c
a
rd
 e
m
pl
oy
ed
 fo
r 
So
ft
w
ar
e 
lia
bi
lit
y,
 
C
on
ta
ct
le
ss
 m
u
lti
-a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
sm
a
rt
 
se
cu
ri
ty
 w
he
n 
di
ff
er
en
t p
ur
po
se
s 
ru
n
s 
th
e 
sc
a
la
bi
lit
y,
 a
n
d 
c
a
rd
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
 is
 u
se
d 
in 
pl
ac
in
g 
ris
k 
o
f c
re
a
tin
g 
a 
sy
st
em
 tr
us
t. 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 th
at
 r
e
qu
ir
e 
to
 p
ro
te
ct
 
se
cu
ri
ty
 a
n
d 
c
e
n
tr
al
iz
ed
 s
to
re
ho
us
e 
o
f 
pe
rs
on
al
 i
nf
om
1a
tio
n 
a
n
d/
or
 d
el
iv
er
 
fin
an
ci
al
 
da
ta
 a
bo
ut
 a
n
 i
nd
iv
id
ua
l's
 
fa
st
, s
e
c
u
re
 t
ra
ns
ac
tio
ns
, 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 in
 
a
c
tiv
iti
es
 (e
.g.
, b
an
ki
ng
, 
T
he
 m
a
jor
ity
 o
f m
a
n
u
fa
ct
ur
er
s 
w
ri
te
 
si
ng
le
 
m
e
di
ca
l, 
a
n
d 
c
re
di
t c
a
rd
s 
pr
op
ri
et
ar
y 
O
Ss
 fo
r 
e
a
c
h 
c
a
te
go
ry
 o
f 
fu
nc
tio
ns
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 r
e
c
o
rd
s).
 
c
hi
p 
c
a
rd
 th
ey
 p
ro
du
ce
. H
ow
ev
er
, 
a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
la
te
ly
 m
u
lti
-a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
o
pe
ra
tin
g 
ca
rd
 
sy
st
em
s 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
de
ve
lo
pe
d.
 T
he
se
 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
O
Ss
 a
re
 p
la
ce
d 
o
n
 to
p 
o
f t
he
 c
a
rd
's 
re
v
ie
w
 4
.2
) 
pr
op
ri
et
ar
y 
sy
st
em
 a
n
d 
c
a
n
 h
os
t 
pa
ra
lle
l a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 s
e
pa
ra
te
d 
by
 
se
c
u
re
 fi
re
w
al
ls
. 
T
he
 J
av
a 
C
ar
d 
pl
at
fo
rr
n 
pr
ov
id
es
 a
 
se
c
u
re
 e
x
e
c
u
tio
n 
e
n
v
ir
on
m
en
t w
ith
 a
 
fir
ew
al
l 
be
tw
ee
n 
di
ff
er
en
t 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 in
 th
e 
sa
m
e
 c
a
rd
 (e
.g.
, I
T 
se
c
u
rit
y:
 l
og
on
 to
 n
e
tw
or
ks
, d
ig
ita
l 
si
gn
at
ur
e,
 b
io
m
et
ric
s,
 a
n
d 
e
n
c
ry
pt
io
n,
 
ba
nk
in
g 
a
n
d 
fin
an
ce
, t
ra
ns
po
rt
at
io
n,
 
te
le
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
, g
ov
em
m
en
t, 
c
o
rp
or
at
io
n 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
, e
tc
.).
 T
hi
s 
a
llo
w
s 
di
ve
rs
e 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 o
n
 t
he
 
sa
m
e
 c
a
rd
 to
 f
un
ct
io
n 
in
de
pe
nd
en
tly
 
fr
om
 e
a
c
h 
o
th
er
 a
s 
if
 th
ey
 w
e
re
 o
n
 
se
pa
ra
te
 c
a
rd
s.
 
T
he
 "
w
a
lls
" 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
's 
a
c
tiv
iti
es
 r
e
c
o
rd
s 
ke
ep
 i
nd
iv
id
ua
l 
19
.	 
L
ow
er
 se
c
u
ri
ty
 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
4 
Cu
rr
en
tly
 th
e 
sy
st
em
 d
oe
s 
n
o
t 
Sy
st
em
 tr
us
t,
 
w
he
n 
e
m
pl
oy
in
g 
cm
pl
oy
 th
e 
al
go
rit
hm
s 
sc
a1
ab
i1
ity
,
in
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
(F
IP
S 
pe
rf
on
na
nc
e.
se
c
u
ri
ty
 
14
0-
2_
02
) F
IP
S 
14
0-
2:
 
a
lg
or
ith
m
s 
Se
cu
rit
y 
R
eq
ui
rc
m
en
ts
 fo
r 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 re
v
ie
w
 
Cr
yp
to
gr
ap
hi
e 
M
od
ul
es
. 
4.
6) 
36
6 
pr
iv
ac
y 
in
 t
w
o 
w
a
ys
: 
1.	
 
T
he
y 
re
st
ri
ct
 th
e 
da
m
ag
e 
to
 
in
di
vi
du
a1
 p
ri
va
cy
 th
at
 ta
ke
s 
pl
ac
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
e
ith
er
 m
is
us
e 
by
 a
n
 
a
u
th
or
iz
ed
 u
se
r 
o
r 
u
n
a
u
th
or
iz
ed
 
a
c
c
e
ss
 b
y 
a
n
 a
tt
ac
ke
r.
 
2.
	 
T
he
y 
pl
ac
e 
a
u
di
tin
g 
o
n
 t
he
 
m
o
n
ito
ri
ng
 c
a
pa
ci
ty
 o
f e
a
c
h 
sy
st
em
. 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 f
ea
tu
re
s 
th
at
 e
n
su
re
 t
he
 
in
te
gr
ity
, c
o
n
fi
de
nt
ia
lit
y 
a
n
d 
pr
iv
ac
y 
o
f i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
st
or
ed
 o
r 
tr
an
sm
itt
ed
, 
in
c1
ud
e 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g:
 
Sm
ar
t c
a
rd
s 
pr
ov
id
e 
a 
m
e
a
n
s 
o
f 
se
c
u
re
 c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
ns
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
c
a
rd
 a
n
d 
c
a
rd
 r
e
a
de
rs
. 
Si
m
i1
ar
 in
 
c
o
n
c
e
pt
 to
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 p
ro
to
co
ls
 u
se
d 
in
 
m
a
n
y 
n
e
tw
or
ks
, t
hi
s 
fe
at
ur
e 
a
llo
w
s 
sm
a
rt
 c
a
rd
s 
to
 s
e
n
d 
a
n
d 
re
c
e
iv
e 
da
ta
 
in
 a
 s
e
c
u
re
 a
n
d 
pr
iv
at
e 
m
a
n
n
e
r.
 T
hi
s 
c
a
pa
bi
lit
y 
c
a
n
 b
e 
u
se
d 
by
 a
 s
ys
te
m
 to
 
e
n
ha
nc
e 
pr
iv
ac
y 
by
 e
n
su
ri
ng
 th
at
 d
at
a 
se
n
t 
to
 a
n
d 
fr
om
 t
he
 c
a
rd
 is
 n
o
t 
in
te
rc
ep
te
d 
o
r 
ta
pp
ed
 in
to
. 
M
ee
t t
he
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 r
e
qu
ir
em
en
ts
 
in
di
ca
te
d 
in
 (F
IP
S 
14
0-
2_
02
) F
IP
S 
14
0-
2:
 S
ec
ur
ity
 R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 f
or
 
C
ry
pt
og
ra
ph
ie
 M
od
ul
es
. 
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20
. M
is
si
ng
 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
3 
T
he
 ri
sk
 o
f e
a
v
e
sd
ro
pp
in
g 
Fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
, 
In
tr
od
uc
e 
a
n
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
a
dd
iti
on
a
l 
th
ro
ug
h 
te
le
ph
on
e 
n
e
tw
or
k 
a
v
a
il
ab
ili
ty
of
 
m
e
th
od
 to
 b
e 
u
se
d 
in
 c
o
n
jun
cti
on
 
a
u
th
en
ti
ca
ti
on
 
is 
a 
ge
nu
in
e 
th
re
at
, 
se
rV
Ic
es
, u
se
r 
w
ith
 P
IN
 l
ik
e 
v
o
ic
e 
re
c
o
gn
iti
on
. 
m
e
th
od
 w
he
n
 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
ly
 s
in
ce
 it
 c
a
n
n
o
t 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n.
 
T
he
 id
ea
l r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
da
tio
n 
he
re
 
u
si
ng
 K
R
A
 
be
 e
n
c
ry
pt
ed
. 
w
o
u
ld
 b
e 
to
 s
w
itc
h 
to
 V
oi
ce
-o
ve
r­
o
v
e
r
 t
he
 
ln
te
rn
et
-p
ro
to
co
l (
Vo
IP
) p
ho
ne
 c
aB
s.
 
te
Ie
ph
on
e 
It 
m
e
a
n
s 
th
at
 th
e 
sy
st
em
 w
o
u
ld
 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
c
o
n
v
e
rt
 a
 v
o
ic
e 
si
gn
al
 in
to
 d
at
a 
re
v
ie
w
 4
.9
) 
pa
ck
et
s 
a
n
d 
se
n
ds
 th
em
 o
v
e
r 
th
e 
In
te
rn
et
. 
V
oi
ce
 o
v
e
r 
IP
 c
o
n
v
e
rt
s 
c
o
n
v
e
rs
a
tio
ns
 to
 p
ac
ke
ts
 o
f b
its
 th
at
 
c
a
n
 b
e 
e
ff
or
tle
ss
ly
 e
n
c
ry
pt
ed
 w
ith
 
se
c
re
t 
ke
ys
. 
21
. R
es
po
ns
e 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
2 
Pr
oc
es
so
r c
u
rr
e
n
tly
 u
se
d 
is 
A
va
il
ab
ili
ty
of
 
A
n 
e
x
a
m
pl
e 
o
f a
 fa
st
er
 p
ro
ce
ss
or
 
T
im
e 
n
o
t 
a
de
qu
at
e 
to
 t
he
 h
ig
h 
se
rv
ic
es
, t
as
k 
w
o
u
ld
 b
e 
th
e 
A
R
M
(R
) S
ec
ur
C
or
e(
R)
 
c
o
m
pr
om
is
ed
 
de
m
an
ds
 o
f s
m
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 
a
ba
nd
on
m
en
t. 
SC
30
0(
TM
) p
ro
ce
ss
or
 13
6 .
 
It
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
. 
fa
st
 r
e
a
l-
tim
e 
ha
nd
lin
g 
o
f m
u
lti
pl
e 
re
v
ie
w
 5
.4
) 
in
te
rf
ac
es
 fo
r n
e
w
 h
ig
h-
sp
ee
d 
a
n
d 
c
o
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
. 
A
no
th
er
 s
o
lu
tio
n 
is 
to
 e
m
pl
oy
 th
e 
Ja
va
 C
ar
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
. 
13
6 
AR
M
 I
ne
. R
et
rie
ve
d 
on
 F
eb
ru
ar
y 
12
, 2
00
9 
<
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.an
n.
co
m
/p
ro
du
ct
s/C
PU
s/f
am
ili
es
/S
ec
ur
Co
re
Fa
m
ily
.h
tm
l>
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22
. S
ec
ur
ity
 r
is
ks
 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
2 
M
al
ie
io
us
 s
cr
ip
ts 
w
ill
 h
av
e 
th
e 
A
va
ila
bi
lit
yo
f 
T
he
 M
TM
 h
os
ts
 d
iff
er
en
t 
u
si
ng
 
W
M
L
Sc
ri
pt
 
la
ng
ua
ge
 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
re
v
ie
w
 4
.1
0)
 
ab
ili
ty
 to
 f
als
ely
 r
in
g 
up
 
ch
ar
ge
s 
or
 p
ot
en
tia
lly
 o
ff-
Io
ad
 
m
on
ey
 fr
om
 s
m
ar
tc
ar
ds
 o
r 
ba
nk
 a
cc
o
u
n
ts
. 
Th
e 
se
cu
rit
y 
ris
ks
 o
f 
W
M
LS
cr
ip
ts 
la
ng
ua
ge
 a
re
 t
he
 
fo
llo
w
in
g:
 
1. 
W
M
LS
cr
ip
ts 
is 
no
t a
 ty
pe
­
sa
fe
 la
ng
ua
ge
. T
yp
e 
sa
fe
ty
 
is 
a 
pr
op
er
ty
 o
f s
om
e 
se
rV
ic
es
, 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 
lia
bi
lit
y,
 a
n
d 
sy
st
em
 tr
us
t. 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 in
 o
rd
er
 to
 p
ro
vi
de
 
se
rv
ic
es
 to
 i
ts 
c
u
st
om
er
s.
 H
ow
ev
er
 
th
e 
se
c
u
rit
y 
o
f t
ho
se
 a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 
c
a
n
n
o
t 
be
 c
o
n
tr
ol
le
d 
by
 th
e 
M
T
M
's
 
o
w
n
e
r 
w
he
n 
u
se
rs
 a
re
 a
c
c
e
ss
in
g 
th
es
e 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 o
v
e
r 
th
e 
In
te
rn
et
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
M
TM
. 
Th
e 
re
c
o
m
m
e
n
da
tio
n 
he
re
 is
 t
ha
t t
he
 
sy
st
em
's
 o
w
n
e
r 
sh
ou
ld
 e
v
a
lu
at
e 
th
ird
­
pr
og
ra
m
m
in
g 
la
ng
ua
ge
s 
pa
rti
es
 a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 a
n
d 
its
 s
e
c
u
rit
y 
th
at
 in
vo
lv
e 
th
e 
us
e 
o
f a
 
ris
ks
 b
ef
or
e 
im
pl
em
en
tin
g 
th
em
 o
n
 
ty
pe
 s
ys
te
m
 to
 p
re
ve
nt
 
th
e 
M
TM
. S
or
ne
 o
f t
he
 b
es
t p
ra
ct
ic
es
 
ce
rta
in
 e
n
o
n
eo
u
s 
or
 
ar
e:
 
u
n
de
sir
ab
lc 
pr
og
ra
m
 
be
ha
vi
or
 c
al
le
d 
ty
pe
 
elT
or
s. 
2. 
W
M
LS
cri
pls
 ca
n 
be
 
sc
he
du
led
 10
 be
 p
us
he
d 
10
 
•
 
M
TM
s 
sh
ou
ld
 n
o
t 
a
llo
w
 
u
n
a
u
th
or
iz
ed
 a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 to
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
e.
 
•
 
M
TM
s 
sh
ou
ld
 v
er
ify
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
the
 c
lie
nl 
de
vic
e 
w
ilh
ou
l t
he
 
in
te
gr
ity
. 
us
er
's 
kn
ow
led
ge
. 
3. 
W
M
LS
cri
pls
 la
ng
ua
ge
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
pr
ev
en
l a
cc
es
s 
10
 
pe
rsi
ste
nt 
slo
rag
e. 
•
 
M
TM
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 i
nv
is
ib
le
 to
 
v
iru
se
s, 
w
o
rm
s,
 a
n
d 
ha
ck
er
s. 
•
 
Lo
ck
-d
ow
n 
th
e 
M
TM
 a
llo
w
in
g 
Po
ss
ibl
e a
tta
ck
s: 
o
n
ly
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
ed
 a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 
1. 
Th
eft
 o
r 
da
m
ag
e 
o
f p
ers
on
al 
an
d 
da
ta
 tr
an
sf
er
 to
 e
x
e
c
u
te
 
inf
or
m
ati
on
; 
2.
 
A
bu
sin
g 
u
se
r's
 
be
tw
ee
n 
tr
us
te
d 
en
dp
oi
nt
s. 
au
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n;
 
3.
 
M
al
ic
io
us
ly
 o
ffl
oa
di
ng
 
m
on
ey
 fr
om
 s
m
al1
 c
ar
ds
. 
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23
. L
ac
k 
o
f 
L
oa
d 
T
im
e 
2 
A
 s
m
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 w
ith
 a
 s
lo
w
 
A
va
il
ab
il
it
yo
f 
A
 h
ig
h 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 F
lP
S
13
7 
re
sp
on
se
 ti
m
e 
(S
ec
ur
ity
 
re
v
ie
w
 5
.4
) 
re
sp
on
se
 ti
m
e 
c
a
n
 le
ad
 to
 a
 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
de
cr
ea
se
. F
or
 e
x
a
m
pl
e,
 
se
rv
ic
es
, t
as
k 
a
ba
nd
on
m
en
t. 
c
e
rt
if
ie
d 
sm
a
lt
 c
a
rd
 w
ith
 a
 s
e
pa
ra
te
 
pr
oc
es
so
r a
n
d 
c
ry
pt
og
ra
ph
ie
 c
hi
p 
a
n
d 
m
e
m
o
ry
 f
or
 e
n
cr
yp
tio
l1
, a
n
d 
w
ith
 a
 
c
o
n
si
de
r t
hi
s 
sc
e
n
a
ri
o:
 t
he
 
32
-b
it 
C
PU
 is
 t
he
 r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
de
d 
th
re
at
 f
ro
m
 a
n
 u
n
tr
us
te
d 
so
lu
tio
n 
fo
r 
th
is
 i
ss
ue
. 
c
a
rd
 r
e
a
de
r t
ha
t t
he
 u
se
r 
st
ic
ks
 h
er
 c
a
rd
 in
to
. T
he
 
c
a
rd
ho
ld
er
 d
oe
s 
n
o
t 
ha
ve
 
in
fi
ni
te
 p
at
ie
nc
e.
 I
f s
he
 p
ut
s 
he
r s
m
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 in
to
 a
 r
e
a
de
r 
a
n
d 
n
o
th
in
g 
ha
pp
en
s 
fo
r 
m
o
re
 t
ha
n 
a 
fe
w
 s
e
c
o
n
ds
, 
sh
e 
w
il
ll
ik
el
y 
pu
ll 
th
e 
c
a
rd
 
o
u
t 
a
n
d 
tr
y 
a
ga
in
. 
If
 n
o
th
in
g 
ha
pp
en
s 
ye
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 re
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 c
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c
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 m
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 d
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 d
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c
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 r
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 c
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 c
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c
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 d
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r r
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 d
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f c
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 s
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at
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 m
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c
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 f
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 b
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c
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 c
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n
d 
w
ir
el
es
s 
pr
ov
id
er
s 
as
 
H
ow
ev
er
 it
 a
ls
o 
sh
ou
ld
 n
o
t 
an
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 la
ye
r. 
T
he
y 
a
re
 
be
 a
 n
u
m
be
r t
ha
t o
th
er
s 
c
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c
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 m
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 p
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r b
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 c
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 p
ro
vi
de
 to
 t
he
 s
e
c
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 b
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 f
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c
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c
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t f
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 d
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 r
e
pr
es
en
ts
 a
 
st
ro
ng
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
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5.4.3 Applicability of USS in the AMDLC: 
Although the USS inspection method has been primarily developed to be 
applied in the Requirements and Design phase of the Authentication Method 
Development Life Cycle (AMDLC), it can be also used as an evaluation tool after the 
product, authentication method, has been released to manufacturing or market. The 
USS can be employed in two ways such as guiding the design decision or assessing 
the design ofaj/na! product as follows: 
•	 Guiding the design decision (requirements and design phase): 
ln the case of guiding the design decision of the authentication method, 
USS is used in the Requirements and Design phase of the AMDLC. It 
influences the design in its early stage when traditionally the bulk of the 
feature design is done. Therefore, it makes the security and usability a 
natural outcome of the AM DLC (see Section 5.1 Introduction, Figure 5). As 
mentioned in Section 6.3 Practical Observations on the Impact of USS in 
Corporate and Academic Environments, by analyzing and answering 
concurrently the usability and security review questions in the inspection 
method, USS forces User Experience and/or Security Designers to think in 
the process as a whole (usability and security) not a part of the whole 
(usability or security). USS also forces them to initiate - or trigger ­
potential solutions in their minds for the questions/issues. In addition, while 
evaluating the review questions User Experience and/or Secllrity Designers 
will be able to anticipate the identification of potential bugs earlier in the 
Requirements and Design phase that wOllld otherwise occur when the 
prodllct is handed-off to the manufacturing. 
•	 Assessing the design ofafina! product (readiness phase): 
Conversely, USS can also be applied to assess the design ofafina! product 
(i.e. authentication method) which has been released to manufacturing or to 
the market. USS is used in this case in the Readiness phase of the AMDLC. 
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It can be used to point out what security and usability fixes and/or 
improvements should be implemented in the next release of the 
authentication method. This is a very important aspect of the authentication 
method development life cycle which can represent benefits in terms of 
improved product reliability, greater business, reduced customer support 
caBs, smaller releases product life cycle, reduced number of bugs to be 
opened against the product, and finally enhanced user interaction (i.e. 
finding bugs earlier can force designers to review and improve 
authentication method functionalities with developers as weIl as project and 
product managers). 
5.5 The Demonstrational Approach 
The Verification and Validation (V&V) phase is undertaken within this thesis 
with the demonstrational approach. V&V are supplementary techniques aimed at 
checking the quality of the system generated. Verification is a Quality control process 
that is employed to assess whether or not a product, service, or system conforms to 
regulations, specifications, or conditions included at the start of a development phase. 
Verification is frequently an internai process. 
Validation is Quality assurance process of laying down facts that provides a 
high degree of assurance that a product, service, or system accomplishes its plalU1ed 
requirements. The crucial goal of validation is to make the model useful; it addresses 
the right problem, and provides correct information about the system being modeled. 
Typically validation can be expressed by the question "Are we building the 
right thing?" and verification by "Are we building the thing right?". "Building the 
right thing" refers back to the user's needs, while "building it right" checks that the 
specifications be properly implemented by the system. 
ln scientific investigation, an experiment is a method of investigating causal 
relationships among variables. An ex periment is a foundation of the empirical 
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approach to acquiring data about the world and is employed in both natural sciences 
and social sciences. An experiment can be employed to aid in resolving a practical 
problem which is the focus of this thesis: the usable security of user authentication 
methods. 
Security systems should be viewed as socio-technical systems that depend on 
the social context in which they are embedded to function correctly. Security systems 
will only be able to offer the intended protection when people truly understand and 
are able to use them correctly. As J0sang el al. (2007) stresses, there are genuine 
differences between the degree by which systems can be considered theoretically 
secure (supposing those systems are properly operated) and in reality secure 
(acknowledging that frequently those systems will be operated erroneously). Often, as 
already stated throughout this thesis, there is a trade-off between usability and 
theoretical security. lt can be useful to reduce the level of theoretical security to 
improve the whole level of actual security. For example, the strongest passwords are 
the ones, from a theoretical perspective, randomly generated. However, given that it 
is difficult to remember such passwords, people will write them down, and in so 
doing weaken the system's security. Thus, it may be important to let people to choose 
passwords that are easier to remember. Even though this reduces the theoretical 
strength of the passwords, it intensifies the security of the system as a who le. 
To this end, the demonstrational approach is transJated in this thesis ln two 
forms: 
•	 Through the applicability of the USS: this thesis applies the USS inspection 
method to evaluate the OTP authentication method. 
•	 Through the demonstration of the One-Time-Password (OTP) authentication 
method which is described in the next sections. 
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5.5.1 Demonstration of One-Time-Password (OTP) 
This section describes the demonstration of the OTP authentication method 
which has been subjected to the GOMS analysis in Sub-Step 3.2. The OTP demo has 
as a goal to demonstrate the difficulties that users are subject to when using this 
particular authentication method. It focuses on the usability aspects of the user 
interaction with the system. The OIP demo is a wireless-and-token based 
authentication task which is comprised of the following elements: 
• a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN); 
• a hardware token with OTP functionality; 
• a Personaildentification Number (PIN) ; 
• a tokencode. 
5.5.1.1 Wireless Network 
A wireless network refers to any type of computer network that is associated 
with a telecommunications network whose interconnections between nodes are 
implemented without the use of wires. Wireless networks are generally implemented 
with some type of remote information transmission system that uses electromagnetic 
waves, such as radio waves, for the carrier and this implementation usually takes 
place at the physicallevel or "layer" of the network (OSI Model l38). 
5.5.1.2 Hardware Token with OTP Functionality 
As already mentioned, RSA SecurlD® 700 hardware token is an OIP scheme 
(Figure 2.7) and an associated authentication mechanism to protect an organization's 
most critical information assets. lt is generally used to secure either local or remote 
138 OSI Model and Communication Between Systems (Cisco, 2010): 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/internetworking/technology/handbook/lntro-to­
lnternet.html#wp 1020627 
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access to computer networks. Each end-user is assigned an authenticator that 
generates a one-time-use code which is the tokencode. When logging on, the user 
simply enters this number plus a PIN which is the passcode to be successflllly 
authenticated. 
RSA SecurlD® 700 is a very widely accepted authentication scheme used by 
many infrastructure solutions. It is a battery powered, hand-held device containing a 
dedicated microcontroller. The microcontroller stores, in Random Access Memory 
(RAM), the CUITent time, and a 64-bit seed value that is unique to a particular tokcl1. 
At the specified interval, every 60 seconds, the seed value and the time are combined 
throllgh a proprietary algorithm stored in the microcontroller's Read Only Memory 
(ROM) to create the tokencode value. 
An authentication server verifies the passcodes. The server maintains a 
database which contains the seed value for each token and the PIN or password for 
each user. From this information, and the current time, the server generates a set of 
valid passcodes for the user and checks each one against the entered value. The PIN 
can be changed if forgotten. The OTP is the concatenation of the four-digit user PIN 
and the six-digit tokencode called the passcode. 
When the token is manufactured, a seed is encoded into the specifie token. The 
RSA SecurID® 700 cornes pre-seeded and is ready-to-use out-of-the-box. It has a 
unique symmetric key that is combined with a proven algorithm to generate a new 
OTP every 60 seconds. Patented RSA technology synchronizes each authenticator 
with the security server, ensuring a high level of security. The OTP, something you 
HA VE, is coupled with a secret PIN, something you KNOW, to generate a 
combination that is almost impossible for a hacker to guess. Due to the algorithm 
being secret and only known to a limited number of individuals, attacks against the 
process of generating new tokencodes are less likely to succeed, unless information 
about it leaks to the public, or a hacker deliberately reverse-engineers the hardware 
token and the authentication server. Other attacks, such as network traffic sniffing, 
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shoulder surfing, keyboard logging, and social englneenng, might have limited 
success. If by one of these methods a hacker manages to obtain a tokencode and 
knows the user PIN number, the hacker can only use the passcode to authenticate 
within a limited period of time - up to 60 seconds after the tokencode was initially 
generated on the RSA SecurID® 700 token. Moreover, the user must not have used 
this tokencode to authenticate, or the tokencode will be rejected as already used. If 
the hacker does not try authentication within the 60-second period after having 
obtained actual credentials, the chance is lost and the hacker needs to find another 
tokencode. However, if a hacker manages to capture a legitimate tokencode from a 
user, the hacker already has the PIN as the first four digits of the passcode. The PIN 
can be used for brute force attacks, decreasing the unknown keyspace from ]010 to 
106 but this is still not likely to lead to success due to the limited time that the hacker 
has. Beyond the 60-second validity period of the tokencode, other attacks such as 
password guessing, sniffing, man-in-the-middle, etc. is not possible because the 
tokencode has already changed. 
The RSA SecurID® 700 is also tamper evident, meanmg that if someone 
opened the token for criminal purposes, it would be apparent to the user of the device. 
5.5.1.3 Personal Identification Number (PIN) 
A Personal Identification Number (PIN) is a secret numeric password shared 
between a user and a system that can be used to authenticate the user to the system. A 
PIN is usually a four-digit number (sometimes six-digit number), and the user is 
required to provide a non-confidential user identifier or token and a confidential PIN 
to gain access to the system. Upon receiving the User ID and PIN, the system looks 
up the PIN based upon the User ID and compares the looked-up PIN with the 
received PIN. The user is granted access only when the number entered matches with 
the number stored in the system. 
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5.5.1.4 Tokencode 
The hardware token displays a new pseudo-random value, usually a six-digit 
number, called the tokencode, at a fixed time interval, usually 60 seconds as shown in 
Figure 5.3. 
- - ­
f ,.. •• 
~ :.. . 'l, .. ' 
Figure 5.3: Tokencode: a six-digit number. 
5.5.1.5 How the OTP Demonstration Works? 
To access resources protected by the RSA SecurlD® 700, users combine their 
secret PIN with the tokencode generated by their authenticators. The outcome is a 
unique, one-time-use passcode that is used to positively identify, or authenticate, the 
user. If the code is validated by the RSA SecurlD® 700 system, the user is granted 
access to the protected resource. If it is not recognized, the user is denied access. 
5.5.1.5.1 System Requirements 
A Virtual Private Network (VPN) client application should be instalJed in the 
user's laptop which is in this thesis is an EMC VPN Client Version 4.8.02.00102006. 
Client type: Windows winNT. 
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5.5.1.5.2 Demonstration Steps 
The demonstration steps of the aTP authentication method with screenshots are 
described as follows: 
• Step 1: User access the EMC VPN application ln the laptop taskbar clicking 
on the corresponding icon; 
• Step 2: System opens up the EMC VPN application on the screen displaying a 
Connections Entry list for authentication; 
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• Step 3: User selects and double-click the proper connection entry for her/his 
area; 
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•	 Step 4: System initialize the authentication process by contacting the 
authentication server which displays the Login screen window; 
I~I==~-------~~~==~ IrAulhenbCath;iuser.. -	 , _._._._.__ .ô.I 
Enter Usemame and Password. 
EMC1 Usemame: 
connECTlOn Passcode: 
OK Cancel 
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• Step 5: User enters usemame in the usemame field; 
Enter Usemame and Password. 
Usemame: i jcarlson 
Passcode: 
• 
ûK 
• 
Cancel 
• Step 6: User enters PIN number in the passcode field. The PIN number is 
provided when user enrolls in the RSA® Authentication Manager 7.1 
application; 
Enter Usemame and Password. 
Usemame: jcarlson 
Passcode: 1 
ûK Cancel 
• 
• 
Step 7: User refers to the RSA SecurlD® 700 hardware token by reading and 
memorizing the tokencode displayed in the token's LCD (Liquid Crystal 
Display). The system generates a different tokencode every 60 seconds; 
Step 8: User concatenates the tokencode (six-digit number) to the PIN already 
entered in the passcode field and click on OK button; 
Enter Usemame and PaSS'",ord. 
Usemame: 1 jcarlson 
Passcode: Ir------:­I --------- ­
ûK Cancel 
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• Step 9: System contacts the security gateway; 
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• Step lO: User clicks on Continue button; 
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•	 Step Il: If authentication is successful, system grants access to the user. The 
yellow padlock icon shown as locked in the taskbar means that the 
authentication was successful. If not, system prompts the user to enter login 
details again. 
5.5.2 One-Time-Password (OTP) Usability Testing 
OTP Usability testing has been performed at RSA - The Security Division of 
EMC in Bedford, Massachusetts (USA) on June, 2009. 
Confidentiality Dise/aimer: Certain usabi/ity testing questionnaires and tests resu/ts 
regarding the OTP Usability Testing cannat be disc/osed ta protect RSA Security 
confldential information. 
5.5.2.1 Objectives of the OTP Usability Testing 
Identify high-priority usability issues: 
•	 Assess the usability of designs for end-user tasks involving an Invisible User 
Authentication enabled SSL-VPN. 
•	 Assess the usability of designs for end-user tasks involving account creation 
and management using the UCM Self-Service Console. 
5.5.2.2 Testing Tools 
The following testing tools have been used: Medium Fidelity Clickable 
Prototype, Morae Recording Software, and System Usability Survey (SUS). 
o	 Additional surveys to gauge ease of use. 
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5.5.2.3 Testing session 
Session length = approximately 1 hour, 12 external Participants: 
•	 Recruitment centered on non-admin users with average computer skills and 
familiarity with remote log in procedures. 
•	 Users were categorized into 3 levels: 
o	 Low - Consistent computer user, not familiar with the concept of 
VPNs. 
o	 Medium - Moderately skilled computer user, accesses remote 
resources but does not have in-depth knowledge or understanding 
about the agent or VPN. 
o	 Advanced - Skilled computer user, frequently accesses remote 
resources, knowledgeable about VPNs. 
5.5.2.4 Testing Methods - Participant Tasks 
Participants were divided into 2 groups: 
Group 1: 
•	 Authenticate via an IUA-enabled SSL-VPN. 
•	 Configure Challenge Method (Security Questions). 
•	 Log into Self-Service Console. 
•	 Request RSA SecurID® 800 hybrid authenticator. 
• Enable Token. 
Group 2: 
•	 Create a Self-Service Account. 
•	 Request IUA Enablement. 
•	 Configure Challenge Method (On-Demand Tokencode). 
•	 Authenticate via IUA-enabled SSL-VPN 
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5.5.2.5 Data Results 
System Usability Scale (SUS): 
•	 What does it measure? 
o	 Effectiveness (can users successfully achieve their objectives). 
o	 Efficiency (how much effort and resource is expended in achieving 
those objectives). 
o	 Satisfaction (was the experience satisfactory). 
•	 Average Score = 72.5 (scale of 1-100). 
•	 Historical Testing Results: 
1.	 FIM (Everest) SUS = 75.00 
2.	 SecurlD Appliance (ClydesdaJe) Round 1 SUS = 67.92 
3.	 SecurlD Appliance (Clydesdale) Round 2 SUS = 81.92 
•	 Areas that Tested Weil: 
o	 Consistency. 
o	 Perception of the ability to learn the system quickly. 
•	 Areas of Improvement: 
o	 Complexity of the system. 
o	 Need for prior knowledge. 
•	 Interesting data point - When rating the system on "cumbersomeness", Group 1 gave 
it the overall worst rating, and Group 2 gave it the overall best of ail the survey 
questions. 
•	 Most tasks were completed with high success rates, but sorne did need 
additional help from the facilitator. 
•	 There wasn 't a strong correlation between user expericnce leveJ and ability to 
complete most tasks easily. 
o	 The one exception was configuring On-Demand as the challenge 
method. 
o	 Ali other tasks were weil toJerated among ail user levels. 
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5.5.2.6 Findings Summary 
Strengths: 
• 2 page logon process in the SSL-VPN. 
• Use of contextual help (i.e., What is this? Links). 
• Save this Deviee. 
• Security Questions: 
• Concept. 
• Specifie questions available. 
• SSL Page Designs. 
• Request a Token self-service console pages. 
Areas of Improvement: 
• Concept of On-Demand service and tokencodes. 
5.5.3 One-Time-Password (OTP) Usability Issues - Discussion 
This section brings up and discusses usability issues regarding the RSA 
SecurlD® 700 hardware token which is in this thesis subjected to a demonstration 
test. The discussion is shown right after the (Christina Braz-n) parenthesis. 
Usability has been always a concern when designing an authentication method 
according to the main authenticator manufacturers RSA, The Security Division of 
EMC I39 V 'S'Ign 140 d V 141 H h"levlOg actua1 b'l' . . J::lact a " en ,an asco. owever ac usa 1 Ity IS 10 
most difficult task when taking into consideration user interaction. 
139 1n "Consumers want security over convenience" section. White Paper: RSA 2010 Global OnJine 
Consumer Security Survey. RSA-The Security Division of EMC. May 23, 20 l 0 
<http://www.rsa.com/products/consumer/whitepapers/I 0665_CSV_WP_1209_Global.pdf> 
140 ln "Information Security Risk Management, Solution: A Balanced Approach to Better Securily" 
section. VeriSign, lnc. May 23, 2010 <http://www.verisign.com/authentication/enlerprise­
authenlication/informalion-security-risk-management/> 
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RSASecurity (2010) manufactures the RSA SecurID® 700 and claims the 
following usability characteristics of its hardware token: 
• Convenient Form Factor 
"With its robust key ring, small size and easy-to-read Liquid Crystal Display (LCD),
 
the SecurlD 700 is a convenient f0I111 factor for employees, partners and customers."
 
(Christina Braz-l) The LCD is not easy to read since due to its design and form,
 
shadow and light reflect off the display, making it very difficult to read the passcode
 
from the LCD. Actually the user has to tum the token in several different positions
 
until the passcode is readable. The token is in fact a bit big not smal!. What was smal1
 
5 years aga (or less) it is in fact nowadays big. For example, the very first portable
 
phones were really big and clunky; then they were small enough to fit in yom
 
briefcase, then your pocket, and then the palm of your hand. Due to the growing
 
trends toward miniaturization (e.g., nanotechnology) and portability users wi 11
 
therefore have more "fitable" artifacts and easier to carry artifacts that reflect on the
 
usability aspect of the product itself.
 
(Christina Braz-2) The token fits to sorne extent on a ring of keys but because it is a
 
little big it rnakes the fob too heavy. Aiso to put the token on the fob ring is difficult;
 
the ring is too thick so you have to use a knife or scissors in order to si ide the token
 
ring through the fob ring. Finally, it doesn't fit weil in a pocket, because as already
 
mentioned the token is a little big.
 
Users can easily read the aTP displayed on the authenticator l42 and know when the
 
number is going to change by watching the countdown indicator."
 
141 ln "Cascades secures its remote nelwork wilh VASCO's lwo-tàclor aUlhentication". Vasco May 23, 
2010 <hltp://www.vasco.com/company/press_room/news_archive/20 JO/cascades 
secures its remote network with vascos two-factor authentication.aspx> 142 - - - - - - ­
ln Convenient Form Factor section. RSA-The Security Division of EMC. May 23, 2010 
<hltp://www.rsa.com/products/securid/datasheets/10306_S10700_DS_0709.pdf> 
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(Christina Braz-3) The LCD \s not easy-to-read as per (Christina Braz-]) 
comment. 
• Reliable Authentication Solution 
"The SecurID 700 authenticator is designed to withstand the worst imaginable 
conditions, offering industry-leading reliability. From temperature cycling to 
mechanical shocks to being immersed in water, the SecurID 700 is subjected to 
rigorous tests to ensure that customers do not face hidden costs due ta token failures, 
The combination of this high level of quality with a lifetime warranty allows 
organizations to reduce the overhead costs of distributing replacement tokens and 
drive down the overall cost of security while providing a consistent and easy-to-use 
authentication experience for end-users I43 ." 
(Christina Braz-4) An OTP is still a difficult method to handle in user authentication 
for the vast majority of average computer users, Users have difficulty understanding 
the concept of concatenation 144; it means users have to first input their PIN (four-digit 
number) then concatenate the passcode (six-digit number generated by the server) 
displayed on the hardware token LCD. 
An OTP authentication method requires the utilization of different artifacts and 
different communication channels by the user, such as a hardware token, a Web 
interface, a laptop, and a wireless network as shown in Figure 1,2. 
143 In Reliable Authentication Solution section. RSA-The Security Division of EMC. May 23, 2010 
<.http://www.rsa.com/products/securid/datasheets/ 10306_SI D700_OS_0709 .pd f> 
144 The USS methodology may guide expel1s towards innovate solutions by making use of the 
"Usability Severity Ratings and Recommendations" and "Security Severity Ratings and 
Recommendations" artifacts where evaluators can propose new solutions to ease the user 
authentication task. Also, a comparative analysis cou Id be undertaken by identifying on one hand the 
potential cognitive probJems (e.g., complex concatenation of PIN and tokencoùe) and on the other 
hand potential supplementary actions (e.g., filling out an additional field beyond username and 
passcode) but this is outside scope of this thesis. 
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The OTP authentication method violates usability criteria within the USS inspection 
method 145. It concerns perceptual and cognitive workload for individual inputs or 
outputs which represent the following usability review questions: 
•	 8-out-of-22 Usability Review questions specified in the Minimal Action 
criterion; 
•	 3-out-of-7 Usability Review questions specified in the Minimal Memory Load 
criterion; 
•	 2-out-of-7 Usability Review questions specified m the Resources Safety 
criterion; 
•	 2-out-of-12 Usability Review questions specified in the Load Time criterion; 
•	 S-out-of-J 9 Usability Review questions specified in the Operability criterion; 
•	 2-out-of-IO Usability Review questions specified in the Security criterion. 
A description of each usability criterion and its corresponding usability review 
questions is given below: 
Usability Criterion: MiNIMAL ACTION 
Capability of the application to help users achieve their tasks in a minimum number 
ofsteps (i.e. the length oftransactions and procedures). 
o	 Is the workload low and simple (e.g., input workload kept to a 
minimum)? 
o	 Is the authentication (verify/authenticate the identity of tbe user) 
process simple to users? 
o	 Does the user have to authenticate usmg different communications 
channels? 
o	 For codes longer than 4 or 5 characters, are mnemOl1lCS or 
abbreviations being used? 
145 The concept of concatenation PIN + passcode is difficult lo be underslood by users, and il can be 
tested nol only employing the USS inspeclion method but also usability test (i.e. observing users 
performing the OTP task) as per section 5.5.2 One-Time-Password (OTP) Usabilily Tesling. Also, 
other usability inspection techniques can be used such as Pluralistic Walkthrough, Task Analysis, etc. 
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o	 Has the requirement of data entry by the user being limited when the 
data can be derived by the application? 
o	 For data entry, has the system displayed currently defined default 
values in their appropriate data fields? 
o	 Does the system accommodate both experienced and average 
computer users (e.g., length of transactions: short cuts are available to 
experienced users)? 
o	 If users must switch between different systems are dual-interfacé chi p 
smart cards used? 
Usability Criterion: MINIMAL MEMOR y LOAD 
Whether a user is required to keep minimal amount ofinformation in mind in arder to 
achieve a specified task. 
o	 Are the sequences and interdependencies of the MTM's artifacts and 
their corresponding Uis (i.e., streamlined business worktlow) "harsh­
less" in the user interaction viewpoint enhancing thus customer 
intimacy (providing appropriate choices, information and advice)? 
o	 Is the memory load on the user minimized (i.e., no memorization of 
long data lists, complicated procedures, or undertake complex 
cognitive activities)? 
o	 Are the entries short (i.e., STM capacity is limited43, so the shorter the 
entries, the smaller elTors and reading times)? 
Usability Criterion: RESOURCE SAFETY 
Whether resources (including people) are handled properly without any hazard. 
o	 Are audible instructions (or voice PIN) avaiJabJe so that people who 
cannot read an MTM screen can independently use the machine49? 
o	 If the MTM offers a silent alarm feature, is Reverse PIN used 
providing faster recall? 
Usability Criterion: LOAD TlME 
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Time requiredfor the application ta foad (i.e., how fast il responds ta the user). 
o	 If login fails, is there available another authentication option to the user ln 
order to achieve her/his task? 
o	 Does the live image require a small memory allocation which will affect time 
for retrieval of the image if solicited by the user? 
Usability Criterion: OPERABILITY 
o	 Amount of effort necessary to operate and control an application. 
o	 Is the user task' workload light? 
o	 Can users customize the user interface to their specifie needs (e.g., 
personalized look and Feel)? 
o	 Can (some) system's mechanisms be configurcd by users to operate 111 
certain waylO (e.g., customer's language and "favorite transaction")? 
o	 Is there an alternative authentication method, when biometrics is not 
available in order to provide availability to the users? 
o	 If users forget their PINs, can users reset them via a web interface rather than 
in an issuance station (i.e., ensme customer convenience & satisfaction)? 
Usabi/ity Criterion: SECUR1TY 
Capability of the application ta protect information and data so that unauthorized 
persons or systems cannat read or modify them and authorized persans or systems 
are no! denied access. 
o	 Do users have more than a few alternatives to authenticate to the system to 
improve the availabiliry and convenience of the system? 
o	 For logical access application, is biometrics provided to enhance usability 
(i.e., on-card biometric match and on-card key generation)? 
Summary of the topics discussed in Chapter 5: The Computer Science Axis. 
This chapter presented the computer science approach as follows: Security as a 
Usability Characteristic, User Authentication Use Cases, Usabiliry Factors and Usability 
Criteria, The USS Inspection Method, Demonstrating USS using A Multifunction Teller 
Machine (MTM), Usability Severity Ratings, Security Severity Ratings, and One-Iime­
Password (OIP) demonstration. 
CHAPTER VI
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
 
6.1 Summary of the Research Work 
There has been very little research on usable security especially related to user 
authentication methods, although a considerable body of research work has been 
made for computer security mechanisms in general other than authentication 
methods. To be able to build reliable, effective, and usable security systems, we need 
inspection methods that take into account the specific constraints of security 
mechanisms and their potential security threats. Systems should be built so as to be 
easy to learn and use by the average corporate or consumer computer user. Human 
factors should be incorporated into the development of security solutions where 
usability is central during the development process. Another particular concern in 
authentication according to Cranor and Garfinkel (2005) is that authentication 
systems do not fail gracefully. This means that if an average consumer computer user 
forgets her username but gets right the password the system does not enable her for 
instance, to gain partial access to an online magazine, or for an average corporate 
computer user access to the system's less criticaJ files, or an emergency or temporary 
access. There is 00 established and recognized mechanism to accommoda te user error 
which means that most likely productivity will be strongly compromised and users 
will be largely dissatisfied with the system. According to Sasse (2004), "Don't focus 
ONLy on UIs to security tools - the big problems are in security requirements, job 
design and user iovolvement." That is exactly what this thesis is ail about: 
Requirements and Design. Additionally, according to Whitteo and Tygar (1999), 
using conventional methods for usability evaJuation that concentrate on the impact of 
usability on security effectiveness will assist developers to discover usability 
problems threatening the security of a system. 
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As strong user authentication becomes more imperative, technologies to 
accomplish it will become more convenient through the use of requirements and 
design tools. Since communication of intent is vital to security, the UI is also a key 
component for achieving computer security, not the only aspect when designing user 
authentication methods. To this end, this thesis has investigated the security 
consequences of usability issues and presented a novel usable security protocol 
through an inspection method named Usable Security Symmetry (USS) for dealing 
with usable security of user authentication methods in the HClSec field that this 
thesis's author hopes will guide the development of truly secure and usable user 
authentication systems. 
6.2 Scientific Contributions 
This section summanzes the body of research performed at University of 
Quebec at Montreal over the past four years and a ha If. Scientific contributions 
contained herein include: 
1.	 A methodo)ogy for a Usable Security ProtocoJ which is translated into a 
usable security inspection method for user authentication methods named 
Usable Security Symmetry (USS) towards the goal of aligning usability and 
security. lt is employed to influence the design of the authentication methods 
earlier in the Requirements and Design phases. USS can also be used in later 
stages to assess existing user authentication methods. To date, USS is the only 
existing design (and evaluation) inspection method to improve the process of 
user-centered design in user authentication methods. An important factor is 
that USS does not present only a general principle but also specify exactly 
what the issues are and recommendations for them. Other related work in 
usable security do not address the usable security issues as a holistic approach 
as USS according to the sub-products of this research work mentioned below 
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(1 to II items). No related work presents any formai method for evaluating 
usable security for user authentication or even for computer security in 
general. Sorne significant differentiators of USS compared to the general 
usable security principles presented in Chapter 3 are the following: 
•	 USS points out specifie usability and security issues and recommends 
specifie solutions for each of them, avoiding therefore the use of 
general guidelines which are very broad in scope and at the end do not 
apply to anything - this is an important aspect of the scientific 
contribution of USS. 
•	 Heuristic evaluation from Nielsen (1994) is only focused on usability 
not considering the security aspects of a system. Aiso heuristic 
evaluation does not recommend any solutions to the problems only 
point them out. 
•	 Cognitive walkthrough IS not also designed to entail the security 
aspects of a system, only usability which USS does. 
•	 Computer Security Design Principles (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975) 
does consider only security aspects. 
•	 Design guidelines for security management systems (Chiasson et al., 
2007) does consider only security aspects. 
•	 Guidelines and Strategies for Secure Interaction Design (Yee, 2005) 
consider usability and security aspects but it is focused on generaJ 
principles. 
•	 Design Principles and Patterns for Aligning Security and Usability 
(Garfinkel, 2005) consider usability and security aspects but it is 
focused on general principles. 
•	 Criteria for Security Software to be Usable (Whitten and Tygar, 1998) 
consider usability and sccurity aspects but it is focused on general 
principles. 
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2.	 A GOMS model developed as a cognitive task analysis tool to understand user 
interaction related to the computer sciences and cognitive processes involved 
in the most representative user authentication methods such as Password/PINs 
(wired network-based task), One-Time-Passwords (wireless/token network­
based task), Out-of-Band Authentication (wired and wireless network-based 
task), and Biometrics (wired network and electronic access control-based 
task). The general guidelines mentioned above do not address formaJly 
cognitive aspects of user authentication. 
3.	 GO MS (design) artifacts which supported the cognitive task analysis work 
such as total learning and execution time measures for each of the user 
authentication methods as referred in item 2 above. 
4.	 A refined and practical definition of usable security considering resources and 
costs. 
5.	 A new definition of Security Scenario encompassing two new types such as 
Tangible Security Scenario (TSS) and Intangible Security Scenario (ISS). 
6.	 A set of methods expressed in a programming-like language GLEAN (GOMS 
Language Evaluation and Analysis) for accomplishing goals for the following 
tasks scenarios: Check Business E-mail (Username and Password), Update the 
SecurID authenticator UI specification (One-Time-Passwords (OTP)), Make 
an electronic funds lran~fer (Out-Of-Band Authentication (OOBA)), and 
finally Access afile on a personal laptop (fingerprint recognition). 
7.	 A Cognitive Model of User Authentication (CMUA) for understanding how 
and what cognitive processes are involved in each of the user authentication 
methods mentioned in item 2 above. The generaJ guidelines mentioned in 1 do 
not again address formally cognitive aspects of user authentication. 
8.	 A set of user authentication use cases used as basic use cases for a MTM. 
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9.	 A comparative analysis of user authentication methods taking into 
consideration a diverse spectrum of attributes such as definition, advantages, 
disadvantages, security, usability, human versus automatism, input process 
time, industrial application, and privacy issues. The general guidelines 
mentioned in 1 do not present any formai comparative analysis related to user 
authentication methods. 
10. An Authentication Risk Assessment matrix to acknowledge and understand 
the main threats and security vulnerabilities related especially to online user 
authentication. 
Il. A comprehensive literature revlew of usabJe security reJated to security 
guidelines and user authentication methods. 
6.3	 Practical Observations on the Impact of USS in Corporate and Academie 
Environments 
This thesis's autbor bas been working on Computer Security especially in user 
authentication for the past 8 years within the following companies and institutions: 
•	 RSA Security, the Security division of EMC, Bedford, MA (USA). 
•	 YeriSign Inc., Mountain Yiew, CA (USA). 
•	 Center for Research and Analysis of Organizations (CIRANO), Montreal, 
Quebec (Canada). 
•	 Rogers Communications, Montreal, Quebec (Canada). 
•	 University of Quebec at Montreal and Concordia University within the 
doctoral program framework - Cognitive Computing, Quebec (Canada). 
•	 University of Montreal within the master program framework - Master of 
Science in Electronic Commerce (specialization in computer science), Quebec 
(Canada). 
ln my point of view, working in the marketplace specifically in very centered 
authentication company and at the same time following a doctoral program which is 
401 
in certain way related to the thesis's subject is a crucial aspect on understanding the 
subject matter, user authentication, and having access to different resources and 
information that would be impracticable if 1 was only restricted to the academic 
program. My professional experience is translated implicitly and explicitly in this 
thesis through the i) demonstration of the aIP authentication method that will be 
performed during my oral defense; ii) the incorporation of questions into the 
questionnaire used for a formaI usability testing of the aIP authentication method at 
RSA as mentioned in Chapter 6; ii) the participation in a demo regarding the aIP 
USB fingerprint authentication method at RSA; iv) the access to numerous technical 
documentation, development data, and usability tests sessions for authentication 
methods, and authentication manager software targeted to administrators (RSA 
Security Console) and corporate end-users (RSA Self-Service Console); and finally 
v) the different types of users involved in user authentication systems (e.g. Super 
Admin, corporate users, etc.) which is vital for the comprehension of the cognitive 
and corporate processes aspects. 
But how this thesis' author enV1SIons USS in the practical real world? 
Performing the USS inspection method User Experience Designers while evaluating 
the usability review questions may come across issues that would not be apparent if 
they were not also evaluating the security review questions at the same time. An 
example is the following: 
•	 Usability review question: 7.4 If the MTM ofJers a si/ent alarm feature, is 
PIN number reversai used providing Iaster recall? Security review question: 
Has the system 's owner security policy a clause that states that PIN number 
reversai must only be usedfor emergency? Here it is clear that a PIN security 
policy should be enforced while providing ease of use to users. Also the 
reverse PIN functionality being enforced avoid the opening of bugs they will 
be able to reduce the number of bugs within a CD software reJease since 
issues can be brought early in the design phase. 
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By analyzing and answenng concurrently the usability and security reVlew 
questions force User Experience or Security designers to think in the process as a 
whole (usability and security) not a part of the whole (usability or security). This also 
forces them to initiate - or trigger - a solution in their minds for the questions/issues. 
In addition, while evaluating the review questions User Experience Designers will be 
able to anticipate the identification of potential bugs earlier in the authentication 
method design phase that would occur when the product is handed-off and released 
to the market. This is a very important aspect of the authentication method 
development life cycle which can represent benefits in terms of improved product 
reliability, greater business, reduced customer support calls, smaller releases product 
Iife cycle, decrease of Quality Engineering (QE) work (i.e., reduction of the number 
of bugs to be opened against the product), an finally enhanced user interaction (i.e. 
finding bugs earlier can force designers to review and improve authentication 
method functionalities with developers, project and product managers). Another 
important aspect is that companies, in general, are having difficulty fitting the 
traditional usability testing into their project plans and budgets when working on an 
Agile software development process (SCR UM framework). Agi le software 
development refers to a set of software development methodologies derived from 
iterative development, where requirements and solutions develop through 
cooperation between self-organizing cross-functional teams. Agile is considered a 
"lightweigbt method" (especially when compared to the Waterfall method) which is 
very appropriate in today's dynamic business environment. SCRUM is an iterative, 
incremental framework for Agile. Using USS can be very appropriate in Agile since 
one (or more) evaluator can perform the inspection method to find out particularly 
major interface issues, speed development, and save user testing logistics time, 
planning, and money. The USS can be applied through a Spike (i.e. a timeboxed 
investigati on, not the original user story), or Non-functional task (e.g., a 
performance-related issue, a reliability issue, etc.) within a two-week Sprint. 
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In the academic environment, the USP methodology design artifacts, described 
In Appendix D, can contribute to the research cycle by providing tools for the 
requirements and design phase of any software application master or doctoral 
project. For instance, within the Cognitive Computing program, the USS inspection 
method could be applied to the study and/or design of a Learning Management 
Systems (LMS) software application for the administration, documentation, tracking, 
and reporting of training programs, classroom and online events, e-Jearning 
programs, and training content. Another application of the design artifacts wou Id be 
to be used as leaming tools for teaching HCl. 
The USP design artifacts can also help III avoiding hurried statements that 
cannot be sustained by objective data. For example, in GOMS Operators like 
DETERfvIINE-POSITION and CLICK-MOUSE BUTTON have been empirical1y 
validated at the keystroke-Ievel, thus models that use those operators can generate 
reliable quantitative estimates. Another example where the design artifacts can be 
useful in the academic environment is in the evaluation of accessibility in an 
application: a task that can be carried out in one minute using a keyboard, might 
need 5 to IO minutes using a mouse. Many disabled users favor to handle web 
applications, using the keyboard, given that it is often faster than using a mouse. As 
researchers are more focused on the conceptualization and modeling activities in a 
research project, USP design artifacts (especial1y 4, 5, and 6) can help in the 
understanding of concepts in a greater extent. Also, the CMUA can be adapted to the 
study and/or simulate other security mechanisms such as the True 128-bit Extended 
Validation SSL I46 from VeriSign which provides a simple and trustworthy way to 
establish trust online by displaying a green address bar with the name of the 
organization that owns the SSL certificate and the name of the Certificate Authority 
that issued it. The green bar shows site users that the transaction is encrypted and the 
146 VeriSign, Inc. June l, 2010 <http://www.verisign.com/ssJ/buy-ssl-certificates/extended-validation­
pro-ssl-certificates/index.html> 
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organization has been authenticated in accordance with rigorous industry standard. 
The CMUA can then demonstrate how the process of recognizing and reasoning 
about the green bar can happen in the user's mind. To wrap up, these examples are 
only a few contributions that USP methodology can provide to the academic 
environment, but it is not limited to, and it is not an exhaustive Iist. 
The lessons learned when developing this research work were the following: 
•	 Usable security is critical to the effective adoption and deployment of user 
authentication methods. 
•	 The development of a user authentication method, irrespective of being a 
software or hardware authenticator or biometrics needs to include usable 
security at early stage as part of Requirements and Design phases. 
•	 A user authentication method can be adapted to a computer system' s 
infrastructure already in place in an organization. They depend on 
environment and implementation factors, and also how weil that product fits 
into the existing lT infrastructure in today's modern network environments 
which tend to be diverse in their requirements. 
•	 The choice of an authentication method depends also on industrial norms, 
legal and business needs such as the environmentaJ characteristics of the 
electronic communication (e.g. online shopping, authentication manager 
application, etc.). 
•	 Security designers are required to address the diverse authentication needs of 
severa] and different users, including system administrators, employees, 
business partners, customers, and end-users. 
•	 Security tools (including authenticators) have been developed, but their 
successful use in real applications is fairly limited because of their 
complexity, "hard-of-use", and the necessity of previous advanced technical 
knowledge on the part of end-users. 
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6.4 Limitations 
Evaluation inspection methods in general do not offer potential solutions to the 
usable security problem. However this thesis provides the usability and security 
severity ratings in order to recommend practical solutions to usable security 
problems. 
Also it is complex to summarize the findings in the inspection methods from 
multiple evaluators as they report problems differently and at different levels. There 
is also the issue of severity. Not ail usable security problems are equal. DeveJopment 
teams need to be able to prioritize what problems get fixed according to the 
seriousness of the problem. There is currently no agreement on how to judge the 
severity ofusability problems (e.g. bugs triage). 
One question is how accurately these inspection methods predict problems that 
real user encounter? An early study found that heuristic reviews were better 
predictors than cognitive walkthroughs and guideline-based evaluations. This was 
compared to results from laboratory usability tests. However, none of these methods 
found more than 50% of the problems discovered in laboratory testing (Scholtz, 
2003). 
6.5 Future Work and Recommendations 
First of ail, a major goal of a future work is the development of a USS Web­
based application which will be named USSWebApp for performing usabJe security 
assessment of user authentication methods. It will automate much of the time­
consuming psychological and statistical work that is required for a deep interface 
analysis. An important and solid requirements and design work has been already 
completed with this doctoral thesis which will pave the way for the development and 
implementation phases of the USSWebApp. 
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Secondly, another goal is the development of a cognitive tool that would 
simulate the Cognitive Model of User Authentication (CMUA) presented in this 
dissertation. This cognitive tool could be used to simulate the user interaction with 
different authentication methods and demonstrate the feasibility of their 
implementation. 
Finally, another important research work would specify the best combination 
among different and existing user authentication methods used in conjunction with 
different wired and/or wireless computer devices with regards to usable security and 
performance. This would provide organizations with robust data in order to 
implement or evaluate user authentication method(s). 
User authentication is a foundation stone of lT security, one that is changing 
quickly. Several areas of technology development will have a major impact on user 
authentication over the next decade or even in a few years. According to Sasse (2004) 
and Manning (2009) from RSA Security, there are key challenges with which 
HClSec researchers will be confronted when ma king research on user authentication 
and should be addressed as follows: 
•	 Thinking security by proposing intuitive or seamless solutions that respond to 
user behavior or what is known about the user; 
•	 Different mechanisms for frequent and infrequently used passwords; 
•	 Consideration of implications regarding physical and mental workload; 
•	 Perceptions of and attitudes to security: ways of persuading and motivating 
users to be secure and change the image of security; 
•	 Design of specific (goal-and risk-based) security policies that are enforced, 
and are seen to be enforced; 
•	 Strong user authentication for end users in the cloud where identity can be 
carried along cloud services (i.e. Cloud Computing is a means to enhance 
capacity or add capabilities on the tly without investing in new infrastructure, 
training new personnel, or licensing new software. lt consists of any 
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subscription-based or pay-per-use service that, in real time over the Internet, 
extends IT's existing capabilities). 
6.6 The Future of User Authentication 
Let us be practical: new authentication management solutions are needed to 
exploit authentication methods and bring stronger security at a reduced cost. A 
feasible novel approach would be artificial intelligence tools embedded within an 
authentication policy engine. This engine will assess for patterns of fraud during each 
user authentication request. Authentication attempts with a high likelihood of fraud 
might activate an alert to an intrusion detection system. Then the user authentication 
manager would dynamically establish an access control threshold, based on the kind 
of threats to a protected resource, and automatically pick the best available 
authentication methods for accessing the protected resource. 
An important obstacle to strong user authentication in e-commerce is the false 
reject (rejecting the authentication attempt of a legitimate user). This will be probably 
overcome through use of intelligent applications that sense when a legitimate user is 
having difficulties authenticating. This usab/e security approach will help the 
legitimate user repeat a failed method or will present an alternative. 
These new automated user authentication systems will be possibly implemented 
In the so called authentication portaIs which will provide extremely granular user 
authentication for accessing significant protected resources with different access 
privileges for different types ofusers. 
•	 Future users will authenticate: 
o	 through trusted computing platforms, which will in tum represent the 
user to the network; 
o	 via RFID and other wireless devices, as logical and physical 
authentication technologies converge; 
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o	 based on what they know - and what they're able to do - in new 
and sophisticated ways; 
o	 anonymously in many cases: as to their privileges, not necessarily 
their identities; 
o	 with passwords sometimes, but the passwords will be better protected, 
and the authentication will be mutual 
This thesis' author claims that user authentication will assume a chief new 
network control function. In an integrated and advanced network of multiple user 
devices (e.g. desktops, laptops, PDAs, cell phones, and so on) each carrying out 
numerous concurrent sessions with a dynamically allocated temporary client address, 
there will be an infinite mix of user authentication requirements to accurately and 
securely provide and bill services. 
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APPENOIXA
 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF USER AUTHENTICATION METHOOS
 
A.l	 Introduction 
This appendix presents details of the comparative analysis of user authentication 
methods presented in Chapter 2. lt specifies sorne definitions and abbreviations used in 
the following tables. To describe the authentication methods attributes, subjective rating 
scales have been used for Security and Usability as follows: 
•	 Total Transaction Tirne (seconds) corresponds to the time for a single user to 
present the biometric (acquisition time), processing time, and, optionally, 
might include entry of a PIN or user identifier (Woodward el al., 2003). 
•	 "Security" and "Usability" range from l=Minimum to 5=Maximurn in order 
to measure the degree of severity issues related to each authentication method. 
•	 "Automation versus Hurnan" range from 1=Human is better; 5=Machine is 
better. 
•	 "Accuracy" has two measure rates of authentication by biometrics: 
o	 False Reject Rate (FRR) where a legitimate user is rejected by the 
acquisition device. 
o	 FaIse Acceptance Rate (F AR) where a false user is accepted. 
•	 "Average Attack Space": corresponds to the number of guesses made by an 
attacker in order to disclose the base secret (e.g. passwords, PINs, etc.). 
•	 Abbreviations used are the following: C/R=Challenge/Response; PK=Public 
Key; PRK=Private Key; SSO= Single-Sign-On; TGS=Ticket Granting 
Service. 
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 c
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 c
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 f
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 p
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r c
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at
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c
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c
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c
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f m
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 c
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a
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at
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 m
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e
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c
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at
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c
u
ri
ty
 
pa
ss
w
or
d 
fo
llo
w
ed
 b
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c
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e l
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e t
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re
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 c
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 f
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 p
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 p
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 c
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 c
ar
d,
 
a 
so
rt
 o
f i
nt
el
lig
en
t 
to
ke
n,
 w
hi
ch
 c
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 d
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 b
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 f
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C
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 r
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 m
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at
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c
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at
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at
or
 
2 
se
c
o
n
ds
 
v
a
ri
et
y 
o
f p
ro
du
ct
s.
 
pr
es
en
te
d 
by
 th
e 
u
se
r:
 
T
he
 i
de
al
 s
w
ip
in
g 
PI
N
, 
m
e
m
o
ry
 c
a
rd
, 
sp
ee
d 
de
al
s 
w
it
h 
yo
ur
 
Sc
hl
um
be
rg
er
Se
m
a,
 
fi
ng
er
pr
in
t, 
e
tc
.) 
se
lf
-c
on
fi
de
nc
e.
 S
hy
 
D
at
ac
ar
d 
G
ro
up
, 
pe
op
le
 s
w
ip
e 
sl
ow
er
. 
G
em
al
to
, e
tc
. 
A
nx
io
us
 p
eo
pl
e 
sw
ip
e 
to
o 
fa
st
. 
C
on
fi
de
nt
 
pe
op
le
 s
w
ip
e 
a
t 
th
e 
id
ea
l s
pe
ed
. 
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D
at
a 
G
en
er
at
or
: 
7.
 M
IC
R
O
PR
O
C
E
SS
O
R
 C
H
IP
 C
A
R
O
 A
N
D
 M
U
L
T
IF
U
N
C
T
IO
N
 C
A
R
D
S 
(M
CC
s)
 
C
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
n 
D
ef
in
iti
on
 
A
dv
an
ta
ge
s 
D
is
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
C
os
t 
(C
AD
$)
 
(1 
=
 
m
in
; 
5=
 m
a
x
) 
Sm
ar
t C
ar
do
 
Th
ey
 h
av
e 
bu
ilt
-in
 
A
tta
ck
s 
in 
M
CC
s a
re
 v
er
y 
Sm
ar
t c
ar
ds
 a
re
 
4 
$8
0 
dy
na
m
ic
 d
at
a 
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 c
ap
ab
ili
tie
s. 
M
C
C
s 
o
rg
an
iz
e 
ca
rd
 
m
em
o
ry
 in
to
 s
ep
ar
at
e 
se
ct
io
ns
 a
tt
rib
ut
ed
 to
 
sp
ec
ifi
e 
fu
nc
tio
ns
 o
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
. A
 
.
 
.
m
lc
ro
pr
oc
es
so
r I
S 
di
ffi
cu
lt 
sin
ce
 th
ey
 u
se
 
pu
bl
ic 
ke
y 
or
 s
ec
re
t k
ey
 
au
th
en
tic
ati
on
. M
CC
s 
st
or
e 
the
 k
ey
 m
at
er
ial
 
(se
cre
t k
ey
) i
nt
er
na
lly
 o
n 
the
 c
ar
d 
its
el
f w
he
n 
u
sin
g 
K
er
be
ro
s 
au
th
en
tic
ati
on
. 
Th
e 
se
cu
rit
y 
o
f 
au
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
sy
ste
m
s 
cu
rr
en
tly
 o
n
ly
 
de
pl
oy
ab
le
 in
 a
n
 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n'
s 
n
et
w
or
k 
du
e 
to
 t
he
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 
fo
r s
pe
ci
al
iz
ed
 
ha
rd
w
ar
e 
co
n
n
ec
te
d 
to
 
th
e 
ho
st 
m
ac
hi
ne
. 
It 
re
qu
ir
es
 a
 
de
te
rm
in
ed
 a
n
d 
w
e
ll­
fu
nd
ed
 a
dv
er
sa
ry
 to
 
c
a
rr
y 
o
u
t 
a
n
 a
tt
ac
k 
o
n
 
a 
sm
a
rt
 c
ar
do
 
C
ar
d 
cm
be
dd
ed
 in
 th
e 
ca
rd
 o
r 
ca
n 
be
 g
re
at
ly
 e
n
ha
nc
ed
 
Si
nc
e 
a 
sm
a
rt
 c
ar
d 
is 
a 
m
ic
ro
co
nt
ro
lle
r c
hi
p 
th
at
 a
dm
in
is
te
rs
 th
is 
m
em
o
ry
 a
llo
ca
tio
n 
an
d 
fil
e 
ac
ce
ss
. 
by
 re
ql
lir
in
g 
m
or
e 
th
an
 
on
e 
fa
cto
r t
o 
gr
an
t 
all
th
en
tic
ati
on
. S
m
ar
t 
ca
rd
s 
pr
ov
ide
 a
n
o
th
er
 
fa
cto
r (
wh
at 
YO
ll 
ha
ve
). 
ph
ys
ic
al
 d
ev
ic
e,
 it
 
n
ee
ds
 a
n
 i
nt
er
fa
ce
 to
 t
he
 
ho
st 
c
o
m
pu
te
r -
th
e 
sm
ar
t 
ca
rd
 re
ad
er
. 
H
lIm
an
 v
s.
 A
ut
om
ati
sm
 
U
sa
bi
lit
y 
To
ta
l T
ra
ns
ac
tio
n 
Ti
m
e 
In
du
st
ria
l 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
Is
su
es
 
A
cc
ur
ac
y 
(1 =
hl
lm
an
 is
 b
ett
er
; 
S=
m
ac
hi
ne
 is
 b
ett
er
) 
(1 
=
 
m
in
; 5
= 
m
ax
) 
(in
 se
c
o
n
ds
) (
W
oo
dw
ard
 
et
 a
l.,
 2
00
3) 
A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
(1 
=
 
m
in
; 5
= 
m
ax
) 
5 (A
cq
ui
sit
io
n 
de
vi
ce
 
o
r 
da
ta
 g
en
er
at
or
 
pr
es
en
te
d 
by
 th
e 
u
se
r:
 
PI
N
, m
e
m
o
ry
 c
a
rd
, 
fi
ng
er
pr
in
t, 
e
tc
.) 
3 Us
ed
 o
fte
n 
in 
co
m
bin
ati
on
 
w
ith
 P
IN
 (2
). 
Sm
art
 ca
rd
s 
w
or
k 
the
 sa
m
c 
as
 a
 c
re
dit
 
ca
rd 
ex
ce
pt 
in 
e.
g. 
W
eb
 
pu
rch
as
ing
 is
 e
as
ier
. I
f w
e 
ha
ve
 a
 c
om
pu
ter
 co
up
led
 
w
ith
 a
 s
m
ar
t c
ar
d 
re
ad
er 
w
e 
ca
n 
sli
p 
in 
ou
r 
sm
ar
t c
ar
d 
an
d 
it 
w
ill 
co
m
ple
te 
the
 o
rd
er 
5-
15
 
A
 b
us
y 
pe
rs
on
 c
an
 
sp
ee
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
dr
iv
e-
th
ro
ug
h 
by
 s
im
pl
y 
pa
ss
in
g 
a 
co
n
ta
ct
le
ss
 
sm
ar
t c
ar
d 
at
 a
 r
ea
de
r 
pl
ac
ed
 a
t 
th
e 
o
rd
er
 
m
ac
hi
ne
. 
G
en
er
al
 a
c
c
e
pt
an
ce
. 
Sm
ar
t c
a
rd
s 
a
re
 
ty
pi
ca
lly
 d
ep
lo
ye
d 
a
s 
pa
rt
 o
f a
 P
ub
lic
 K
ey
 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
. 
G
em
al
to
, e
tc
. 
4 
D
is
ta
nc
e 
an
d 
c
yc
le
 
dc
la
y 
do
 h
av
e 
an
 i
m
pa
ct
 
o
n
 t
he
 a
c
c
u
ra
c
y 
o
f 
R
ea
d/
W
rit
e.
 
A
 fi
ng
er
pr
in
t t
em
pl
at
e 
st
or
ed
 o
n
 a
 s
m
ar
tc
ar
d:
 
e
n
ha
nc
em
en
t a
lg
or
ith
m
 
re
du
ce
d 
eq
ua
l e
rr
o
r 
ra
te
 
for
m 
thu
s s
av
ing
 us
 v
alu
ab
lc 
to
 1
.6
%
 in
 ti
m
e 
o
f 
tim
e. 
ap
pr
ox
im
at
el
y 
5 
se
co
n
ds
. 
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D
at
a 
G
en
er
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or
: 
8.
 P
U
B
LI
C
 K
E
Y
 A
U
T
H
E
N
T
IC
A
TI
O
N
 
C
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
n 
D
ef
in
iti
on
 
A
dv
an
ta
ge
s 
D
is
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
C
os
t (
CA
D$
) 
(1 
=
 
m
in
; 5
= 
m
a
x
) 
Pu
bl
ic
 K
ey
 
Pu
bl
ic
 k
ey
 e
n
c
ry
pt
io
n 
PK
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
m
u
ch
 
K
ey
 
4 
D
ep
lo
yi
ng
 re
a
de
rs
 
C
ry
pt
og
ra
ph
y 
in
vo
lv
es
 a
 p
ai
r o
f 
st
ro
ng
er
 id
en
tit
y 
di
st
rib
ut
io
nJ
ex
ch
an
ge
 
Sa
fe
r t
o 
di
st
rib
ut
e 
c
a
n
 c
o
st
 $
22
0 
pe
r s
e
a
t 
PK
 a
n
d 
PR
K
 (8
) 
ke
ys
 -
a 
pu
bl
ic
 k
ey
 
c
he
ck
in
g.
 
.
 
A
ls
o 
if
 as
ym
m
et
ri
c 
a
c
ro
ss
 m
u
lti
pl
e 
a
ro
u
n
d 
50
00
 u
se
rs
.
 
(P
K)
 an
d 
a 
pr
iv
at
e 
e
n
c
ry
pt
io
n 
is 
u
se
d 
th
e 
e
n
te
rp
ri
se
s.
 
PK
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
 o
ft
en
 
ke
y 
(P
RK
) -
U
nn
ec
es
sa
ry
 th
e 
"
ke
y 
PR
K
 is
 a
 s
in
gl
e 
po
in
t 
a
ss
u
m
e
s 
sm
a
rt
 c
a
rd
 
a
ss
o
c
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 a
n
 
e
n
tit
y 
th
at
 n
e
e
ds
 to
 
m
a
n
a
ge
m
en
t"
 a
s 
in
 
se
c
re
t 
c
ry
pt
og
ra
ph
y.
 
o
f a
tt
ac
k,
 e
x
tr
em
el
y 
v
a
lu
ab
le
 to
 t
he
 
H
ig
he
r r
e
si
st
an
ce
 to
 
tr
ia
l-a
nd
-e
IT
or
 
re
a
de
rs
 to
 b
e 
st
an
da
rd
 
o
n
 a
il 
w
o
rk
st
at
io
ns
 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
e 
its
 
id
en
tit
ye
le
ct
ro
ni
ca
lly
 
Ea
ch
 u
se
r 
si
m
pl
y 
pu
bl
is
he
s 
th
ei
r 
PK
, 
e
n
e
m
y.
 
T
he
 p
ro
c
e
ss
 to
 v
e
ri
fy
 
a
tt
ac
ks
. 
a
n
d 
PC
s. 
CU
IT
en
t P
K
 
a
lg
or
ith
m
s 
re
qu
ir
e 
o
r 
to
 s
ig
n 
o
r 
e
n
c
ry
pt
 
a
n
d 
th
e 
se
n
de
r a
n
d 
a 
u
se
r'
s 
id
en
tit
y 
a
n
d 
m
a
th
em
at
ic
al
 
da
ta
. E
ac
h 
PK
 is
 
th
e 
re
c
ip
ie
nt
 n
o
 
o
bt
ai
n 
a 
di
gi
ta
l 
o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 o
n
 
pu
bl
is
he
d,
 a
n
d 
th
e 
lo
ng
er
 h
av
e 
to
 w
o
rr
y 
c
e
rt
if
ic
at
e 
c
a
n
 b
e 
n
u
m
be
rs
 h
un
dr
ed
s 
o
f 
cO
IT
es
po
nd
in
g 
PR
K
 is
 
a
bo
ut
 k
ey
 
te
di
ou
s,
 e
IT
or
 p
ro
ne
, 
di
gi
ts
 lo
ng
, w
hi
ch
, 
ke
pt
 s
e
c
re
t. 
D
at
a 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n.
 
a
n
d 
tim
e 
c
o
n
su
m
in
g,
 
e
v
e
n
 w
ith
 to
da
y'
s 
e
n
c
ry
pt
ed
 w
ith
 y
om
 
in
vo
lv
in
g 
m
u
lti
pl
e 
pr
oc
es
sm
g 
po
w
er
, 
PK
 c
a
n
 b
e 
de
cr
yp
te
d 
st
ep
s 
fo
r 
c
a
n
 p
re
se
nt
 a
 la
rg
e 
o
n
ly
 w
ith
 y
om
 P
R
K
. 
a
dm
in
is
tr
at
or
s 
a
n
d 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 p
en
al
ty
 
e
n
d-
us
er
s.
 
w
he
n 
e
n
c
ry
pt
in
g 
la
rg
e 
a
m
o
u
n
ts
 o
f d
at
a.
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H
um
an
 v
s.
 A
ut
om
at
is
m
 
U
sa
bi
lit
y 
To
ta
l T
ra
ns
ac
tio
n 
Ti
m
e 
In
du
str
ia
l 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
Is
su
es
 
A
cc
ur
ac
y 
(1=
hu
m
an
 b
et
te
r; 
(1 =
 
m
in
; 5
= 
m
ax
) 
(in
 se
co
n
ds
) (
W
oo
dw
ar
d 
A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
(1=
 m
in
; 5
= 
m
ax
) 
S=
m
ac
hi
ne
= 
be
tte
r) 
e
t 
a
l.,
 2
00
3) 
5 
2 
(2
) 
5-
15
 
W
id
el
y 
u
se
d 
to
 
4 
A
ve
ra
ge
 S
pa
ce
 
(A
cq
ui
sit
io
n 
de
vi
ce
 
(P
GP
) 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
E-
A
tta
ck
 
o
r 
da
ta
 G
en
er
at
or
 
c
o
m
m
e
rc
e
 h
as
ts
 o
n
 
R
at
e:
 
pr
es
en
te
d 
by
 th
e 
u
se
r:
 
th
e 
W
or
ld
 W
id
e 
W
eb
. 
5l
2-
B
it
 P
ub
lic
 K
ey
= 
PI
N
, m
e
m
o
ry
 c
a
rd
, 
Pr
et
ty
 G
oo
d 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
26
3 
fi
ng
er
pr
in
t, 
e
tc
.) 
(P
GP
) (
5)
, S
ec
ur
e 
10
24
-B
it 
Pu
bl
ic
 
So
ck
et
s 
L
ay
er
 (S
SL
), 
K
ey
=2
86
 
a
n
d 
o
th
er
s.
 
20
48
-B
it 
Pu
bl
ic
 
K
ey
=2
 11
6 
(S
m
ith
,2
00
2)
. 
C
os
t o
f c
ry
pt
og
ra
ph
ie
 
o
pe
ra
tio
ns
: 
81
.3
9 
m
iII
is
e
c
o
n
ds
 (1
3)
. 
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D
at
a 
G
en
er
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or
: 
9. 
K
E
R
B
E
R
O
S 
C
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
n 
D
ef
in
iti
on
 
A
dv
an
ta
ge
s 
D
is
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
C
os
t (
CA
D$
) 
(l 
=
 
m
in
; 
5=
 m
a
x
) 
K
ey
 D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
It 
m
a
ke
s 
u
se
 o
f s
tr
an
g 
T
ru
s
te
d-
th
ird
-
pa
rty
: 
Sc
al
ab
ili
ty
 p
ro
bl
em
: 
4 
Fr
ee
 s
o
ft
w
ar
e 
C
en
te
r (
KD
C)
 
c
ry
pt
og
ra
ph
y 
so
 t
ha
t 
K
er
be
ra
s 
w
o
rk
s 
K
D
C
 r
e
qu
ir
es
 
(M
IT
,2
00
6)
 
a 
c
lie
nt
 m
ig
ht
 p
ra
ve
 
th
ro
ug
h 
a 
c
e
n
tr
al
iz
ed
 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l 
its
 id
en
tit
y 
to
 a
 s
e
rv
e
r 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
se
rv
e
r 
c
e
n
tr
al
iz
ed
 
(a
nd
 vi
ce
 v
e
rs
a
) 
th
at
 a
il 
sy
st
em
s 
in
 th
e 
a
dm
in
is
tr
at
io
n.
 
a
c
ro
ss
 a
n
 m
se
c
u
re
 
n
e
tw
or
k 
in
he
re
nt
ly
 
n
e
tw
or
k 
se
ss
io
n.
 
tr
us
t. 
Th
us
, a
il 
M
ut
ua
l 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n:
 
pr
oc
es
se
s 
ha
pp
en
 
be
tw
ee
n 
a 
u
se
r 
a
n
d 
a 
be
tw
ee
n 
c
lie
nt
s 
a
n
d 
se
rv
e
r.
 
se
rv
e
rs
. 
T
he
 K
D
C
 
c
a
rr
ie
s 
o
u
t 
th
e 
A
ut
he
nt
ic
at
io
n 
Se
rv
ic
e 
(A
S)
 an
d 
th
e 
T
ic
ke
t G
ra
nt
in
g 
Se
rv
ic
e 
(T
GS
). 
T
he
 
K
D
C
 h
as
 a
 c
o
py
 o
f 
e
a
c
h 
pa
ss
w
or
d 
re
la
te
d 
to
 e
v
e
ry
 c
lie
nt
 o
r 
se
rv
e
r.
 H
en
ce
, i
t i
s 
c
ru
c
ia
l t
o 
m
a
in
ta
in
 
th
e 
K
D
C
 a
s 
se
c
u
re
 a
s 
po
ss
ib
le
. 
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 b
et
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 m
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 se
co
n
ds
) (
W
oo
dw
ar
d 
A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
(1=
 m
in
; 5
= 
m
ax
) 
5=
m
ac
hi
ne
 is
 b
et
te
r) 
e
t 
a
l.,
 2
00
3) 
5 
2 
5-
15
 
W
id
el
y 
u
se
d 
to
 
4 
R
eq
ui
re
s 
do
ck
 
(A
cq
ui
sit
io
n 
de
vi
ce
 
Si
ng
le
 S
ig
n-
O
n 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
sy
nc
hr
on
iz
at
io
n 
o
r 
da
ta
 g
en
er
at
or
 
e
-c
o
m
m
e
rc
e
 h
os
ts
 o
n
 
be
tw
ee
n 
m
a
c
hi
ne
s 
o
n
 
pr
es
en
te
d 
by
 th
e 
u
se
r:
 
th
e 
W
or
ld
 W
id
e 
W
eb
 
th
e 
n
e
tw
or
k 
(9
) 
PI
N
, m
e
m
o
ry
 c
a
rd
, 
a
n
d 
a
ls
o 
in 
a
n
 
fi
ng
er
pr
in
t, 
e
tc
.) 
e
n
te
rp
ri
se
 
e
n
v
ir
on
m
en
t f
or
 
a
c
c
e
ss
 c
o
n
tr
ol
 to
 
n
e
tw
or
k 
re
so
u
rc
e
s 
(e
.g.
, 
K
er
be
ro
s 
5.
1.
3.
2 
v
e
rs
io
n 
(M
IT
, 
20
06
)).
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D
at
a 
G
en
er
at
or
: 
10
. F
IN
G
E
R
PR
IN
T
 R
E
C
O
G
N
IT
IO
N
 (F
R)
 
C
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
n 
D
ef
in
iti
on
 
A
dv
an
ta
ge
s 
D
is
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
C
os
t (
CA
D$
) 
(1 
=
 
m
in
; 5
= 
m
a
x
) 
B
io
m
et
ri
es
 (t
he
 
sc
ie
nc
e 
o
f 
id
en
tif
yi
ng
, o
r 
v
e
ri
fy
in
g 
th
e 
id
en
tit
y 
o
f, 
a 
pe
rs
on
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 
ph
ys
io
lo
gi
ca
l o
r 
be
ha
vi
or
al
 
c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s) 
By
 h
av
in
g 
an
 in
di
vi
du
al 
sc
an
 a
 fi
ng
er
pr
in
t 
ele
ctr
on
ica
lly
 to
 d
ec
ip
he
r 
in
fo
rm
ati
on
, t
he
 is
su
er
 o
f 
the
 d
ata
 c
an
 b
e s
ur
e 
tha
t 
the
 in
ten
de
d 
re
cip
ien
t i
s 
the
 re
ce
iv
er
 o
f t
he
 d
ata
. 
To
 3
ut
he
nt
ica
te 
the
 u
se
r,
 
the
 sy
ste
m
 c
om
pa
re
s 
u
se
r'
s 
re
ad
in
g 
w
ith
 a
 
pr
ev
io
us
ly
 c
ol
lec
ted
 
th
um
bp
rin
t. 
Ph
ys
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
ch
ar
ac
ter
ist
ic 
A
 f
in
ge
rp
ri
nt
 is
 e
a
si
ly
 
sa
m
pl
ed
 u
si
ng
 lo
w
­
te
ch
 m
e
a
n
s,
 a
n
d 
n
o
n
­
in
tru
si
ve
. 
U
ni
qu
e 
to
 t
he
 
in
di
vi
du
al
. 
V
er
y 
st
ro
ng
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
fin
ge
rp
rin
t a
n
d 
cr
im
in
al
 h
ist
or
y.
 
Th
er
e 
is 
el
as
tic
 
di
sto
rti
on
 fr
om
 o
n
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
to
 t
he
 n
ex
t. 
Th
er
e 
is 
a 
la
rg
e 
v
ar
ia
tio
n 
o
f t
he
 q
ua
lit
y 
o
f t
he
 f
in
ge
rp
rin
t o
v
er
 
th
e 
po
pu
la
tio
n.
 
H
yg
ie
ne
. 
4 Fo
rg
er
ya
lm
os
t 
im
po
ss
ib
le
. 
lm
pe
rs
on
at
io
n 
at
ta
ck
, 
w
he
re
 a
n 
u
n
au
th
or
iz
ed
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
ha
ng
e 
he
r/h
is 
bi
om
et
ric
 to
 
ap
pe
ar
 li
ke
 a
n 
au
th
or
iz
ed
 in
di
vi
du
al
. 
R
ep
la
y 
at
ta
ck
, w
he
re
 a
 
re
co
rd
in
g 
o
f t
ru
e 
da
ta
 is
 
pr
es
en
te
d 
to
 t
he
 s
en
so
r.
 
$1
00
-5
00
 (s
en
so
r).
 
T
he
 s
iz
e 
a
n
d 
pr
ie
e 
o
f 
fi
ng
er
pr
in
t r
e
a
de
rs
 a
re
 
c
o
n
tin
ua
lly
 d
ec
lin
in
g.
 
T
he
 c
o
st
 o
fa
 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
se
n
s
o
r 
is 
qu
ite
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 fr
om
 
th
e 
to
ta
l c
o
st
 o
f 
o
w
n
e
rs
hi
p.
 I
t d
ep
en
ds
 
o
n
 t
he
 m
a
gn
itu
de
 o
f 
e
a
c
h 
a
pp
lic
at
io
n.
 
H
um
an
 v
s.
 A
ut
om
at
is
m
 
U
sa
bi
lit
y 
To
ta
l T
ra
ns
ac
tio
n 
Ti
m
e 
In
du
st
ria
l 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
Is
su
es
 
A
cc
ur
ac
y 
( 1=
hu
m
an
 is
 b
et
te
r; 
(1 
=
 
m
in
; 5
= 
m
ax
) 
(in
 se
co
n
ds
) (
W
oo
dw
ard
 
A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
(1 
=
 
m
in
; 
5=
 m
a
x
) 
5=
m
ac
hi
ne
 is
 b
et
te
r) 
e
t 
a
l.,
 2
00
3) 
1 
4 
2-
9 
N
on
-e
rim
in
al
, e
iv
ili
an
 
3 
Ev
alu
ati
on
 M
eth
od
: 
(A
cq
ui
sit
io
n 
de
vi
ce
 
o
r 
da
ta
 g
en
er
at
or
 
pr
es
en
te
d 
by
 th
e 
u
se
r:
 
PI
N
, m
e
m
o
ry
 c
a
rd
, 
fi
ng
er
pr
in
t, 
e
tc
.) 
(1
0)
 
En
ro
lm
en
t 
Ti
m
e 
<
3 
se
cs
 
V
er
ifi
ca
ti 
on
 T
im
e 
<
 3
 se
cs
 (i
.e.
, 
th
e 
tim
e 
pe
rio
d 
u
se
rs
 
m
u
st
 s
pe
nd
 to
 h
av
e 
th
ei
r b
io
m
et
ric
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 s
u
ch
 a
s 
ac
ce
ss
 c
o
n
tr
ol
, t
im
e 
an
d 
at
te
nd
an
ce
 tr
ae
ki
ng
, 
v
au
lt,
 m
ili
ta
ry
 re
la
te
d 
an
d 
co
m
pu
te
r u
se
r 
lo
gi
n.
 
V
er
ifi
er
 3
00
 L
e 
2.
0 
14
9 .
 
It 
m
ig
ht
 in
tr
ud
e 
o
n
 
o
n
e
's
 p
ri
va
cy
 (d
ata
 
c
o
n
fi
de
nt
ia
lit
y)
. 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 (B
oll
e e
t 
a
l.,
 
20
04
). 
Fa
lse
 R
eje
ct 
(A
 le
gi
tim
ate
 su
bje
ct 
is 
de
ni
ed
 s
er
vi
ce
): 
3 
to
 7
 in
 
1,0
00
 (0
.3-
0.7
%)
 F
als
e 
Ac
ce
pt
 (A
 su
bje
ct 
is 
fa
lse
ly
 a
cc
ep
ted
, c
au
sin
g 
in
tru
de
rs 
to
 e
n
te
r 
the
 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
te
m
pl
at
e 
sy
ste
m
): 
1 t
o 
lO
in
 
su
cc
es
sf
ul
1y
 c
re
at
ed
). 
10
0,0
00
 (0
.00
1-0
.01
 %
). 
14
9 
Cr
os
s M
atc
h 
Te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
 <
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.er
os
sm
ate
h.e
om
/v
er
ifi
er
-3
00
-1
e-
2.p
hp
> 
43
8

 
D
at
a 
G
en
er
at
or
: 
Il
. 
H
A
N
D
 G
EO
M
ET
R
y 
(H
G)
 
C
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
n 
D
ef
in
iti
on
 
A
dv
an
ta
ge
s 
D
is
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 
Se
cu
rit
y 
C
os
t (
CA
D$
) 
(1 
=
 
m
in
; 5
= 
m
a
x
) 
B
io
m
et
ri
cs
 
Ty
pi
ca
l f
ea
tu
re
s 
Ea
si
ly
 c
o
lle
ct
ib
le
 a
n
d 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
4 
$1
00
 ta
 5
00
 (s
en
sa
r) 
(lt
 re
fe
rs
 to
 t
he
 
in
cl
ud
e 
le
ng
th
 a
n
d 
n
o
n
-in
tru
si
ve
. 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
Im
pe
rs
on
at
io
n 
a
tt
ac
k,
 
T
he
 c
o
st
 o
fa
 
ge
om
et
ri
c 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
o
f 
w
id
th
 o
f t
he
 f
in
ge
rs
, 
ha
nd
 g
eo
m
et
ry
 a
n
d 
w
he
re
 a
 u
n
a
u
th
or
iz
ed
 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
se
n
so
r 
is 
th
e 
hu
m
an
 h
an
d.
) 
a
sp
ec
t r
a
tio
 o
f t
he
 
pa
lm
 o
r 
fin
ge
rs
, w
id
th
 
o
f t
he
 p
al
m
, e
tc
. 
H
G 
is 
m
e
a
su
re
d 
w
he
n 
a 
su
bje
ct 
pr
es
se
s 
th
e 
bi
om
et
ric
 a
ga
in
st
 a
 
pl
at
en
. 
Ph
ys
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
. 
C
om
pu
ta
tio
ns
 a
re
 
al
so
 f
ai
rly
 s
im
pl
e;
 a
 
st
an
da
lo
ne
 s
ys
te
m
 is
 
ea
sy
 to
 b
ui
ld
. 
c
rim
in
al
 h
is
to
ry
. 
In
di
vi
du
al
 h
an
d 
fe
at
ur
es
 t
he
m
se
lv
es
 
ar
e 
n
a
t 
v
e
ry
 
di
st
in
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 o
n
e
 
pe
rs
on
 to
 a
n
o
th
er
. 
Su
ch
 c
o
n
ta
ct
 m
a
y 
be
 
c
a
u
se
 fo
r s
o
m
e
 p
ub
lic
 
hy
gi
en
e 
c
o
n
c
e
m
s.
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
ha
ng
e 
hi
s 
bi
om
et
ric
 to
 a
pp
ea
r 
lik
e 
a
n
 a
u
th
or
iz
ed
 
in
di
vi
du
al
. 
R
ep
la
y 
a
tt
ac
k,
 w
he
re
 
a 
re
c
o
rd
in
g 
o
f t
ru
e 
da
ta
 is
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 to
 
th
e 
se
n
so
r.
 
qu
ite
 d
iff
er
en
t f
ro
m
 
th
e 
to
ta
l c
o
st
 o
f 
o
w
n
e
rs
hi
p 
(co
st 
o
f 
m
a
in
te
na
nc
e 
o
f t
he
 
se
n
so
r,
 c
o
st
s 
o
f 
ru
n
n
in
g 
th
e 
fa
ci
Iit
y,
 
tr
ai
ni
ng
, a
n
d 
o
th
er
 
re
la
te
d 
co
st
s).
 It
 
de
pe
nd
s 
o
n
 th
e 
m
a
gn
itu
de
 o
f e
a
c
h 
a
pp
lic
at
io
n.
 
43
9

 
H
um
an
 v
s.
 A
ut
om
at
ism
 
U
sa
bi
lit
y 
To
tal
 T
ra
ns
ac
tio
n 
Ti
m
e 
In
du
str
ial
 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
Is
su
es
 
A
cc
ur
ac
y 
(1 
=
hu
m
an
 is
 b
ett
er
; 
(1 
=
 
m
in
; 5
= 
m
ax
) 
(in
 se
co
n
ds
) (
Wo
od
wa
rd 
A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
(1 =
 
m
in
; 5
= 
m
ax
) 
5=
m
ac
hi
ne
 is
 b
ett
er
) 
e
t 
a
/.,
 2
00
3) 
1 
4 
4-
10
 
M
uc
h 
o
f t
he
 a
v
a
ila
bl
e 
3 
Ev
al
ua
tio
n 
M
et
ho
d:
 
(A
cq
uis
iti
on
 de
vi
ce
 
o
r 
da
ta
 g
en
er
at
or
 
pr
es
en
te
d 
by
 th
e 
u
se
r:
 
(H
G 
re
c
o
gn
iti
on
 
sy
st
em
s 
ar
e 
su
rp
ris
in
gl
y 
in
fo
l1
11
ati
on
 is
 in
 t
he
 
fo
rm
 o
f p
at
en
ts
 o
r 
a
pp
lic
at
io
n-
or
ie
nt
ed
 
N
on
-in
tru
si
ve
 
c
o
m
pa
re
d 
to
 i
ris
 a
n
d 
re
tin
a.
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 a
n
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 (B
oll
e e
t 
a
l.,
 2
00
4)
. 
PI
N
, m
e
m
o
ry
 c
ar
d,
 
w
id
es
pr
ea
d 
du
e 
to
 
de
sc
rip
tio
n.
 
Fa
ls
e 
R
eje
ct 
(A
 
fin
ge
rp
rin
t, 
e
tc
.) 
th
ei
r u
se
r-
Ex
am
pl
es
: 3
 D
 h
an
d 
le
gi
tim
at
e 
su
bje
ct 
is 
fr
ie
nd
lin
es
s) 
pr
of
ile
 id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n 
de
ni
ed
 s
er
v
ic
e):
 
ap
pa
ra
tu
s 
u
se
d 
by
 
Si
dl
au
sk
as
 15
0 
(p
ate
nt­
ba
se
d)
, a
n
d 
a 
pr
ot
ot
yp
e 
sy
st
em
 
de
sc
rib
ed
 b
y 
Ja
in
 e
t 
1 
in 
33
(3
%
) 
1 
in
 2
0(
5%
) 
1 
in
 1
0(
10
%
) 
1 
in
 3
(3
0%
) 
11
51
 (
 
l" 
.
a 
ap
p 
lc
at
lü
n-
Fa
ls
e 
A
cc
ep
t (
A 
o
rie
nt
ed
). 
su
bje
ct 
is 
fa
ls
el
y 
a
c
c
e
pt
ed
, c
a
u
si
ng
 
in
tru
de
rs
 to
 e
n
te
r 
th
e 
sy
st
em
): 
1 
in
 7
 (1
5%
), 
1 
in
 1
0(
10
%
), 
1 
in 
20
 
(5
%
 ) 
-
(0
%
) 
15
0 
D.
P. 
Si
dla
us
ka
s, 
3D
 H
an
d 
Pr
of
ile
 Id
en
lif
ica
tio
n 
Ap
pa
rat
lls
, U
S 
Pa
ten
t N
o. 
4,7
36
,20
3 
(19
98
).
 
15
1 
A.
 K
. J
ain
, A
. 
Ro
ss,
 a
nd
 S
. P
an
ka
nli
, A
 Pr
ot
ot
yp
e 
Ha
nd
 G
eo
m
etr
y-
ba
se
d 
Ve
rif
ica
tio
n 
Sy
ste
m.
 [n
 211
(1 I
EE
E 
In
ter
na
tio
na
l C
on
fer
en
ce
 o
n 
Al
ldi
o­

an
d 
Vi
de
o-
ba
se
d 
Bi
om
etr
ie 
Pe
rso
n 
Au
th
en
tic
ati
on
, p
ag
es
 1
66
-1
71
, W
as
hin
gto
n, 
OC
 (1
99
9).

 
44
0

 
D
at
a 
G
en
er
at
or
: 
12
. F
A
C
E 
R
E
C
O
G
N
 IT
IO
N
 (F
R)
 
C
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
n 
D
ef
in
iti
on
 
A
dv
an
ta
ge
s 
D
is
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
C
os
t (
CA
D$
) 
(1
= 
m
in
; 5
= 
m
a
x
) 
B
io
m
et
ri
cs
 
A
n 
im
ag
e 
is 
Ea
si
ly
 s
a
m
pl
ed
 a
n
d 
Th
er
e 
is 
so
rn
e
 
4 
$1
00
 to
 5
00
 
e
x
a
m
in
ed
 fo
r 
o
v
e
ra
ll 
n
o
n
-i
nt
ru
si
ve
. 
c
ri
m
in
al
 a
ss
o
c
ia
tio
n 
(l0
) 
(se
ns
or
) 
fa
ci
al
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
. 
In
 
Pe
rs
on
al
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
w
ith
 f
ac
e 
id
en
tif
ie
rs
 
T
he
 fa
ct
 th
at
 th
e 
a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
IS
 u
n
n
e
c
e
ss
a
ry
. 
si
nc
e 
it 
ha
s 
lo
ng
 b
ee
n 
de
ci
si
on
s 
m
a
de
 b
y 
T
he
 c
o
st
 o
f 
a 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
, t
he
 
sy
st
em
 h
as
 a
 c
a
m
e
ra
 
th
at
 s
e
a
rc
he
s 
fo
r 
a 
u
se
r'
s 
fa
ce
 a
n
d 
m
a
tc
he
s 
it 
a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
fa
ce
 s
to
re
d 
in
 th
e 
u
se
r 
re
c
o
rd
. 
T
he
 le
as
t i
nt
ru
si
ve
 
fr
om
 a
 b
io
m
et
ri
c 
sa
m
pl
in
g 
po
in
t o
f 
.
 
.
 
.
 
V
lew
, r
e
qU
ln
ng
 n
o
 
c
o
n
ta
ct
, 
n
o
r 
e
v
e
n
 t
he
 
a
w
a
re
n
e
ss
 o
f t
he
 
su
bje
ct.
 
u
se
d 
by
 la
w
 
e
n
fo
rc
em
en
t a
ge
nc
ie
s 
("m
ug
-sh
ots
").
 
Si
m
il
ar
it
yo
f 
a
pp
ea
ra
nc
e,
 e
.g
. o
f 
id
en
tic
al
 tw
in
s. 
In
flu
en
ce
 b
y 
gl
as
se
s,
 
be
ar
d,
 m
o
u
st
ac
he
, 
bi
om
et
ri
cs
 s
ys
te
m
s 
c
a
n
 b
e 
u
se
d 
as
 
po
si
tiv
e 
pr
oo
fs
/d
en
ia
ls
 o
f a
n
 
in
di
vi
du
al
's 
a
u
th
or
iz
at
io
n 
a
n
d 
lo
I' 
pr
es
en
ce
 a
t a
 s
e
n
s
o
r 
.
 
.
ra
ls
es
 s
e
n
o
u
s 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
se
n
so
r 
is 
qu
ite
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 
fr
om
 t
he
 to
ta
l c
o
st
 o
f 
o
w
n
e
rs
hi
p 
(co
st 
o
f 
m
a
in
te
na
nc
e 
o
f t
he
 
se
n
so
r,
 c
o
st
s 
o
f 
ru
n
n
in
g 
th
e 
fa
ci
lit
y,
 
tr
ai
ni
ng
, a
n
d 
o
th
er
 
Ph
ys
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
ha
ir
 s
ty
le
. 
qu
es
tio
ns
 a
bo
ut
 
re
la
te
d 
c
o
st
s).
 lt
 
c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
. 
R
es
tr
ic
tio
ns
 b
y 
in
te
gr
ity
 o
f t
he
 
de
pe
nd
s 
o
n
 t
he
 
ill
um
in
at
io
n,
 
o
v
e
ra
ll 
bi
om
et
ri
cs
 
m
a
gn
itu
de
 o
f e
a
c
h 
ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
, a
n
d 
sy
st
em
s.
 
a
pp
lic
at
io
n.
 
a
n
gl
e 
o
f 
ph
ot
og
ra
ph
in
g.
 
44
1

 
H
um
an
 v
s.
 A
ut
om
at
ism
 
U
sa
bi
lit
y 
To
ta
l T
ra
ns
ac
tio
n 
Ti
m
e 
In
du
str
ial
 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
Iss
ue
s 
A
cc
ur
ac
y 
(l=
hu
ma
n 
is 
be
tte
r; 
(1 
=
 m
in
; 5
= 
m
ax
) 
(in
 se
co
n
ds
) (
Wo
od
wa
rd 
A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
(1
= 
m
in
; 5
= 
m
ax
) 
S=
m
ac
hi
ne
 is
 b
ett
er
) 
e
t 
a
l,
 2
00
3) 
1 
4 
(1
0)
 
10
-1
5 
M
or
e 
a
c
c
e
pt
ab
le
 th
an
 
1 
Ev
al
ua
tio
n 
M
et
ho
d:
 
(A
cq
uis
iti
on
 de
vi
ce
 
m
o
st
 b
io
m
et
ric
s. 
It 
m
ig
ht
 in
tru
de
 o
n
 
T
ec
hn
ol
og
ya
nd
 
o
r 
da
ta
 g
en
er
at
or
 
o
n
e'
s 
pr
iv
ac
y 
(d
ata
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 (B
oll
e e
t 
a
l.,
 
pr
es
en
te
d 
by
 th
e 
u
se
r:
 
PI
N
, m
er
n
o
ry
 c
ar
d,
 
It
 is
 a
 fa
irl
y 
go
od
 
bi
om
et
ric
 id
en
tif
ie
r 
co
n
fid
en
tia
lit
y)
. 
U
se
rs
 g
en
er
al
ly
 fi
nd
 
20
04
). 
Fa
ls
e 
R
eje
ct 
fin
ge
rp
rin
t, 
et
c.
) 
fo
r 
sm
al
l-s
ca
le
 
le
ss
 in
tru
si
ve
. 
(A
 le
gi
tim
at
e 
su
bje
ct 
au
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
H
ow
ev
er
, s
o
rn
e 
u
se
rs
 
is 
de
ni
ed
 s
er
v
ic
e):
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n.
 
m
ay
 b
e 
re
lu
ct
an
t t
o 
10
 to
 2
0 
in
 1
00
 
ha
ve
 th
ei
r f
ac
es
 
(1
0-
20
%
 ) 
L-
I 
ld
en
tit
y 
So
lu
tio
ns
 '52
 
re
co
rd
ed
 in
 a
 
da
ta
ba
se
. 
Fa
ls
e 
A
cc
ep
t 
(A
 su
bje
ct 
is 
fa
ls
el
y 
ac
ce
pt
ed
, c
a
u
si
ng
 
in
tru
de
rs
 to
 e
n
te
r 
th
e 
sy
st
em
): 
10
0 
to
 1
00
0 
in
 
10
0,
00
0 
(0
.1-
1 %
). 
15
2 
Fa
ce
 re
co
gn
iti
on
 so
lut
ion
s. 
L-
l 
Id
en
tity
 S
olu
tio
ns
 <
ht
tp
://
ww
w.
lli
d.c
om
/pa
ge
s/5
75
-fa
ce
> 
44
2
 
D
at
a 
G
en
er
at
or
: 
13
. V
O
IC
E 
R
E
C
O
G
N
IT
IO
N
 (V
R)
 
C
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
n 
D
ef
in
iti
on
 
A
dv
an
ta
ge
s 
D
is
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
C
os
t (
CA
D$
) 
(1 =
 
m
in
; 5
= 
m
a
x
) 
B
io
m
et
ri
es
 
V
R
 a
tt
em
pt
s 
to
 
id
en
tif
y 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
by
 h
ow
 th
ey
 s
o
u
n
d 
w
he
n 
sp
ea
ki
ng
. 
V
oi
ce
 is
 a
 b
eh
av
io
ra
l 
Vo
ice
 is
 a
 n
at
ur
al 
bi
om
etr
ic,
 
on
e 
tha
t p
eo
pl
e 
us
e 
in
sti
nc
tiv
ely
. U
se
rs 
do
 Il
ot 
ha
ve
 to
 r
em
em
be
r 
pa
ss
w
or
ds
. U
se
rs 
do
 Il
ot 
ha
ve
 
to
 g
o 
to
 a
 s
ep
ar
ate
d 
pr
oc
es
s 
fo
r v
er
ifi
ca
tio
n,
 si
llc
e 
C
ha
ng
es
 c
o
n
si
de
ra
bl
y 
o
v
e
r 
tim
e 
(il
lne
ss,
 
a
gi
ng
, e
m
o
tio
n,
 e
tc
.) 
B
ac
kg
ro
un
d 
n
o
is
e.
 
1 V
R 
is 
pa
rti
cu
la
rly
 
v
u
ln
er
ab
le
 to
 r
ep
la
y 
at
ta
ck
s 
be
ca
us
e 
o
f t
he
 
u
bi
qu
ity
 o
f s
o
u
n
d 
re
co
rd
in
g 
an
d 
pl
ay
ba
ck
 
$1
00
 to
 5
00
 
(se
ns
or
) 
Th
e 
co
st
 o
f a
 b
io
m
et
ric
 
se
n
so
r 
is 
qu
ite
 d
iff
er
en
t 
fro
m
 th
e 
to
ta
l c
o
st
 o
f 
o
w
n
e
rs
hi
p 
(m
ain
ten
an
ce
 
c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
 b
ut
 is
 
an
yt
hi
ng
 th
ey
 s
ay
 a
s 
pa
rt 
o
f 
de
vi
ce
s. 
o
f t
he
 s
en
so
r,
 r
u
n
n
in
g 
th
e 
de
pe
nd
en
to
n 
u
n
de
ri
yi
ng
 p
hy
si
ca
l 
tr
ai
ts
, w
hi
ch
 g
ov
em
 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y,
 n
as
al
 t
on
e,
 
the
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
di
alo
g 
ca
n 
be
 
us
ed
 to
 v
er
ity
 th
eir
 id
en
tit
ies
, 
re
sli
iti
ng
 in
 a
n 
in
teg
ra
ted
 a
nd
 
n
o
n
-in
tIu
siv
e 
v
er
ifi
ca
tio
n 
pr
oc
es
s. 
V
oi
ce
 re
ql
lir
es
 n
o 
co
nt
ac
t. 
1m
pe
rs
on
at
io
n 
at
ta
ck
, 
w
he
re
 a
n 
u
n
au
th
or
iz
ed
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
ha
ng
e 
he
r! 
hi
s 
bi
om
et
ric
 to
 a
pp
ea
r 
lik
e 
an
 a
u
th
or
iz
ed
 in
di
vi
du
al
. 
fa
ci
lit
y,
 t
ra
in
in
g,
 a
n
d 
o
th
er
 
re
la
te
d 
co
st
s).
 Ir
 d
ep
en
ds
 
o
n
 t
he
 m
ag
ni
tu
de
 o
f e
a
c
h 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n.
 
c
a
de
nc
e,
 e
tc
. 
H
um
an
 v
s.
 A
ut
om
at
is
m
 
U
sa
bi
lit
y 
To
ta
l T
ra
ns
ac
tio
n 
Ti
m
e 
In
du
st
ri
al
 
Pr
i v
a
c
y 
Is
su
es
 
A
cc
ur
ac
y 
(I 
=
hu
m
an
 is
 b
et
te
r; 
(1 
=
 
m
in
; 
5=
 m
a
x
) 
(in
 se
co
n
ds
) (
W
oo
dw
ard
 
A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
(1
= 
m
in
; 
5=
 m
a
x
) 
5=
m
ac
hi
ne
 i
s 
be
tte
r) 
e
t 0
1.
,2
00
3) 
1 
4 
10
-1
2 
M
or
e 
ac
ce
pt
ab
le
 th
an
 
1 
Ev
al
ua
tio
n 
M
et
ho
d:
 
(A
cq
ui
sit
io
n 
de
vi
ce
 
o
r 
da
ta
 g
en
er
at
or
 
pr
es
en
te
d 
by
 th
e 
u
se
r:
 
PI
N
, m
e
m
o
ry
 c
ar
d,
 
N
ov
el
 N
eu
ra
l N
et
 
(3
) (
la
) 
m
o
st
 b
io
m
et
ric
s. 
It 
is 
a 
fa
irl
y 
go
od
 
bi
om
et
ric
 id
en
tif
te
r f
or
 
sm
al
l-s
ca
le
 a
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n.
 
It 
m
ig
ht
 in
tru
de
 o
n 
o
n
e'
s 
pr
iv
ac
y 
(d
ata
 
co
n
fid
en
tia
lit
y)
. 
U
se
rs
 g
en
er
al
ly
 fi
nd
 l
es
s 
in
tru
si
ve
. H
ow
ev
er
, s
o
m
e
 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 a
n
d 
Sc
en
ar
io
 
(B
oll
e e
t 
a
l.,
 2
00
4).
 
Fa
lse
 R
eje
ct 
(A
 le
gi
tim
at
e 
su
bje
ct 
is 
de
ni
ed
 s
er
v
ic
e):
 
la
 to
 2
0 
in 
10
0 
fin
ge
rp
rin
t, 
e
tc
.) 
u
se
rs
 m
ay
 b
e 
re
lu
ct
an
t t
o 
(1
0-
20
%
) .
 
A
pp
le
 M
ac
 O
SX
, V
oi
ce
 
ha
ve
 th
ei
r 
fa
ce
s 
re
co
rd
ed
 
fa
ls
e 
A
cc
ep
t 
Se
cu
rit
y 
in
 a
 d
at
ab
as
e.
 
(A
 su
bje
ct 
is 
fa
lse
ly
 
ac
ce
pt
ed
, c
au
si
ng
 
in
tru
de
rs
 to
 e
n
te
r 
th
e 
sy
st
em
): 
10
0 
to
 1
00
0 
in 
10
0,
00
0 
(0
.1-
1%
). 
D
at
a 
G
en
er
at
or
: 
14
. S
IG
N
A
T
U
R
E
 R
E
C
O
G
N
IT
IO
N
 (S
R)
 
C
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
n

 
B
io
m
et
ri
es

 
(S
R 
o
pe
ra
te
s 
in
 a
 3
D

 
e
n
v
ir
on
m
en
t
 
m
e
a
su
ri
ng
 h
ei
gh
t a
n
d

 
w
id
th
 a
s 
w
e
il 
a
s 
th
e

 
a
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f p
re
ss
ur
e

 
a
pp
lie
d 
in
 a
 p
en

 
st
ro
ke
).

 
Hu
m
an
 v
s. 
Al
ito
illa
tis
m

 
(1 
=
hll
ma
n 
is 
be
tte
r;

 
5=
ma
ch
ine
 is
 b
ett
er)

 
1

 
(A
cq
uis
iti
on
 de
vi
ce
 o
r

 
da
ta
 g
en
er
at
or

 
pr
es
en
te
d 
by
 th
e 
u
se
r:

 
PI
N
, m
e
m
o
ry
 c
ar
d,

 
fin
ge
rp
rin
t, 
et
c.
)
 
D
ef
in
it
io
n 
Of
f-l
ine
 o
r 
"
sta
tic
" s
ign
atu
res
 
ar
e 
sc
an
ne
d 
fro
m 
pa
pe
r 
do
cu
m
en
ts,
 w
he
re 
the
y 
w
er
e 
w
ril
ten
 in
 th
e c
on
ve
nt
ion
al 
w
ay
. 
On
lin
e o
r 
"
dy
na
mi
c"
 
sig
na
tur
es
 ar
e 
w
ril
ten
 w
ith
 an
 
ele
ctr
on
ica
lly
 in
stl
1J
mc
nte
d 
de
vic
e a
nd
 th
e d
yn
am
ic 
inf
or
m
ati
on
 (i.
e., 
pe
n 
tip
 
loc
ati
on
 th
ro
ug
h 
tim
e) 
is 
us
ua
lly
 a
va
ila
ble
 at
 h
igh
 
re
so
lut
ion
. 
Be
ha
vio
ral
 
ch
ara
cte
ris
tic
. 
U
sa
bi
lit
y 
(1 
=
 
m
in
; 5
= 
m
ax
) 
4 
(1
0)
 
A
dv
an
ta
ge
s 
H
ig
hl
y 
a
c
c
e
pt
ed
 b
y 
u
se
rs
. 
To
tal
 T
ran
sa
cti
on
 T
im
e (
in 
se
co
nd
s) 
(W
ood
wa
rd 
el
 a
/..
 
20
03
) 
10
-1
5 
D
is
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 
T
he
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
 o
f 
pe
rm
an
en
ce
 o
f 
si
gn
at
ur
e 
is
 
qu
es
ti
on
ab
le
 s
in
ce
 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
c
a
n
 
c
ha
ng
e 
th
ei
r 
si
gn
at
ur
es
 a
t 
a
n
y 
tim
e.
 
SR
 is
 a
ff
ec
te
d 
by
 
ill
ne
ss
, e
m
o
ti
on
 o
r 
a
gm
g.
 
In
du
st
ria
l 
A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
In
te
lli
ge
nc
e 
C
or
po
ra
tio
n 1
5'
 a
n
d
J 
C
yb
er
 S
IG
N
 I5
4 .
 
Se
cu
ri
ty

 
(1 =
 
m
in
; 
5=
 m
a
x
)
 
3

 
Im
pe
rs
on
at
io
n 
at
ta
ck
,
 
w
he
re
 a
n
 u
n
a
u
th
or
iz
ed

 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
ha
ng
e

 
he
r/h
is
 b
io
m
et
ric
 to

 
a
pp
ea
r l
ik
e 
an

 
a
u
th
or
iz
ed
 in
di
vi
du
al
.
 
R
ep
la
y 
at
ta
ck
, w
he
re
 a

 
re
c
o
rd
in
g 
o
f t
ru
e 
da
ta
 is

 
pr
es
en
te
d 
to
 t
he
 s
en
so
r.

 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
Is
su
es

 
Cl 
=
 
m
in
; 5
= 
m
ax
)
 
2 lt 
m
ig
ht
 i
nt
ru
de
 o
n
 
o
n
e
's
 p
ri
va
cy
 (d
ata
 
c
o
n
fi
de
nt
ia
lit
y)
. 
44
3

 
C
os
t (
CA
D$
) 
$3
00
 
(s
en
so
r) 
(S
m
ith
,
 
20
02
)
 
Th
e 
co
st
 o
fa
 b
io
m
et
ric

 
se
n
so
r 
is 
qu
ite
 d
iff
er
en
t
 
fro
m
 th
e 
to
ta
l c
as
t o
f

 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 (s
en
so
r
 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 c
as
t, 
co
st
s 
o
f
 
ru
n
n
in
g 
the
 f
ac
ili
ty
,
 
tra
in
in
g,
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 re
lat
ed

 
co
st
s).
 IL
 d
ep
en
ds
 o
n 
the

 
m
ag
ni
tu
de
 o
f e
ac
h
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n.

 
A
cc
ur
ac
y

 
Ev
al
ua
tio
n 
M
eth
od
:
 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 a
nd
 S
ce
na
rio

 
(B
ol 
le 
e
t 
a
l.,
 2
00
4).

 
Fa
lse
 R
eje
ct:

 
3-
try
: 2
.0
6%
; 2
-tr
y:

 
2.
10
%
; 
I-t
ry
: 9
.10
%

 
Fa
lse
 A
cc
ep
t: 
3-
try
:
 
0.
70
%
; 2
-tr
y 
0.
58
%
;
 
l-t
ry
: 0
.4
3%
.
 
15
3 
CI
C 
eS
ig
na
tu
re
 S
ol
ut
io
ns
 fo
r E
nt
er
pr
ise
-W
id
e 
Pa
pe
rle
ss
 B
us
in
es
s 
Pr
oc
es
se
s. 
Co
m
m
un
ica
tio
n 
In
te
lli
ge
nc
e
 
Co
rp
. 
<
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.ci
c.c
om
/so
lu
tio
ns
/a
ny
m
et
ho
d/
>

 
15
4 
W
its
w
ell
 C
on
su
lti
ng
 &
 S
er
vi
ce
s, 
In
c. 
<
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.cy
be
rs
ig
n.
co
m
/c
om
/C
Sl
ac
ro
ba
t.h
tm
l>

 
D
at
a 
G
en
er
at
or
: 
15
. K
E
Y
ST
R
O
K
E
 R
E
C
O
G
N
IT
IO
N
 (K
R)
 
C
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
n 
D
ef
in
iti
on
 
A
dv
an
ta
ge
s 
B
io
m
et
ri
es
 
U
se
r's
 t
yp
in
g 
rh
yt
hm
. 
N
ei
th
er
 e
n
ro
lm
en
t n
o
r 
W
he
n 
a 
u
se
r 
a
tt
em
pt
s 
v
e
ri
fi
ca
tio
n 
bo
th
er
s 
to
 l
og
 o
n
to
 t
he
 s
ys
te
m
 
th
e 
re
gu
la
r 
w
o
rk
 f
lo
w
 
(d
om
ai
n 
se
rv
e
r),
 th
e 
be
ca
us
e 
u
se
rs
 w
o
u
ld
 
u
se
r 
n
a
m
e
 a
n
d 
be
 ta
pp
in
g 
th
e 
ke
ys
 
pa
ss
w
or
d 
a
re
 
a
n
yw
ay
. 
c
o
m
pa
re
d 
to
 t
he
 
st
or
ed
 k
ey
st
ro
ke
 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
te
m
pl
at
e.
 
B
eh
av
io
ra
l 
c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
. 
H
um
an
 v
s.
 A
ut
om
at
is
m
 
U
sa
bi
lit
y 
To
ta
l T
ra
ns
ac
tio
n 
Ti
m
e

 
(1 
=
hu
m
an
 is
 b
et
te
r; 
(1 
=
 
m
in
; 5
= 
m
ax
) 
(in
 se
c
o
n
ds
) (
W
oo
dw
ar
d

 
5=
m
ac
hi
ne
 is
 b
et
te
r) 
e
t a
f.,
 2
00
3)

 
1 
4 
B
et
w
ee
n 
7 
to
 3
0

 
(A
cq
ui
sit
io
n 
de
vi
ce
 
E
ve
ry
on
e 
kn
ow
s 
ho
w
 
se
c
o
n
ds
, d
ep
en
di
ng

 
o
r 
da
ta
 g
en
er
at
or
 
to
 t
ap
 in
 a
 k
ey
bo
ar
d 
o
n
 t
he
 u
se
r'
s 
ta
pp
in
g

 
pr
es
en
te
d 
by
 th
e 
u
se
r:
 
sp
ee
d.

 
PI
N
, m
e
m
o
ry
 c
a
rd
,
 
fi
ng
er
pr
in
t, 
e
tc
.)

 
D
is
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 
If
 so
m
e
o
n
e
 is
 w
ith
 
yo
u,
 f
or
 e
x
a
m
pl
e,
 
s/
he
 c
o
u
ld
 p
os
si
bl
y 
o
bs
er
ve
 y
ou
r 
ke
y 
c
lic
ks
 (i
m
pe
rs
on
at
io
n 
a
tt
ac
k)
. 
In
du
st
ria
l 
A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
K
ey
L
og
PC
 (6
) 
L
im
ite
d 
a
c
c
e
pt
an
ce
. 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
(1
= 
m
in
; 
5=
 m
a
x
) 
3 KR
 is
 u
se
d 
as
 a
 m
ea
n
s 
o
f c
er
ta
in
 a
tt
ac
ks
 
(ti
mi
ng
 at
ta
ck
s) 
in 
o
rd
er
 
to
 i
nf
er
 ta
pe
d 
te
xt
's 
co
n
te
nt
 a
n
d 
n
at
ur
e 
in 
a 
w
ay
 to
 p
ut
 u
p 
fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e 
a 
pa
ss
w
or
d.
 
N
ot
 o
n
ly
 m
u
st
 t
he
 
at
ta
ck
er
s 
kn
ow
 th
e 
co
rr
ec
t 
pa
ss
w
or
d,
 b
ut
 
th
ey
 m
u
st
 a
lso
 b
e 
ab
le
 
ta
 r
ep
ro
du
ce
 th
e 
u
se
r'
s 
ra
te
 o
f t
yp
in
g 
an
d 
in
te
rv
al
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
le
tte
rs
. 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
Is
su
es
 
(1 
=
 
m
in
; 5
= 
m
ax
) 
2 It 
m
ig
ht
 in
tr
ud
e 
o
n
 
o
n
e
's
 p
ri
v
a
c
y 
(d
at
a 
c
o
n
fi
de
nt
ia
lit
y)
. 
44
4

 
C
os
t (
CA
D$
) 
$4
5 
(k
ey
bo
ar
d)
 
Fr
e
e
 s
o
ft
w
ar
e 
is 
a
v
a
ila
bl
e.
 
A
cc
ur
ac
y 
L
im
ite
d 
u
se
 f
or
 
pr
of
es
si
on
al
 
a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 d
ue
 to
 a
n
 
in
su
ff
ic
ie
nt
 a
c
c
u
ra
c
y.
 
1 G
en
er
at
or
: 
16
. 
IR
IS
 R
E
C
O
G
N
IT
IO
N
 (I
R)
 
C
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
n	
 
D
ef
in
it
io
n 
B
io
m
et
ri
es
	 
T
he
 c
o
lo
re
d 
pa
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
e
ye
 b
ou
nd
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
pu
pi
l 
is
 t
he
 i
ri
s,
 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
e
x
tr
em
el
y 
ri
ch
 i
n 
te
xt
ur
e.
 
C
U
IT
en
t c
o
m
m
e
rc
ia
l 
s
ys
te
m
s 
re
qu
ir
e 
u
s
e
rs
 
to
 p
os
it
io
n 
th
ei
r 
e
ye
s 
w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
fi
el
d 
o
f 
v
ie
w
 o
f a
 s
in
gl
e 
n
a
IT
ow
-a
ng
le
 c
a
m
e
ra
. 
P
hy
si
ol
og
ic
al
 
c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
c 
H
um
an
 v
s.
 A
ut
om
at
is
m
	 
U
sa
bi
lit
y 
(1 
=
hu
m
an
 is
 b
et
te
r;	
 
(1 
=
 
m
in
; 
5=
 m
a
x
) 
5=
m
ae
hi
ne
 is
 b
et
te
r) 
4 
(1
0)
 
(A
cq
ui
sit
io
n 
de
v
ic
e
 
Pe
rs
on
al
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
o
r 
da
ta
 g
en
er
at
or
 
IS
 u
n
n
e
c
e
s
s
a
ry
. 
pr
es
en
te
d 
by
 t
he
 u
se
r:
 
C
ol
la
ti
ng
 m
a
y 
ta
ke
 
PI
N
, 
m
e
m
o
ry
 c
a
rd
, 
ti
m
e.
 
fi
ng
er
pr
in
t, 
e
tc
.) 
A
dv
an
ta
ge
s 
U
nc
ha
ng
ea
bl
e 
du
rin
g 
lif
et
im
e. 
U
ni
qu
e 
to
 in
di
vi
du
al
. 
Th
er
e 
is 
no
 e
la
sti
c 
di
sto
rti
on
 fr
om
 o
n
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
to
 t
he
 n
ex
t. 
N
o 
co
n
ta
ct
. 
Il 
cl
ai
m
ed
 a
n
d 
m
ay
 w
id
el
y 
be
lie
ve
d 
to
 b
e 
th
e 
m
o
st
 
ac
cu
ra
te
 b
io
m
et
ric
, 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 w
he
n 
it 
co
m
es
 
to
 F
A 
ra
te
s.
 I
ris
 h
as
 v
er
y 
fe
w 
FA
, a
n 
im
po
rta
nt
 
se
cu
rit
ya
sp
ec
t. 
To
ta
l T
ra
ns
ac
tio
n 
T
im
e 
(in
 se
c
o
n
ds
) (
W
oo
dw
ard
 
e
l 
a
l.,
 2
00
3) 
4-
12
 
Po
si
ti
ve
 
Id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
= 
5 
s
e
c
o
n
ds
 
E
nr
ol
lm
en
t=
 <
1 O
se
es
 
D
is
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 
IR
 r
e
qu
ir
es
 m
u
c
h 
u
s
e
r 
c
o
o
pe
ra
ti
on
 a
n
d 
c
o
m
pl
ex
 a
n
d 
e
x
pe
ns
iv
e 
in
pu
t 
de
vi
ce
s.
 
T
he
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 
ir
is
 a
u
th
en
ti
ca
ti
on
 
m
a
y 
be
 i
m
pa
ir
ed
 b
y 
gl
as
se
s,
 s
u
n
gl
as
se
s,
 
a
n
d 
c
o
n
ta
ct
 l
en
se
s.
 
In
du
st
ria
1 
A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
V
er
y 
lim
ite
d 
a
e
e
e
pt
an
ce
. 
iC
am
TD
 1
00
 
(Ir
ite
ch
) 1
55
. 
IR
 m
ig
ht
 b
e 
m
o
re
 
re
a
di
ly
 a
c
c
e
pt
ed
 d
ue
 to
 
th
e 
fa
ct
 th
at
 th
er
e 
is 
n
o
 
c
ri
m
in
al
 a
ss
o
c
ia
tio
n.
 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
(1 
=
 
m
in
; 
5=
 m
a
x
) 
4 FO
I·g
er
ya
lm
os
t 
im
po
ss
ib
le
. 
Th
e 
fa
ct 
th
at
 th
e 
de
ci
sio
ns
 
m
ad
e 
by
 b
io
m
et
ric
s 
sy
st
em
s 
ca
n
 b
e 
u
se
d 
as
 
po
sit
iv
e 
pr
oo
fs
/d
en
ia
ls 
o
f 
an
 i
nd
iv
id
ua
l's
 
au
th
or
iz
at
io
n 
an
d 
lo
r 
pr
es
en
ce
 a
t 
a 
se
n
so
r 
ra
ise
s 
se
rio
us
 q
ue
st
io
ns
 a
bo
ut
 
in
te
gr
ity
 o
f t
he
 o
v
er
al
l 
bi
om
et
ric
s 
sy
ste
m
s. 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
Is
su
es
 
(1
= 
m
in
; 
5=
 m
a
x
) 
2 It 
m
ig
ht
 i
nt
ru
de
 o
n
 
o
n
e
's
 p
ri
va
cy
 (d
at
a 
c
o
n
fi
de
nt
ia
li
ty
). 
44
5

 
C
os
t (
CA
D
$)
 
$3
00
-7
00
 a
c
qu
is
iti
on
 
de
vi
ce
 
(S
mi
th
, 2
00
2)
 
T
he
 c
o
st
 o
f 
a 
bi
om
et
ri
c 
se
n
so
r 
is 
qu
ite
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 
fr
om
 th
e 
to
ta
l c
o
st
 o
f 
o
w
n
e
rs
hi
p 
(se
ns
or
 
m
a
in
te
na
nc
e 
c
o
st
 ,
 
c
o
st
s 
o
f r
u
n
n
in
g 
th
e 
fa
ci
lit
y,
 
tr
ai
ni
ng
, a
n
d 
o
th
er
 
re
la
te
d 
c
o
st
s 
) .
 
Il
 
de
pe
nd
s 
o
n
 t
he
 
m
a
gn
itu
de
 o
fe
a
c
h 
a
pp
lic
at
io
n.
 
A
cc
ur
ac
y 
Ev
al
ua
tio
n 
M
et
ho
d:
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 
(B
oll
e e
t 
a
l.,
 2
00
4).
 F
al
se
 
R
eje
ct 
2 
to
 1
0 
in 
10
0 
(2-
10
%)
 
Fa
lse
 A
cc
ep
t: 
~ 
10
.5 
(0.
00
1%
). 
15
5 
Iri
s 
ID
 <
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.ir
isi
d.
co
m
/p
s/p
ro
du
ct
s/i
ca
m
_t
dI
O
O
.h
tm
> 
1 
44
6 
G
en
er
at
or
: 
17
. 
R
E
T
IN
A
 R
E
C
O
G
N
IT
IO
N
 (R
R)
 
C
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
n 
B
io
m
et
ri
es
 
Hu
m
an
 v
s.
 A
ut
om
ati
sm
 
( 1
=
hu
m
an
 is
 b
ett
er
; 
5=
m
ac
hi
ne
 is
 b
ett
er
) 
(A
cq
ui
si
tio
n 
de
vi
ce
 
o
r 
da
ta
 g
en
er
at
or
 
pr
es
en
te
d 
by
 t
he
 u
s
e
r:
 
P
IN
, 
m
e
m
o
ry
 c
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 b
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 b
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c
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c
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c
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c
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os
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r c
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r c
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D
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 c
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APPENDIX B
 
DATA GATHERING
 
8.1 Introduction 
Data gathering has been developed through a combination of primary, 
secondary, and tertiary data as follows: 
•	 The primary data have been gathered from observations, and feedback derived 
mostly from personal communications with experts within the field of Hel 
and HCISec as below. This thesis had as one of its goals to understand the 
user authentication process, and the attitudes and behavior of users. 
o	 Professor Dr. Bonnie E. John
 
Pittsburgh, PA (USA)
 
http://www.cs.cmu .edu/~bej/
 
CogTool
 
http://cogtool.hci i. cs .cmu.edu/
 
o	 Professor Dr. Audun Josang
 
Kjel1er, Norway
 
http://persons.un ik.no/j osang/
 
o	 Professor Dr. Rick Smith 
Hastings, MN (USA) 
http://www.cryptosmith.com/about 
Authentication: From Passwords to Public Keys (Smith, 2002) 
•	 The secondaI)' data have been gathered from journal articles, scientific papers, 
review articles, Iiterature reviews, dissertations, and theses in HCI and 
HCISec as indicated in the References section. 
453 
•	 The tertiary data have been in turn gathered from standards developed by 
research institutions and private organizations such as International 
Organization for Standardization (I SO)/International Electro-technical 
Commission (lEC) norms and standards: (IEEE 802.11, 1999), (IEEE 1061, 
1998), (ISO 13407, 1999), (ISO/lEC 7816, 1998), (ISO/lEC 9126, 2004), 
(ISO 9241-11, 1998), scientific journal articles, proceedings of meetings, 
conferences and symposia, technical reports, and graduate dissertations as 
indicated in the References section. The following international norms and 
standards have been researched as below: 
[S03407:99: Human Centred Design Processesfor Interactive Systems: 
This standard ex plains human-centred design processes for interactive 
systems, and proposes four categories of human-centred design activities: 
•	 Understand and specify the context ofuse 
•	 Specify the user and organizational requirements 
•	 Produce design solutions 
• Evaluate designs against requirements. 
1S09126: Parts Dl, 02. 04: Software Engineering - Product Quality - Part 1: 
Quality ModeIISO/1EC 9126-1:2001 Edition 1; (2001): 
Parts l, 2, and 4 illustrates a two-component model for software product 
quality: i) Internai quality and external quality, and ii) Quality In use. 
"Briefly, internai quality concerns properties of the non-executable portion of 
a software product during ils development. and metrics for internai quality 
general/y concern the quality oflntermediate deliverables, such as the source 
code for a prototype version. ln contrast, external qualify concerns the 
behavior of the computer system ol which the software product is a part. " 
(Seffah and Donyaee, 1998). ln i), the model determines six characteristics for 
internaI and external quality, which are further subdivided into sub 
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characteristics; whereas in ii) the model detennines four quality in use 
characteristics. Quality in use is the combined result for the user of the six 
software product quality characteristics. The following have been investigated 
and employed on this dissertation in terms of user's perspective, that lS, 
usability: 
•	 In "Quality Model for extemal and internaI quality", item 6.3 
Usability: Understandability, Learnability, Operability, and Usability 
Compliance. 
Sorne important questions to be asked are: 
•	 Is the UI intuitive? 
•	 Is it easy to perfonn easy operations? 
•	 Is it feasible to perform difficult operations? 
•	 Does the authentication method give sensible error messages? 
•	 Is the UI self-explanatory/ self-documenting? 
• Is the UI responsive or too slow? 
Software engineering - Produet Quality - Part 3: Internai metries ISOIIEC 
TR 9126-3:2003: 
The internaI metrics might be applied to a non-executable software product 
during its development stages (e.g. requirements definition, design 
specification, etc.). InternaI metrics provide us the ability to measure the 
quality of the intermediate deliverables and thus predict the quality of the final 
product. This enables us to identify quality issues and make corrective action 
as early as possible in the deveJopment life cycle. This thesis makes use of 
the jimetionality metrics (security metrics), usabi/ity metrics 
(understandability metrics, leamability metrics, operability metrics, 
operability metrics, attractiveness metrics, and usability compliance metrics), 
portability metrics (adaptability metrics, instability metrics, and portability 
compliance metrics). 
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Produet quality - Part 4: Quality in use metries IS011EC TR 9126-4:2004:
 
Part 4 explains the measures that may be employed to specify or evaluate the
 
impact of the use of the software when operated by the user. The lSO/IEC TR
 
9126-4 can be broken up into three factors such as effectiveness (i.e.,
 
usefulness), productivity, and safety. Only the effectiveness (e.g. task
 
comp1etion, error frequency) and productivity (e.g., task time, task efficiency,
 
relative user efficiency) factors have been considered in this thesis work.
 
"EfJeetiveness metries assess the tasks performed by users achieve specifled 
goals with accuraey and eompleteness in a specified context of use. They do 
not take aceount ofhow the goals were achieved, only the extent ta which they 
were achieve n. Productivity metries assess the resources that users consume 
in relation ta the effectiveness aehieved in a specifled context ofuse. The most 
cammon resource is time ta complete the task, although other relevant 
resources could include the user 's effort, materials or the .finaneial cast of 
usage n. 
IS09241-11:98: Ergonomie Requirements for Office Work with Visual 
Display Terminais (VDTS - PART II: GUIDANCE ON USAB1LJTYj 
lS0924l-l1:98, PART II defines usability in terms of efficiency, 
effectiveness, user satisfaction, and whether specific goals can be achieved in 
a specified context of use. "Usability is defined as the extent ta which a 
product can be used by speeified users to aehieve speeifled goals with 
elfeetiveness, ejjicieney and sati~faetion ln a speei/ied eontext of use. 
Effectiveness is the accuracy and completeness with which users achieve 
particular goals. Efficiency in turn is related to the resources spent in relation 
to the accuracy and completeness with whicb users achieve goals. FinaJ1y, 
satisfaction is the freedom from discomfort, and positive attitudes towards the 
use of the product. 
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It is important to highlight that the framework of (IS09241-11:98) may be 
used to identify the aspects of usability and the components of the context of 
use to be taken into account when designing, specifying or evaluating the 
usability of the authentication method. The performance (efJectiveness and 
efficiency) and satisfaction of the users may be used to measure the extent to 
which a product is usable in a particular context. "Measures of the 
performance and satisfaction of the users can provide a basis for the 
cornparison of the relative usability 0/ products with different technical 
characteristics which are used in the sarne context". As a matter of fact, 
effectiveness and satisfaction factors are more appropriate to be employed to 
authentication methods. 
To specify and measure the usability of the authentication methods through 
the task scenario identified beneath the prototype phase, the following 
sections have been employed within the norm (lS09241-1 1:98) as basis for 
this research work: "5 Specifying and Measuring the Usability of Products", 
"Specification and Evaluation of Usability during Design", and "Specifying 
and measuring a Work System in Use". 
APPENDIX C
 
CHECKLIST DEVELOPMENT
 
C.l Introduction 
Checklists are valuable evaluation instrument when carefully developed, 
validated, and applied. A sound evaluation checklist clarifies the criteria that at least 
should be considered when evaluating something in a particular area; aids the 
evaluator not to forget important criteria; and enhances the assessment's objectivity, 
credibility, and reproducibility. Moreover, such a checklist is useful in planning an 
enterprise, monitoring and guiding its operation, and assessing its outcomes. ln the 
evaluation dialect, checklists are useful for both formative and summative 
evaluations. 
Checklists development Checklist (CDC) (Stuftlebeam, 2000): 
1. Focus the checklist task:
 
Define the content area of interest.
 
Define the checklist's intended uses.
 
Reflect on and draw upon pertinent training and experience.
 
Study the relevant Iiterature.
 
Engage and have conversations with experts in the content area.
 
Clarify and justify the criteria to be met by the checklist (e.g., pertinence,
 
comprehensiveness, clarity, concreteness, ease of use, parsimony, applicability to the
 
fu]] range of intended uses, and fairness).
 
2. Make a candidate list of checkpoints:
 
List descriptors for well-established criteria of merit.
 
Briefly define each of the initial checkpoints.
 
Add descriptors for checkpoints needed to round out a definition of merit for the
 
content area.
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Provide definitions for each of the added descriptors. 
3. Classify and sort the checkpoints: 
Write each descriptor and definition on a separate 4" x 6" card 
Sort the cards in search of categories 
Identify the main candidate categories and label each category 
4. Define and flesh out the categories 
Define each category and its key concepts and terms 
Write a rationale for each category 
Present relevant wamings about being overzealous in applying the checkpoint 
Review the checkpoints in each category for inclusiveness, clarity, and parsimony 
Add, subtract, and rewrite checkpoints as appropriate 
5. Determine the order of categories 
Decide if order is an important consideration regarding the intended uses of the 
checklist 
If so, write a rationale for the preferred order 
Provide an ordering of the categories 
6. Obtain initial reviews of the checklist 
Prepare a review version of the checklist 
Engage potential users to review and critique the checklist 
Interview the critics to gain an in-depth understanding of their concerns and 
suggestions 
List the issues in need of attention 
7. Revise the checklist content 
Examine and decide how to address the identified issues 
Rewrite the checklist content 
8. Delineate and format the checklist to serve the intended uses 
Determine with potential users whether category and/or total scores are needed or 
desired 
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Determine with users what needs exist regarding differentiaJ weighting of categories 
and/or individual checkpoints 
Determine with users any checkpoints or categories of checkpoints that must be 
passed for a satisfactory score on the overall checklist 
Determine with users what needs exist regarding profiling of checklist results 
Format the checklist based on the above determinations 
9. Evaluate the checklist 
Obtain reviews of the checklist from intended users and relevant experts 
Engage intended users to field-test the checklist 
Generally, assess wh ether the checklist meets the requirements of pertinence, 
comprehensiveness, clarity, applicabi litYto the full range of intended uses, 
concreteness, parsimony, ease of use, and fairness 
10. Finalize the checklist 
Systematically consider and address the review and field-test findings 
Print the finalized checklist 
Il. Apply and disseminate the checklist 
Apply the checklist to its intended use 
Make the checklist available via such means as joumals, professional papers, web 
pages, etc. 
Invite users to provide feedback to the developer 
12. Periodically review and revise the checklist 
Use ail available feedback to review and improve the checklist at appropriate 
intervals. 
APPENDIX D
 
USABLE SECURITY PROTOCOL (USP) REUSE METHODOLOGY
 
D.l Introduction 
The USP reuse methodology provides you the capability to reuse its design 
artifacts so then you can customize the design of your own products and/or services. 
As already mentioned, when reuse is implemented at low granularity Jevel, it can 
assist in shrinking the product development process wastes (Gautam et al., 2007) and 
fasten the go-to-market strategy. 
D.2 Design Artifacts for Reuse 
Reusing USS is straightforward, you basically replace the USS keys (e.g. 
(usabilityCriterion_n)) with you own parameters. The USS keys are pretty much 
descriptive as shown in the system's design artifacts below. 
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APPENDIX E 
THE GOMS FAMILY: WHICH TECHNIQUE TO USE? 
E. 1 NGOMSL versus CPM-GOMS, KLM, and CMN-GOMS 
The basic difference between execution time predictions for NGOMSL, KLM 
and CMN-GOMS is how time is assigned to cognitive and perceptual operators. 
Actually the differences relate to how large mental operators are supposed. For 
example, the NGOMSL has more M (Mental)-like operators than do the CMN­
GOMS and KLM models. A more important difference is in the character of the 
unobservable operators. There are essentially two types of operators: the ones directly 
observable when looking al human performance (i.e., motor operators) and those that 
are not or usually not observable (i.e., perceptual and cognitive operators such as eye­
movements). The KLM has a particular basic M operator that comes first each cognitive 
unit of action. NGOMSL, because it is founded on Cognitive Complexity Theory (CCT), 
constantly demands some cognitive execution lime for every slep, manipulaling goals and 
working memory, and for enlering and leaving melhods. On the other side, CMN-GOMS 
allocates no time to such cognitive overhead. But aIl three models include M-like 
operators for substantial time-consuming mental actions such as finding information 
on the screen and checking entries. As shown in Table E-l, each version of GOMS is 
applicable for specifie types of tasks and for getting particular types of information. 
The KLM and CMN-GOMS are the original models developed by Card et al. (1983). 
KLM characterizes task perfonnance as a sequence of low-Ievel operators and offers 
quantitative assessments of task performance times. CMN-GOMS requires a strict 
goal-method-operation-selection rules structure. Natural GO MS Language as aJready 
stressed in this section is an extension of CMN-GOMS that illustrates tasks in 
English-like statements. Finally, the Critical Path Method (or Cognitive, Perceptual, 
467 
Motor) GOMS (CPM-GOMS) (Gray et a/., 1993) extends GOMS analysis to tasks 
perfonned concurrently. The critical path in a schedule chart provides the prediction 
of total task time (John and Kieras, 1996; John and Kieras, 1996a). 
GOMS Description Design Information
 
Model Obtained
 
Card Moran and Original formulation of Operator sequences, execution 
Newell (CMN) GOMS. times and error recovery for 
GOMS sequential tasks. 
Keystroke-Leve] List of keystrokes and mouse Execution times and error 
Model (KLM) movements to perform a task. recovery for sequential tasks. 
Natural GOMS Procedure for identifying ail Functionality consistency, 
Language GOMS components expressed operator sequences, execution 
in a programming language.	 times, procedure leaming 
times, and error recovery for 
sequential tasks. 
Critical Path GOMS applied to tasks Operator sequences, execution 
Method (or performed in parallel, uses times, and error recovery for 
Cognitive, cognitive, perceptual, and sequential and paralJel tasks. 
Perceptual, motor opera tors 
Motor) GOMS (Card et al., 1983), in which 
the sequential dependencies 
between the user's perceptual, 
cognitive, and motor processes 
are mapped out in a schedule 
chart, whose critical path 
predicts the execution time. 
Table E-I : Summary of different versions of GOMS models. Adapted from John and 
Kieras (1996). 
E.2 GOMS Models Comparative Analysis 
The search and selection process to detennine the most adequate GOMS model 
with regards to the cognitive task analysis is the following: 
•	 Perform extensive research on ail GOMS models. 
•	 Narrow down the two most relevant GOMS models: CPM-GOMS and 
NGOMSL. 
•	 Develop a comparative analysis of the CPM-GOMS and NGOMSL models. 
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•	 Demonstrate the advantages of using NGOMSL model over CPM-GOMS as 
shown in Table E-2. 
•	 Adopt the most relevant model for this thesis research. 
NGOMSL Modei	 CPM-GOMS Model 
•	 Information about leaming time is provided No learning time 
only by NGOMSL model, and predictions cover predictions. Aiso relatively 
the time to leam the methods in the GOMS unspecified multiple 
model and any LTM information they requ ire. parai lei processor 
•	 NGOMSL is the only method of the four architecture in CPM­
GOMS techniques (KLM, CMN-GOMS, GOMS. 
NGOMSL, and CPM-GOMS) that makes 
leaming time predictions. These predictions are 
limited to the effects of the amount of 
procedural knowledge and related LTM 
information to be leamed, and to learning 
situations for which the coefficients have been 
empirically determined. 
•	 The relationship between the NGOMSL
 
notation and the CCT architecture is direct:
 
there is a one-to-one relationship between
 
statements in the NGOMSL language and the
 
production rules for a GOMS model written in
 
the CCT format. Therefore, the CCT prediction
 
results can be used by the NGOMSL model to
 
estimate not only execution time like KLM and
 
CMN-GOMS, but also the time to leam the
 
procedures.
 
•	 Information can be gathered about functional No such consistency
 
consistency by comparing methods and the functionality is present in
 
knowledge necessary to carry out diverse CPM-GOMS.
 
commands. NGOMSL is mainly appropriate to
 
an analysis of consistency, because the structure
 
and content ofNGOMSL methods can be
 
inspected, and the Jearning time predictions of
 
NGOMSL take this form of consistency into
 
account. That is, a consistent interface is one in
 
which the same methods are used throughout for
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the same or similar goals, resulting in fewer 
methods to be learned (Kieras, 1996). ln fact, 
transfer of training effects can be calculated by 
deducting the number ofNGOMSL statements 
in methods that are similar, to ones already 
known to the learner (Bovair et al., 1990). This 
categorization of interface consistency in terms 
of the quantitative transferability of procedural 
knowledge is possibly the most significant 
contribution of the CCT research and the 
NGOMSL technique (John and Kieras, 1996). 
•	 NGOMSL includes a more rigorous set of mies for No rigorous set of rules 
identifying the GOMS components and information 
such as the number of steps in a method, how goals 
are set and terminated, what information needs to be 
remembered while performing the task. 
•	 Because NGOMSL models specify methods in • CPM-GOMS predicts 
program form, they can characterize the only execution time 
procedural complexity of tasks, both in terrns of based on an analysis of 
how much must be learned, and how much has component activities. It 
to be executed. NGOMSL provides predictions doesn 't provide Pure 
of operator sequence, execution time, and time Learning Time. 
to leam the methods. • In addition, it's difficult 
•	 An additional component of the Pure Learning to use CPM-GOMS 
Time is the time required to memorize chunks of models due to the 
declarative information required by the intrinsic difficulty of 
methods, such as the menu names under which identifying and 
commands are found. The total learning time describing in detail how 
consists of the time to execute the training tasks pcrceptual, cognitive, 
plus the extra time required to learn how to and motor processing 
perform the tasks (i.e. the pure learning time). activities are 
coordinated in time. ­
CPM-GOMS model 
significantly 
underpredicts the 
execution time related 
to the other models. 
According to Kieras 
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Elaborated sequential architecture with a working 
memory and specified procedure knowledge 
representation. 
NGOMSL technique currently involves more M 
(mental)-like operators than CPM-GOMS, as weil as 
some cognitive overhead due to method step 
execution. 
NGOMSL takes time for the unobservable activity 
related to the production-ru le cycling assumed in the 
basic architecture and represented with the 0.1 
sec/statement cognitive overhead. 
(1994) this is to the 
conjecture of extreme 
expertise in the current 
CPM-GOMS technique: 
. .
uSll1g maxImum 
operator overlapping, 
tiner-grain time 
estimates for the 
individual operators, 
and assuming the 
minimum of cognitive 
activity allowed by the 
MHP. 
Powerful cognitive 
architecture but reJatively 
unspecified multiple 
parallel processor 
architecture. 
The main distinction with 
NGOMSL (and other 
GOMS models as weil) is 
that CPM-GOMS does not 
include M-Jike operators; it 
does not include any 
substantial cognitive 
activity associated with 
selection of methods or 
complex decisions in the 
case of the extreme 
expertise. Such cognitive 
activity is represented in 
the other GOMS variants 
with M-like operators of 
about a second in duration. 
CPM-GOMS does not take 
into account unobservable 
activity. 
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Since NGOMSL is founded on CCT, it has particular 
properties that make it unique. CCT not only gives 
estimations for execution times, but also predicts 
leaming time. NGOMSL represents methods in terms 
of a cognitive architecture that is CCT. CCT has been 
shown to provide good predictions of execution time, 
leaming time, and transfer of procedure learning 
(Bovair et al., 1990). 
CCT and NGOMSL model have bcen empirically 
validated at the keystroke-level of analysis (operators 
like DETERMINE-POSITION and CLICK-MOUSE­
BUTTON), therefore, models at that level can generate 
reliable quantitative estimates. In theory, other levels 
could be researched and empirically validated, but 
this has not yet been done (Kieras, 1996). 
There are also differences in the distribution of 
mental time. The KLM has a tendency to place 
mental time in the preparation for action, while 
CMN-GOMS mental time tends to come at the end of 
actions in VERIFY operators, and NGOMSL has 
mental time in both places. 
The GOMS family consists oftask analysis techniques that 
are related to models ofhuman information processing. 
Current research involves additional computational 
cognitive architectures, but only CCT is shown as a 
"ready-to-use" technique. Only CCT, a production-ru le 
architecture based on the seriai stage model, has been used 
as the basis for a specifie GOMS technique, NGOMSL, 
which incorporates CCT's assumptions about working 
lt is based directly on MHP 
(Card et a/., 1983), which 
is a cognitive modeling 
method used to calculate 
how long it takes to 
perfonn a certain task. As 
mentioned CPM-GOMS 
doesn't provide learning 
time, and learning transfer. 
Not empirically validated. 
Duration and dependencies 
of unobservabJe operators 
are specified in the 
templates used to construct 
the CPM-GOMS mode!. 
However, the other 
opera tors needed to 
accomplish a task and their 
dependencies make every 
critical path different, and 
no one estimate of "mental 
time" is meaningful in 
CPM-GOMS (John and 
Kieras, 1996). 
CPM-GOMS does not include 
assumptions about working 
memory management, flow of 
control, and other 
architectural mechanisms. 
CPM-GOMS is too academic 
and complex. 
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memory management, flow of control, and other 
architectural mechanisms. 
Information can be obtained about functional consistency No functional consistency. 
by comparing methods and the knowledge necessary to 
perform different commands. NGOMSL is particularly 
suited to an analysis of consistency, because the structure 
and content ofNGOMSL methods can be inspected, and the 
learning time predictions ofNGOMSL take this form of 
consistency into account. That is, a consistent interface is 
one in which the same methods are used throughout for the 
same or similar goals, resulting in fewer methods to be 
leamed. 
User authentication tasks are essentially seriai tasks so CPM-GOMS models are too 
NGOMSL is the most relevant and simpler GOMS model detai led for tasks that can bc 
for that particular type oftasks. usefully approximated by 
seriai opera tors (Kieras, 
1994). 
Non-expert behavior for leaming time. CPM-GOMS model makes an 
assumption of extreme 
expertise in the user. That is, 
they usuany model 
performance that has been 
optimized to proceed as fast 
as the MHP and information­
flow dependencics will allow. 
The user is extremely 
experienced and executes the 
task as rapidly as the MHP 
architecture permits. 
Table E-2: The advantages ofusing NGOMSL over CPM-GOMS. 
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E.3. Why GOMS Model When Compared With Other CTAs I56? 
The GOMS task analysis method has been offered as a valuable method for 
comparing different design solutions to the same user interface problem (John and 
Kieras, 1994; John and Kieras, 1996). The approach is restricted to a comparison of 
performance times for error-free expert execution of everyday (i.e. skill-level) tasks. 
On the other hand such analysis of learning and execution times involved in 
NGOMSL model which is the one used in this thesis, can be of value, particularly 
when analyzing user interaction within demanding and complex computer security 
applications including authentication tasks. Despite of the usefulness of the GOMS 
model for comparison purposes, this thesis explores the applicability of GOMS 
analysis, more specifically NGOMSL, to understand and identify the cognitive 
processes involved in user authentication and also investigate its programming-like 
capabilities for future work. This thesis is focused on NGOMSL as it assures to yield 
a thorough analysis of interaction which has a psychological basis, which in turn, 
relates strictly to the Cognitive Axis of this research work. 
But why exactly the GOMS task analysis was chosen 111 relation to other 
existent cognitive task analysis? As a matter of fact carrying out a GOMS analysis 
involves defining and then describing in a formaI notation the user's Goals, 
Operators, Methods, and Selection Rules. Most of the work seems to be in defining 
the Goals and Methods. That is, the Operators are mostIy determined by the hardware 
and lowest-Ievel software of the system, such as whether it has a mouse, for example. 
Thus the Operators are fairly easy to define. The Selection Rules can be subtle, but 
usually they are involved only when there are clear multiple methods for the same 
156 Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) identifies aspecls of system design that place heavy demands on 
lhe user's cognitive resources including memory, attention, and decision-making. Il is used 10 
determine the thought processes lhal users follow 10 perform lasks al various levels, from novice 10 
expert. 
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goal. In a good design, it is dear when each method should be used, so defining the 
Selection Rules is relatively easy as weIl. 
Identifying and defining the user's goals is often difficult, because you must 
examine the task that the user is trying to accomplish in sorne detail, often going 
beyond just the specifie system to the context in which the system is being used. This 
is especially important in designing a new system, because a good design is one that 
fits not just the task considered in isolation, but also how the system will be used in 
the user's job context. 
Once a Goal is defined, the corresponding method can be simple to define 
because it is simply the answer to the question "how do you do it on this system?" 
The system design itself determines what the methods are (John and Kieras, 1994). 
A task description describes a generic task in terms of the goal to be 
accomplished, the situation information required ta specify the goal, and the auxiliary 
information required to accomplish the goal that might be involved in bypassing 
descriptions of complex processes. Thus, the task description is essentially the 
"parameter list" for the methods that perform the task. 
Example: A sampIe task description for deJeting text with a certain word 
processor contains the following items: 
• the goal is to dei ete a piece of arbitrary text; 
• the starting location of the text; 
• the ending location of the text; 
• a find string for locating the beginning of the text. 
E.3.1 Characterizing the User's Tasks 
Although user tasks can be characterized 10 many different ways, three 
dimensions are important for deciding whether a GOMS analysis technique is 
applicable and most suitable to the user's task: the degree of "routinized" ski]] 
involved in the user's task, the "sequentiality" of the user's task, and the degree to 
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which the interaction is under the control of the user versus the computer system or 
other agents involved in the task (John and Kieras, 1996). 
E.3.1.1 Locus of Control 
Computer system tasks can be roughly categorized into passive-system tasks 
and active-system tasks. ln passive-system tasks, the user has control over the pace 
and timing of task events; the computer simply sits and waits for inputs from the user 
(e.g. text editing in username and password fields). In active-system tasks, the system 
can produce spontaneous, asynchronous events outside of the user's control. Thus the 
user must be prepared to react to the system, which can also include other people who 
are providing information or making requests. 
E.3.1.2 Goal-Directness 
Many computer applications today are to support work-related goals: find 
information, do analyses, produce reports, and so on. In these examples, the user has 
a task goal and the application should support that goal as efficiently as possible, both 
in terms of leaming how to accomplish the goal and in essentially accomplishing the 
goal. Nevertheless, sorne applications are Jess goal-directed, like an electronic 
magazine through which a user wou Id browse primarily for entertainment as opposed 
to trying to find an article for example about a particular security breach. 
E.3.1.3 Skill Dimension of Tasks 
The skill dimension of tasks goes from one extreme of problem-solving, where 
the user does not know how to perform a task and must search for a solution, to 
routine cognitive skill, where the user knows precisely what to do in the task situation 
and merely has to identify that situation and perform the appropriate actions. The 
existing GOMS techniques apply only to the routine end of this dimension. 
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E.3.1.4 Sequential Versus Parallel Activity 
Several HCI tasks can be handily approximated as sequential application of 
operators, such as text-editing. However other tasks entail so much overlapping and 
paral1el activities that this simplification does not usefully approximate the task, as in 
the telephone operator tasks analyzed by Gray et al. (1993). Although this is currently 
only applicable to CPM-GOMS, in reality a parallel case, it is important to consider 
when a task involving sorne parallel operations can be helpfully approximated by a 
sequential mode!. Sometimes parallel operations can be represented as a simple 
modification to the sequential mode!. For example, it is rationally necessary that users 
must visually locate an object before they point at it with a mouse. In a sequential 
analysis, there would be an operator such as VISUALLY-LOCATE-OBJECT 
followed by a POINT-TO-OBJECT operator. But practiced users can locate a fixed 
object on the screen (e.g., the password field) while pointing at it with a mouse, 
meaning that these two operators can execute in para Ile!. 
E.4 Why GOMS? 
Since the introduction of The Psychology of Human-Computer Interaction by 
Card et al. (1983), the GOMS model has been a leading theory in cognitive modeling 
and has been cal1ed the most mature engineering model of human performance. 
GOMS is one of the most validated methods in Human Computer Interaction (HCI). 
GOMS models continue to be applied to the evaluation of software systems, and it 
remains an active area of scientific research. Kieras et al. (1995) lists many 
successful applications of GOMS to practical design problems. 
The GOMS task analysis method has been provided as a valuable method for 
comparing different design solutions to the same user interface problem (John and 
Kieras, 1994; John and Kieras, 1996). The approach is restricted to a comparison of 
performance times for error-free expert execution of everyday (i.e. skill-level) tasks. 
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Conversely such analysis of leaming and execution times involved in NGOMSL 
model can be of value, particularly when analyzing user interaction within demanding 
and complex computer security applications including authentication tasks. Despite 
of the usefulness of the GOMS model for comparison purposes, this thesis explores 
the applicability of GOMS analysis, more specifically NGOMSL, to understand and 
identify the cognitive processes involved in user authentication and also investigate 
and partially implement its programming-like capabilities for future work. In a 
nutshel1, this thesis is interested in NGOMSL as it assures to yield a thorough 
analysis of the user interaction which has a psychological basis, which in tum, relates 
strictly to the cognitive axis of this research work. 
Sorne important benefits of using GOMS model are the following: 
•	 Provide a step-by-step description of how users interact with your system, 
software, etc. 
•	 Predict time needed to complete tasks/goals. 
•	 Do systematic task analysis - use GOMS tasks in studies with real people. 
•	 Use GOMS to speed up iterations ofnew UI designs. 
•	 Evaluate an existing system through a GOMS analysis. 
•	 Write something for expert users who can't be bothered to help test the 
software. 
GOMS is based on the Model of Human Processor (MHP) (Card et al., 1983) 
which makes GOMS truly appropriate and relevant for the cognitive computing 
subject matter. As mentioned, the MHP model is a cognitive modeling method used 
to calculate how long it takes to perform a certain task. This engineering approach 
produces a simple model that could generate quantitative predictions for human 
performance and help designers make low-Ievel design decisions. This model 
integrates psychological knowledge of human perception and performance with the 
design process and translated those findings to a form suitable for HCI analysis. 
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GOMS models can foresee the procedural aspects of usability. These concern 
the amount, consistency, and effectiveness of the procedures that users must follow. 
Since the usability of many systems depends c10sely on the straightforwardness and 
effectiveness of the procedures, GOMS model has significant value in guiding 
interface design. The reason why GOMS models can foresee these aspects of 
usability is that the methods for accomplishing user goals tend to be tightly 
constrained by the design of the interface, making it doable to build a GOMS model 
given just the interface design, previous to any prototyping or user testing. 
Finally, data on real tasks at this level of complexity which encompasses 
computer security tasks is expensive to obtain and likely to be problematic for model 
validation. 
E.4.1 During Design - GOMS Analysis Guiding the Design 
As stated by Diaper and Stanton (2003), rather than analyze an existing or 
specified design, the interface could be designed concurrently with describing the 
GOMS mode!. That is, by starting with listing the user's top-Ievel goals, then defining 
the top-Ievel methods for these goals, and then going on to the sub-goals and sub­
methods, one is in a position to make decisions about the design of the user interface 
directly in the context of what the impact is on the user. For example, bad design 
choices may be immediately revealed as generating inconsistent, complex methods, 
leading the designer quickly into considering better alternatives. Clearly, this 
approach is possible only if the designer and analyst are closely cooperating, or is the 
same person. 
Additionally, there is little difference in the approach to GOMS analysis 
between doing it during the design process and doing it afler. Doing the analysis 
during the design means that the analyst and designer are making design decisions 
about what the goals and methods should be, and then immediately describing them 
in the GOMS modeJ. Doing the analysis afler the system is designed means that the 
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analyst is trying to detennine the design decisions that were made, sometime in the 
past, and then describing them in a GOMS mode!. For example, instead of 
determining and describing how the user does a recall_password within an existing 
RBA authentication method, the designer-analyst decides and describes how the user 
will do it. It seems clear that the reliability of the analysis would be better if it is done 
during the design process, but the overall logic is the same in both cases. 
